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Abstract 
 
 
From the middle of the 1880s until the commencement of the Great War 1914-’18 the 
first-class cruiser was an vital component of the British battlefleet. This was a period in 
which technology and tactics evolved at an extremely rapid pace, forming the material 
basis for Sir John Fisher’s ‘Dreadnought Revolution’, in which cruiser qualities of 
speed, range and offensive power were greatly prized. Throughout this era enormous 
sums were spent on such types: they were frequently longer than and cost almost as 
much as their battleship contemporaries, while carrying a near-equivalent armament and 
possessing significant advantages in both speed and endurance.  
 
Despite these capabilities, British first-class cruisers, especially those of the 1890s, are 
comparatively rarely examined by historians. This thesis fills the gap in the 
historiography by examining the place and development of the type in the Royal Navy 
from 1884-1909, and illustrates how they would progress from being a trade-defence 
vessel, to a genuine alternative to the battleship, and would ultimately form the basic 
inspiration for all of the service’s first all-big-gun capital ships. It begins by assessing 
the origins of the type in the mid-Victorian era and considers how the contemporary 
strategic position and materials drove vessel characteristics, resulting in the 
development of the first unofficially termed ‘battle-cruisers’ to counter the threat of a 
Franco-Russian guerre de course employing dedicated raiding types and armed high-
speed liners. Following a dramatic advance in the protective capacity of armour that 
occurred in the mid-1890s, it is shown how the first-class cruiser would gain a fighting 
ability at least equal to their battleship contemporaries in addition to their continued 
utility in the trade-defence role, and how latterly, these characteristics would become 
the cornerstone of Sir John Fisher’s planned radical transformation of the service in the 
first decade of the 20
th
 Century.  
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Introduction 
 
 
To date, relatively little has been written about the first-class cruisers of the late-Victorian 
era Royal Navy.1 Outside of design studies, references to the type have been mainly 
confined to sub-sections within texts on wider matters of strategy and national policy.2 
Mentions are frequently encountered in works on the Royal Navy during the First World 
War, but these tend principally to confine themselves to remarks upon the outdated nature 
of such vessels during the conflict. A typical example, in the context of the Jutland 
engagement, refers to ‘Sir Robert Arbuthnot, with three of his large, obsolescent armoured 
cruisers (the Grand Fleet’s own Funf Minuten squadron).’3 No major attempt at analysing 
the evolution of the type as a whole, or its significance for the British naval service prior to 
the Great War has yet been made. As a result, the belief that these first-class cruisers pre-
dating the famous big-gun armed types were of secondary importance in the development 
of the contemporary service persists.4 Yet an examination of the archival and published 
                                                     
1 The first major work is the recently published design-history by N. Friedman British Cruisers of the Victorian 
Era (Barnsley: Seaforth, 2012), which also covers 2nd & 3rd class types 
2 A. Marder The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 
1880-1905 (London: Frank Class & Co., 1964), D. Schurman The Education of a Navy: The 
Development of British Naval Strategic Thought 1867 – 1914 (London: Cassell, 1965),  J. Sumida In 
Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914 (London: 
Routledge, 1993), J. Beeler ‘Steam, Strategy and Schurman: Imperial Defence in the Post-Crimean Era, 
1856-1905’ in G. Kennedy and K. Neilson [eds.] Far Flung Lines: Studies in Imperial Defence in 
Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman (London: Routledge, 1996) N. Lambert Sir John Fisher’s 
Naval Revolution (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2002), R. Parkinson: The Late 
Victorian Navy: The Pre-Dreadnought Era and the Origins of the First World War (Woodbridge: The 
Boydell Press, 2008), S. Grimes Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918 (London: 
Boydell, 2012). Notable design studies include the aforementioned work by Friedman, with sections on 
the vessels to be found in D. Brown Warrior to Dreadnought: Warship development 1860-1905 
(London: Caxton, 2003), D. Brown The Grand Fleet: Warship Design and Development 1906-1922 
(London: Caxton, 2003),  R. Chesnau and E Kolesnik [eds.] Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships 
1860-1905 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 2002), Gray, R. [ed.] Conway’s All the World’s Fighting 
Ships 1906-1921 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1985) 
3 A. Gordon The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (London: John Murray, 1996) p.443 
Further examples may be found in G. Bennett The Battle of Jutland (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 
1999), G. Gordon ‘Jellicoe: Jutland, 1916’ in E. Grove [ed.] Great Battles of the Royal Navy (London: 
Arms and Armour Press, 1994), E. Grove Fleet to Fleet Encounters (London: Arms and Armour Press, 
1991), P. Halpern A Naval History of World War I (London: Routledge, 2005), R. Hough The Great 
War at Sea 1914-1918 (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2000), N. Steel & P. Hart Jutland 1916: Death in the Grey 
Wastes (London: Cassel, 2004).  The point made, that the first-class cruisers designed prior to 1905 
were obsolete in the context of a First World War fleet action dominated by heavy artillery, taken 
purely in itself is reasonable. However, these negative connotations have coloured wider perceptions of 
the type, and likely resulted in the relative lack of interest in such vessels 
4 The big-gun armed types are what would later come to be officially termed, and are generally known to 
historians as, ‘battlecruisers.’ For the purposes of this thesis, heavy artillery (nee ‘big-gun’) is taken to 
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primary source materials reveals a very different situation; one in which the standing of the 
type was very much greater than their current place in the historiography would suggest. In 
1898, noting remarks of George Goschen, First Lord of the Admiralty in the House of 
Commons, we find Thomas Brassey, editor of The Naval Annual, writing that  
 
Whether it is true or not that “power on the sea has been transferred rather to cruisers 
than to battleships,” it is to cruisers, Mr. Goschen tells us, that we are directing our main 
attention.5 
 
To an extent the importance of such vessels has been noted, albeit sporadically by naval 
historians: nevertheless, the subject is one that remains largely unexplored.6 This 
dissertation fills the gap in the current historiography by specifically examining the 
development of the British first-class cruiser during the period 1884-1909, and the 
wider technological, strategic and tactical contexts in which this occurred. It 
demonstrates how, from the early 1880s, the type would grow from being a trade-
defence vessel, to a second form of capital ship, and finally, the model for all of the first 
all-big-gun vessels constructed by the Royal Navy. 
 
 
Naval history and the first-class cruiser 1884-1909 
Recently there has been a considerable upsurge of scholarly interest in the late-Victorian 
and Edwardian period, particularly in terms of Royal Naval strategy, and how this 
would extend to the First World War.7 The classic text on the pre-1905 Royal Navy, 
Marder’s Anatomy of British Sea Power, dates back to 1940 and itself owes a 
considerable amount to the earlier work of Woodward on the Anglo-German Naval 
Rivalry, and to Ropp’s then-unpublished work on the late-Nineteenth Century French 
                                                                                                                                                                     
begin at 10in calibre weapons or greater, with intermediate calibre weapons falling into the 4.7in – 
9.2in calibre region 
5 T. A. Brassey ‘The Progress of the British Navy’ in T. A. Brassey [ed.] The Naval Annual, 1898 (Portsmouth: J. 
Griffin and Co., 1898) p.4 
6 In particular, Marder, Schurman, Sumida & Grimes Op. Cit. have considered them within wider naval strategy, 
but no dedicated work at present exists 
7 See S. Grimes Op. Cit.; M. Seligmann The Royal Navy and the German Threat 1901-1914: Admiralty Plans to 
Protect British Trade in a War Against Germany (Oxford: OUP, 2012). Also N. Lambert Planning 
Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War (London: Harvard University Press, 
2012) 
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naval service.8 Marder’s analysis, in essence, states that the Royal Navy went through a 
period of decline in the mid-Victorian period during which it became dangerously weak 
compared to rival naval powers, let alone approaching a ‘two-power’ standard which 
required equality in strength to any two rival forces combined. The weakness, Marder 
asserts, would be addressed following several war ‘scares’ with Russia and France 
during the 1880s which resulted in an upsurge in naval spending. This further coincided 
with the emergence of a new generation of naval theorists, most notably John and Philip 
Colomb, who eliminated the confusion that existed in the service and used the lessons 
of the past to promote a classical, ‘blue-water’ battlefleet model of operations. Navalist 
agitators, extensively employing these strategic views and claims of British naval 
weakness were largely responsible for the Naval Defence Act of 1889. 
 
With these points made, much of the rest of Marder’s work is given over to the 
consequences of the Naval Defence Act, the relationship between contemporary 
economics, politics and diplomacy with the general concept of ‘sea power’ and more 
particularly British naval power. The overriding emphasis, as far as the fleet was 
concerned, is upon battleships and battlefleet strategy with little major attention given to 
possible alternatives, although the first-class cruiser is frequently referred to and its 
significance to the service noted. The subject of commerce protection, a matter naturally 
closely associated with the cruiser, is raised, as were the theoretical consequences of a 
guerre de course against Britain, but Marder appears to have employed sources mostly 
concerned with the protection of food supply, whether by choice or a matter of  access. 
 
There is, however, a contradiction in Marder's argument between his emphasis on the 
potential decisive impact of an assault on British shipping, and his acceptance that 
Britain would have had sufficient produce to avoid potential starvation for at least three 
to six months.9 He also suggested that no ‘clear and definite policy’ existed for the 
protection of commerce ‘owing to the absence at the Admiralty of any first-class 
strategist’ until Reginald Custance became DNI in 1899.10 This assertion has not stood 
the test of time. 
                                                     
8 Marder Op. Cit., E. Woodward Great Britain and the German Navy (Oxford: Cass, 1935). Ropp’s thesis was 
later published as T. Ropp [ed. S. Roberts] The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy, 
1871-1904 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987) 
9 Marder Op. Cit. p.85 
10 Ibid p.97 & 95 
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Despite the flaws in his work, Marder’s influence was considerable, and many 
historians have concurred with his views. Notably, Parkes, in his monumental study of 
British Battleships agrees with Marder’s assessment of a mid-Victorian naval weakness 
which was addressed by the Naval Defence Act, and the subsequent dominance of the 
‘blue-water’ school of naval strategy, with the battleship being the principal means of 
achieving naval supremacy.11 This was also echoed and expanded by Rodger, who went 
even further in questioning the competence of the mid-Victorian Admiralty and its 
professional advisers.12 Sandler also takes a similar view of the period, pointing to the 
creation of a vessel with a similar layout to a later battleship, but then writing the period 
off as one of stagnation in vessel design.13 
 
There are however numerous significant shortcomings in this analysis. Beeler and 
Andrew Lambert have recently done much to demonstrate the fallacy of the concept of 
mid-Victorian naval weakness, pointing out that it has been judged by later standards 
rather than in reference to contemporary rivals.14 Marder, Parkes and many of their 
successors also largely missed the fact that owing to the limitations of contemporary 
material technologies, the Royal Navy during the mid-Victorian period moved away 
from the traditional policy of battlefleet-blockade, toward one of coast-assault, not out 
of confusion, but as a matter of necessity. They are notably weak in their understanding 
of the limitations imposed by the new materials on strategy, tactics and the inherent 
design of major naval vessels, be they small craft, battleships, or, of particular 
                                                     
11 O. Parkes British Battleships: A History of Design, Construction and Armament 1860 – 1950 (London: Leo 
Cooper, 1990) Since Parkes’s work was written over a period of some 31 years, from 1925-1956, there 
is some question about whether he may have developed this view independently of Marder, or whether 
Marder influenced his thinking 
12 N. Rodger ‘The Dark Ages of the Admiralty, 1869-85, Part I: Business Methods, 1869-74’ Mariner’s Mirror 
61/4 (November 1975), ‘The Dark Ages of the Admiralty, 1869-85, Part II: Change and Decay, 1874-
80’ Mariner’s Mirror 62/1 (February 1976), ‘The Dark Ages of the Admiralty, 1869-85, Part III: Peace, 
Retrenchment and Reform, 1880-85’ Mariner’s Mirror 62/2 (May 1976), ‘British Belted Cruisers’ 
Mariner’s Mirror 64/1 (February 1978). It must be said, however that Professor Rodger has recanted 
from some of his earlier critical views: see the remarks on his earlier work in the bibliographies to his 
monumental Naval History of Britain. 
13 S. Sandler The Emergence of the Modern Capital Ship (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1979) 
14 J. Beeler British Naval Policy in the Gladstone-Disraeli Era. 1866-1880 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1997), ‘Steam, Strategy and Schurman: Imperial Defence in the Post-Crimean Era, 1856-1905’ in G. 
Kennedy and K. Neilson [eds.] Far Flung Lines: Studies in Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald 
Mackenzie Schurman (London: Routledge, 1996), Birth of the Battleship: British Capital Ship Design 
1870-1881 (London: Caxton Editions, 2003), ‘A One Power Standard? Great Britain and the Balance 
of Naval Power 1860-1880’ Journal of Strategic Studies 15/4 (December 1992), ‘In the Shadow of 
Briggs: A New Perspective on British Naval Administration and W. T. Stead’s 1884 “Truth About the 
Navy” Campaign’ International Journal of Naval History 1/1 (April 2002) 
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significance to this thesis: cruisers. Again, Beeler, Brown, Friedman and Andrew 
Lambert have largely overturned this perspective, providing a more balanced and deeper 
appreciation of the strategic and material aspects of the 1870s and 1880s.  
 
The subject of trade-defence is one touched upon by many authors, Ranft being the first 
to make it a major study, but appreciation of the general strategic position seems to have 
been coloured by the failure of the Royal Navy to effectively counter the U-Boat guerre 
de course during the First World War. The almost complete abandoning of convoy is 
widely condemned; Parkinson recently has placed considerable emphasis upon the 
subject, the evidence supplied to the often-forgotten Carnarvon Commission, and the 
influence of Captain W. H. Hall as head of the Foreign Intelligence Committee (FIC), 
set up in 1883, who it is suggested committed a ‘massive misreading of history’ in 
rejecting convoy as no longer possible, inherently defensive and not part of the service’s 
tradition.15 Yet despite the frequent criticism directed at the abandoning of convoy, it is 
much more seldom asked whether convoy was a practical, or even a necessary 
proposition in the last decades of the Nineteenth and first decade of the Twentieth 
Centuries, nor whether the strategy the Royal Navy adopted was inherently mistaken. 
Beeler and Friedman have recently started to point out that the matter was by no means 
clear-cut.16 It also seems evident that some historians have misunderstood the nature of 
the alternative approach the Royal Navy adopted. 
 
The development of the first-class cruiser itself and its increase in dimensions over the 
period in question has also come in for criticism. Schurman, while discussing Sir Julian 
Corbett and his views, remarks 
 
Their permanent function was to exercise the sea supremacy won by the doughty ‘line’ 
ships. Misapprehension of the basic needs behind Nelson’s oft-quoted cry for more 
cruisers had led Corbett’s contemporaries to over-value the ‘eyes of the fleet’ function 
for cruisers to the point where they were being increased in size and up-graded in 
                                                     
15 R. Parkinson The Late Victorian Navy: The Pre-Dreadnought Era and the Origins of the First World War 
(Woodridge: The Boydell Press, 2008) pp.241-242 
16 Beeler Birth of the Battleship, Friedman British Cruisers of the Victorian Era, B. Ranft ‘The protection of 
British seaborne trade’ in Brian Ranft [Ed.] Technical Change and British Naval Policy 1860-1939 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977)   
 xiii 
 
function to rival battleships themselves and hence their main purpose, the functional 
tasks of convoy, commercial blockade and search were much neglected.17 
 
Although appealing, this interpretation, which also appears to have some connection to 
Marder, is difficult to reconcile with the evidence contained in the Admiralty archives, 
Ship Covers, and various private collections. Two major factors were at work. Firstly, 
the vessels were gradually becoming a fusion type, capable of both functions. This was 
far from a confusion of purpose but a practical reality.  
 
The first British cruisers to re-introduce side-armour were specifically designed to 
function as the fast wing of a battlefleet, but were perfectly capable of independent 
operations should they be called upon to do so. Their successors, the even larger 
Drakes, were designed for the trade-defence role with fleet duties a secondary 
capability; their size reflected their speed, range, protection, armament and sea keeping 
abilities, all of which were calculated to overwhelm any existing or projected rival 
cruiser at the time of their design. Though they never received the name, these types 
were probably the vessels most accurately described by the ‘battlecruiser’ term. In 
effect, the largest first-class cruisers had moved beyond a pure trade defence remit, and 
had become a second type of highly flexible capital ship, capable of multiple different 
operational functions. The matter of large dimensions was relevant to most of the 
vessels produced during the period covered by this thesis however: the objective was 
qualitative superiority over rivals on an individual unit basis. When this principle was 
temporarily abandoned, the vessels were of much reduced utility, and suffered rapid 
obsolescence. 
 
With his ground-breaking 1989 work In Defence of Naval Supremacy Sumida produced 
one of the first major texts to depart significantly from the Marder interpretation of the 
era. Sumida’s careful assessment of finances began to lay the foundation for a somewhat 
different interpretation of the period; one in which the first-class cruiser was given 
greater importance than it had generally received to date. Sumida also pointed toward 
the evolutionary nature of vessel design, even in the early 20th Century, although he also 
largely accepted the Marder-esque view of naval weakness leading to the Naval 
                                                     
17 D. Schurman The Education of a Navy: The development of British naval strategic thought, 1867-1914 
(London: Cassel, 1965) pp.178-179 
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Defence Act, despite Kennedy, and indeed, Ropp’s work on French naval policy in the 
era indicating that this was rather more an image manufactured by the contemporary 
navalist agitators than actual. This concept has more recently been almost completely 
discredited by the work of Beeler, Lambert, Grimes and Seligman.18 
 
The vast number of studies produced on Sir John Fisher, his influence, and the service 
in the first decade of the 20th Century shows no sign of abating, with three major works 
recently having been published covering this era.19 Marder again ‘got there first’, with 
his five volume series From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. The contention of 
Marder’s work, as indicated above, is that Fisher wrought a revolution in the Admiralty 
when appointed First Sea Lord in 1904 in almost every conceivable area, from strategy 
to vessel design and administration. He was the father of the all-big-gun vessel in the 
form of the ‘revolutionary battleship’ HMS Dreadnought, though his real love was for 
the faster, more lightly protected battlecruisers. Strategically, his great contribution was 
to concentrate the Royal Navy’s battle-squadrons in European waters. These views, like 
those expressed on the previous years, were widely accepted, Parkes and Hough notably 
following this general theme, and it continues to be expressed in many popular 
histories.20 
 
It is beyond question that Fisher had a massive impact on the service, but many of these 
themes have required severe revision. Kennedy and Sumida (particularly the latter) were 
amongst the first to produce major works suggesting that Fisher’s plans and actions 
were somewhat different from the Marder-model, being the product of both adapting 
economic and political circumstances.21 With Britain forming alliances with other 
powers, and following the annihilation of the Russian fleet at the hands of the Japanese 
off Tsushima in 1905, there was a much reduced requirement to maintain battle-
                                                     
18 Beeler Op. Cit., Lambert Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution, Grimes, Seligmann Op. Cit. 
19 S. Grimes Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918; Lambert Planning Armageddon, 
Seligmann The Royal Navy and the German Threat 
20 Parkes Op. Cit. Hough First Sea Lord: An Authorised Biography of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher (Bristol: 
Severn House, 1977), The Great War at Sea 1914-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), R. 
Massie Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War (London: Pimlico, 2004) 
21 P. Kennedy The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Classic Penguin, 2001), The Rise of Anglo-
German Antagonism (London: George Allan and Unwin, 1980), Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945. 
Eight Studies (London: George Allan and Unwin, 1983) M. Seligmann ‘Britain's Great Security 
Mirage: The Royal Navy and the Franco-Russian Naval Threat, 1898–1906’ Journal of Strategic 
Studies, 35:6; ‘A prelude to the reforms of Admiral Sir John Fisher: the creation of the Home Fleet, 
1902–3’ Historical Research, vol. 83, no. 221; Sumida Op. Cit. 
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squadrons outside European waters, ergo bringing the battleships home was a perfectly 
reasonable strategic move. It was also to an extent economic, since there was an 
opportunity for placing vessels into reserve, reducing permanent manning costs. Fisher 
was further attempting to exploit the new technologies of the era: the all-big-gun armed 
first-class cruiser, equipped with the new fire-control equipment then being developed, 
was the ultimate expression of his personal preferences for capital ship design.22 
 
Most historians of the late-Victorian and Edwardian era navies now accept this general 
contention, and in recent years, Lambert, Grimes and Seligmann have produced material 
expanding on aspects of this theme. Strategic war planning in this later period has 
however recently been the subject of works by both Grimes and Nicolas Lambert, which 
shed greater light on contemporary naval thinking.23 Lambert’s recent work suggests the 
service, under Fisher in the first decade of the Twentieth Century, had in mind a 
dramatic concept for exploiting British control of the global trading routes and networks 
to rapidly destroy an enemy economy, though as a text dealing largely with wider 
theoretical economics and strategy, it does not explore the place of the first-class cruiser, 
or its rise to prominence. Grimes’s text has exposed the detailed practical war-planning 
that was engaged in from the late 1880s, the influence of the Naval Intelligence 
Department on this, and how these related to the service’s annual Manoeuvres: large 
mock ‘wars’ that examined particular scenarios, and tested new strategic and tactical 
ideas, along with the latest material developments. Like Lambert’s though, with its 
broad coverage of war-planning and the service’s gradually adapting strategic goals, 
Grimes does not chart the increasing significance of the first-class cruiser through this 
time in great detail. Seligmann has done some work upon this subject however, 
suggesting that the Royal Navy took a possible German naval challenge seriously rather 
sooner than ‘revisionist’ historians believe to be the case, but their concerns were 
directed rather toward a possible commerce-raiding threat from this quarter than a 
battle-fleet challenge per se. This, Seligmann contends, had a considerable impact on 
Admiralty thinking throughout the first decade of the Twentieth Century, and may have 
been responsible for the development of the Invincible class battlecruisers.24 
                                                     
22 N. Lambert Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution 
23 Grimes Op. Cit. N. Lambert Op. Cit.  
24 Seligmann The Royal Navy and the German Threat; ‘New Weapons for New Targets: Sir John Fisher, 
the Threat from Germany, and the Building of HMS Dreadnought and HMS Invincible, 1902–1907’ The 
International History Review 30:2;  
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Few authors to date however, have considered whether Fisher actually did replace the 
battleship, albeit briefly, with the first-class cruiser. Grove, in his Society for Nautical 
Research Lecture and Mariner’s Mirror paper was one of the first to suggest 
Dreadnought was closer to a cruiser than a ‘traditional’ battleship, as they had 
nominally developed since 1890.25 The issue is to an extent one of nomenclature, as is 
illustrated over the following chapters. That there was a degree of crossover between the 
battleship and cruiser types was noted by Sumida and has more or less quietly continued 
to be observed ever since.26 It had, as noted above, been developing for some years. 
 
 
Primary source materials 
With an assessment of the technological evolution of the British first-class cruiser 
forming a major part of this thesis, the papers delivered before the Institution of Naval 
Architects (INA) are an invaluable resource.27 The INA was established in 1860 by four 
principal founders, John Scott Russell, Edward Reed, Nathaniel Barnaby and Rev. 
Joseph Woolley. The papers delivered before it were published in yearly volumes of 
Transactions. Original copies appear to be becoming quite rare, and collections are often 
incomplete and difficult to access. The Maritime Historical Studies Centre, University 
of Hull has a respectable collection which were made available to this author, and all of 
the transactions continue to be available from the Royal Institution of Naval Architects 
in printed or electronic form, though at a prohibitive cost for many private researchers if  
numerous full editions are required. The INA papers have not been especially 
extensively used to date by many naval historians for reasons which are unclear. Brown, 
in his design histories, has used them more extensively than most. 
 
During the period in question the papers were read mostly in the Lecture Hall of the 
Royal Society of Arts and contain a wide range of contributions from leading naval 
architects, senior officers both serving and retired, and industry figures; equally 
valuable are the discussions which followed each paper, which frequently contained 
                                                     
25 E. Grove ‘Battleship or First Class Cruiser? HMS Dreadnought and the Limitations of Jackie Fisher's 
Radicalism’ Society for Nautical Research Annual Lecture, 1 December 2006; aka ‘The Battleship is 
Dead, Long Live the Battleship; HMS Dreadnought and the Limits of Technological Innovation’ 
Mariner’s Mirror Vol. 93/4 (2007) 
26 Sumida Op. Cit. pp.53-56 
27 Now Royal Institution of Naval Architects, having received its Royal Charter of Incorporation in 1910, and 
latterly, 1960 
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further insights and information. The subject of cruisers was a popular one, and the 
topic of several papers and many debates. It is difficult to overstate the value of these 
Transactions, the papers and discussions, although a degree of care must be taken in 
certain cases, particularly where a commercial interest may be involved (such as those 
produced by the employee of an armaments manufacturer), or when a wider 
disagreement carried over into debates (Sir Edward Reed was notorious for attacking 
the Admiralty and its officials, often by highly unscrupulous methods). 
 
The Journal of the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) provides an excellent 
companion to the INA Transactions. Founded slightly earlier than the INA, and 
covering a much wider field of military subjects, the two institutions shared many of the 
same members, and where the INA papers provide principally technical data, the RUSI 
papers and debates frequently covered strategic and tactical matters; John Knox 
Laughton, John and Philip Colomb all read major papers there, while prize-winning and 
highly commended annual naval essays were also printed, and may be found alongside 
proposed rules for naval war-games or board-games, which themselves provide an 
interesting insight into contemporary strategic and particularly tactical thought, 
especially on the part of relatively junior or mid-ranking officers. As noted, there was 
some overlap between the institutions, the RUSI often seeing technical papers, and the 
somewhat more specialised INA less frequently seeing those touching upon strategic 
and historical matters. The papers are slightly more accessible than the INA. Printed 
copies are more readily found at many libraries and institutions, often with more 
complete collections. At the time of writing the majority of the papers delivered are also 
available on the internet to institutions subscribing to various collected Periodicals 
archives, a more restricted number being made available to RUSI members via the 
RUSI website. Like the INA papers, these, in conjunction with other materials are an 
extremely valuable resource, providing a detailed backdrop to contemporary thinking 
and developments, although similar care must be exercised in assessing the background 
in which the paper was delivered. 
 
The establishing of a large number of professional and semi-professional societies in the 
Victorian era like the RUSI and INA has left a considerable additional body of valuable 
material in their respective yearly Transactions and Journals. Relevant papers may be 
found in the Transactions of the (American) Society of Naval Architects and Marine 
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Engineers, and Institute of Civil Engineers, as might be reasonably expected. However, 
material may also be found in the Journals of other, less obviously related bodies such 
as the Society of Arts. 
 
Official Admiralty records are mostly held at the National Archives (formerly the Public 
Records Office) in Kew, starting with ADM 1. Containing a vast array of 
correspondence from senior officers at home and abroad, memoranda, reports, 
proceedings, this section gives a reasonably complete record of major decisions taken 
and the implementation of these. Background information supplied to the Board of 
Admiralty in particular can be found in other sub-sections. ADM 8 contains the List 
Books showing the monthly returns of vessel and fleet dispositions, along with the 
names of relevant senior officers. The data from the late 1880s in particular is of value, 
since it shows the change in vessel classifications that took place during this time, 
pointing toward a more fundamental shift in technology and the service’s strategic 
approach. ADM 123-128 contain reports from the more remote Eastern Foreign 
Stations, including the Cape, East Indies, and China Stations, which as major trade-
centres have a particular interest for this thesis. Reports from the Admiralty 
Experimental Works can be found in ADM 226; generally of a technical nature, 
covering sketches to model experiments, some of these may also be found repeated in 
the Ship Covers held by the National Maritime Museum, although in general, those held 
by the National Archives appear to be the sole surviving copies. 
 
The establishing of the Naval Intelligence Department (NID) in 1887, superseding the 
FIC, provided a division nominally dedicated to supplying the Board with intelligence 
data, although as several historians have pointed out, both bodies under William Hall 
appeared to move well beyond their theoretical remit, and toward something akin to a 
Naval Staff.28 An examination of the voluminous FIC / NID papers, primarily contained 
within ADM 231 appears to confirm this suggestion, at least to an extent, although it 
can also be exaggerated. Topics covered were wide-ranging, and includes assessments 
of coal supply in peace and wartime scenarios, summaries of strategic and tactical war 
games by the Royal Naval College, annual comparisons of the fleets of major powers 
and not least extensive reports on the annual Naval Manoeuvres. These massive 
                                                     
28 Parkinson Op. Cit. p.242 
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exercises, spanning several weeks of each year were the testing and proving grounds for 
service strategy and tactics, the scenarios being largely developed by the NID. 
 
Case records: large groups of related Admiralty documents collected into specific 
‘cases’, are collected in ADM 116; several are of particular interest to this thesis, 
ranging over a number of interlinked subjects, from commerce protection, the 
rearrangement of Station boundaries, wartime standing orders for Foreign Stations, and 
construction programmes for vessels and shore bases / facilities. 
 
In addition to the Admiralty records, the National Archives also contain a large number 
of Cabinet, Colonial and Foreign Office records of relevance to this study. Predating the 
nominal selected starting point, but of interest are the reports of the Carnarvon 
Commission in CAB 7, which contains a wide variety of defence committee 
correspondence and reports. CAB 16, 17 and 35 contain further sub-committee minutes, 
memoranda and reports, including those on the protection of ocean trade, and 
requirements for cruisers, and the Colonial Office papers in CO 537 also link closely to 
these, containing the report of a Committee established to consider the limits of Foreign 
Stations. CAB 37 is of particular value, containing photographic copes of Cabinet 
Papers, those pertaining to naval matters giving the political companion piece to 
Admiralty memoranda. These include minutes providing views on the naval estimates, 
assessments provided to Government of the relative strengths of fleets and rival nations’ 
shipbuilding programmes, an appreciation of the status of British food-supply in the 
event of a maritime conflict at the end of the 19th Century, and various papers by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and First Lord strongly debating naval expenditure in light 
of contemporary national finances. These are particularly significant when viewed 
alongside the yearly Navy Estimates contained in the House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers (copies also in ADM 181). 
 
The National Maritime Museum (NMM) holds the Ship Covers for the various classes 
of vessels considered in this thesis at the Brass Foundry outstation. These files contain 
surviving papers from the Constructor’s department pertaining to the design and 
development of ships built, from the inception of the type through to final 
modifications, and frequently hold early sketch designs. Gaps do exist, and some 
Covers are considerably larger than others, suggesting that certain documentation has 
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been lost. For example, it is known that details pertaining to the re-positioning of certain 
intermediate-calibre guns in the Duke of Edinburgh class armoured cruisers were 
destroyed during the Second World War.29 In combination with Admiralty records at the 
National Archives, INA and JRUSI papers, and private correspondence and collections, 
a reasonably complete picture of the history of these vessels can be established. Scale 
plans, and  the NMM’s photograph collection are also held by the Brass Foundry. 
 
Private collections of correspondence by naval officers and related officials are 
contained at the NMM’s Caird Library. The papers of Admiral Sir Alexander Milne, 
Admiral Sir Gerard Noel, Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, and Sir Eustace Tennyson 
d’Eyncourt are of considerable value. Milne, though pre-dating the nominal 
commencing year of this thesis established the Royal Navy’s trade-defence policy; a 
policy which was to continue, modified, but following the same principle, throughout 
the period covered. 
 
Bridge and Noel are interesting figures historically; both served in senior roles at the 
Admiralty, as C-in-C China Station, and held strong views which were not always 
entirely in keeping with those of the Board of Admiralty. Both were able strategists of 
the battle-fleet school, Bridge producing several books on the subject, while both were 
more or less frequent contributors to journals and societies when they were in the 
country. Noel as a junior officer won several prizes for his essays on naval tactics, and 
in later years he became a staunch supporter of the theories of Alfred Mahan. In 
principle, he and Philip Colomb also had much in common on such matters, but in 
character they were completely dissimilar and the two men fell out in 1893, following 
the loss of HMS Victoria under almost farcical conditions, and Colomb’s spectacularly 
ill-judged pontificating on the matter in the letters pages of The Times.30 
 
D’Eyncourt’s papers, though of a somewhat lesser scale, provide useful independent 
data on service cruisers; he would become Director of Naval Construction (DNC) 
following Sir Philip Watts, but during the early years of the 20th Century he was 
employed by the Armstrong armaments firm who built several such vessels for the 
                                                     
29 Parkes Op. Cit. p.443 Parkes does not state how this occurred, though the conjecture of an air-raid does not 
seem improbable 
30 Colomb’s remarks met with a strong riposte in The Times from both Noel, and Captain (later Admiral) C. C. 
Penrose FitzGerald 
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Royal Navy under contract. d’Eyncourt appears to have back-engineered certain areas 
of Admiralty designs, and also produced a series of power and efficiency curves for 
several types, which correlate closely with official data. His archive has an additional 
value since the papers of his predecessors as DNC, Sir Philip Watts and Sir William 
White, have not survived. Possibly this is a reflection of social status, since White and 
Watts came from the emergent lower-middle class, while d’Eyncourt came from a 
somewhat higher position, where the preservation of personal papers was more 
common.    
 
Further primary source material are the papers and magazines of the era. These range 
from professional publications such as The Engineer to more popular productions 
including The Times, The Spectator, The Nineteenth Century (subsequently ‘The 
Nineteenth Century and After’) The Pall Mall Gazette, The National Observer and 
many others, including both articles and letters to their respective Editors. The Naval 
Annual, published from 1886, edited first by Lord Brassey, and later by his son (with 
two years under Leyland at the turn of the century), was the most prominent journal 
dedicated to naval affairs of the age, and a fixed place in the wider landscape.31 As such, 
The Naval Annual is an extremely important resource, and covered a wide range of 
naval matters ranging from the Estimates, assessments of the current states of various 
major naval powers, opinion pieces on strategic and policy issues, annual manoeuvres, 
and tabulated data on the various vessels in commission, major features of these, their 
builders and cost. Nevertheless, it must be used with a considerable degree of caution; 
there has been a tendency to accept the information and many statements printed in The 
Naval Annual at face value when in fact their accuracy is not always clear-cut, and 
sometimes demonstrably erroneous.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
31 Although frequently described as ‘Brassey’s Naval Annual’, and just as frequently abbreviated to “Brassey’s” 
the publication during the years in question was in fact simply entitled ‘The Naval Annual’ of x year 
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Thesis Structure 
This thesis is divided into five interrelated chapters, with an additional concluding 
section. The first provides an overview of the strategic backdrop of the mid-Victorian 
era, and the beginnings of the late-Victorian period. It argues the reclassification of the 
fleet in October 1887 was a much more significant event than a simplifying of service 
nomenclature, in reality reflecting changing material and strategic conditions, and the 
transition of the service from one largely dominated by coast-assault toward a more 
classical ‘blue-water’ battlefleet model akin to that of the sailing era. The emphasis of 
the fleet once again turned to blockade as the primary means to defending trade, in 
conjunction with a system of focal-area defence first set out by Alexander Milne in the 
1870s, which is also assessed. It further suggests that several of the older masted 
ironclads were rated as ‘cruisers’ less in order to keep elderly and inefficient types on 
the books, but because they remained by virtue of their ocean-going capacity useful 
vessels in such a role, albeit as a temporary measure. Finally, it assesses the still severe 
technological limitations of the 1880s, and the first new class to be commissioned as 
‘cruisers’ into the service. 
 
The second chapter examines the development of the first-class cruiser from 1888-1894. 
This covers the ‘protected deck’ era of design, in which the Royal Navy’s Director of 
Naval Construction, William White, abandoned almost all side-armour on cruiser type 
vessels in favour of internal oblique protection, reaping a considerable performance gain 
in the process. The impact of the Naval Defence Act is assessed, as is White’s influence 
upon the service, both as a designer and on wider strategic and tactical matters. During 
this period, the first vessels to be termed ‘battle-cruisers’ were developed, and their 
practical functions and abilities are gauged. The subject of contemporary armour 
development is examined in detail, as is the rise of the intermediate-calibre quick-firing 
gun. Both matters are considered of paramount importance to vessel design, 
construction, overall strategy and contemporary tactics up to the middle of the first 
decade of the 20th Century. It is further demonstrated that the experiments carried out on 
the old ironclad HMS Resistance experiments had a major impact upon the design of 
Royal Navy cruisers. The contemporary strategic environment and naval rivals are 
evaluated, with the threat of the guerre de course or a guerre industrielle still remaining 
of major concern to the service, which it is argued was effectively forced to counter two 
different strategic threats partly owing to the vacillating policy of the major naval rivals. 
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Contemporary cruisers, it is demonstrated, were intended as trade defence types, 
although it is argued that they would have been more capable in a fleet role than is often 
believed. 
 
Chapter Three, covering the approximate period 1894-1901 examines the impact of new 
armour technologies on vessel (and particularly first-class cruiser) design, and how this 
had a significant impact upon contemporary strategy and tactical thinking. The 
crossover point from the protected-deck vessels to side-armoured ships carrying these 
new forms of face-hardened plate is considered. Although the introduction of such 
armoured vessels by France is often regarded as rendering British protected cruisers 
obsolescent, it is argued that initially, the advantage was not as great as widely believed. 
The gradually evolving means of protecting commerce is examined, along with the 
significance of the ‘Spencer Programme’ of funding and construction. It is argued that 
the introduction of face-hardened side-armour into Royal Navy vessels produced a type 
that effectively rendered the contemporary battleship obsolescent, was an inherently 
more flexible and useful type for the service, and that it would not have been an 
especially unrealistic proposition for such vessels to supersede the slower, more heavily 
armoured battleship type. In this time, the largest first-class cruisers became a genuine 
alternative, or second form of, capital ship. Construction policy, and the question of 
quantity verses quality is examined, and it is suggested that a rare error was made in 
producing first-class types of reduced displacement and fighting capacity at the end of 
the 19th, and beginning of the 20th Century. 
 
Chapter Four departs from Europe and matters of vessel design, and considers the 
presence of first-class cruisers in operational conditions in the Far East. This region 
makes for a particularly valuable case-study since it was a major trade-hub, with 
significant routes passing through and close by, and of considerable economic 
importance to the British Empire. It also had an unusually demanding set of 
geographical conditions, requiring vessels with the ability to work in the littoral region 
(including upon the major rivers) while also being capable of hunting commerce-raiding 
types stationed in the area by rival colonial powers, and operating with the battle-
squadron that were stationed there until the post-Tsushima years. The strategic and 
logistical impact of the contemporary first-class cruiser on the local stations is explored, 
supporting the contention that the type provided much-improved operational capacity on 
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foreign stations than the miscellaneous small-craft that had been widely employed to 
date, and that this model would be continued and extended, following the appointment 
of Admiral Lord Fisher as First Sea Lord. 
 
The final chapter deals with the first-class cruiser during the first decade of the 20th 
Century, its material development and also the next stage in the evolution of strategic 
thinking brought by Admiral Lord Fisher. The last intermediate-gun-armed vessels are 
considered, and how in response to the changing nature of foreign construction, these 
moved the type back toward a fleet-cruiser concept, abandoning attempts to restrict 
displacement and reduce individual unit-cost.  It is argued however that there was a 
certain loss of clarity in the details of design during this period. The financial 
implications of the large-scale cruiser and battleship construction programmes are 
illustrated, and how this would become an opportunity for Fisher to forward his new 
strategic vision for the service, which at least in part was a radical extension of existing 
policy. It is demonstrated how Fisher in fact achieved far more of his plans than is 
commonly realised, and that the first-class cruiser became the model type for the first 
all-big-gun capital ships built for the service, including HMS Dreadnought which in 
design and function was not quite the line-of-battleship she is usually described as 
being. 
 
The conclusion consolidates the findings of the previous chapters, illustrating how the 
first-class cruiser in the Royal Navy, over the quarter century principally covered, 
moved from being primarily a trade-defence vessel (with some fleet capacity) to being 
an alternate form of capital ship, and finally, for a brief period, became the basis for all 
of the service’s first-class vessels, irrespective of the nomenclature attached to them. 
This in part reflected the gradually evolving strategic situation, but it also was a 
consequence of technological developments. In the 1890s, the major changes were 
water-tube boilers, the quick-firing gun and, most significantly, the introduction of face-
hardened armour plate. White and Fisher are shown to have been the major 
contemporary figures in the development of the type, although they did not always carry 
their views. Strategically, the Royal Navy continued to employ variations on the focal 
area-defence policy created by Alexander Milne for the protection of commerce. In the 
mid-Victorian era, this had been in conjunction with European fleets largely built for 
coast-assault. By the end of the 1880s, littoral combatants were giving way to ocean-
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going types capable of blockade. Fisher brought a further transition with the object of 
abandoning the battleship type, relying on a flotilla-defence system of surface and sub-
surface torpedo-boats for defending the UK, major foreign ports, and use in narrow 
seas. Ocean-going duties would be given over almost entirely to a new generation of 
high-speed, heavily armed first-class cruisers which could hunt down and overwhelm 
commerce-raiders.  
 
The first-class cruiser of the late Victorian and Edwardian eras has been frequently 
overlooked, its importance to the contemporary service and its true strategic value often 
marginalised in the historiography. The ‘old’ armoured cruisers of the First World War: 
targets for U-Boats and battlecruisers, has become a widely accepted view. Yet in the 
late 1890s, the introduction of new technologies allowed designer Sir William White to 
develop the first-class cruiser into the most formidable naval vessel of its generation, a 
point not lost on Admiral Sir John Fisher and other radical naval thinkers who would 
later attempt to exploit the capabilities of the type to the ultimate degree. 
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Chapter 1 
Beginnings: 
The birth of the modern cruiser, politics, strategy and rivals 
 
 
During October 1887 the Royal Navy embarked upon a large scale reclassification of its 
fleet.1 By the end of the month the administrative work was completed, and the new 
nomenclature it introduced was employed for parliamentary purposes from 1 November.2 It 
was this reclassification that saw the term ‘battleship’ finally supersede the miscellaneous 
designations which had been employed until that time in the service.3 Of no less significance 
was the simultaneous widespread adoption and rationalisation of the term ‘cruiser’ which like 
‘battleship’ had been sporadically employed for some years, albeit in an apparently rather 
haphazard fashion, most notably in connection with the Leander, Mersey and Imperieuse 
classes, as well as for (armed) chartered merchant steamers.4 
 
The fleet reclassification has lately been noted by naval historians, but thus far its 
significance does not appear to have been fully appreciated, nor has the exact sequence of 
events been thoroughly explored.5 There is a temptation to regard it purely as a matter of 
administrative convenience, and the replacement of the previous system of categorisation, 
with its disparate types, with something simpler and more efficient. One recent author 
unequivocally states that the reclassification occurred along the lines of size, with ‘battleship’ 
                                                     
1 E. Grove The Royal Navy Since 1815: A New Short History (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)  p.73 
2 House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (henceforth HCPP) ‘Navy Estimates for the Year 1888 – 89 with 
Statement by the Financial Secretary Descriptive of the Rearrangement of the Votes and Explanation of 
Differences.’ 1888 (71) LXVIII, 1, pg.18 
3 TNA ADM 8/166 (Confidential) A List of Her Majesty’s Ships in Commission (London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationary Office [henceforth HMSO], 1887). See also F. T. M. Gibbs [Ed.] The Illustrated Guide to the 
Royal Navy and Foreign Navies; Also Mercantile Marine Steamers Available as Armed Cruisers and 
Transports (London: Waterlow Bros. & Layton Ltd., 1896) for a comprehensive published breakdown 
of Royal Naval vessels and their official classifications, albeit some years after the fact. 
4 For examples, see HCPP ‘Navy (Admiralty Cruisers). Return showing the number, names, tonnage, and terms 
under which the Admiralty chartered merchant steamers for employment as naval cruisers’ 1885 (331) 
XLVIII, 447, pg.1. Also HCPP ‘Navy (fighting and sea-going ships). Copy of statement of the fighting 
and the seagoing ships of Her Majesty’s navy on 1 January 1884, together with statements explanatory 
of the shipbuilding and repairing programme for 1884-85.’ 1884 (101) L, 531, pp. 1, 4-5. It appears that 
at least for official documentation, including parliamentary purposes, the term ‘cruiser’ was starting to 
be employed as an addition to other designations employed at the time, e.g. ‘corvette’, ‘sloop’ etc.: 
designations which it would ultimately supersede in the 1887 fleet reclassification, such types 
becoming cruisers of the 2nd and 3rd classes. 
5 Most notably Grove, Op. Cit., and R. Parkinson The Late Victorian Navy: The Pre-Dreadnought Era and the 
Origins of the First World War (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2008) 
 2 
 
being adopted for the larger and ‘cruiser’ for the smaller naval vessels, this ‘change in 
nomenclature [giving] the new-age steel-built ships a sharpened focus in the public mind.’6  
 
Insofar as they go, these are valid points, but there are also flaws. Most obvious of these is 
that two of the largest vessels laid down in the 1880s, the 9,150 ton Blakes, were not 
battleships but first-class cruisers.7 Moreover, there is an abundance of evidence in 
contemporary official papers that indicates to assess the reclassification purely in these 
simplistic terms is also to misunderstand the strategic and material realities of the middle and 
late Victorian periods. The real importance of the 1887 reclassification and rationalisation of 
vessel designations is that it marked the culmination of a gradual process which had begun 
some years earlier: ‘the growing maturity of the ocean-going battlefleet, now abandoning sail 
power, and making the transition back to engaging its enemies at, rather than from the sea.’8 
It was in this mid-Victorian crucible that the cruiser, as it is seen today, was born. 
 
 
The ‘Dark Ages’ reconsidered: international rivals and the domestic situation 1884-1889 
The mid-Victorian period has been and frequently still is regarded as a low point in the 
modern history of the Royal Navy. In 1940, Marder bleakly argued that it witnessed a steady 
weakening of the service in terms of finance, leadership, strategic outlook and not least, 
material. Parkes famously denounced the period as the ‘dark ages’ and this opinion of the era 
was widely accepted for many years.9 The charge was that ‘although the cost of individual 
ships was rising rapidly, the Estimates were kept at round about £11 millions, and our 
administration was mainly a matter of waste and reckless economy which might well have 
succeeded in endangering the security of the Empire.’10 Another author, concurring with this 
                                                     
6 Parkinson The Late Victorian Navy p.204 
7 R. Chesneau & E. Kolesnik [eds.] Conway’s All The World’s Fighting Ships 1860-1905 (London: Conway, 
1979) Pp.66 At 399ft in length, only the initial batch of Royal Sovereign class battleships, laid down in 
1899, were longer. 
8 Grove Op. Cit. p.73 
9 Oscar Parkes British Battleships 1860-1950: A History of Design, Construction and Armament (London: Leo 
Cooper, 1990) p.230  It is possible that this phrase was influenced, consciously or otherwise, by the 
first of Admiral Ballard’s ‘Black Battlefleet’ papers in the Mariner’s Mirror. See G. A. Ballard ‘The 
Black Battlefleet: some notes on the mid-Victorian transformation in battleship design’ The Mariner’s 
Mirror XV (1929) pp.122-123. Ballard’s reference was, of course, purely to the fact that the battleship 
hulls of the 1860s and early 1870s were unrelieved black, but the similarity of phrase is striking, and 
while a matter of conjecture, it does not seem unlikely. 
10 Parkes Op. Cit. p.230 
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general view, has gone even further, condemning it as a period in which ‘the Navy was 
subject to gross neglect, and weakened both in numbers and effectiveness.’11  
 
There are two basic sources from which such interpretations of the mid-Victorian Royal Navy 
are derived. Firstly and most obviously, they have origins in the claims made by 
contemporary navalist agitators.12 There was little new about naval agitation or even feelings 
of insecurity, but from the laying down of HMS Warrior in 1859 until 1884 these concerns 
were rather more frequently over details of vessels than naval strength in general. A notable 
example from the 1860s was the lengthy press campaign orchestrated by Captain Cooper 
Coles for turret armament, the outcome of which was the unseaworthy HMS Captain and the 
worst peacetime disaster ever suffered by the modern Royal Navy when she exceeded her 
minimal stability, capsized, and sank off Finisterre with the loss of all but 18 of her crew.13 
The regular furores raised during the 1870s and ’80s (most notably by Sir Edward Reed, the 
former Chief Constructor of the Royal Navy) regarding individual vessels and most 
especially protective schemes caused considerable comment and interest, but again, largely 
did not develop into a wide scale concern over the relative strength of the Royal Navy vis-à-
vis rival powers per se.14 
 
The first such major naval scare for some years appeared in the September of 1884 when 
William Thomas Stead, ‘a clever journalist who indulged an unfortunate talent for sensations, 
                                                     
11 Antony Preston ‘The end of the Victorian Navy’ Mariner’s Mirror 60/4 (November 1974) p.363 
12 See in particular John Beeler British Naval Policy in the Gladstone-Disraeli Era 1866–1880 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1997); also Birth of the Battleship: British Capital Ship Design 1870–1881 
(London: Caxton Editions, 2003) 
13 Arthur Hawkey Black Night off Finisterre: The Tragic Take of an Early British Ironclad (London: Airlife, 
1999) p.183 Hawkey provides a list of survivors and their age and rank. Although largely unreferenced, 
Hawkey’s sources can be easily identified. See also the Court Martial proceedings contained in the 
House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 
14 Reed, who resigned over the debacle of HMS Captain (and subsequently being proven correct regarding her 
lack of seaworthiness), looked askance on most vessels laid down by his successor, his brother-in-law 
Nathaniel Barnaby, but the Inflexible bore the brunt of his ire for many years. Reed favoured a full-
length protective waterline armour belt over the principle employed in the Inflexible, viz. a central 
armoured citadel, with heavily subdivided soft ends. His stated belief was that were the ends to be 
riddled, the central armoured portion would lack sufficient buoyancy to keep the vessel afloat (later 
disproved). Ironically, despite his later thunderous polemic against the vessel, he also claimed to be the 
originator of the protective scheme employed in Inflexible. See The Times, 4 August 1873, p.4 Reed’s 
expressed views were frequently inconsistent and even self-contradictory on numerous matters; he was 
not above deliberately misrepresenting statements by others and frequently used his position in 
Parliament to cause as much trouble as he could for the Admiralty, in addition to regular letters and 
articles in the press and producing pamphlets. This unfortunately tarnishes his reputation, for he was an 
able warship designer and could have been of greater service to the Admiralty, or private warship firms 
than was ultimately the case –largely a reflection, one suspects, of his behaviour following his 
resignation from public service.   
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restarted the old business of naval panic-monger in the Pall Mall Gazette.’15 The series of 
four articles: ‘What is the Truth about the Navy’; ‘A Startling Revelation’; ‘Who is 
Responsible for the Navy’ and ‘The Responsibility for the Navy’ (along with the often 
forgotten two part follow up: ‘The Truth About Our Coaling Stations’) were a demand for 
increased naval spending based on the premise that rival nations had substantially increased 
their own naval spending while in Britain the naval Estimates remained relatively unchanged. 
The Royal Navy was thus alleged to be dangerously weak and underfunded, rendering the 
security of both the Empire and Great Britain itself at grave risk.16  The trigger for the articles 
was the considerable increase in the French Estimates from 1878 and continuing for a five 
year period. The opening paragraphs of Stead’s first article established a highly populist tone: 
 
The scramble for the world has begun in earnest. In face of that phenomenon, how far 
are we able to prevent our own possessions being scrambled for by our neighbours? 
The answer to that question depends upon the condition of our navy. If it is as strong 
as it ought to be, we have nothing to fear. If, on the other hand, it is no longer in a 
position of incontestable superiority to the navies of the world, we are in a position of 
peril too grave to be capable of exaggeration. 
Not only our Imperial position, but the daily bread of twenty millions out of the thirty 
millions of our population depends entirely upon our dominion of the sea. If that is 
lost, or even endangered, our existence is at stake.17 
 
Stead was described as ‘the most powerful journalist in the island’, and there is considerable 
accuracy in this view, since he helped set the foundations of the modern tabloid press.18 It has 
been claimed that the ‘revelations of naval weakness… fell like a bomb upon a public already 
uneasy at the commercial and colonial threats to Britain’s world interests.’19 An alternative 
perspective is provided by the liberal F. W. Hirst, writing closer to the time (which he had 
lived through, albeit as a child), who remarks that ‘of popular panic there was no trace; but 
Mr. Stead and his fellow co-conspirators managed to produce a feeling of nervous 
                                                     
15 F. W. Hirst The Six Panics and Other Essays (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1919) p.41 
16 A. Marder The Anatomy of British Sea Power; A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 
1880-1905 (London: Frank Class, 1964) pp.121-122 
17 W. T. Stead ‘What is the Truth About the Navy?’ The Pall Mall Gazette 6069 (Monday 15 September, 1884) 
p.1 
18 Marder Op. Cit. p.121 
19 P. Kennedy The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Penguin Classics, 2001) p.178 
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disquietude in high society’.20 The actual truth in terms of the public reaction, as is often the 
case, lay somewhere in between. 
 
The ‘Truth About the Navy’ articles and the public reaction to them are generally held to be 
the prime motivation for what has come to be known as the ‘Northbrook programme’, after 
the First Lord of the Admiralty, Thomas Baring, 1st Earl of Northbrook.21 The name of the 
programme is somewhat ironic given that the First Lord was out of the country at the time of 
Stead’s publication, and did not personally believe that expenditure on additional ships was 
the best use of resources. Nevertheless ‘in his absence it was decided to provide a further £3 
million for the Navy which Northbrook announced in Parliament on 4 December –just six 
months after he had said that he would not know what to do with additional funds even if 
available!’22 The First Naval Lord (Sir Astley Cooper Key) also 
 
threw in his lot with the agitators. In a memorandum to the Board he urged an 
increase in naval expenditure to keep pace with other European powers, on the ground 
that, with the amount being annually voted for the navy, during the next five years 
their present naval superiority would gradually decrease to equality with “one 
powerful neighbour” only; and by that time they would be inferior to two powers 
combined.23 
 
It is of course hardly surprising that the First Naval Lord would take advantage of the 
situation in order to obtain extra funding and ships, even if his political overlord was not in 
favour of such a course. All other things being equal, he would have been unsuited to his post 
if he had failed to do so. Cooper Key himself makes for an interesting study, inasmuch as 
although he was a technocrat with considerable knowledge of the new materials then 
emerging, he was also inherently conservative on other matters. Although far from rivalling 
Geoffrey Phipps-Hornby, Alexander Milne or Philip Colomb as a strategist, it is also easy to 
overstate his apparent lack of vision and he does not  appear to have been as inept in this 
                                                     
20 Hirst, The Six Panics p.42 
21 Marder Op. Cit. pp.121-122 
22 D. Brown Warrior to Dreadnought: Warship Development 1860–1905 (London: Caxton Editions, 2003) p.113 
Actually the Northbrook programme was around the £3.1M mark 
23 Marder Op. Cit. p.122 Note that Marder actually employs the anachronistic nomenclature ‘First Sea Lord’, 
which would not be revived until Admiral Sir John Fisher was appointed in 1904. 
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regard as some have claimed or implied.24 In fact, Cooper Key agreed with Northbrook on 
several levels, and did not actively seek increases in the Estimates since he saw little actual 
requirement for additional spending, believing the service fit for contemporary requirements. 
With that said, although he and Northbrook shared a similar view of this matter it seems that 
he was also relatively easily manipulated, at least partly due to financial worries: his second 
wife had expensive tastes and some ascendency over her husband, while the marriage of his 
daughter produced additional monetary strain.25 
 
Cooper Key had also broken a compact between himself and Admirals Hornby and 
Beauchamp Seymour, in which all three had agreed to refuse the post of First Naval Lord 
unless some reform at the Admiralty was forthcoming. However, Colomb states that Cooper 
Key informed the First Lord that Hornby should be appointed instead of himself when he 
became aware that he was to be offered the post of senior naval lord.26 Whether this was 
genuinely meant or was a veiled apology to Hornby and Beauchamp Seymour is difficult to 
ascertain. Colomb points out that in principle, it would have been difficult to pass over 
Cooper Key in any case given his seniority, although it certainly would not have been 
impossible had the First Lord been willing to make the effort in favour of another officer.27 
What does seem clear is that, had he maintained the compact with his service friends and 
refused the position, it is likely they could between them have forced the government's hand 
on service matters if they had felt a significant requirement to do so. Nicholas Lambert has 
suggested that 
 
Britain’s naval leaders deliberately made little effort to educate their political masters 
on the true workings of sea power. For the Admiralty there was some advantage in 
using “vague and insubstantial” language whenever the first lord was obliged to ask 
Parliament for more money… whereas in the age of sail, laymen could estimate the 
relative strength of a fleet, in the age of industrial navies, especially during an age of 
rapid technological change, estimates of the fighting value of warships were highly 
subjective, and, thus, only professional naval officers were in a position to say with 
                                                     
24 Beeler British Naval Policy in the Gladstone-Disraeli Era 1866–1880 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1997) p.185 
25 A. Lambert, ‘Key, Sir Astley Cooper (1821–1888)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/15494, accessed 5 November 2010] 
26 P. H. Colomb Memoirs of Admiral the Right Honourable. Sir Astley Cooper Key G.C.B. &c. (London: 
Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1898) p.410 
27 Ibid pp.410-411 
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any authority how many ships were required to uphold naval supremacy –if such a 
number existed.28 
 
While a potentially polemical argument, there is a reasonable amount of circumstantial 
evidence spanning the period covered by this thesis, to suggest Lambert’s view is not without 
a degree of merit. Several examples of the apparent reticence on the part of professional naval 
officers to give their political masters operational details are covered below, and in later 
Chapters.  
 
John Beeler has identified a second source for the negative interpretation of the mid-Victorian 
era as being the influential strategic writers of the early 1890s, most notably Alfred Theyer 
Mahan, John and Phillip Colomb, who popularised the doctrine that not only Britain’s 
national security ‘but its great power status were dependent on the possession of a large fleet 
of capital ships, capable of beating back any challenges to its maritime supremacy through 
the strategy of guerre d’escadre.'29 
 
Recently however, these traditional assessments of the mid-Victorian era navy, and Britain’s 
naval position during this time have also started to be reassessed. An early seed of doubt was 
sown by Sumida, who forwards the idea that increases ‘in naval capital costs, rate of capital 
depreciation and overhead expenses did not pose serious financial problems during much of 
the 19th century, because the weakness of foreign navies enabled Britain to maintain her naval 
supremacy with a fleet that was neither large nor wholly up-to-date.’30 Several subsequent 
studies have substantially expanded upon this general theme, and have re-examined the 
period from contemporary sources 
 
rather than those rendered ipso post facto. Post-Mahanian assessments of the size, 
strength and war-readiness of the pre-Mahanian fleet have been almost without 
exception dismissive, but these assessments typically contrast the Navy of 1870 or 
                                                     
28 N. Lambert Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2002) pp.17-
18 
29 Beeler Birth of the Battleship p.14 
30 J. Sumida In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914 
(London: Unwin Hyman, 1989) p.8 Sumida further tempered this on the following page by a reiteration 
of the Mackinderite notion that ‘the manifold effects of industrialisation not only diminished Britain’s 
naval power, but also magnified her national danger in other ways’. 
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1880 with that of 1895 or 1900, rather than with the contemporary French, Russian, 
Italian or American navies.31 
 
The tendency to view pre-Mahanian British naval policy through post-Mahanian lenses is 
clearly deeply misleading, since apart from its anachronism it also ‘distorts the interpretation 
of events prior to the Naval Defence Act.’32 It may be observed that this interpretation also 
appears to be paralleled by a similar propensity for anachronistically assessing the generation 
immediately preceding the Fisher reforms by post-Fisher criteria. Moreover, more or less 
accepting the claims of naval agitators at face value is dangerous, given the inevitable 
inherent bias involved. The relative strength of the mid-Victorian Navy should be determined 
by assessing whether it was capable of performing the duties required of it, viz. dealing with 
contemporary rivals should a conflict occur. 
 
Throughout the period, and indeed until the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and 
Entente Cordiale, the principle naval rivals to Britain were France and Russia, and 
 
although the British [or at least the British press] were to remain anxious about the 
Franco-Russian naval challenge until the events of 1905, it seems in retrospect that 
they probably overestimated the danger from this direction, forgetting the weakness of 
their rivals and seeing only those in their own fleet.33 
 
This is in fact a somewhat more accurate assessment of the naval situation during the mid-
Victorian era. As far as the Guerre d’Escadre was concerned, considering France as the 
principle navel challenger, this is underlined by the fact that in 1870, the ratio of British to 
French ironclads was 40 to 30 in Britain’s favour: by 1890 this had become 96 to 78, and the 
gap was even wider than the figures suggest, since 11 of the latter were merely small floating 
batteries.34 Stead’s ‘Truth About the Navy’ articles when objectively considered clearly 
contained very little truth about the contemporary naval situation, Kennedy pointing out that 
they were in effect  
 
                                                     
31 Beeler Birth of the Battleship pp.14-15 
32 Beeler British Naval Policy p.3 
33 Kennedy Op. Cit. p.179 
34 Beeler Birth of the Battleship p.20 
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a belated, hysterical, and largely unjustified response to the ambitious French 
replacement shipbuilding of the early 1880s. By the time Stead published, the French 
naval budget, which had climbed rapidly between 1878 and 1883, was on the decline 
again. Discerning spectators were quite aware of not only French aims, but also the 
means used to finance them.35 
 
The most significant word is of course ‘replacement.’ The French building programme of the 
early 1880s was not a matter of naval expansion so much as one of necessity. Many of the 
earliest French ironclads were of wooden construction and quickly wearing out, while the 
extreme pace of technological progress seen during this era meant that by the early 1880s 
their armour was ineffective and their armament incapable of piercing the protection of newer 
vessels. Their date-equivalents in Britain, by comparison, were more likely to be iron-hulled 
and could be effectively employed for a variety of duties even in later years when they were 
no longer first-rank fighting units.36 The vessels of the French replacement programme were 
also financed by a large increase in the French national debt, and a continuation of this would 
have been completely unsustainable over the long term. Given the state of the French 
economy over the period, even medium-term sustainability was out of the question. 
 
In comparison to other nations, the situation was even more favourable, since the Russian 
fleet had few first-class fighting ships by the standards of the 1880s, with Germany and 
Austria-Hungary in a similar position, while the United States was in terms of such types 
nowhere, since its ironclads were all coastal monitors incapable of making ocean transit in 
any kind of safety. The Italian fleet had two impressive first-class fighting vessels in the early 
1880s in the form of the Duilio class, designed by Benedetto Brin, with 4 gigantic 100 ton 
Armstrong built 17in muzzle-loaders in twin turrets mounted en echelon amidships.37 These 
would be joined by the equally innovative Italia class battleships later in the decade, which 
have been described as forerunners of the battlecruisers owing to their heavy armament and 
apparently light protection (for a nominal capital ship).38 However, as Beeler observes, 
                                                     
35 Ibid p.22 
36 The wooden hulled British ironclads were also often better built, with the notable exception of the Lord Clyde 
which was built from incompletely seasoned wood (mostly oak), and fell prey to ‘timber fungus’ 
(presumably a form of dry rot) –see Admiral G. A. Ballard The Black Battlefleet (London: Nautical 
Publishing Co., 1980) p.84 Ballard’s account is not entirely consistent in terms of dates, but otherwise 
his information is sound. 
37 Chesneau & Kolesnik [eds.] Op. Cit. p.340 
38 Ibid p.341 
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‘provocative designs aside, four ships do not a fleet make’, and given the fact that these 
vessel’s predecessors were obsolescent by the 1880s, the Italian navy posed little practical 
threat to the Royal Navy, let alone British interests in a wider sense.39 
 
In no case did naval spending ever approach that of Britain, aside from in France during the 
years mentioned, in which it peaked at some £8.8 million, or around 82 per cent of that year’s 
Estimates in Britain.40 The traditional two-power standard (where Britain was to possess 
naval strength equal or greater than any other two powers combined) was in practical terms 
easily maintained or exceeded, despite the trumpeting of sensationalist press. A further vital 
point to be considered is that even if two rival powers did indeed fight jointly against Britain 
they would have had almost no experience of combined fleet operations: communications and 
signalling would have proven difficult owing to different methods and languages employed, 
while neither France nor Russia, as the most probable rivals, were ever in the position of 
being able to dedicate more resources on their navies when relations with continental rivals 
were at best problematical.41 
 
The entire naval ‘scare’ of 1884 may be assessed as having been manufactured by navalist 
agitators, and was indeed their first major success for some years, although certainly not their 
last. Much of the information that was used in the production of Stead’s articles was 
surreptitiously provided by John Fisher, then a Captain, and was clearly very carefully 
selected and presented to create the desired impression of naval weakness. This coincides 
rather well with Fisher’s famous remark that ‘when I was Controller I had an excellent 
secretary. Whenever I asked him for facts, he asked me what it was I wanted to prove! There 
is no doubt that facts can be most misleading.’42 Despite the facetious humour, Fisher’s point 
is a good one: naval affairs are almost always too complicated to be reduced to simple 
statements, numbers and tables. Whether Stead himself was aware of this or not is 
questionable: he was no more a naval expert than most members of the public, and unlikely 
to recognise that information he was given had been manipulated to produce a desired 
appearance. Whether he would have cared can only be a matter of conjecture, although given 
his proto-tabloid approach, it is probable that he had little interest. Similar assessments would 
                                                     
39 Beeler Birth of the Battleship p.18 
40 Ibid p.22 
41 Kennedy The Rise and Fall… p.179 
42 Richard Hough First Sea Lord: An Authorised Biography of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher (Bristol: Severn 
House, 1977) p.298 
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become a particular annoyance for William (later Sir William) White, both during and 
subsequent to his tenure as Director of Naval Construction (DNC).43 
 
 
Defending the Empire: strategy during the mid-Victorian era reconsidered 
The Royal Navy’s basic functions during the mid-Victorian period were derived, as in any 
other era, from the four elemental attributes of the sea –Till’s graphic reproduction is shown 
in Figure 1.1. The functions themselves can be usefully summarised by the Use of the Sea 
Triangle shown in Figure 1.2, these being the military, diplomatic and constabulary roles. The 
mid-Victorian period was no different to others in that the military role is the ultimate reason 
for the existence of a naval force, the other two forming subsidiary, though still highly 
important functions.44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
43 See W. H. White ‘A Note on “British Ships in Foreign Navies”’ Nineteenth Century: A Monthly Review (May: 
1898) pp.866-867 White would regularly take up this gambit in official correspondence, and in 
professional bodies such as the Institute of Naval Architects 
44 K. Booth Navies and Foreign Policy (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1977) p.16 
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Figure 1.1 Responding to the Four Attributes of the Sea 
 
 
 
Source: Geoffrey Till Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (London: Frank Class, 
2004) 
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Figure 1.2 The Use of the Sea Triangle 
 
 
 
Source: Eric Grove The Future of Seapower (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990) 
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That the British fleet of the 1870s and much of the 1880s was at best heterogeneous is 
generally accepted, and few would attempt to argue otherwise. The era was unique in that the 
introduction and sporadic development of the new industrial age products had thrown 
development and operations into a state of severe confusion.45 Ideally, material should be the 
servant of strategy, and armaments the servant of tactics, as forcibly voiced by Fisher years 
later.46 Unfortunately, this is predicated upon the assumption that the contemporaneous 
materials are sufficiently advanced to allow the pursuit of a desired policy. This was 
manifestly not the case during the mid-Victorian era, when centuries of hard-won experience 
under sail had ‘gone by the board when the fruits of industrialisation were applied to warship 
design in the middle of the nineteenth century.’47 The naval administrators of the period were 
the first to fully confront the phenomenon of  
 
unceasing rapid technological change, a revolutionary, confusing, and often unsettling 
situation… This lack of certainty was equally evident regarding what sort of gun the 
Navy should employ, the type, extent, and thickness of armour, whether armour 
should be used at all, and whether to retain sails.48 
 
These problems severely affected the entire fleet -both the main battlefleet and vessels 
intended for operations on a wider scale. The result of these issues, the fact that the fleet 
lacked the cohesive nature that it would possess in the late Victorian and Edwardian periods, 
and the fact that the era predated Mahan has often been interpreted to mean that little or no 
strategic thinking existed.49 This was far from being the case. 
 
By the 1880s it is clear that the traditional naval rivals to Britain, most especially France and 
Russia, would have been unable in time of conflict to challenge the Royal Navy through the 
strategy of guerre d’escadre and appreciating this fact, increasingly moved toward 
alternatives in which the guerre de course played a significant part. In the case of France this 
would culminate in the rise of the Jeune École.50 In consequence of the fluctuating strategy on 
                                                     
45 Beeler Birth of the Battleship p.204 
46 Admiral Sir John Fisher in Lieut.-Commander P. Kemp [ed.] The Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher: Volume 
1 (London: Navy Records Society, 1960) p.40 
47 Ibid p.104 
48 Beeler Birth of the Battleship p.87 
49 N. A. M. Rodger ‘The Dark Ages of the Admiralty, 1869-85, Part I: “Business Methods”, 1869-74’ in 
Mariner’s Mirror 61/4 (November 1975) p.331 
50 Note that the Jeune Ecole was never adopted as the official strategic approach, though its importance waxed 
and waned with the prevailing political interests 
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the part of its rivals, the British fleet during the mid-Victorian period gradually became an 
amalgam ‘of two forces designed for two largely incompatible, if not wholly unrelated, roles. 
One was suited for national defence and intervention in European affairs, the other was a 
peacetime police force that operated almost exclusively in extra-European waters.’51 
 
This separation can to a considerable degree be traced directly back to Admiral Sir Alexander 
Milne, First Naval Lord 1866-1868, and again from 1872-1876. During his second term of 
office, Milne became increasingly concerned about the danger fast French cruisers, operating 
from bases near main trade arteries, posed to British merchantmen, and this  
 
led him to accept the dual necessity for Britain to deploy cruiser squadrons wherever 
her trade could be threatened as well as having the superiority in ironclads needed to 
blockade the main fleets of the next two maritime powers, France and Italy. Here was 
the germ of the worldwide naval strategy which was the core of Britain’s defence 
posture for the rest of the century and in support of which she was eventually to go to 
war with Germany.52 
 
Milne has been  described as ‘the one flag officer of his generation with a fully developed 
concept of imperial strategy, and the ability to meet national needs with naval forces.’53 An 
outstanding administrator and advocate of a steam navy, ‘his professional interests lay in the 
fields of strategy and tactics.’54 The overall concept Milne devised was an extremely 
aggressive proto-unified strategic approach in which the Royal Navy’s battlefleets would 
immediately on outbreak of war attack opposing fleets in their own harbours. This would also 
deal with a good proportion of possible commerce raiders. Those that remained would be 
countered by cruisers stationed in specific focal areas where shipping density was at its 
highest, which commerce-raiders would naturally tend to concentrate upon.55 This general 
                                                     
51 Ibid p.6 
52 B. Ranft ‘The protection of British seaborne trade’ in Brian Ranft [Ed.] Technical Change and British Naval 
Policy 1860-1939 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977) p.2 
53 A. Lambert, ‘Milne, Sir Alexander, first baronet (1806–1896)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn., May 2009 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/18781, 
accessed 18 Oct 2010] 
54 Ibid 
55 NMM MLN / 142 / 2 Draft report by Milne, 1858. 
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strategic approach would dominate the pre-Naval Defence Act service, and to a considerable 
extent beyond, in theme if not in detail.56 
 
The reason for the division, and the emphasis upon coast-assault with the battlefleets was the 
inevitable product of the rapidly increasing power of naval artillery and the inability of 
contemporary wrought-iron armour technology to keep pace.57 Until the laying down of HMS 
Devastation in 1869 all of the first-class ironclads constructed for the Royal Navy were 
‘cruising’ types, retaining the masts and sails necessary for operations on the high seas during 
the era. Contemporary simple-stage expansion engines were too inefficient to allow practical 
operations outside European waters without auxiliary sail power, above all since a global 
network of coaling stations would not be fully established until the early 1890s. This in turn 
further mandated high freeboard to ensure sufficient stability, a requirement the Captain 
disaster of 1870 emphasised.58 A reasonable freeboard also significantly improved crew 
comfort, an often overlooked matter in maintaining running and fighting efficiency, and sea 
keeping in general, most notably the ability to maintain speed in poor weather or a headway.59 
 
Unfortunately, as the power of naval artillery rapidly increased, it became increasingly 
difficult for such types with their large area of exposed hull and heavy rig to carry sufficient 
quantities of the contemporary wrought-iron armour to withstand assault from the latest 
heavy weapons. The 1871 Committee on Designs of Ships of War that was set up in the 
aftermath of the Captain disaster emphasised this point, remarking that as far as first-class 
types were concerned 
 
We all view with regret what presents itself to the minds of most of us as the 
inevitable failure of the attempt to unite in one ship a very high degree of offensive 
and defensive power with real efficiency under sail... But at present we find ourselves 
compelled to regard the attainment of this very desirable object as an insoluble 
problem, and we believe that our transmarine possessions, and other important 
                                                     
56 Ranft Op. Cit. makes the further point that Milne was a member of the 1879 Carnarvon Commission, which 
strongly supported his general strategic views. Within the context of the era Milne does appear to have 
been justified in many of his views. 
57 The National Archives (henceforth TNA) ADM1/6212 Report of the Committee on Designs for Ships of War 
26th July 1871 (henceforth 1871 Committee) pp.ix–x The Committee stated that in their view there was 
little reason to suppose that even 24in of iron armour plate would remain impenetrable, long term. 
58 Brown Op. Cit. pp. 47-51 
59 Ibid p.214 See further discussion on freeboard during the period 1887–1909 in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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interests in distant parts of the world, will be more efficiently protected by the 
establishment, where requisite, of centres of naval power, from which vessels of the 
“Devastation” class may operate, than by relying upon cruising ships of [such] limited 
fighting power...60 
 
HMS Devastation, a low-freeboard, mastless breastwork monitor, thus ‘marked the 
emergence of the cruising / coast-assault dichotomy as it pertained to first-class vessels.’61 
Following her, only two further masted first-class (cruising) ironclads, Alexandra and 
Temeraire, would be laid down.  Unlike their masted predecessors, which were capable of 
operations on a global scale these new, low-freeboard, mastless monitor-style designs were 
not intended for, and were all but incapable of, operations outside the European theatre. 
Blockade was also impractical owing to their modest endurance and poor sea-keeping 
capabilities, thus the Royal Navy’s battlefleet was optimised as far as possible for coast-
assault duties. This also applied to the euphemistically  titled ‘coast defence’ vessels. These 
have been described as ‘relatively useless.’62 In reality, they too were also principally 
intended for operations against enemy harbours and fortifications.63 The most graphic 
illustration of the service’s intended approach to dealing with opposing fleets in the European 
theatre during the mid-Victorian era occurred during the 1885 manoeuvres, in the twilight of 
the coast-assault era, Hornby 
 
…took his ‘menagerie’ fleet to Berehaven (Bantry Bay) in the south of Ireland, and 
set up a boom stretched across one of the entrances to the Berehaven anchorage. The 
                                                     
60 1871 Committee p.xiv The dissenting voices on the Committee in this regard were Admiral Stewart, Captain 
Hood and Dr. Woolley, who believed first-class cruising ironclads were capable of improvement. Note 
that HMS Monarch was one of the last of the masted first-class cruising ironclads, and aside from the 
unfortunate Captain, the only one of its type in the Royal Navy to carry turrets. 
61 Beeler Birth of the Battleship p.108 
62 D. Schurman The Education of a Navy: The development of British naval strategic thought, 1867-1914 
(London: Cassell, 1965) pp.40-41 
63 Beeler British Naval Policy p.23 Beeler’s suggestion that the offensive capacity of these ‘coast defence’ 
vessels was downplayed to avoid an outcry from the left wing of the Liberal Party seems highly 
plausible, since such an outcry would have likely resulted in a catastrophic split in the party itself. It is 
not unlikely that it would have been of sufficient magnitude to bring down a government. This point 
may be extended into a more general question of whether all of the implications on both national and 
international policy and relations had been fully thought through. To an extent, this may be viewed as 
rather  academic, since as far as the Royal Navy was concerned during the mid-Victorian era there was 
no realistic alternative available owing to the limitations of contemporary material. Nevertheless, the 
Cabinet and Foreign Office would likely have had severe reservations about such an approach, as 
would many others in the country. The protests in the press about the simulated attacks on ports and 
their associated cities and towns of the 1888 Manoeuvres being unrealistic for wider strategic and 
policy reasons is instructive, and lends further weight to the idea that the RN was deliberately 
disingenuous in some of its vessel designations. Further research is needed on this matter.  
 18 
 
attack on the boom by the torpedo-ram Polyphemus simulated an attack on a defended 
harbour, arguably Cronstadt. The boom was defended by four rows of observation 
mines ten yards apart, also 24 field guns and 24 machine guns. At 18 knots speed the 
Polyphemus steered for the boom and avoided four out of the five torpedoes fired at 
her. She swept through spars and steel hawsers without even a momentary check. It 
was a triumphant success.64 
 
Despite the emphasis on littoral warfare, cruising vessels still had major roles with the 
battlefleet. There was still a requirement for scouting vessels since they could at least 
ascertain the presence, numbers, more-or-less exact positions and status of an enemy before 
an assault on a harbour or similar naval base or station commenced. Equally, while it was 
preferable to destroy the enemy in harbour rather than attempt to fight at sea with vessels 
inherently unsuited for the task, it was appreciated that this might not be possible, and 
therefore large cruising type vessels would retain their heavy scouting function, while also 
potentially forming a fast wing capable of enveloping manoeuvres or assaulting the rear of a 
fleeing opponent. This would have had significant value, since many officers expected 
ramming tactics to play a major role in contemporary fleet actions, Lieutenant (later Admiral 
of the Fleet) Gerard Noel stating in his prize-winning essay to the Royal United Services 
Institution that 
 
There can be little doubt of the prominent part that ‘Rams’ will play in the next naval 
battle… All Naval nations must have rams, and must have men who can guide them. I 
would go further and say that all ships ought to be rams, and that all officers ought to 
be practiced in manoeuvring them… no fleet can ignore the enemy’s rams so entirely 
as to expose its broadside to their attack. The first encounter, therefore, between two 
fleets equally anxious to engage, will be most likely from an end-on position.65 
 
Ramming tactics have been ridiculed for many years as a morbid and deeply misguided 
contemporary fascination, but this is short sighted. Although there were many difficulties 
involved, it was essentially the only effective means of sinking an enemy vessel at sea during 
the mid-Victorian era. Contemporary big guns were slow-firing and relatively inaccurate, 
thus they were unlikely to score a hit except at point-blank range. The torpedo of the era was 
                                                     
64 Parkinson The Late Victorian Navy p.58  
65 G. Noel The Gun, Ram and Torpedo [Prize Essay] (London: J. Griffin & Co., 1874) pp.74-76 
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short-ranged, slow and unreliable, while the quick-firing guns that would dominate the 1890s 
and first years of the 20th Century had not yet been developed. Realistically, that left the ram 
as the only available option, and assuming it could be delivered effectively it made, as 
peacetime accidents spectacularly demonstrated, an extremely formidable weapon. As a 
result, many of the tactics and procedures of the era which have also been criticised make 
somewhat more sense if considered in such a context. No less a strategist than Philip Colomb 
would remark in (inevitably prolix) papers addressed to the Royal United Service Institution 
that ‘the serious part of a future naval attack does not appear to be the guns, but the rams.’66 
 
Colomb today lacks the prestige of Alfred Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett, but a case can be 
made that, as Alexander Milne was primarily responsible for the Royal Navy’s strategic 
outlook during the mid-Victorian era, he, along with Sir Geoffrey Phipps-Hornby, Sir George 
Tryon, and some younger officers like John Fisher and Gerard Noel was at least in 
responsible for the Royal Navy’s tactics. The enormously complex Signal Books were also 
largely his creation, and while rightly condemned by many officers and historians over this 
point of complexity, ramming and end-on tactics also suggests a slightly different 
perspective.67 Ramming a ship that did not wish to be rammed in an individual action was 
extremely difficult; in a fleet action, where independent manoeuvring abilities were heavily 
circumscribed for obvious reasons, it became somewhat more practical. Therefore, while the 
Signal Books were overly complex and a cause of many problems, in such an environment, 
the fleet that could maintain the best cohesion and manoeuver most precisely would almost 
certainly be the victor. Within this tactical environment, anything that could disrupt an 
opponent’s cohesion would be an advantage, thus large, swift cruising types engaging in 
flanking manoeuvres, distracting the outer portions of a fleet and potentially causing havoc 
with enemy signalling could play a vital role. 
 
Coast assault, and the popularity of ramming tactics (if only as an interesting academic 
exercise for off-duty officers) only began to dwindle with advances in material; most notably 
the introduction of the triple-expansion reciprocating engine, the widespread use of steel, and 
the development of compound armour. The first of these saw a considerable improvement in 
efficiency and economy for a given weight. Steel allowed for lighter and stronger structures, 
                                                     
66 P. Colomb ‘Modern Naval Tactics’ Journal of the Royal United Service Institute (henceforth RUSI) Volume 
IX (1865) p.22  
67 Gordon Op. Cit. 
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while compound armour, which featured a hard steel face welded to a tough iron back 
provided a substantial improvement in protective ability for a given thickness of plate.68 The 
Admiral class, and the one-off HMS Collingwood on which they were based are often 
considered to be the first step back toward an ocean-going fleet, although they were 
themselves an uneasy compromise, featuring the low-freeboard hull of a coast-assault vessel 
with barbette armament more suitable for seagoing operations.69 This was less-than-ideal, 
since barbettes offered little protection against plunging fire that could be expected from 
shore batteries, while the low-freeboard hull ensured they were unable to maintain high speed 
in a seaway –something that was sharply criticised during the annual Manoeuvres of 1889.70 
Nevertheless, the type for all its faults did indicate a way forward that would later be fully 
exploited, and it was this increasing ocean-going capacity that the 1887 reclassification of the 
fleet reflected. 
 
In the aftermath of the fleet reclassification of 1887 (and the 1889 Naval Defence Act) the 
majority of the earliest, masted high-freeboard ironclads would eventually come to be rated 
as first-class cruisers or third-class battleships.71 Although this could be interpreted as an 
attempt to keep elderly vessels on the active list by down-rating them, their being reclassified 
as cruisers was also highly practical. Since vessels outside the European theatre would be 
unlikely to meet first-class fighting units, the relatively weak armour and armament of these 
early ironclads was not a major handicap. They were also relatively swift, having good sea-
keeping and hull-forms. Indeed, even in 1897 Charles Beresford was still advocating the use 
of ‘four of the armoured cruisers which could be made serviceable and efficient fighting 
vessels if re-armed.’72 Beresford additionally made the case for several of the later masted 
cruising type ironclads that had been classified as 3rd class battleships to be re-armed in the 
                                                     
68 Chapter Two examines the development of armour in greater detail 
69 The original turret was essentially a large armoured pillbox sitting on a turntable. The barbette was subtly 
different in featuring an armoured tube, with the turntable moving only the top plate, with the guns 
affixed to it. As a result it was much lighter, particularly in its original form, when the guns were 
exposed, without any form of shield protection. Only later would armoured shields be added, until the 
weapons were finally fully enclosed in a gunhouse, becoming the modern ‘turret.’ 
70 1889 Manoeuvres Report cited in Parkes Op. Cit. p.319 
71 See TNA ADM 8/166-172; also Gibbs [Ed.] Op. Cit. In practical terms, there was little functional or 
operational difference between these nominal classifications 
72 Captain the Right Honourable C. Beresford ‘On the fighting value of certain of the older ironclads if rearmed’ 
Transactions of the Institute of Naval Architects (henceforth TransINA) Volume XXXVIII (1897) p.199 
The vessels in question were Northumberland, Agincourt, Achilles and Minotaur which were amongst 
the earliest cruising / masted ironclads to be built by Britain, and had been re-rated as cruisers some 
years earlier. By this point, with new modern cruisers built under the Naval Defence Act emerging, 
their value was significantly reduced compared to what it was at the start of the decade. 
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same fashion.73 The subsequent discussion indicated a certain amount of sympathy for 
Beresford, although it is perhaps more interesting to note that there was little in the way of 
advocacy for removing the vessels from the list of Ships in Commission, still less from the 
Fleet Reserve.74 
 
Outside of fleet operations and the European theatre, cruising types also had their traditional 
function of trade defence. As outlined above, the preferred means of achieving this began to 
be developed by Milne around 1858. During his second tenure as First Naval Lord, Milne 
produced multiple memoranda on the subject, in which it was argued that in addition to 
explicitly offensive operations by the main battlefleet some fifty or sixty fast British cruisers 
should be stationed at eighteen specific focal points he identified where shipping density was 
highest, with telegraph stations being extensively employed for the reporting of intelligence 
information.75 Enemy cruisers wishing to attack British trade, Milne argued, would naturally 
gravitate to such locations where shipping was concentrated. Two or three cruisers would be 
stationed at each of the stations identified, the remainder of the fifty to sixty vessels being 
made up of relief and intelligence-gathering vessels.76 
 
Since Milne was a member of the Carnarvon Commission of 1879, he was able to use it as a 
platform to help forward the doctrine he outlined.77 It would be confirmed and elaborated 
upon in 1885 in a report by the Foreign Intelligence Committee ‘The Protection of Commerce 
by Patrolling the Ocean Highways and by Convoy’, which proposed the use of eighty-three 
cruisers and seventy-five mercantile auxiliaries for the protection of trade routes.78 This 
                                                     
73 Ibid p.200 
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Unarmoured Ships for Protection of Trade’ (Copy) 
76 N. Friedman British Cruisers of the Victorian Era (Barnsley: Seaforth, 2012) p.17 
77 B. Ranft ‘The protection of British seaborne trade and the development of systematic planning for war, 1860-
1906’ in B. Ranft [ed.] Technical Change and British Naval Policy 1860-1939 (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1977) p.2 
78 TNA ADM 231 / 6 Foreign Intelligence Committee Report No. 73 ‘The Protection of Commerce by Patrolling 
the Ocean Highways and by Convoy’ May 1885 The report also contained a second, substantially 
reduced proposal for thirty-eight cruisers and thirty-seven auxiliaries detailed to this role assuming the 
majority of the enemy fleet was either successfully destroyed or blockaded. The use of mercantile 
auxiliary cruisers garnered considerable attention from the 1870s onward, one of the most useful papers 
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scheme was viewed as an alternative to convoy, which was believed to have been rendered 
unsuitable for the protection of contemporary shipping for a variety of reasons, which may be 
outlined as 
 
(1) Steam power was not subject to potential delays in dangerous waters, unlike 
sail, which was always at the mercy of the wind, and therefore had far greater 
flexibility in choosing the time and exact route 
(2) The assembly of a convoy could not be kept secret due to modern 
communications techniques, such as telegraph, wireless &c., while the mass of smoke 
would tend to give away its position and draw enemy commerce raiders 
(3) For commercial reasons, too much time would be lost in assembling, and 
unloading cargo owing to a number of ships arriving in port at the same time 
(4) Foreign trade was so much larger than it had been in the past, it would be 
impossible to convoy more than a small percentage of this shipping.79 
 
An additional, uncomfortable reality was that the Royal Navy did not possess cruisers that 
were capable of operating with the fastest merchant vessels, either in terms of speed or 
endurance (a consequence of the differing requirements of naval and mercantile vessels rather 
than any lack of skill on the part of naval constructors).80 Thus, Milne’s concept of focal area 
defence as a part of a wider integrated strategy was seen as the most effective and realistic of 
the available options, though it was not made, or considered suitable for, public consumption. 
The only other alternative, that of patrolling the trade routes with cruisers was rejected as 
impossible on account of the number of vessels it would require.81 
 
Milne’s system would be refined over time, the main later development being ‘to analyse 
trade routes to decide exactly what areas demanded cruisers’ but the basic approach remained 
in essence unchanged.82 In these later refinements, larger first-class cruisers would be 
stationed at the most critical of the identified regions, and / or between several, thereby 
offering potential heavy-support to smaller vessels, or to use their greater range and sea-
                                                                                                                                                                     
by Nathaniel Barnaby ‘The fighting power of the merchant ship in naval warfare’ TransINA Volume 
XVIII (1876) pp.1-23 
79 TNA CAB 17/3 pp.34-35 
80 Friedman British Cruisers of the Victorian Era p.18 
81 Ibid 
82 Ibid 
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keeping capabilities to hunt down escaped raiders. The use of wireless and electric telegraph, 
along with passing shipping for the purposes of intelligence gathering and communication of 
the enemy’s movements would become an increasingly important aspect to the general 
approach. 
 
Although objections have been raised on the grounds that raiders could have transferred their 
activities elsewhere and would have been able to continue their depredations unhindered, this 
fails to account for the fact that foreign vessels engaged in a guerre de course did not possess 
an unlimited coal supply, and were circumscribed in their movements and radius of action by 
the limited number of coaling stations practically available to them. For their voyage to be 
worthwhile, enemy commerce raiders would have had little alternative but to risk entering 
regions where shipping concentrated, in the process markedly increasing their risk of 
interdiction by British cruisers stationed in the area. 
 
The rejection of convoy in favour of focal area defence has been heavily criticised, mostly it 
would appear due to its failure during the Great War 1914-1918 to protect against the U-Boat 
guerre de course. This however ignores the fact that the U-boat’s success was almost entirely 
due to the unique nature of the attacker. In the absence of this, there seems little evidence to 
suggest the strategy, in conjunction with blockade (or, as in the mid-Victorian era, a direct 
assault on the enemy while they were still in their bases) would not have worked. In fact, 
precisely this strategy was successfully used to hunt down German surface raiders during the 
opening months of the First World War: all such surface raiders that had been at sea in August 
1914 had been chased down by December.83 
 
It should be stressed however that not all contemporaries ruled out the convoy system. To be 
sure, quite apart from the technical issues it is clear from the evidence given to the Carnarvon 
Commission that the majority of ship owners and those with commercial interests did not 
wish for their trade to be interfered with in any way by the Admiralty, but while they may 
have held concerns over profit losses if convoy was applied –concerns which, in the 
aspirational Victorian society, were understood, if not necessarily appreciated or agreed with 
by most in the service and elsewhere– nor were they devoid of common sense. In a paper at 
the Royal United Services Institute, Philip Colomb pointed out the sensitivity of commerce, 
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 24 
 
and that in his view, if a naval war were declared and a valuable English ship was known to 
have been captured, many merchants or ship owners would have likely been willing to delay 
their vessels sailing if it was known that this would allow them to travel in company with a 
warship.  
 
…It almost seems that whenever the markets allowed of it the merchant and the ship-
owner would ask for convoy at the hands of the Government just as in older days, 
unless they were well assured that the enemy’s cruizers were entirely masked by our 
own fleets and cruizers.84 
 
A difficulty that cruising vessels faced in the mid-Victorian era was that in addition to being 
able to chase down unarmoured commerce-raiders, they were often also expected to be able 
to deal with opposing ‘station ironclads’ –effectively second-class battleships intended for use 
on foreign stations and challenging for local command of the sea.85 The same technological 
issues which restricted the capabilities of first-class fighting vessels also caused problems for 
these units intended for use on foreign stations. Sail was particularly necessary until the 
development of the triple expansion engine, along with an expansion of the global coaling 
network that could support a wholly steam-powered navy.86 
 
The quandary faced was basically an insoluble one, largely caused by the introduction of armour. The 
traditional approach of designing moderately sized second-class ironclads, and swift, unarmoured 
cruising type vessels to counter their equivalents was turned on its metaphorical head by the 
introduction by foreign powers (notably Russia, and later, France) of swift armoured commerce 
raiders. Station-ironclads lacked the speed to catch this new breed, while the unarmoured vessels, 
though possessing sufficient speed, lacked protection.87 However, since rival nations continued 
constructing station-ironclads, the type could not be completely discontinued.88 As a result, British 
cruising vessels for some years were an uneasy compromise that attempted to address all three of the 
basic roles defined above. HMS Shannon, sometimes called the first armoured cruiser (she was 
                                                     
84 P. Colomb ‘Convoys: are they any longer possible?’ JRUSI Volume 31 (1887/1888) pp.311-312 
85 Beeler Birth of the Battleship pp.198-199 
86 Ibid p.203 
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officially designated as a ‘broadside, armour-belted cruising ship’) in the Royal Navy was a failure 
primarily for these reasons.89 It would not be until the Imperieuse and Warspite of 1881 that any 
significant advance was made, largely through accepting that a general type was impractical and 
placing a greater design emphasis upon the cruiser aspect of their duties.90 Nevertheless, Beeler 
contends that even with these vessels and the seven Orlando class that followed there was still a 
significant desire to produce a multipurpose type capable of tangling with station battleships, and 
points to their thick (but narrow) waterline armour belt as evidence of such wishful thinking.91 This 
assertion seems highly questionable though given that the means of protecting cruisers was a hotly 
debated one, and during the design stages of the Orlandos stages it was in fact discussed whether the 
type should carry a waterline belt of armour plate, or employ the alternative method of utilising an 
internal curved armour deck.92 That the belted type was favoured by the Civil Lord, George Rendel, is 
actually rather more surprising than otherwise since he had himself designed the first recognisably 
modern cruiser (the Esmeralda) when he worked at the Armstrong armaments firm, the key element 
to her success being the use of the protective deck system rather than an armour belt.93 
 
In a tactical sense, most of these vessels would operate individually or in small groups on 
foreign stations in the commerce-protection role, as indicated above, and would only be 
employed in greater force should there be an equivalent to deal with in the vicinity. Single 
ship actions, as may be anticipated, did not emphasise the ram (or the torpedo) as much as 
contemporary fleet actions, since with room to manoeuvre such tactics were largely 
ineffective, assuming the opposing captain was competent at handling his vessel, and the gun 
remained the predominant weapon. Although predating the true Quick-Firer, the lighter 
calibre weapons commonly used were substantially faster firing and loading than the big guns 
of a first-class fighting unit / battleship, and thus more likely to score a hit at modest ranges 
by quantity of fire and the law of percentages. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
89 Brown Ibid p.69 The need for some form of rationalisation of vessel designations becomes obvious. She was 
crewed to the level of a second-class battleship, which in practice, was exactly what Shannon was. 
90 N. Rodgers ‘British Belted Cruisers’ Mariner’s Mirror 61/4 (February 1978)  p.32 
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93 See Chapter Two for a detailed consideration on the subject of contemporary armour types and protective 
schemes 
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The First New Builds 
The first vessels to be laid down as ‘cruisers’  were the four 2nd class Leanders.94 Modified 
versions of the Iris class dispatch vessels, with a 6in Breech Loader (BL) armament and a 
protective deck, these, together with the somewhat adapted follow-on Mersey class, may be 
regarded as the basic model from which all cruisers built for the Royal Navy would be 
derived for the next fifteen years.95 Arguably of more practical significance in themselves, 
and the direct product of the Northbrook programme, were the aforementioned 7-stong 
Orlando class, laid down between 1885-1886, and completed during 1888-1889. These 
vessels were also amongst the first to be specifically designed, laid down and built under the 
‘cruiser’ cognomen.96 
 
On their 5600 ton displacement and 300ft between points, the pretty Orlandos carried two 
9.2in chase guns and ten 6in BL, and were amongst the first RN vessels to be fitted with 
triple-expansion engines, giving a trial speed on the order of 19 knots.97 Figure 1.3 shows an 
elevation and deck plan of the Orlando class from the 1902 edition of The Naval Annual. 
Essentially, they were enlarged versions of the Mersey class with a shallow 10in compound 
armour belt.98 Speaking in his role as Secretary of the Admiralty on 2 December 1884 Sir 
Thomas Brassey placed some emphasis upon the latter feature, humorously commenting that 
the Right Hon. Sir Edward Reed, who was sitting behind him during his speech, would 
doubtless approve.99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
94 HCPP ‘Navy Estimates for the Year 1884 – 85 with Appendix 1884 (76) LI, 1, p.210   
95 Chesneau & Kolesnik Op. Cit. p.75 
96 Ibid p.65 
97 Ibid Note that the design speed with forced draught was 18 knots; all exceeded this specification, although the 
trials speeds were run light 
98 Compound armour consisting of a hard steel plate welded to a softer wrought iron back. See Chapter Two  
99 Hansard: House of Commons vol. 294 c455 (2 December 1884) Sir Thomas Brassey, Secretary to the 
Admiralty 
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Figure 1.3 Elevation and plan of Orlando class cruisers 
 
 
Source: T. A. Brassey [ed.] The Naval Annual, 1902 (Portsmouth: J. Griffin & Co., 1902) 
Plate 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
 
In point of fact, the Orlandos floated approximately 18in deep with the result that the top of 
their narrow armour belt was on the load water-line, and was often somewhat below, 
rendering its protective properties almost worthless, given that it had been provided to defend 
the waterline.100 They were the last British first class cruisers to possess an armoured belt 
until the Cressy class of 1899. Rodger was scathing in his assessment of them, claiming that 
the design of the Orlando class  
 
served to epitomize the faults of the old system of which they were the last products. 
They were the last belted cruisers ever constructed for the Navy, and when armoured 
cruisers were again built at the end of the century, it was to very different models… it 
was no longer sufficient that the Orlandos were a great improvement on their 
predecessors; they were compared with their rival designs, existing and projected, and 
they were found wanting. In particular, the protected cruiser seemed to offer far better 
cruiser qualities for only a notional sacrifice of fighting capacity.101 
 
This view was shared by William White, who, having left the Admiralty at this point for a 
commercial post at Armstrong’s Elswick yard, remarked in January 1885 that ‘The use of 
thick and costly side armour instead of a sloping deck of equal defensive power I think is a 
mistake. The speed is also too low. For equal cost I think we could produce a swifter and 
more powerful ship.’102 
 
A slightly different perspective is provided by the irascible Penrose Fitzgerald who, while 
regarding them as ‘a travesty –a burlesque – of the principles of a belted ship, or 
endeavouring to protect stability or buoyancy by armour’, like former Chief Constructor Sir 
Edward Reed, still favoured side-armour belts for major naval vessels, including cruisers.103 
 
Assessing the Orlandos from a historical perspective is difficult. As Rodger points out, had 
the autumn of 1884 given more time for reflection, they might not have been built to the 
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design they were.104 Although quickly rendered obsolescent, the Orlando class vessels do 
appear to have been at least a reasonable match for contemporary cruisers, and well suited to 
their trade protection role and for use on foreign stations. Despite the major error regarding 
their displacement, which left their protection almost invariably submerged and all but 
valueless, they had a powerful armament for the era and their triple expansion engines 
provided a decent turn of speed and range when coupled with their 900t nominal coal supply: 
exactly what was required for commerce protection. Their successors, the defensive 
protection and the armour belt verses the internal protective deck, along with White’s design 
views and influence are considered in detail in Chapter Two. 
 
 
The mid-Victorian origins in perspective 
The mid-Victorian era had been a period of confusion and conflict wrought by the 
introduction of an array of new technologies, many of which were initially debilitating in the 
strategic and tactical senses. Most significant of these were issues of propulsion, armour and 
armament. For a time, both strategy and tactics by necessity were forced to react to and 
reflect the material realities of the era. The fact that developments in the various major fields 
of warship engines, protection and armament were sporadic, and the pace of change so rapid 
that a vessel could be obsolete on completion did not help matters. The period of confusion 
would end however, and by the mid-1880s, the disparate material technologies had started to 
attain a reasonable level of maturity: these improvements would be quickly seen in a new 
generation of vessels that made a substantial jump in capability over their predecessors. 
Nevertheless, these vessels would owe much to the groundwork that had been laid down, and 
the mid-Victorian Royal Navy was by no means the weak, underfunded, hidebound and 
poorly led force it is still frequently believed to be. Though far from perfect, it was during 
this period that the cruiser-type would gradually emerge in the Royal Navy, and much 
progress was also made in strategic thought, most notably regarding the best means to protect 
the enormous British mercantile fleet and interests. Admiral Alexander Milne established the 
model for trade-defence that would be employed (subject to periodic mild revisions) 
throughout the period covered, and despite the many misunderstandings that have plagued 
this subject, the system of focal area defence appears sound, and would later prove highly 
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effective in the Great War 1914-’18 until a new threat in the form of a submarine guerre de 
course, which had not previously existed, emerged.  
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Chapter 2 
Birth of the Battle-Cruiser: Strategy and Design 1888-1894 
 
 
Chapter One established the strategic, tactical and material origins of the first-class cruiser 
during the mid-Victorian era. Although for many years regarded by historians as a period of 
stagnation in the Royal Navy, with little in the way of strategic thinking and a chaotic 
approach to design, this has been demonstrated to be too simplistic an assessment. Strategic 
thinking there was, but it was to a considerable extent necessarily governed by the material 
realities of the age. To be sure, there was confusion and disagreement amongst senior officers 
and designers, but given the pace of technological change and the lack of naval conflicts from 
which to draw guidance this was an rather an inevitability than otherwise, and much of this 
was a matter of detail, or caused by attempting too much on restricted displacements. 
 
Such periods of uncertainty inevitably end however, and as the new technologies attained a 
reasonable degree of maturity by the final years of the 1880s, so  the strategic outlook of the 
Royal Navy, and that of the  whole nation began a transition toward a more traditional model 
akin to that of the sailing era. Thus began a process which would culminate in the first-class 
cruiser effectively supplanting the ‘traditional’ concept of the line-of-battleship. This chapter 
examines the presence and progression of the type during the period 1888-1894, along with 
several of the key figures involved in their development, most notably being the Director of 
Naval Construction Sir William White. It was in this time that trade defence against the 
possibility of an organised, systematic guerre industrielle received greater interest in response 
to perceived threats from the traditional French and Russian rivals. The various means of 
achieving this, and what type of cruiser would best meet the requirements of the day were the 
subject of much contemporary debate. It was also during this time that the term ‘battle-
cruiser’ was first voiced to describe the new breed of vessels being constructed.1 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Rear-Admiral Samuel Long, Associate, Member of Council ‘On the Present Position of Cruisers in Naval 
Warfare’ TransINA Volume XXXVI (1893), p.3 Note the hyphenation of the original terminology 
employed by Long 
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The Strategic Environment & the guerre de course 1888-1894 
The importance of viewing vessels in their proper context is a perennial issue. As early as 
1888, Director of Naval Construction William White was obliged to point out in discussion at 
the Institution of Naval Architects, that 
 
…it is sometimes forgotten that we do not build our ships to fight other ships of the 
Royal Navy, but must design with reference to what is being done abroad… In 
considering the offensive and defensive qualities which our ships should possess, 
regard must obviously be had to existing vessels of other nations, and to those in the 
course of construction.2 
 
The Royal Navy of the late 1880s, as established in Chapter One, underwent a paradigm shift 
in its approach to strategy. The ironclad fleet of the mid-Victorian era had largely bifurcated 
as a consequence of the limitations of contemporary materials. With the traditional policy of 
close-blockade impossible, the service adopted a strategy of littoral warfare and built 
dedicated first and second-class coast-assault vessels capable of 'slugging it out' with forts, or 
battering their way into defended harbours and destroying enemy fleets still at anchor.3 
Simultaneously, cruising vessels (ironclad or otherwise) capable of seagoing operations on a 
global basis were also required for those duties the coast-assault types were incapable of 
performing, and again, both first and second classes of this type were produced.4 In the late 
1880s, with a degree of technological maturity attained, the coast-assault combatants would 
slowly develop into the seagoing line-of-battleship of the late 1880s, while the cruising 
ironclads would evolve into the first-class cruisers of the post-fleet-reclassification era. 
 
Admiral Samuel Long in 1893 summarised the roles of Royal Navy cruisers during this 
period as falling into three basic categories 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2 William White, in discussion on paper by Captain C. C. Penrose FitzGerald, R.N., Associate ‘On Unarmoured 
Waterlines in Warships’ TransINA Volume XXIX, p.199 Note that White was knighted in 1895 
3 J. Beeler Birth of the Battleship: British capital ship design 1870-1881(London: Caxton, 2003) p.90  
4 Ibid 
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(1) To act as look-out ships or scouts for fleets 
(2) To act independently of fleets for the protection or attack of commerce, as well 
as for distant operations 
(3) To convoy slow steam traders5 
 
The first and second of these are obvious enough, and were accepted by the service as a 
whole; the third point, that of convoy escort, was a rather more contentious matter since 
convoy had, as discussed below and in the previous chapter fallen out of general favour since 
the late 1860s. 
 
At this time, France and Russia formed the principal naval rivals to Britain, as they had 
during the mid-Victorian era and indeed it was taken as axiomatic by the Board that France in 
particular was the major naval opponent to be countered.6 Italy was gradually building or 
acquiring a respectable fleet, but was little threat to British global interests, though it was 
naturally a factor to be considered in the Mediterranean. Much the same applied to Germany, 
and to lesser extent, Austria-Hungary. All possessed vessels of reasonable to good capability, 
but numbers were few, colonial possessions limited, and as continental powers, their strategic 
priorities differed considerably from those of Britain. As had occurred in 1884 however, 
navalist agitation in conjunction with the latest French invasion-scare triggered an even more 
widespread public clamour for naval expansion.7 The on-going British occupation of Egypt 
following the 1882 war was a major source of tension, and it was trumpeted by navalist 
agitators that a major expansion of, or upgrade to the fleet was essential to counter the 
potential threat from across the channel, above all if this was supplemented by support from 
Russia. In material terms, this was at best an exaggeration in the short and medium term, 
though the practical / material realities were somewhat less important diplomatically 
speaking than matters of appearance. The size of the fleet had become ‘politically outdated.’8 
Lord Salisbury, in response to this alleged menace  
 
                                                     
5 Rear Admiral Samuel Long ‘On the Present Position of Cruisers in Naval Warfare’ TransINA Volume XXXIV 
(1893), p.4 
6 C. Lowe Salisbury and the Mediterranean, 1886-1896 London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1965) p.41 
7 J. Sumida In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, technology and British naval policy, 1889-1914 (London: 
Unwin Hyman, 1989) p.11 
8 Lady Gwendolyn Cecil Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury Vol. IV (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1932) 
p.187 
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found himself now compelled to enter England in that race whose progress on the 
Continent had called from him such earnest warnings of danger. At the close of his 
speech he hinted that, apart from the actuality of strategical calculation, the panic of 
that summer had been an evil whose recurrence could not be risked.9 
 
At least some of the agitation for increased naval expenditure can be traced to the influence 
of the armament industry and the related heavy engineering trades that benefitted from naval 
construction programmes. Marder quoted the Iron and Coal Trades Review which on 
Valentine’s day 1902 boasted: ‘There are no interests that have more directly and more 
largely benefitted by our improved navy than the iron and steel industries.’ The Admiralty 
had ‘been like a fairy godmother to the steel and iron industries of the country and to the 
many auxiliary trades.’10 Navalist agitation also coincided with a somewhat improved 
national financial situation. During the first half of the 1880s budgets had been constrained 
by the necessity of paying off loans from the late 1870s that had been taken to cover the costs 
of colonial wars; after 1885 Britain avoided major confrontations with great powers in the 
colonial sphere, and as a result,  
 
…large budget surpluses were thus achieved in the late 1880s in spite of a slight fall 
in the level of revenue. And in 1888, G. J. Goschen, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
put through a conversion scheme that achieved a considerable decrease in the cost of 
servicing the National Debt that was to become effective from April, 1889. By the end 
of the 1880s, it had thus become possible to spend much more on the navy without 
recourse to the politically dangerous alternatives of borrowing or greatly increased 
taxation.11 
 
The Board’s position at this time is interesting, and somewhat equivocal. It has been 
suggested that the naval lords did not believe that there was any requirement for a substantial 
increase in construction, the First Naval Lord Arthur Hood testifying to the 1888 House of 
                                                     
9 Ibid 
10 Arthur Marder The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A history of British naval policy in the pre-Dreadnought 
era, 1880-1905 (London: Frank Class, 1964) p.24 Although his analysis has in many areas been 
overtaken by revisionist authors, Marder’s work on this point continues to carry some weight. 
Certainly, as a matter of enlightened self-interest, the armaments, and wider British industry were 
hardly likely to attempt any cuts to naval expenditure, and the considerable profits this brought to their 
respective companies  
11 Sumida Op. Cit. p.12 
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Commons Select Committee on Navy Estimates ‘that in general, he and the other naval lords 
were satisfied with the strength of the Royal Navy.’12 However, there were almost certainly 
other factors at work. Hood inherently ‘was not enamoured of theoretical speculation on a 
public platform, particularly one set up by Lord Charles Beresford.’13  It is therefore possible, 
or even probable that he was simply playing his cards close to his chest, in a similar way to 
how his predecessor, Cooper-Key may have been on the subject of trade defence some years 
earlier in his evidence before the Carnarvon Commission. This speculation is lent greater 
credence by the fact that in June 1887, the DNC sent a memo to the Board ‘drawing attention 
to the number of ships which were obsolescent, or would become so within the next five 
years. His paper included very detailed proposals for the number and type of replacement 
ships together with planned building schedules, and a detailed estimate of the rate of 
spending.’14 It scarcely seems necessary to point out that Hood was perfectly aware of this, 
and he participated with the rest of the Board in submitting a memo to Cabinet on 1 
December 1888 recommending an extensive construction programme very similar to White’s 
proposals of the previous year.15 In the face of popular support (or at least populist agitation) 
for greater naval expenditure, the proposed programme was further augmented by Cabinet to 
include an extra five cruisers. 
 
The provisions of the Naval Defence Act that directly have been covered by several authors 
and will not be repeated here in great detail.16 In broad terms, the Bill passed by Parliament 7 
March 1889 authorised the spending of £21,500,000 sterling over a five year period  on a 
large programme including ten battleships, forty-two cruisers, and eighteen torpedo 
gunboats.17 This broke down into the following classes: 
 
 
 
                                                     
12 Ibid p.13 
13 A. Lambert ‘Hood, Arthur William Acland, Baron Hood of Avalon (1824–1901)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33966, 
accessed 19 December 2011] ‘Charlie B’ was one of the main navalist agitators of the age. An able 
naval officer at this stage of his career, though a chronic self-publicist a severe personality clash with 
the severe Hood was an inevitability 
14 D. Brown Warrior to Dreadnought: Warship development 1860-1905 (London: Caxton, 2003) p.124 
15 HCPP ‘Navy Estimates for the Year 1888 – 89 with Statement by the Financial Secretary Descriptive of the 
Rearrangement of the Votes and Explanation of Differences.’ 1888 (71) LXVIII, 1 
16 Most notably Marder Op. Cit., , Sumida Op. Cit., and recently, albeit in a rather disorganised fashion, R. 
Parkinson The Late Victorian Navy: The pre-Dreadnought Era and the Origins of the First World War 
(Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2008) 
17 L. Sondhaus Naval Warfare, 1815-1914 (London: Routledge, 2005) p.161; Sumida Op. Cit. p.13 
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Battleships: First Class  7 x Royal Sovereign + 1 x Hood 
Battleships: Second Class  2 x Centurion 
Cruisers: First Class   9 x Edgar 
Cruisers: Second Class  21 x Apollo + 8 x Astraea 
Cruisers: Third Class    4 x Pallas 
Torpedo Gunboats   18 x Sharpshooter18 
 
Also formalised was the traditional ‘two power’ principle beloved of the popular media 
whereby the Royal Navy’s strength was (notionally) established as at least equal to that of 
any two rival nations.19 The eight first-class battleships and arguably the two second class 
Centurions are generally regarded as the backbone of the programme, but the number of 
cruisers included testifies to requirements beyond the pure guerre d’escadre that was then 
making a return to practicality, and that it was appreciated that especially the French and 
Russian rivals set great store by the strategy of commerce-raiding in the event of a naval war 
with Great Britain. The post-1889 service has been described by Parkinson as a ‘cruiser-
battleship navy’ on the basis of spending across the period 1889-1906, and while aspects of 
his financial arguments are distinctly unconvincing, the emphasis laid on the significance of 
cruisers within the contemporary service at least is well-made.20 
 
It is easy to be cynical about some of the political and business interests that ‘encouraged’ the 
NDA; nevertheless the less-easily quantified diplomatic factors are important. Britain needed 
to make a demonstration to prevent rival colonial powers, especially France, the occasion of 
making apparently credible naval threats to gain leverage. A stronger charge is that that NDA, 
far from acting as a deterrent to rival nations, as claimed by Lord George Hamilton, actually 
                                                     
18 Brown Op. Cit. p.125 
19 In reality  Britain’s relative naval strength throughout much of the mid-Victorian era can be realistically 
assessed as substantially greater than a two power equivalent, making the formalised two-power 
standard in effect a downgrade, despite appearing otherwise 
20 Parkinson Op. Cit. p.207 A total of £66.7 million is cited as being spent on cruisers of the first – third classes, 
as against £63 million for first & second class battleships. Given the global nature of the British Empire 
at the time, such sums, essentially confirmed by the Estimates and addenda, contain no real surprises. 
But it is also suggested that the battleship figures were distorted upward by the expensive King Edward 
VII class vessels, and Parkinson argues that if these, and the following two Lord Nelson class vessels 
are discounted from the reckoning, a near 2:1 split on spending between cruisers and battleships is 
revealed: the aforementioned £66.7 million on cruisers, and £45.4 million on battleships. Since the 
King Edward VIIs undeniably existed however, simply deducting them from the reckoning does not 
appear to prove anything of value 
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triggered a naval arms race.21 Certainly given the subsequent French Gervais (some £37 
Million), and Russian construction (£26.8 Million) programmes, this appears to be partially 
true.22 The former most especially was an obvious reply to the British construction. The NDA 
did not receive an immediate successor though, although Hamilton drafted a new programme 
shortly before the 1892 general election. Much of this was suspended even before the 
Liberals under Gladstone came to power (albeit as a minority government), but did result in 
the authorising of the two largest first-class cruisers built to date and the second class 
battleship HMS Renown as part of the 1892/1893 Estimates, and it formed a basic blueprint 
for the Spencer Programme discussed in Chapter Three.23 
 
Throughout the period 1888-1894 the Royal Navy was still faced with the necessity of 
countering two distinct strategic approaches. The 1880s had seen the Jeune École, which 
emphasised the use of vessels such as cruisers, variant forms of gunboats and torpedo boats 
over the traditional guerre d’escadre, gain considerable traction, although this was tempered 
by repeated changes in French naval administration which frequently resulted in alternating 
support of the two strategic concepts.24 By 1886-1887, when its greatest advocate, Admiral 
Hyacinthe Laurent Théophile Aube served as French Minister of Marine, it reached its zenith, 
and thereafter, as a complete concept, began to wane.  This was in part the result of the 
changing material and strategic environment, with the development of new technologies 
(such as the quick-firing gun discussed below), undermining the supposed ability of small 
vessels such as torpedo-boats to attack battleships at sea or stationary in harbour.25 Equally, 
the death of Aube at the end of 1890 deprived the movement of its main figurehead, while the 
publication that year of Captain Alfred Mahan’s seminal The Influence of Sea Power upon 
History 1660-1783 provided strong arguments for the guerre d’escadre in a more easily 
                                                     
21 See for example Sumida Op. Cit. p.16, Sondhaus Op. Cit. p.168, Marder Op. Cit. pp.162-163 
22 Ibid p.247 
23 William Ewart Gladstone, FRS, FSS, Liberal Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on four separate 
occasions, 1868–1874, 1880–1885 1886 (February–July) & 1892–1894. Gladstone was generally 
opposed to increases in the naval estimates 
24 Sondhaus Op. Cit. p.141 
25 Such abilities, although much espoused in certain naval circles, and surprisingly even by Sir Nathaniel 
Barnaby, Chief Constructor / Director of Naval Construction 1872-1885 were never more than 
notional, and most particularly in poor weather conditions. See for example William White ‘Notes on 
Recent Naval Manoeuvres’ TransINA Volume XXXI (1890) pp.2-9 in which the practical sea-keeping, 
speed and fighting capabilities of various types of vessel were discussed at length. White’s remarks on 
the inability of the low-freeboard coast-assault ram HMS Hero to fight her guns in a long, smooth 12ft 
– 15ft swell (p.7-8), are quite graphic. It should be noted in fairness that these were not conditions for 
which a coast-assault ram like Hero was designed, but by the time of her completion the operational 
environment had changed, leaving her without a role 
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accessible form than previous papers on the subject by strategists such as John and Philip 
Colomb.26  
 
Despite this, on an international level the strategy of the guerre de course, which had been 
enthusiastically incorporated into the Young School, did not dwindle to anything like the 
extent many of the other aspects did. It has been stated that France ‘resumed a battleship 
strategy’ from January 1889, with the laying down of the Brennus.27 However, France 
continued building first-class cruisers specifically designed for commerce raiding into the 
first decade of the Twentieth Century, while interest in using converted merchant ships for 
commerce raiding continued.28 In 1888, the laying down of the 6,676 ton Dupuy de Lome 
caused a major furore in certain naval circles.29 The laying down of a first-class cruiser would 
not normally have been an especially noteworthy occurrence, but the Dupuy de Lome was 
notable, and is remembered for, the nature of her protective scheme. Uniquely for the era her 
hull had an extensive coverage of thin steel side-armour plate extending from 4ft 6in below 
the waterline to the upper deck. As a result, and possibly owing to the slow build-time which 
did not see her completed until 1895, she has been described as ‘revolutionary’ and 
effectively categorised with later side-armoured cruisers.30 As is illustrated in the sections 
detailing contemporary protective schemes in first-class cruisers this is a severe 
overstatement of her capabilities, a point well appreciated by the Constructor’s Department 
and the Board, who declined to employ such an armour configuration in cruisers built for the 
Royal Navy. 
 
Two years later in 1890, Russia apparently raised the bar even further by laying down the 
Rurik, a very large side-armoured cruiser of some 10,933 tons (as designed) that, like her 
predecessors, was intended specifically for commerce raiding.31 Russia had taken an early 
interest in commerce raiding, even before the rise to prominence of the Jeune École, and 
                                                     
26 See for example J. Colomb (published anonymously) The Protection of our Commerce and Distribution of 
our Naval Forces Considered (London: Harrison, 1867),  P. Colomb ‘Great Britain’s Maritime Power: 
How best developed…’ JRUSI Volume 22 (1878), ‘Blockades: Under existing conditions of warfare’ 
JRUSI Volume 31 (1887/1888) 
27 Parkinson Op. Cit. p.167 
28 TNA ADM 166 / 866b. Secret. ‘The Protection of Ocean Trade in Time of War’ 31 April 1905, p.45 Copy also 
available NA CAB 17/3 
29 R. Chesneau & E Kolesnik [eds.] Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships 1860-1905 (London: Conway 
Maritime Press, 1979) p.303 
30 Parkinson Op. Cit. p.x; Sondhaus Op. Cit. p.167; B. Ireland Cruisers (London: Book Club Associates, 1981) 
p.29 
31 Chesneau & Kolesnik Op. Cit. p.189 
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from the early – mid-1870s had been designing proto-armoured cruisers (essentially second-
class masted ironclads) for the purpose of threatening British trade.32 The contemporary 
Russian navy as a result has garnered some interest, but despite the dire warnings that 
emanated from navalist agitators the dangers to British commerce were rather more latent 
than actual, given the limited number of these vessels, their poor speed and the fact that they 
would necessarily have to operate from Vladivostok, far from the most heavily travelled 
trade-routes.33 The Rurik however had a considerably greater effect upon contemporaries, at 
least for a short period in the first half of the 1890s. Marder stresses this point, stating that  
early reports on the new Russian vessel nearly created an outright panic in the corridors of 
Whitehall, and  
 
…awakened fear in English hearts, which imagined her as “a roaring sea-lion, going 
up and down the world devouring British traders, and slaughtering out of hand any 
British cruiser that might have the temerity to withstand her.” Well might there be 
alarm in England, for the Russian cruisers were intended to be superior in speed, 
armament and coal supply to all existing first-class cruisers in the British navy.34 
 
The size of the Rurik and the difficulties in ascertaining her exact features (which was rather 
less a matter of secrecy on the part of Russia, but rather the fact that her design was altered 
several times after being approved) all but mandated some kind of British response, which 
emerged in the form of the two enormous Powerful class cruisers considered below.35 Thus, it 
is seen that the strategic necessity of countering both a ‘traditional’ guerre d’escadre and a 
guerre de course determined the nature of the contemporary Royal Navy’s fleet, with the 
newly reinstated (line-of) battleship forming the principal counter to the former, with the 
first-class cruiser forming the mainstay of the latter, with both being supported where 
necessary by smaller types. 
 
Much of the Royal Navy’s strategic approach to countering a possible guerre industrielle can 
be traced back to Alexander Milne, as discussed in the previous chapter. Elements of this 
would be gradually modified in light of the re-established seagoing capability of the 
                                                     
32 See Ibid pp.186-188 
33 John Beeler Birth of the Battleship: British Capital Ship Design 1870-1881 (London: Caxton, 2003) p.26 
34 Marder Op. Cit. p.164 
35 NMM Confidential memorandum ‘New First Class Cruisers Powerful and Terrible: Programme 1893-94’ 8 
February 1893 p.1 Powerful class ship cover 
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battlefleet, which made blockade practical once again, superseding the coast-assault 
dominated approach of the mid-Victorian era. Outside the European theatre however, Milne’s 
basic concept of focal area defence with cruisers stationed in regions of high shipping density 
remained intact. Convoy continued to be out of favour for much the same reasons as it had 
before: the disruption to trade, and the fact that most service cruisers lacked the speed and 
range of the fastest mercantile vessels was believed to preclude it as an effective means of 
protecting commerce. The other alternative system of patrolling trade routes was hardly 
entertained at all, being considered almost completely impractical. As noted though, some of 
the more perceptive naval strategists like Colomb (and Mahan) did not rule out the convoy 
system completely. Admiral Samuel Long was another who did not reject the convoy system 
outright, although he did assume that it would be used in conjunction with other means of 
trade defence.36 Moreover, it is interesting to note that Long suggested that the convoying of 
merchant steamers could be a suitable role for ‘the old battle-ships converted into armoured 
cruisers.’37 Not content however with merely being a rare advocate of the convoy system, 
Long had controversial views on the use of the first-class cruiser away from its primary role 
in the contemporary service as a commerce protector, and he was not afraid to express them 
on a public forum.  
 
 
Samuel Long, the guerre d’escadre, and the birth of the battle-cruiser 
Rear-Admiral Samuel Long died on the morning of 25 April 1893 at his home, Blendworth-
lodge, in Horndean, Hampshire, from head injuries sustained the previous day when he was 
thrown from his horse while riding on the Petersfield-road.38 Although an almost forgotten 
figure today, there are strong indications that he was amongst the most forward-thinking 
officers of his generation. During the early 1880s, while holding the rank of Captain, Long 
contributed three papers to the United Services Institution, where he was a frequent 
participant in discussions, and his entry for the 1880 Naval Prize Essay, which that year dealt 
with ‘Naval Tactics on the Open Sea, with the Existing Types of Vessels and Weapons’ was 
honourably mentioned by the referees.39 Two of his papers dealt with naval strategy and 
tactics, on the blockade and the utilisation of mercantile auxiliaries respectively, while the 
                                                     
36 Long Op. Cit. p.2 
37 Ibid p.10 Long is here referring to the old masted broadside & centre-battery vessels, with their high-
freeboard & ocean-going capabilities 
38 Obituary: Rear-Admiral Samuel Long, The Times Wednesday 26 April 1893 p.5 
39 The Gold Medal for that year was won by [then] Captain Edmund Fremantle 
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third strongly advocated the wider establishment of libraries in major British naval ports for 
the education of naval officers and men.40 At this time like many of his fellow officers, Long 
was a supporter of the ram, in conjunction with artillery, and the growing though still limited 
use of the torpedo. Where he and some other relatively young reformers (with whom he 
appears to have been on good terms) such as Gerard Noel, Edmund Fremantle, Cyprian 
Bridge, Arthur Wilson, John Fisher and to an extent Philip Colomb differed was in the depth 
of thought they brought to tactical considerations, and how the new weapons of the machine 
age might best be used.41  
 
Long’s progressive views for the torpedo in particular provided a solid basis for later stages 
of his career. On 2 September 1884 he was appointed to the new ‘coast defence’ battleship 
HMS Agamemnon, and spent approximately the next 18 months lurking on the China Station, 
setting off from Colombo on the return journey to Malta on 9 March 1886.42 Long would be 
officially posted to the torpedo-school HMS Vernon from the 23 of that month, from thence 
to become Captain-Superintendent of Pembroke Dockyard on New Year’s Eve, 1888.43 At the 
time of the 1891 Naval Manoeuvres, during the second half of which he commanded the Red 
Squadron, he was naval ADC to Her Majesty, and he was promoted Rear-Admiral 7 
September of that year.44 During the late 1880s until the time of his death, he was a regular 
attendee at the meetings of the INA, and seems to have known the DNC reasonably well, 
occasionally supporting him in debates following various papers,  and explaining the reason 
for his absence for a paper read by Lord Brassey.45  
 
                                                     
40 ‘The Tactical Aspect of the Utilisation of Ocean Steamers for War Purposes’ RUSI, Journal 24 (1881) pp.415-
444; ‘Study of the Tactics of Naval Blockade as Affected by Modern Weapons’ ‘RUSI, Journal 25 
(1882) pp.316-349; ‘On Libraries considered as Subsidiary to Education, and on the Best Means of 
Diffusing Information among the Officers and Men of Her Majesty’s Navy’ RUSI, Journal 28 (1885) 
pp.515-551 
41 A useful handle is to loosely describe them as the ‘Gun, Ram and Torpedo’ school, after the title of the 1874 
Junior Naval Professional Association prize essay, won by Gerard Noel’s remarkable entry, printed in 
book form accompanied by another on the same subject by John Knox Laughton, and an intriguing 
shorter piece by Lt. Charles Campbell 
42 The Times, Wednesday 3 September 1884, p.7 & Monday 6 March 1886, p.10 The Agamemnon, was well 
suited to the China station, since she drew relatively little water –a subject considered in greater detail 
in Chapter Four. Long, and Agamemnon did have a role in a minor diplomatic incident;  shadowing the 
Russian cruiser Vladimir Monomakh she entered Yokohama on 15 May 1885 to find the Russian vessel 
readied for action, with guns tracking. See TNA ADM 1/6713 Agamemnon (Long) to C-in-C China 
Station 
43 The Times, Tuesday 23 March 1886, p.10 & Tuesday 1 January 1889, p.4 
44 The Times Monday 20 July 1891 p.11 & The London Gazette Tuesday 8 September 1891 
45 White had been called to Winsor 
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The 1891 Manoeuvres marked something of a turning point for the Royal Navy since in 
previous annual exercises ‘the contending fleets had been unavoidably made up of 
heterogeneous elements ; and their composition bore but a faint resemblance to that of the 
fleets likely to be organised in war.’46 For 1891, it was appreciated that more homogenous 
force-structures needed to be employed, to better reflect the realities of a naval conflict. 
Moreover, methods of torpedo-boat warfare needed further exploration owing to the 
considerable emphasis laid upon such operations by France.47 While the traditional concept of 
close blockade was waning, an ‘observational blockade’ variation on the theme, established 
via the use of cruisers and forward flotilla bases was being developed.48 The Manoeuvres for 
1891 comprised two separate sets of exercises examining the aforementioned areas. Long’s 
Red Squadron in the second set of Manoeuvres comprised the ironclad ram Hotspur, and the 
two early ‘armoured cruisers’ Shannon and Northampton, forming a ‘skeleton’ armoured fleet 
open to, and capable of defending itself against, assault from torpedo-boats. Since a major 
component of these exercises was to investigate the effect of offensive action against torpedo-
boats themselves, to these three large armoured vessels were attached the new 3rd class 
cruiser Barracouta, and the torpedo-gunboats Seagull, Spider, Skipjack, Gossamer and 
Rattlesnake, acting as ‘torpedo-boat catchers.’  
 
Long’s force, particularly the third ‘Detached Squadron’ of Skipjack, Seagull and Gossamer 
which was to take the war to the ‘enemy’s’ waters ran rampant through much of the exercise 
area, in both operations against vessels at sea and in harbour.49 Grimes, in his summary of the 
exercises, states that they were a ‘clear demonstration of the potential ineffectiveness of the 
torpedo-boat when confronted by an offensive British response.’50 This is true enough insofar 
as it goes: the value of taking the offensive against enemy torpedo-boats (under contemporary 
conditions) rather than relying on passive or local defences to handle them was indeed a 
major finding; however, it was also noted that deductions concerning the value of the boats 
should not be taken too far, and that under night-time conditions, torpedo-boats stood a better 
chance carrying out a successful assault, or at least emerging from one unscathed.51 From the 
                                                     
46 TNA ADM 231/20 NID Report No.288 December 1891: Report on the 1891 Manoeuvres p.11 
47 Ibid pp.11-12 
48 See S. Grimes Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918 (Edinburgh: Boydell, 2012) pp.21-
40 
49 Report on the 1891 Manoeuvres pp.31-42 provide a summary of Long’s Red Squadron activities during the 
exercises  
50 Grimes Op. Cit. p.24 
51 ADM 231/20 Report on the 1891 Manoeuvres p.40 
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NID report on the 1891 Manoeuvres and his lectures to institutions like the RUSI and INA it 
is apparent that Long was an progressive thinker, an aggressive commander and an excellent 
tactician, but one who also valued and wished to encourage initiative in his subordinates: a 
flexibility reminiscent of Sir George Tryon. Although some of this in 1891 was necessarily 
enforced by the rules of the Manoeuvres and the division of the force he had under his 
command, the Red Squadron’s success combined with the written evidence suggests it fell 
naturally to him, as a commander with an overly rigid approach to tactics and signalling 
procedures would be unlikely to have done as well, or, in all probability, be selected for this 
particular command. The following year, he was Umpire for the annual Manoeuvres, along 
with Admiral Sir Noel Salmon and Rear-Admiral Sir Walter Kerr.52 
 
Following his promotion, it appears that Long wished to recommence his literary activities, 
and it was in the brief period before his premature death that he would produce his two final 
papers. The first, again before the Royal United Services Institution, was a careful assessment 
on the impact of the new quick-firing gun on naval tactics and construction.53 It is likely that 
Long’s recent experiences operating with torpedo-boats provided considerable operational 
perspective on the use of such weapons by, and against, small-craft, but the paper’s primary 
utility was the extension of the views into the probable use of them against larger vessels, 
especially cruisers and battleships. A study of the subsequent discussion on the paper is quite 
illuminating, since, though at first glance the reception appears to have been mixed, a closer 
examination reveals a basic agreement with Long’s fundamental point: that the high rate of 
fire brought by QF guns was having a significant impact upon naval tactics, construction, and 
even wider strategy.54 Some of the points raised by Long are considered later in this chapter, 
in the section on the rise of the Quick Firing gun.  
 
The second of the two papers opened the spring 1893 session of the Institution of Naval 
Architects, just a month before his death. ‘On the Present Position of Cruisers in Naval 
Warfare’ was in part a historical study, evidently inspired by the works of Alfred Mahan, John 
Knox Laughton, and John and Philip Colomb.55 The paper was also an extremely perceptive 
assessment of the genesis of the cruiser to date, how they might develop in future, and how 
                                                     
52 TNA ADM 231/22 NID Report No.332 March 1893. Report on the 1892 Manoeuvres p.13 
53 Rear Admiral Samuel Long ‘An Attempt to Estimate the Probable Influence of the Introduction of QF Guns 
on Naval Tactics and Construction’ Royal United Service Institution, Volume XXXVI (March 1892) 
54 See discussion on Ibid  
55 Rear Admiral Samuel Long ‘On the Present Position of Cruisers in Naval Warfare’ TransINA Volume XXXIV 
(1893), p.2 
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the roles and functions of different classes of cruisers were (or should be considered) distinct 
from each other. The three general categories of work Long suggested cruisers would 
undertake in wartime have already been quoted at the beginning of this chapter. It is his 
proposals for the use of the first-class cruiser with fleets that marks out Long’s paper as one 
of the most forward thinking works of naval strategy of the late-Nineteenth Century.  
 
Long assessed that, as of early 1893, the largest cruisers were no longer constrained by 
‘traditional’ roles set out –the attack and protection of commerce, or functioning as scouts for 
a battlefleet- but were in fact usurping some of the roles of the battleship itself, a view also 
held by an increasing number of professional constructors and naval officers internationally. 
To that end, and in consequence of the wide range of dimensions and fighting capability, he 
proposed in the most significant passage of his paper that a new designation should be 
employed for such vessels:  
 
Cruisers as a class comprehend a great variety of ships with displacements varying in 
our own navy from the Blake of 9,000 tons to the Pearl of 2,575… Such a 
conspicuous difference in the size and offensive powers of cruisers points to the 
necessity of carefully distinguishing between the parts allotted to them in war, and 
would, it appears, justify attaching the name of battle-cruisers to many of them, such 
an extension of classification appearing to meet the facts of the day, and to assist in an 
accurate distribution of the fleet.56 
 
Long’s following remarks, which clearly set out the reasoning behind the new designation, 
contain an element of near-prophesy:  
 
…it is possible first-class or battle-cruisers may be attached to fleets to play the part 
assigned by Lord Howe to his fast-sailing battle-ships on May 28, 1794, so well 
described by Captain Mahan. In fact, it seems not impossible that offensive power and 
speed may be developed in future battle-ships at the expense of armoured protection.57 
 
Similar views had been expressed before (both for and against) in debates on fleet 
manoeuvres and vessel design in the course of the previous decade, but had rarely been quite 
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so clearly stated in public.58 Captain S. Eardley-Wilmot was one who had in print, and in 
reference to the large Blake class vessels, remarked that when cruisers were built of such 
large dimensions, and carrying such a quantity of offensive and defensive equipment, they 
were evidently not far removed from battleships.59 Eardley-Wilmot’s comment provides 
additional evidence that some forward-thinking senior officers in the Royal Navy were by the 
early 1890s already considering the first-class cruiser as an equal of (if not yet quite a 
replacement for) the line-of-battleship. Indeed, Eardley-Wilmot’s remarks actually pre-date 
Long’s INA paper, although whether the latter had read Eardley-Wilmot’s book, or discussed 
the matter with him can only ever be a matter of speculation. On balance, it seems possible, if 
not probable, since Eardley-Wilmot had served as Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, 
1887-1890.60 Similar ideas were also being mooted in other nations; in Italy, Insp. Eng. 
Benedetto Brin created the two remarkable Italia class vessels, often considered distant 
precursors of the dreadnought-battlecruisers.  
 
There is little indication that such a capacity was investigated during the Royal Navy’s annual 
Manoeuvres during the first years of the 1890s, primarily due to the relative lack of modern 
first-class cruisers (other than a handful of Orlandos, many of which were on foreign 
stations) than any unwillingness to explore vessel capabilities or their potential.61 As a result, 
the majority of cruisers employed during the exercises until the mid-1890s were second and 
third-class vessels, which aside from performing scouting and dispatch duties were 
occasionally deployed with light-craft, especially torpedo-boats to  simulate attacks on fleets 
in their own harbours.62 The few first-class vessels available did however occasionally make a 
significant when operating against smaller types, notably Blenheim in 1893.63 
 
Long had been assisted by Fisher, then Third Naval Lord and Controller of the Navy, in the 
preparation of his 1893 INA paper. This was stated to have been purely on the technicalities 
of coal endurance and consumption of certain vessels, although given that both men had a 
considerable appreciation for the first-class cruiser, it is unclear whether their views were 
                                                     
58 See for example Rear-Admiral Edmund Freemantle ‘Speed as a Factor in Naval Warfare’ RUSI, Journal 32 
(1888/1889) pp.117-133. Also Captain [later Admiral] S. Eardley-Wilmot The Development of Navies 
during the Last Half-Century (London: Seeley & Co. Ltd., 1892) p.259 
59 Eardley-Wilmot Ibid 
60 The Times, Monday 14 February 1887, p.10 
61 The Blake and Edgar classes were still under construction, and would not start to complete until 1892 onward.  
62 See Grimes Op. Cit. p.24 Largely an emulation of contemporary French strategy and tactics (the continuing 
influence of the Jeune Ecole) and establishing the best means of countering such assaults 
63 Detailed in the subsection on the Blake class below 
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developed independent of each other, or if there was an influence in either direction or both.64 
The designation of ‘battle-cruiser’ and Long’s concept of fleet operations for them did not 
meet with universal approval at the INA. The DNC in the discussion that followed expressed 
severe reservations with the term, remarking that the term ‘battle-cruiser’ seemed to him to be 
a self-destructive title unlikely to find favour, since contemporary cruisers, however large, 
were ‘intended for detached and separate service, and to be more capable of single-ship 
action than action with a fleet, although they may assist in such actions.’65 This was likely the 
first use of the term ‘battle-cruiser’, and it seems probable that the vessels referred to by this 
were, in addition to the two Blake class vessels cited, the Edgar class cruisers: reduced 
Blakes which had all been launched, and were completing at the time the paper was 
delivered.66 Long concluded his paper with a summary of six key points worth stating in full: 
 
(1) There exists, in fact, a class of cruisers analogous to battle-ships. These might 
advantageously be termed “battle-cruisers.” 
(2) That speed and coal endurance are qualities of primary importance in cruisers, 
and should be associated with high freeboard ; but that the fighting qualities should 
never be diminished below those of corresponding vessels of other nations, but, if 
necessary, resort should be had to increased displacement. 
(3) If a quantitative estimate may be hazarded, the minimum sea speed now 
acceptable should be 20 knots, and the coal supply sufficient to last a minimum of 
seven days, 20 hours each day, at 10 knots and four hours at chasing speed, besides 
enough to proceed to and from the base at 10 knots and fight an action. 
(4) That powerful cruisers at the end of a telegraph wire will be more conducive 
to sea power than numerous small ones, where ocean routes are concerned. 
(5) That subsidies should be given to steamship companies for all vessels 
maintaining a sea speed of 21 knots. 
(6) That the convoy of slow merchant steamers is likely to form an important 
feature of naval work in war, and would be a more effectual and economical means of 
                                                     
64 Long Op. Cit. p.6 
65 William White, in discussion on Ibid p.34 White later revised his views on the use of cruisers, reflecting 
developments in armour that occurred in the mid-1890s. See Chapter 3 
66 Chesneau & Kolesnik Op. Cit. p.66 
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protecting trade, by ensuring the simultaneous presence of war-ship and 
merchantman, than any other at present contemplated.67 
 
Long’s early death robbed the Royal Navy of a progressive thinker with a practical approach 
to naval strategy and tactics as well as material. Judging from the positions he held, had he 
lived, it is probable that he would have become at least a member of the Board and a more 
influential figure in the history of the Royal Navy as a result. 
 
 
Sir William White –Director of Naval Construction 1885-1902 
William Henry White was born at Drews Cottage in Devonport, Sunday 2 February 1845, the 
third and youngest son of Richard and Jane White.68 Following a breakdown in his father’s 
health he was nominated for the entrance examination at Devonport Dockyard by Mr. Miles, 
an alderman of Devonport and the owner of the private school for boys in Morrice Square the 
young William attended.69 Passing this entrance examination in March 1859, White became a 
shipwright’s apprentice, occupying ‘the highest position on the list of a large number of 
competitors, and throughout the whole of his scholastic career he invariably occupied that 
position among students of his own seniority, and sometimes stood higher than students of 
longer service.’70 In 1864 he entered the newly established Royal School of Naval 
Architecture as the most senior of the eight shipwright apprentices appointed in that initial 
year.71 Three years later, he was appointed to the Admiralty Staff under Chief Naval 
Constructor Sir Edward Reed.  
 
White’s early career was distinguished, and saw him working closely with both Reed and 
Reed’s successor, Nathaniel (later Sir Nathaniel) Barnaby in the Constructor’s Department, 
garnering a considerable reputation as an assistant, an inspector, a designer, and cemented the 
                                                     
67 See Long Op. Cit. p.12 
68 Frederic Manning The Life of Sir William White KCB, FRS, LLD, DSc (London: John Murray, 1923) p.1 
69 Ibid pp.1-3 
70 ‘Obituary Notice: Sir William Henry White, K.C.B., LL.D., Sc.D., F.R.S., D.Eng., Honorary Vice President’ 
TransINA Vol. LV (1913) p.244 Manning Op. Cit. p.3 mentions that White was too slightly built to pass 
the mandatory medical examination that was part of the entrance examination, a situation his elder 
sister remedied by packing his boots with blotting paper to increase his height by the necessary fraction 
of an inch. Since such tales are by no means uncommon, and a medical examination might be 
reasonably supposed to take place sans footwear, the veracity of this story is questionable, although 
given White’s relatively diminutive frame, it is at least theoretically possible. 
71 David K. Brown Warrior to Dreadnought: Warship Development 1860-1905 (London: Caxton, 2003) p.123 
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respect with which he was regarded by his extensive work on vessel stability. This was a 
comparatively new scientific field; the basic principles had been established by Atwood 
during the late 18th century, but owing to the difficulty involved in the calculations they were 
rarely employed until F. K. Barnes published ‘A new method of calculating the statical and 
dynamical stabilities of a ship’ at the Institution of Naval Architects in 1861, in which he 
introduced both a layer correction to compensate for differences in volume between the 
immersed and emerged wedges, and radial integration.72 Ten years later at the Spring 1871 
meeting, White produced in conjunction with William John what would be the first of some 
twenty papers at the Institution, detailing the methods employed for calculating the curves of 
stability displayed in a preceding paper by Barnaby, and practical lessons to be derived from 
these.73 He also published during 1877 his classic textbook A Manual of Naval Architecture, 
which was sporadically revised over time in order to remain up to date.74 In 1882 however, he 
was lured away from public service by Lord Armstrong, joining his company as head of 
warship building at the Elswick shipyard on the Tyne.75 
 
At the time of White’s arrival, Armstrong’s had under construction what is often regarded as 
the first ‘modern’ (viz. sans sails) protected cruiser, the Esmeralda, designed by White’s 
predecessor George Rendel for the Chilean navy.76 During his time at Elswick, as well as 
considerably expanding the yard and its facilities, White designed numerous examples of the 
famous Elswick cruisers for various foreign navies as diverse as Italy, Austria, China and 
                                                     
72 K. C. Barnaby The Institution of Naval Architects 1860-1960: An Historical Survey of the Institution’s 
Transactions and Activities over 100 Years (London: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects in 
Association with George Allan & Unwin, 1960) p.27 
73 See W. White & W. John ‘On the Calculation of the Stability of Ships and some matters of interested 
connected therewith’ TransINA Vol. XII (1871) pp.77-127 In essence, the significance of the work to 
this point by Reed, Barnes, Barnaby, White & John was to demonstrate that establishing the initial 
metacentric height, or calculating the righting force (GZ) at a single relatively small angle of 
inclination was not a sufficiently accurate guide to vessel stability. For that a GZ curve showing the full 
range of righting levers was necessary 
74 W. H. White A Manual of Naval Architecture (London: J. Murray, 1877) 
75 ‘Obituary Notice: Sir William White’ TransINA (Op. Cit.) p.247 Brown (Op. Cit.) also provides some 
comparative figures of White’s income; his total Admiralty salary had been £651, including £51 fees 
from the Royal Naval College. At Armstrong’s, this increased to £2,000, plus 2/ -per ton of warship and 
1/ -per ton of mercantile  vessels built. Both were of course supplemented by income from work he did 
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76 Philip Watts ‘Elswick Cruisers’ TransINA  Vol. XLI (1899) p.286 White was essentially headhunted for the 
position  by Lord Armstrong following the departure of Rendel, who was widely respected as a naval 
architect. Rendel’s resignation from the company was primarily caused by Armstrong appointing 
Andrew Nobel, with whom Rendel had a mutual antipathy, sole manager of the Ordnance Department. 
Although rarely referenced by naval historians  (likely because he was never in public service) Rendel 
was undoubtedly an excellent cruiser designer; the Esmeralda is ample testament to his capabilities and 
there seems no reason to suppose that he would not have continued to produce vessels of a high quality 
if he had remained at Elswick. 
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Japan.77 It was at Elswick that White’s talents as a designer were first given free reign since 
he had, within the obvious constraints of fulfilling the client’s requirements, far fewer 
restrictions than was the case for public officials designing vessels to conditions laid down by 
the Board of Admiralty. Nevertheless, while employed by Armstrong, he maintained strong 
contact with and interest in Royal Navy  vessels, and regularly analysed them both in light of 
his own views and for the purposes of comparison with vessels he and Armstrong’s produced 
for their foreign naval clients. His opinion regarding the Orlando class of belted cruisers has 
been given in Chapter One. Further confirmation of this particular case is provided by his 
lengthy remarks in the discussion of John Biles’s 1887 Institute of Naval Architects paper 
‘Comparative Effects of Belted and Internal Protection upon the Other Elements of Design of 
a Cruiser’: 
 
…I took the trouble to see what could be done on the dimensions of the Orlando 
class, provided that I passed from vertical armour to the other system. I found that a 
ship of exactly the same size, with the same armaments, the same engines –nothing 
changed, excepting the system of protection, might take on board 200 tons more coal, 
and would cost £20,000 less, than the belted ship.78 
 
This paper, and the subsequent discussion (White’s contribution, as DNC, being particularly 
significant) is one of the most valuable primary sources from the era in which professional 
naval architects and naval officers discussed the offensive and defensive properties of 
cruisers and the methods thereof. The paper, the belted, and ‘the other system’ of protection 
are examined in detail later in this chapter. 
 
Upon the retirement in 1885 of Sir Nathaniel Barnaby from the post of Director of Naval 
Construction, the First Lord, George Hamilton, decided to re-organise the Controller’s 
departments and persuaded White to return as DNC in a complicated arrangement which 
included the release of Philip (later Sir Philip) Watts by the Admiralty to take White’s place at 
Armstrong’s.79 The vast reorganisation proposed by White, and which was largely carried out 
                                                     
77 These included the Dogali, Geovanni Bausan, Naniwa Kan, Takachiho Kan, Chih Yuan, Ching Yuan, Panther 
and Leopard See Watts Ibid. 
78 William White, in discussion of J. H. Biles ‘Comparative Effects of Belted and Internal Protection Upon the 
Other Elements of Design of a Cruiser’ TransINA Volume XXVII (1887) p.356 
79 Brown Op. Cit. White was however, not unreasonably expected to remain available for consultation on 
designs to which he had contributed for a five year period. It appears that he did not hesitate in 
returning to the Admiralty, despite the significant drop in salary that this entailed. Barnaby resigned 
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intact after being approved by the Ritchie Committee, transformed the Dockyards into the 
fastest builders of naval vessels in the world, testifying to his formidable managerial 
abilities.80 It should be emphasised however that White had many advantages denied to his 
predecessor Barnaby: along with advances in material, he had the good fortune to work in a 
political climate that was willing to increase naval expenditure, a consequence of the popular 
navalist agitation already referred to.81 Without the increased levels of funding, provided most 
obviously through the Naval Defence Act and Spencer Programme, White would have been 
far more restricted in terms of what he was able to achieve with individual vessel types. As it 
was, he held, particularly during the first years of his tenure as DNC, a remarkably influential 
position, and he used it to encourage both British industry and experimentation.82 The scope 
of his authority was not dissimilar to that held by Reed during the 1860s, rather higher than 
his immediate predecessor Nathaniel Barnaby, who, notwithstanding claims to the contrary, 
was heavily circumscribed by Board requirements, and it would also seem substantially 
greater than that of his successor, Philip Watts. White however possessed a level of tact 
completely alien to Reed, ‘who relished controversy as most do food and sleep’, and with the 
benefit of new technologies unavailable to his predecessors and a good understanding of 
these was therefore in a rather stronger position to press his own views.83 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
ostensibly on health grounds, although his grandson would later claim Sir Nathaniel was tired of 
constantly arguing with Sir Edward Reed, who was married to his sister, and who enjoyed nothing so 
much as attacking Admiralty vessels 
80 The reorganisation programme of 1885 itself is outside the purview of this thesis, but is covered in a generally 
even-handed fashion by Manning Op. Cit. Chapter XV pp.213-231 White’s return to the Admiralty, 
although widely welcomed, was not without a degree of controversy, mostly caused by the terms of his 
departure from Armstrong’s, and the clause of his being available to consult on vessels which he had 
designed during his time at Elswick. Armstrong’s surrendered their right to White’s advice on such 
matters in 1886 following representations that the somewhat ambiguous position made him vulnerable 
to attack from adversaries  (despite the terms having been made clear by the First Lord in Parliament). 
81 Marder Op. Cit. pp.24-29 Marder places significant stress on the role of the armament industry, and that of 
related trades in the big-navy movement, a point that later historians have not dwelt upon quite as 
much. However, the figures Marder provides for shareholder dividends and net profits over the period 
clearly demonstrate the level of commercial interest involved, and it would be naive to ignore this as a 
contributory factor in addition to other aspects already discussed 
82 White assisted with the Resistance experiments, which are considered under vessel protective schemes later in 
this chapter. He also was active in encouraging British armament and related manufacturers, with a 
particular interest in the iron and steel industry, and those companies producing armour:  see the 
discussion following the paper by Mons. J. Barba ‘Recent Improvements in Armour Plates for Ships’ 
TransINA Volume XXXII (1891) pp.160-161 Barba’s paper was not well received, being described, not 
without an element of justification by T. Vickers as ‘a trade puff’ Ibid p.151 However, it was the 
catalyst for an interesting debate on the merits of various types of contemporary armour, the tests 
performed, the companies involved, and the positions of particularly the British manufacturers, as well 
as the involvement of the Admiralty and Constructor’s Department 
83 John Beeler Birth of the Battleship: British Capital Ship Design 1870-1881 (London: Caxton, 2003)  p.127 
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In his Staff Monograph on cruiser development Commander Spencer King-Hall classified the 
period 1888-1902 as ‘The Period of Constructors materialism.’84 The DNC’s department, he 
asserts, was extremely powerful under White, who had an excellent grasp of naval strategy 
and tactics, and did for the Board what the naval officers could not, or would not do for 
themselves.85 An examination of the ship covers and Admiralty records though suggests this 
is an exaggeration. As well as being a superb designer and administrator, White certainly had 
an excellent understanding of the strategic and tactical contexts in which vessels would 
operate –at least as good as his naval colleagues. Since the Board were perfectly well aware 
of this, they were often happy to go along with him and reap the benefits of his expertise; 
nevertheless, he did not invariably get his way. Discussing the Royal Sovereign class 
battleships, he stated outright that while he was the responsible designer, they were ‘ships of 
the Board of Admiralty. It must not be supposed –and I want to emphasise this– that I 
personally approve of everything in these ships.’86  
 
Throughout his tenure, White strongly favoured first-class vessels, both in terms of 
battleships, and cruisers. Although it is often implied that he preferred small vessel types 
(Fisher in later years inaccurately remarked ‘Sir William White designed the County Class 
[sic.] but forgot the guns’), this was far from being the case.87 White had no illusions at all 
about the limited value of second class types, and the rapid obsolescence often entailed in 
their construction. Equally however, he had no use for large dimensions purely for their own 
sake, and believed that balance in warship design was critical if they were to be effective 
vessels.88 As Director of Naval Construction from 1885-1902, he was the responsible designer 
of no fewer than forty-seven first-class cruisers for the Royal Navy, these being 
 
 
                                                     
84 TNA ADM 116/878 Commander S. King-Hall ‘The Evolution of the Cruiser’ Naval Staff Monograph, 1928. 
The period 1888-1902 was evidently selected to cover all of White’s first-class cruiser designs, from 
the Blake class (ld. 1888)  to the Devonshire class (ld. 1902) 
85 Ibid 
86 William White in discussion following his paper ‘On the Designs for the New Battleships’ TransINA Volume 
XXX (1889) pp.209-210 The fact that White needed to say this though gives a good idea of the degree 
of influence he was believed to exert  
87 Robert K. Massie Castles of Steel: Britain, Germany and the Winning of the Great War at Sea (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 2004) p.203 Fisher was principally referring to the Monmouth class, and is inconsistent 
with his prior held gunnery views –equally, as referenced, and discussed later in the chapter, White 
designed the Monmouths to meet Board requirements, more or less on sufferance; they did not 
accurately reflect his own views 
88 Sir William White ‘Notes on the Armaments of Battleships’ Transactions of the Society of Naval Architects 
and Marine Engineers (henceforth TransSNAME) Volume XVIII (1910) p.15 
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2 x Blake class 
9 x Edgar class 
2 x Powerful class 
 8 x Diadem class 
 6 x Cressy class 
 4 x Drake class 
 10 x Monmouth class 
 6 x Devonshire class 
 
Arriving at the Admiralty to wide (though not universal) approbation, the later years of his 
incumbency saw increasing criticism of many of the vessels, and particularly the first-class 
cruisers, for which he was responsible. These criticisms, as demonstrated in this and 
following chapters were largely based on inaccurate premises, but they tarnished his 
reputation, which suffered a further blow when the new Royal yacht, Victoria and Albert III 
almost capsized after fitting out. The latter had been caused by excessive top-weight having 
been worked into her unbeknownst to the DNC, severely reducing her metacentric height.89 
White’s health, which had been sporadic for several years, broke down and he requested early 
retirement. This was granted and he departed the Admiralty on 31 January 1902, according to 
Lady White’s melodramatic assessment ‘a broken-hearted, disappointed, and worn-out 
man.’90 
 
White almost certainly had suffered a nervous-breakdown, partly brought on by over-work 
and the increasing number of attacks made upon him and the designs for which he was 
responsible. However, after a few months recovering, it appears that his intellectual facilities 
were little diminished and he travelled extensively, maintaining the global network of 
contacts which he had established throughout his career. It is said that in retirement he 
strongly opposed the introduction of the all-big-gun types due to bitterness and resentment at 
the supposedly revolutionary new vessels that rendered his own work obsolete. This is not an 
accurate assessment of White’s views however, and such simplistic assumptions do him 
considerable disservice. He was undoubtedly bitter about the end of his career in public 
service, and criticisms directed at him and the vessels he was responsible for based on 
                                                     
89 Oscar Parkes British Battleships: A History of Design, Construction and Armament (London: Leo Cooper, 
1990) p.347 This was compounded, as Parkes notes, by the fact that she had been floated out with 
almost empty bunkers and water in only three of her boilers 
90 Manning Op Cit. p.445 
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inaccurate premises. However, he was far from the retrogressive he is sometimes made out as 
being. He had no objection to the steam turbine, and had always kept abreast of the latest 
technological developments, encouraging them where it was practicable for him to do so. He 
was also, contrary to popular myth, happy to accept a greater number of heavy guns in first-
class battleships and heartily endorsed the superimposed barbette configuration introduced by 
the Americans in the Michigan class battleships.91 Nonetheless, he also maintained that 
adding extra weapons without proper consideration given to their fields of fire, blast effects, 
restrictions on magazine and machinery layouts &c. was misguided, and that a powerful 
secondary battery of quick-firing guns was a valuable feature that should not be casually 
discarded.92 It is difficult to object to any of these points in principle, and when many of the 
early all-big-gun types are considered, it is apparent that White’s criticisms often had 
considerable validity. Some examples of these are considered in Chapter Five. His private 
correspondence and contributions to various journals and societies continued to be 
voluminous until his death from a stroke.93 
 
With the benefit of historical perspective, Sir William Henry White played a critical role in 
the development of the Royal Navy for almost four decades. He helped advance the science 
of naval construction, assisted with ground-breaking scientific work on vessel stability, 
encouraged the British metallurgical and engineering industries, significantly improved the 
administration and efficiency of the Royal Dockyards, and produced some of the finest 
warships of the era, including, as covered in Chapter Three, what amounted to a new type 
which for a brief period nominally usurped the position of the battleship itself as the most 
powerful contemporary naval vessel.  
 
 
The Blake and Blenheim 
The two Blakes were the first major cruisers designed by White when he returned to the 
Admiralty as Director of Naval Construction. Laid down in 1888 they pre-dated the Naval 
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based upon rather more practical considerations of protection, fire-control, and wider strategy and 
tactics. These points are considered in more detail in Chapter Five 
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Defence Act, being a part of the proposed construction programme for 1888-1892 based upon 
the probable wastage of the Navy during those years.94 
 
The elegant Blake and Blenheim were the largest and fastest cruisers in the world at the time 
of their design, being 375ft between perpendiculars with a load displacement of 9,150 tons, 
and possessed remarkable range for contemporary naval vessels. Figure 2.1 shows the right 
elevation and deck plan of the class. It is probable that White and the First Lord saw them ‘as 
built-for-purpose (and hence more satisfactory) equivalents of liners converted into cruisers, 
capable of running down and killing foreign fast converted liners.’95 These were, during the 
mid-late 1880s, considered a serious threat as commerce raiders owing to their possessing 
higher speed and greater range than most contemporary cruisers. It would not be until the 
Great War 1914 – ’18 that this was finally disproven.  
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Figure 2.1 
Blake class cruiser deck-plan and side-elevation 
 
 
Source: T. A. Brassey [ed.] The Naval Annual, 1902 (Portsmouth: J. Griffin and Co., 1902) 
Plate 4 
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The Blakes were the first examples of first-class cruisers designed for the Royal Navy 
employing the protective deck system, rather than external armour plate. The subject of the 
protection and armour of first-class cruisers during this period is of such significance that it is 
examined at length below. In the case of the Blakes, their internal curved armour deck was 
3in thick on the flat and 6in on the slopes, the crown of the deck being 18in above the load-
water-line, curving down at the sides to end 6ft 6in below the load-water-line, 12in armour 
being added to the Conning Tower (CT). The Blakes had a design maximum smooth-water 
speed of 22 knots with the objective of achieving a continuous sea-speed of 20 knots.96 
Nominal coal capacity was 1,500 tons, with a maximum of 1,800.97 Coal ‘was to be provided 
for 6 ½ days at 20 knots or 80 days at 10 knots.’98 
 
Two sets of vertical triple-expansion reciprocating engines were provided in tandem on twin 
shafts, and like many vessels of the late 1880s, the Blakes were designed to exploit closed-
stokehold forced-draught. By raising the air-pressure with a fan in a stokehold where the only 
means of exit for the air was through the grates, and thence to the uptakes, significantly 
higher furnace temperatures and power-outputs could be obtained.99 The compromise was 
that the high temperatures also could result in the generation of steam within the boilers, 
lifting the water away from the surface of the tubes, with the result that the latter could 
quickly overheat and start to break down and leak.100 Primarily owing to this, forced draught 
was regarded with deep suspicion by many in the Royal Navy, even being described ‘by a 
gallant officer as “an invention of the evil one”’.101 It was however supposed to be used only 
for short periods when maximum power was necessary; for example when chasing down a 
commerce raider. Initially neither vessel quite attained the target trials speed, mainly owing to 
problems attaining the maximum design power from the engines, but both proved capable of 
high sustained sea speeds and later exceeded 22 knots with forced draught fully employed.102 
 
                                                     
96 Ibid 
97 NMM Undated handwritten memorandum on new cruisers by White, pp.11-12 Blake class ship cover 
98 Brown Op. Cit.p.135 Also see Ibid for notes during design stages 
99 L. S. Robertson [trans. & ed.] Marine Boilers: Their construction and working dealing more especially with 
tubulous boilers. Based on the work by L. E. Bertin (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1906) pp.72-72 
& 75-76 
100 Chesneau & Kolesnik Op. Cit. p.66 
101 Quoted by William White in ‘Notes on Recent Naval Manoeuvres’ TransINA Volume XXXI (1890) p.14 
102 Ibid After 1892, the maximum permissible margin between natural and forced draught in service vessels was 
set to 25 per cent (the Blakes, had up to 60 per cent forcing available –see Friedman British Cruisers of 
the Victorian Era p.323) 
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On account of their size, the Blakes were described by some contemporaries as ‘monsters.’103 
Carrying two 9.2in guns in single turrets on forecastle and poop, they were originally 
intended to be fitted with eight 6in breech loading rifled (BLR) guns between-decks.104 In 
light of early experiments on the old ironclad Resistance, this was changed during 
construction to ten 6in quick-firing (QF) guns, with four weapons being moved to the main-
deck and provided with armoured casemates, ‘the first appearance of this feature which 
would become typical of White’s ships.’105 Both ships completed in 1892, with Blenheim 
nominally being placed into reserve until May 1894.106 Despite this status she participated in 
the 1893 Manoeuvres, and was in fact the first of the new generation of first-class cruisers 
designed under White to do so, forming part of Vice-Admiral Fairfax’s ‘Red Side’.107 The 
overarching object of the Manoeuvres for that year was very simply stated as being  
 
On the part of one side to obtain command of the sea between Great Britain and 
Ireland and on the other side to prevent it.108 
 
The terminology and general concept reflects Philip Colomb’s views on naval strategy, where 
‘Command of the Sea’ is the dominant strategic concept or ‘aim of naval war’, and whose 
book, Naval Warfare had been published only weeks after Mahan’s in 1891.109 Taking place in 
the relatively narrow seas allowed a junction of fleet divisions within range of opposing 
torpedo-boat flotillas to be simulated –a key factor in any projected conflict with France in 
particular.110 The stronger Red Side was to endeavour to bring the Blue to action, and to 
report when command of the sea had been gained ‘so that a large expedition may be sent 
across it.’111 A component of ‘A’ Fleet’s primary ‘Group a’, Blenheim was highly regarded, 
Fairfax stating that  
 
                                                     
103 Sir William White ‘Presidential Address’ ProcICE Volume 3 (1903) p.158 
104 Manning Op. Cit. p.224 
105 Chesneau & Kolesnik Op. Cit. p.66 
106 TNA ADM 8/172; see also the Blake class ship cover 
107 TNA ADM 231/23 Admiralty [nee ‘Naval’] Intelligence Department Report No.372 Report on the 1893 
Manoeuvres February 1894 p.9 
108 Ibid p.24  
109 P. Colomb Naval Warfare: Its Ruling Principles and Practices Historically Treated Volume I (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1990) p.47 Original publication by W. H. Allan & Co. of London, 1891 
110 Report on the 1893 Manoeuvres February 1894 pp.7-9. See also Grimes Op. Cit. p.25 
111 ADM 231/23 1893 Manoeuvres p.25 
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It is hardly possible to speak too strongly of the value of this ship to a fleet. She was 
always ready for any service, with a great command of speed, large coal capacity, and 
power to make her presence felt immediately.112  
 
During these exercises, which took place 27 July – 6 August, Blenheim was regularly 
detached as a heavy scout, using her speed and firepower to drive off and later overwhelm 
opposing smaller second and third-class class cruisers and torpedo-boats. When later 
operating with the main fleet, she was stationed ahead to provide cover and heavy support for 
the smaller second-class Apollo cruisers.113 These activities clearly fall within the classic first-
class cruiser or battle-cruiser functions (the latter term having been largely coined for her and 
her sister), and are the first overt example of such operations with the new vessels. The 
opposing fleets did not meet during the Manoeuvres, and the lack of other first-class vessels 
(the only other modern first-class cruiser in Red fleet being Narcissus of the Orlando class, 
which was suffering from problems with her low-pressure pistons) evidently precluded any 
chance of using her as a fast wing. Three years later Blenheim, along with two second-class 
Astraea cruisers, was classified as a ‘battleship’ for the purposes of the 1896 Manoeuvres.114  
This was to make up numbers though and not to explore possible uses in a fleet action; 
should such occur, the rules laid down that it would be decided purely on superiority in 
battleship (or simulated battleship) numbers, cruisers not affecting the issue.115 There was 
once again a considerable emphasis on smaller craft, particularly the latest types of destroyer 
then becoming available, and which were replacing the torpedo gunboats of the first half of 
the decade.116 The following year, she and her sister were heavily used in the annual 
Manoeuvres, this time in their proper ‘cruiser’ guise, functioning as heavy scouts for their 
battlefleet and supporting smaller second-class types.117 
 
 
The Edgar class 
Of the forty-two cruisers laid down under the Naval Defence Act, the backbone was formed 
by the nine first-class Edgars. In many essentials, they were cut-down versions of the 
                                                     
112 Ibid p.58 
113 Ibid pp.60-74 & 89-92 Her commander during the Manoeuvres was Captain William H. Hall, the previous 
(first) DNI. 
114 TNA ADM 231/27 Admiralty Intelligence Department Report No. 474 Report on the 1896 Manoeuvres p.17 
115 Ibid p.12 
116 Grimes Op. Cit. pp.27-28 
117 See Chapter Three 
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preceding Blake and Blenheim; a continuation of a recurring theme whereby the Board would 
tend to order a small number of a large type, and follow it with a larger number of somewhat 
smaller vessels. This was repeated over an extended period, the seven 5,600 ton Orlandos 
following two 8,500 ton Imperieuse class vessels, the nine 7,700 ton Edgars following the 
two 9,150 ton Blakes, and the eight 11,000 ton Diadems following the two 14,200 ton 
Powerfuls.118 
 
The original concept for the design was to combine the hull, machinery and protection of the 
Vulcan, a torpedo-boat carrier and depot ship with many cruiser features of which White was 
exceedingly proud, with the armament of the Blakes.119 Ultimately, the hull needed to be 
slightly lengthened to 360ft between perpendiculars, 10ft more than the Vulcan to ensure the 
20 knot design speed, but otherwise the basic design intentions were achieved. Figure 2.2 
shows the elevation, deck plan and cross-section of the class. On 7,700 tons, they carried the 
same 9.2in and 6in armament as their larger predecessors, being the first RN first-class 
cruisers to be designed from the outset with casemate protection for the QF guns.120 The class 
appear to have been considered good sea boats, particularly Crescent and Royal Arthur, 
which completed with a raised forecastle, and twin 6in QF in place of the single 9.2in of their 
sisters.121 All proved good steamers; running in 12 fathoms off Stokes Bay, Edgar achieved 
20 ½ knots with 13,260 I.H.P. In deeper water off Falmouth, 21 knots was obtained with 
12,550 I.H.P., confirming they amply exceeded the design requirements, and the resistance of 
shallow water.122 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
118 Note that the displacement figure given for the Edgars is generalised to being that of the Crescent and Royal 
Arthur, the nominal load draught of the remaining seven vessels being 7,350 tons. See Chesneau & 
Kolesnik Op. Cit. pp.64-68 
119 Friedman British Cruisers of the Victorian Era p.221 
120 NMM ‘Improved “Mersey” or modified “Vulcan” –Outline design for’ dated 7/88 Edgar class ship cover 
121 Brown Op. Cit. p.135 The covers of successive classes at the NMM, and the Admiralty records at the NA 
confirm that White, as Brown notes, regularly used these two vessels as examples of the need for 
adequate freeboard, both during and after his time as DNC 
122 Edward L. Attwood War-ships: A textbook on the construction, protection, stability, turning etc. of war 
vessels (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1904) p.258 
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Figure 2.2 
Edgar class cruiser deck-plan, side-elevation and cross-section 
 
Source: T. A. Brassey [ed.] The Naval Annual, 1902 (Portsmouth: J. Griffin and Co., 1902) 
Plate 4 
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Like the Blakes, and the successive Powerful and Diadem classes, the Edgar class were 
primarily intended for the trade protection role, although they too could realistically have 
been employed with fleets as heavy scouts and support for smaller cruisers if required. They 
continued the trend begun by White with the Blakes for British first-class cruisers to employ 
a complex protective deck system rather than a thick external waterline belt of steel or 
compound armour, or a more extensive coverage of thinner side-plating. The curved 
armoured deck was 2 ½in thick on the flat crown, and 5in on the slopes, 6in plating being 
added around the cylinder heads which protruded above the deck, while 12in steel was used 
for the CT, as it had been in the Blakes.123 Several of the class saw extensive use early in the 
First World War, notably on the blockade north of Scotland, although the prevailing 
conditions indicated that even the raised forecastle vessels had inadequate freeboard for such 
duties.124 
 
Compared with roughly contemporary French cruisers, which they were principally intended 
to counter (such as the Amiral Charner class) they had approximately double the bunker 
capacity, were several knots faster, and carried a heavier armament easily capable of 
penetrating the soft steel armour plating of the French vessels.125 Their protective scheme, 
was, in the context of the contemporary gunnery environment, and like all the British first-
class cruisers of this period, far more effective than is often appreciated, covered in the 
following sections. 
 
 
The age of the quick-firer 
During the late 1880s, a revolution was taking place in naval artillery. The preceding decade 
had seen the final transition from muzzle to breech loading, and was largely dominated by the 
big gun. This tendency has been criticised owing to the inaccuracy and slow rate of fire of 
these weapons, but since the vessels were largely littoral combatants, and expected to engage 
at very short range, this would have been somewhat less of an issue than is often believed.126 
With the transition back toward engaging other vessels and the increasing perceived threat of 
the torpedo-boat, this tendency moderated, and there was a greater interest in providing an 
auxiliary armament in both battleships and cruisers.  This went hand-in-hand with the 
                                                     
123 Friedman British Cruisers of the Victorian Era p.221 
124 Brown Op. Cit. p.136 
125 Chesneau & Kolesnik Op. Cit. p.66 & p.304 
126 See Chapter 1, also the referenced works of John Beeler 
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development and introduction of new types of propellant, with slower, more predictable 
combustion. Cordite Mk I, composed of 58% nitro-glycerine, 37% guncotton and 5% 
Vaseline was adopted in 1889. Although not perfect, causing considerable wear in the gun 
bores, this was an acceptable compromise compared to the previous Prismatic powders and 
Slow Burning Cocoa (SBC).127  A considerable improvement in the accuracy of guns of all 
calibres was the result. 
 
The rise of the auxiliary armament and the quick-firing gun is often linked directly to 
countering small torpedo boats which were regarded in the Jeune École as a realistic and 
cheap means of countering (nee ‘destroying’) battleships.128 Although this is partially true, it 
is far from a complete explanation of the contemporary gunnery environs. While the smaller 
QF guns remained primarily as a counter to torpedo-craft, the larger weapons had a different 
purpose, and initially arose out of the shrinkage of total armoured area in many major vessels 
over the previous decade.129 While this matter was more or less successfully addressed by 
different naval constructors in new vessel designs, the QF batteries remained, as it had been 
recognised that in the gunnery conditions of the era, without any effective means of fire-
control, the faster-firing guns were the only weapons that realistically stood a chance of 
hitting anything in the initial stages of an action, whether a fleet (as would be the likely case 
with battleships) or single-ship (for which first-class cruisers were intended) by virtue of their 
sheer volume of fire.130 Rear-Admiral Samuel Long, in his paper of 29 January 1892 ‘An 
Attempt to Estimate the Probable Influence of the Introduction of QF Guns on Naval Tactics 
and Construction’ at the Royal United Service Institution, stated that in his view rapidity of 
fire was more important at sea, where moving bodies were concerned, than on land, the 
power to repeat a shot instantly before the vessels have much changed their position being 
likely to produce much more effective firing.131 
 
Thus, rate of fire was directly related to the effective firepower of the vessel. This became 
even more marked following the development by Captain Percy Scott of HMS Scylla (later 
                                                     
127 Parkinson Op. Cit. p.135-136 
128 Ibid p.142 
129 William White, in discussion on Captain C. C. Penrose FitzGerald ‘Side Armour Verses Armoured Decks, 
from a Naval Point of View’ Royal United Service Institution, Journal 29 (1885/1886) p.87 
130 Eric Grove Fleet to Fleet Encounters (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1991) p.14 
131 Long An Attempt to Estimate… p.235 
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HMS Terrible) of continuous aim techniques.132 This reduced errors caused by the inevitable 
lag in reaction time by the gunner, and increased the rate of fire since there was no longer any 
delay while waiting for a set point in the roll.133 In practice, a strong case can be made for the 
batteries of medium calibre weapons being the primary armament of contemporary first-class 
battleships and cruisers.134 Long further remarked his belief that guns of this type would form 
an important feature in battleship armament, and the main armament of most cruisers, the 
significant increase in the rapidity of fire being likely,  
 
…in the opinion of many Officers, to have more influence on sea fights than the 
increased power of the guns which has been so marked a feature in all navies since the 
Crimean war.135 
 
This view was concurred with in other nations. The Admiralty Intelligence Department 
summarised a criticism on the British Navy published in the spring of 1892, that the heavy 
guns were becoming the ‘reserve’ portion of the armament, to be used for their ‘crushing 
effect when a favourable opportunity occurs.’136  The value of rapidity of fire was if anything 
more significant for a first-class cruiser than it was for their battleship contemporaries, since 
they were more likely to be engaging in single-ship actions, at higher speed, with greater and 
less predictable manoeuvring on both parts. 
 
From relatively small machine-guns, the QF gun rapidly grew in size and power; in Britain, 
this was primarily led by the armaments manufacturer Sir W. G. Armstrong and Company. 
Initial steps away from light types created a 4.7in weapon, which was quickly developed to a 
45lb projectile from an initial 30lbs.137 The nominal advantage with QF weapons was the 
much simpler loading arrangements. In the smallest types ammunition could be made up like 
a rifle cartridge, rather than with separate powder and projectile; in larger types, the projectile 
was separate, but loading arrangements were much eased by the use of a cartridge for 
                                                     
132 Norman Freidman Naval Firepower: Battleship guns and gunnery in the dreadnought era (Barnsley: 
Seaforth, 2008) p.19 See also Chapter Five 
133 Ibid 
134 It would remain so until it finally become possible to fire the big gun accurately at long range; it must be 
recalled that HMS Dreadnought herself did not really possess the fire-control facilities that would 
allow such until around 1909 
135 Long An Attempt… p.233 
136 TNA ADM 231/21 Admiralty Intelligence Department Report No.312 July 1892 
137 Eardley-Wilmot Op. Cit. pp.190-191 Also The Naval Annual by Lord Brassy (Portsmouth: Griffin & Co., 
1887) p.453 
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carrying the propellant, and the 4.7in weapon was claimed to be capable of some ten aimed 
shots per minute.138 In Admiralty trials at Shoeburyness in 1888 ‘an Armstrong 4.7-inch QF 
fired ten aimed rounds in 47.5 seconds, compared with 5 minutes 7 seconds for the current 
“issue” weapon.’139 These 4.7in weapons were extensively employed in second-class cruisers, 
and replaced during the late construction stages the 5in BL weapons the Trafalgar class 
battleships were originally intended to be equipped with.140 They were also employed in the 
two Centurion second-class battleships White designed as part of the provisions of the Naval 
Defence Act. 
 
The last mentioned have some relevance to this thesis, since they were intended for duties not 
dissimilar from those of first-class cruisers, and they perfectly illustrate the QF dominated 
gunnery conditions of the era, where in the absence of effective fire-control, volume of fire 
was the dominant factor. The Centurions are little regarded today, on the principle that ‘time 
has shown that the construction of second-class ships merely to avoid expenditure is false 
economy.’141 White, as previously noted, did not care for second class vessels, and on balance 
they have been (somewhat grudgingly) justified by historians on the basis that they were 
intended for operations in the Far East, and while not capable of fighting first class 
battleships, they were an effective counter for the large and rather slow cruisers often 
stationed in the region (notably by Russia).142 However, many contemporaries saw the matter 
in a rather different light, with numerous naval officers preferring them to the first-class 
Royal Sovereigns.143 Although the 4.7in may be thought relatively insignificant, the extremely 
high volume of fire they lent the Centurions (and any other vessel so equipped) would have 
been quite capable of devastating the unarmoured or lightly-armoured upper works of many 
contemporary opponents, particularly if employing powder-filled or high explosive (HE) 
shell. This then, was the principle use for the large batteries of QF guns carried by 
contemporary battleships and cruisers. 
 
                                                     
138 Ibid p.190 
139 Bernard Ireland Cruisers (London: Book Club Associates, 1981) p.26 Under combat conditions the rate of 
fire would undoubtedly have been far lower, but the figures suffice to demonstrate the increased 
firepower the QF gun provided 
140 Chesneau & Kolesnik Op. Cit. p.31 
141 Parkes Op. Cit. p.366 
142 Brown Op. Cit. pp.131 –see also Chapter Four for a review of the China Station and cruiser operations in the 
region 
143 Manning Op. Cit. p.274 
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From 4.7in, a 6in QF weapon was developed, and this was the gun, in its three marks (the 
inevitable I, II, and III), which would come to dominate contemporary RN gunnery. Figure 
2.3 shows an Armstrong’s built 6in QF gun with shield, projectile and cartridge[s].  
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Figure 2.3 
Armstrong-built 6in QF gun with shield, projectile and cartridges 
 
Source: Captain S. Eardley-Wilmot The Development of Navies During the Last Half-
Century (London: Seeley & Co. Ltd., 1892) pp.190-191 
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In principle akin to a scaled up 4.7in weapon, again with a separate projectile and brass 
cartridge which contained the propellant and primer in its base, the 6in QF had a rate of fire 
of some 5-7 aimed rounds per minute. In this weapon the zenith of the true QF piece was 
reached; although larger weapons could be fired with respectable rapidity, the 100lb projectile 
of the 6in was the practical limit of what could be physically loaded without the rate of fire 
rapidly falling off through crew-exhaustion.144 On average, compared to previous breech-
loaders, the new QF guns, when firing at a target were capable of discharging in a given time 
approximately six times the quantity of ammunition.145 As Long, citing Sir Andrew Noble  
remarked: 
 
“I need not impress upon you the significance of these facts, or the importance of 
quick-firing armaments, especially if firing shell, possibly charged with high 
explosives, against the unarmoured portions of cruisers or other vessels.” 
Naval Officers will readily acknowledge the truth of this statement when the large 
area of unarmoured structure to be found even in armour-clad vessels is considered.146 
 
The vessels primarily under consideration in this chapter (viz. the Blake, Edgar and Powerful 
classes) were all equipped with the 6in QF as their ‘auxiliary’ armament, coupled with single 
9.2in weapons fore and aft.147 As in the battleships, the mixed calibre armament was generally 
favoured in first class cruisers as the 9.2in with its 380lb projectile and high velocity provided 
considerable extra destructive and armour piercing capacity. Their position, effectively as 
chase weapons of old, meant that slightly longer-range fire could be attempted, although 
range-finding would be difficult under such conditions. The real value of including the 9.2in 
guns was their utility in lengthy stern-chases, where the slow range-rate and bearing changes 
would allow for somewhat more accurate longer-range fire, while the additional punch would 
be useful closer in, finishing off crippled opponents. As illustrated in the section covering the 
Powerful class, this view of maintaining a mixed-calibre armament was not universally 
accepted though. 
 
                                                     
144 Eardley-Wilmot Op. Cit. p.191 
145 Sir Andrew Noble writing in ‘Engineering’ (as Captain A. Noble) 12 September 1890 Also cited by Long, An 
Attempt pp.233-234 
146 Long An Attempt p.234. Long’s citation is from Noble, in ‘Engineering’ 19 September 1890 
147 With the exception of two of the Edgar class vessels, Crescent and Royal Arthur, which were equipped with a 
high[er] forecastle and carried two 6in in place of the fore 9.2in. See Chesneau & Kolesnik Op. Cit. 
p.66 
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Given the dominance of QF weapons, the armament of the first-class cruisers can be 
objectively assessed as little weaker than that of their battleship contemporaries since the 
Admiralty policy was to give these vessels a quick-firing armament identical with that 
adopted for first-class battleships of the same date.148 Indeed, since the 9.2in gun was capable 
of penetrating most armour at sub-3,000yrd battle-ranges typical of the era, and was faster-
firing, the armament of the first-class cruisers may be assessed as an equal or superior outfit 
under certain conditions. Table 2.1a & 2.1b give a simple breakdown of the numbers of QF 
weapons carried in Royal Naval 1st class vessels of the late 1880s – early 1890s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
148 Sir William White ‘The Principles and Methods of Armour Protection in Modern War-ships’ in T. A. Brassey 
[ed.] The Naval Annual 1904 (Portsmouth: J. Griffin and Co., 1904) p.121 
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Table 2.1a 
Armament of British first-class cruisers 1888-1905 
Class Chase / heavy guns –No. & 
Calibre 
QF guns –No. & Calibre 
Blake 2 x 9.2in 10 x 6in 
Edgar 2 x 9.2in* 10 x 6in 
Powerful 2 x 9.2in 12 x 6in 
Diadem N/A 16 x 16in 
Cressy 2 x 9.2in 12 x 6in 
Drake 2 x 9.2in 16 x 6in 
Monmouth N/A 14 x 6in 
Devonshire 4 x 7.5in 6 x 6in 
Duke of Edinburgh 6 x 9.2in 10 x 6in 
Warrior 6 x 9.2in 4 x 7.5in 
Minotaur 4 x 9.2in 10 x 7.5in 
*Note: Crescent & Royal Arthur = 1 x 9.2in & 12 x 6in QF 
 
Table 2.1b 
QF armament in British first-class battleships 1888-1905 
Class Chase / heavy guns –No. & 
calibre 
QF guns –No. & Calibre 
Royal Sovereign 4 x 13.5in 10 x 6in 
Renown* 4 x 10in 10 x 6in 
Majestic 4 x 12in 12 x 6in 
Canopus 4 x 12in 12 x 6in 
Formidable 4 x 12in 12 x 6in 
London 4 x 12in 12 x 6in 
Duncan 4 x 12in 12 x 6in 
King Edward VII 4 x 12in, 4 x 9.2in 10 x 6in 
Swiftsure** 4 x 10in 14 x 7.5in (B.L.) 
Lord Nelson 4 x 12in 10 x 9.2in 
*Note: Renown nominally 2nd class. Originally intended to have 4 x 12in 
**Swiftsures not designed for Royal Navy; nominally 2nd class 
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Projectiles 
Projectiles of the era generally fell into two broad categories, armour-piercing (AP) shot, and 
explosive shell.  
 
The most common form of AP shot was Palliser chilled-iron. Invented by Major Sir William 
Palliser, it was cast from wrought white-iron, with the head chilled by means of water-
cooling in a differential mould.149 It was cast with an internal hollow due to the difficulty of 
ensuring consistent casting with large solids. This could contain a bursting charge, lending it 
some notional armour-piercing shell qualities. However, the charge was too small to be of 
significant value, and was discontinued. Palliser shot was valuable for assaulting wrought-
iron and thin steel armour, being quite capable of penetrating such defensive measures and 
causing heavy damage to internals.150 Against compound armour and later face-hardened 
types of steel armour referred to in Chapter Three, Palliser was largely ineffective, and 
typically broke up on impact.151 By 1886 forged steel shot, with substantially superior armour 
penetrating capabilities was accepted into the Royal Navy when 400 Holtzer projectiles were 
purchased.152 
 
Common (explosive) shell was available in a variety of types, powder filled being the most 
common. New forms of high explosive were also being developed, and the period saw the 
gradual introduction of Lyddite (picric acid) as a filling. This latter was regarded as showing 
promise in testing, but was treated with caution since further development was needed to 
improve its stability.153 Intended for use against unarmoured and lightly armoured structures, 
explosive shell was highly regarded for its blast and anti-personnel effects.154 As noted below, 
the French naval architect M. de Bussy at this time had such a regard for the effects of 
shellfire that he designed the cruiser Dupuy de Lome with thin armour covering the majority 
of her hull above water specifically to defend against such attack. However, thin armour 
could suffer from considerable blast damage if insufficiently supported. A variety of shrapnel 
                                                     
149 See Major William Palliser ‘The Conversion and Rifling of Cast-Iron Ordnance and on Chilled White-Iron 
Projectiles’ RUSI, Journal 11 (1868) pp.165-7. 
150 NMM Diadem class ship cover. See Confidential Submission of the Director of Naval Construction to the 
design of New First Class Cruisers (“Diadem” Class.)   
151 War Office ‘Treatise on Ammunition’ (London: HMSO, 1905) p.103 
152 Brown Op. Cit. p.79 Also see William Hovgaard Modern History of Warships (London: Taylor & Francis, 
1920) p.426 
153 Brown Op. Cit. p.102 
154 See for example Sir Nathanial Barnaby, K.C.B. ‘The Protection of Buoyancy and Stability in Ships’ 
TransINA Volume XXX (1889) p.226; also the remarks of Admiral Sir Vesey Hamilton on Long On the 
Present Position… p.24 
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shells remained available; primarily made to contain as many bullets as possible for anti-
personnel effect, they were rarely employed on first class cruisers, and are therefore not 
discussed here.  
 
 
Under-gunning in Royal Navy Cruisers under White 
White’s first-class cruiser designs were often accused of being under-gunned for their 
displacement, a subject largely covered under the respective types. More generally, it has 
been claimed that 
 
…in most cases the British vessels were designed for more exacting requirements of 
seaworthiness and endurance which could not have been combined successfully with a 
heavier gun battery. However, this is a generalisation, and it is clear from the fact that 
several of White’s cruisers were refitted with heavier or additional weapons that there was 
room for some improvement, although not on the scale suggested by some critics.155 
 
This is a question that is open to debate rather than being ‘clear.’ In comparison to some 
commercial designs such as the later Elswick cruisers designed under Philip Watts, which 
often packed a rather heavier battery into an equivalent or smaller hull, some of the vessels 
produced under White do seem to carry a relatively light armament, and this was increasingly 
remarked upon in the final years of the Nineteenth Century.156 A handful of White’s cruisers, 
notably the Powerfuls were indeed refitted with heavier or additional weapons, although 
more notable was the shifting of some of the casemate-mounted main-deck weapons to the 
upper deck (due to the main-deck guns being too close to the water for practical use in poor 
weather conditions). This however entailed a severe loss of protection to these weapons, their 
ammunition supply and their crews. During operations off the Dardanelles 15 August 1915, 
serious injuries aboard HMS Edgar were mostly amongst upper-deck crew –a clear 
demonstration of the risks entailed if weapons were located or repositioned to these locations, 
with only light shield-protection.157   
 
                                                     
155 Chesneau & Kolesnik Op. Cit. p.61 
156 See for example the discussion following Philip Watts ‘Elswick Cruisers’ TransINA Volume XLI (1899) 
pp.296-308; W. White ‘A Note on “British Ships in Foreign Navies”’ The Nineteenth Century: A 
Monthly Review May 1898 pp.866-868 
157 TNA ADM 1 / 8430 / 239 Official correspondence to Admiralty 17 August 1915 
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A major feature of all the first-class cruisers designed by White for the Royal Navy was the 
ensuring of an adequate (viz. ‘large’) ammunition supply. Ease of transport of this 
ammunition to the widely dispersed guns was also given considerable attention, particularly 
from the Powerful class onwards, with ammunition passages  running below the protective 
decks to ensure rapid service of the guns from the magazines and shell-rooms. These 
passages have received severe criticism from historians and later naval architects as a major 
weakness and a severe threat to the safety of the ship, with their performance during the 
Great War 1914-’18 cited as evidence. This subject warrants separate assessment, and is so 
treated in Chapter Five.   
 
 
Armour types and development 
Armour was first added to ships specifically for the purpose of limiting the destructive effect 
of shell in and against the gun batteries: a point made by Sir Nathaniel Barnaby in a paper at 
the Royal Institution of Naval Architects in April 1889.158 It was not the first time in that year 
that Barnaby had discussed the subject; in January he had prepared and read a paper before 
the Institution of Civil Engineers which also summarised his views on armour and the history 
of its use, as he saw it.159 However, as Barnaby illustrated, in comparatively short order the 
primary function of armour shifted away from being solely for the defence of artillery and its 
crews, toward the protection of the ‘vitals’ –the engines, boilers and magazines. To a varying 
extent, it was also seen as a means of guarding buoyancy and stability, but, post the echelon 
coast-assault vessels like the Inflexible  this was far from invariable.160 
 
In developing the physical properties of armour plate the principle was and indeed remains to 
balance the two fundamentally opposing properties of resistance to penetration (i.e. its 
                                                     
158 Barnaby The Protection of… p.216 
159 Sir Nathaniel Barnaby ‘Armour for Ships ; its Uses and its Nature’ Proceedings of the Institution of Civil 
Engineers [Henceforth ProcICE] Volume 98 (1889) pp.1-24 Also see discussion on paper, pp.25-75 By 
way of diagram and explanation, Barnaby divided the historical use of armour into five ‘phases.’ In 
these, he suggested that at the commencement the portion of ship hull above water was completely 
clothed with armour; by degrees in the second through fourth phases the area covered by armour was 
gradually reduced, and in the fifth phase the cycle of change turned full-circle and the vessels were 
once again fully clothed in protective plating. Note that Barnaby was using French vessels from which 
to derive his ‘phases’ 
160 Note that Barnaby, in his fifth ‘phase’ noted that the French, impressed with the results of high explosive 
shells, had reverted to the use of extensive thin side armour ‘to prevent the admission of such shells 
between the decks, under the guns and gunners  The Protection of… pp.216-217 see below for a 
discussion on the various armour configurations employed during this period, including the use of 
extensive thin side-armour in cruisers 
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hardness), against its ability to resist shattering under assault (its toughness). Assuming a 
homogenous material, were too hard a plate created it would have a good chance of stopping 
a projectile, but being broken up in the process. Conversely a soft plate, although less likely 
to crack, shatter or otherwise break up under assault, was unlikely to prevent a projectile from 
penetrating to the other side and entering the vitals of the ship.161 There is however a more 
complicated and ultimately more effective approach whereby the resistive and elastic 
properties of the material vary by depth within the plate itself. The ideal is to combine a hard 
external face to break up incoming projectiles with a tough back which provides the requisite 
mechanical support. This was perfectly well appreciated during the latter half of the 19th 
century, but until the middle of the closing decade, metallurgical technology and 
manufacturing processes had not sufficiently advanced to allow the production of such plates. 
 
During the period 1888-1894 there were two general types of armour available that had 
useful defensive capabilities: compound and homogenous steel / nickel-steel alloys. It must 
be emphasised that in comparison to the face-hardened types that would become available by 
the middle of the 1890s the performance of both these types was substantially inferior for a 
given thickness. This, and the weights involved in carrying sufficient thicknesses to 
effectively resist assault by contemporaneous weapons posed problems for both battleships 
and cruisers. It was however particularly marked for the latter, where speed and coal 
endurance necessarily took priority and could therefore not afford to give over as high a 
percentage of their displacement to protection as their battleship counterparts, which were 
specifically intended for close action and little else. 
 
Wrought-iron had long since reached the limit of its practical value; although tough and 
possessing an impressive resistance to cracking (particularly when the iron was of a very pure 
grade) it was insufficiently resistant to penetration.162 Compound plates, which welded a hard 
steel face to a tough wrought-iron back proved to be a substantial improvement. Employees 
of two Sheffield firms, Cammell and John Brown, independently conceived the idea, 
although their respective modes of manufacture differed in detail. In the former case the plate 
was made by casting a steel face directly onto a rolled iron back, while in the latter, a thin 
steel plate was placed close to the wrought-iron backing, and steel cast in the gap between the 
                                                     
161 See Captain T. J. Tressider C.M.G. ‘Modern Armour and its Attack’ TransINA Volume L (1908) pp.25-27 
162 Charles E. Ellis ‘Armour For Ships (1860 to 1910)’ TransINA Volume LIII Part II (1911) pp.338-339 
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two.163 In each case, all the solid plates present were heated during the casting of the steel, 
and the entire resultant compound plate was then subjected to heavy rolling once casting was 
complete.164  
 
Trials indicated compound plates provided some 50% improvement over wrought-iron when 
attacked by chilled-iron (Palliser) shot, and 25% improvement against forged chrome-steel 
projectiles –figures of merit of 1.25 – 1.5.165 Although variations in the comparative figures 
quoted by different authors have led some historians to question how effective the new 
armour really was, it seems probable that these differences were simply the result of the 
figure of merit varying depending on the type of projectile assumed, as indicated above (for 
e.g. Palliser, or forged chrome-steel).166 Various proportions of steel and iron were tried, and 
‘a proportion of about one to two [steel to wrought-iron] was found to give the best results.’167 
 
The alternative of homogenous steel armour was also available, and its capabilities were 
being slowly advanced. Steel armour in fact predated compound by approximately a year, but 
the earliest types were of questionable utility.168 Prior to the development of effective face-
hardening processes (see Chapter Three), steel armour was, as had been the case with 
wrought-iron, largely a matter of finely tailoring the homogenous hardness (or softness) of 
the plate, and typically a middle-ground between plates which were more resisting and less 
tough, and those which were less resisting and more tough was sort.169 There was a view 
expressed during the early 1890s that creating a laminated structure within the steel itself was 
preferable, it being further suggested that this was a primary reason for the toughness of 
wrought-iron.170 This was distinct from stacking multiple plates together to create a given 
thickness, which was experimentally demonstrated to be substantially inferior to a single 
plate of the same thickness in both hardness and toughness.171 In terms of general metallurgy 
there is much truth in this assertion, although there was some doubt expressed by other 
manufacturers, Thomas Vickers stating in the discussion on an 1891 INA paper by Mons. J. 
                                                     
163 Ibid p.341 
164 Ibid 
165 Brown Warrior to Dreadnought p.77 The assumption / comparisons made are based upon British 
requirements / measures to provide a common baseline.  
166 Rodger Parkinson The Late Victorian Navy: The Pre-Dreadnought Era and the Origins of the First World War 
(Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2008) p.133 
167 Ellis Op. Cit. p.341 
168 Brown Op. Cit. p.77 
169 T. E. Vickers, in discussion on Barba Op. Cit. pp.151-152 
170 Barba Op. Cit. p.145 
171 Charles Orde Browne Armour, and its Attack by Artillery (London: Messrs. Dulau & Co., 1887) p.5 
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Barba, Chief Engineer of Schneider’s Creusot works, that there was no known process that 
could create such laminations (or fibrous properties) in cast plates.172 
 
The first significant advance in the capability of homogenous material armour occurred with 
the introduction of nickel-steel alloys. It has been stated that ‘the advent of nickel-steel 
armour in 1888, which was superior to the compound armour that was then in service, 
allowed reductions in the thickness of plates, and thus in the weight of protection.’173 This is 
not so. While the introduction of nickel-steel alloy was important to the development of 
armour, the contention that the introduction of nickel itself conferred substantial 
improvements is a severe misunderstanding of the historical development of armour plate, 
and the metallurgical realities involved. While the introduction of nickel was a step forward, 
it did not in itself bring such gains that a significantly thinner plate could be substituted for an 
equal level of protection.  
 
The technical facts are these: a suitable low-alloy mix (such as introducing a small percentage 
of nickel) has the potential for superior mechanical properties in both hardenability and 
toughness over plain carbon steels, but this greatly depends upon the heat-treatment processes 
employed, viz. the details of what annealing, quenching and tempering were applied to the 
plate, and the lengths of time involved. These advantages were in some cases partially 
realised, but it is evident from the close relative performances in competitive trials between 
compound, solid steel, and nickel-steel plates that contemporary production methods did not 
allow this potential to be fully exploited. The advantages of low-alloy nickel steel (Schneider 
used approximately 4% nickel) over plain carbon steel for homogenous ship armour without 
additional face-hardening were in any event relatively small, at most in the order of 
approximately five per cent.174 This is confirmed by the 1915 Gunnery Manual, which 
categorises 12in of all-steel armour as equivalent to 12in of compound.175 It appears that 
armour producers at the start of the 1890s regarded the major benefit of adding nickel as a 
tendency to increase toughness and improve resistance to cracking compared to an equivalent 
                                                     
172 T. E. Vickers, in discussion of Barba Op. Cit. p.152 Whether heat-treating, face-hardening &c. can be 
considered to create a laminated structure within the material is another matter. Since these essentially 
post-date the period in question for armour technology, they are discussed in Chapter Three 
173 Sumida Op. Cit. p.12 
174 See Naval Ordnance and Gunnery: Volume 1 (Washington DC: US Gov. Printing Office, 1957) pp.41-42 
175 Cited by Brown Op. Cit. p.150 In this case although ‘all-steel’ may be strictly read as ‘mild-steel’ rather than 
an alloy, it is clear that the reference is intended to describe non-face-hardened plates 
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mild-steel plate for a similar hardness level.176 This was seen as requisite when the plate was 
unbacked, or generally unsupported.177 
 
Tests on HMS Nettle  (ex-HMS Thunderer of 1831, hulked at a target ship in Portsmouth and 
renamed Nettle in 1870) assessed a variety of armour types, mostly privately submitted from 
commercial British firms. In armour trials throughout the 1880s and early 1890s there 
appeared to be very little to choose in practice between all-steel (and later also nickel-steel) 
and compound plate. Results varied slightly in favour of one or the other, but the variables in 
the tests did not always appear to be especially tightly controlled or consistent (an obvious 
example being the number of bolts holding the plates to the target), and since the criteria of 
different nations tended to vary with regard to the relative qualities of hardness and 
toughness, it is safe to assert that no dramatic differences existed between the various 
contemporary armour types.178 As a rule of thumb, armour resistance to penetration for a 
given type of homogenous material, without any face-hardening or other processes applied, 
can be said to vary approximately at the square root of the cube of the thickness.179 
 
 
The Resistance experiments 
From 1885 to 1889, the old ironclad HMS Resistance was used in a series of full-scale trials 
to test various protective schemes.180 One historian has stated that the trials were largely 
created for White to test the validity of his theories.181 Although this is probably an 
overstatement, White was certainly deeply involved with, and took considerable interest in, 
the trials. Sometimes dismissed as having been abandoned before yielding useful data, such 
was far from being the case.182 These trials were conducted with a level of secrecy that was 
                                                     
176 See Barba Op. Cit. 
177 Charles E. Ellis ‘Recent Experiments in Armour’ TransINA Volume XXXV (1894) p.216 
178 Brown Op. Cit. p.78 Based on the reports of various trials, it seems that some nations favoured a softer plate 
that exhibited no signs of cracking, accepting greater penetration as the trade-off, while others did not 
regard cracking (to a varying extent) as such a significant issue, and were willing to accept a degree of 
this in order to secure greater resistivity against penetration 
179 Lord William Armstrong, letter dated 12 April 1871, given in evidence to Report of the Committee on 
Designs for Ships of War NA ADM 1/6212 p.xxii 
180 Parkes Op. Cit. p.29 There may have been some deliberate irony in selecting her given her name. Her sister 
ship Defence would have been a credible alternative, but damage suffered in a collision in 1884 may 
have been sufficient for Defence to be favoured for the purposes of testing 
181Antony Preston ‘The End of the Victorian Navy’ The Mariner’s Mirror Volume 60, No.4 (November 1974) 
p.374 
182 Alan Cowpe ‘The Royal Navy and the Whitehead Torpedo’ in B. Ranft [ed.] Technical Change and British 
Naval Policy 1860-1939 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1977) p.26 Cowpe’s assessment is based on 
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extremely unusual in the Nineteenth Century; Brown cites an letter from the Admiralty to C-
in-C Portsmouth which stated that ‘…every effort to be used to prevent unauthorised persons 
from witnessing the experiments, or gaining knowledge of the damage done when the ship is 
brought into harbour.’183 That the Admiralty guarded the results and findings so carefully is a 
clear indication of the importance with which the Board and others regarded these 
experiments, and the fact that they were viewed as being important, if not vital, to national 
security.  
 
The original tests were mostly concerned with assessing means of self-sealing small holes 
from light calibre strikes against unarmoured structures. A variety of possible methods were 
explored including the use of asbestos, cellulose and India-rubber, along with some patented 
products such as Woodite (which contained white and brown / grey asbestos along with other 
base materials). There was considerable interest in the use of such devices in the last years of 
the 1880s and first years of the 1890s, largely due to the rise of the light – medium calibre QF 
gun increasing the likelihood of multiple small perforations around unprotected waterlines, 
and potentially fatally affecting buoyancy and stability if other measures (such as effective 
internal protective schemes) had not been implemented.184 In France cellulose was favoured: 
the armoured cruiser Dupuy de Lome famously employed the substance in cofferdams above 
the protective deck and behind the side-armour.185 Captain C. C. Penrose-FitzGerald, in an 
1888 paper before the INA ‘On Unarmoured Water-Lines In War-Ships’ (specifically 
referring to cruisers) argued for some form of additional substance to be used to help seal 
small holes from shot or splinters, and stated that he had in fact had carried out some small-
scale experiments of his own with India-rubber, to such good effect that the Admiralty 
engaged in larger scale experiments on board the Resistance.186 FitzGerald, although claiming 
                                                                                                                                                                     
HMS Vernon’s Annual Report in NA ADM 189/7 & ADM 1/7687 which primarily focused upon 
torpedo experiments 
183 Brown Op. Cit. p.101 citing letter Admiralty to C-in-C Portsmouth 16 June 1888, Ordnance Board Minutes. 
The Bill that would create the Official Secrets Act (1889) was presented to Parliament by the Attorney 
General, Secretary Stanhope, and Lord George Hamilton -see Hansard 10 May 1888, Volume 325, 
c.1934 
184 It is easy to condemn previous vessels owing to perceived vulnerability to such conditions, but such 
assessments are short-sighted and fail to appreciate the extraordinary pace of technological 
development, and the fact that these vessels were designed for an era in which no such threat existed. 
There was a world of difference between the standard breach-loading weapons and the quick-firers 
starting to be introduced, as already discussed. The dramatic jump in rate of fire and thus overall 
firepower completely overset existing conditions 
185 R. Chesneau & E Kolesnik [eds.] Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships 1860-1905 (London: Conway 
Maritime Press, 1979) p.303 
186 Captain C. C. Penrose-FitzGerald ‘On Unarmoured Water-lines in Warships’ TransINA Volume XXIX (1888) 
pp.172-173 
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that he was ‘by no means specially wedded to indiarubber in this connection’ seemed to be 
rather put out by the conclusion of the trials, which he felt may have been based upon 
erroneous placement or assumptions as to its use.187 In the subsequent discussion, White 
refuted this, remarking that everyone who had been present at the Resistance trials ‘was well 
disposed to make the best use of indiarubber in those experiments, and I think everybody who 
saw the results was unanimous in disappointment.’188 White further stated that he could not 
give the meeting additional particulars on the tests carried out on the Resistance, but often 
cited findings as influencing features of his ships.189 Subsequent trials in 1887 focused upon 
defence against torpedo attack. Although the threat posed by torpedoes was taken seriously, 
the cellular construction and placement of coal-bunkers in the first-class cruisers of the era 
would have provided some protection against underwater attack during this period when 
warheads remained small, so particulars of the torpedo trials are not given here. 
 
The 1888 trials once again turned to assault by artillery, this time with an eye upon testing 
various methods of defence against the new high explosive shells coming into vogue, along 
with solid armour-piercing shot. The Resistance was modified so that part of her hull 
represented the secondary battery of a modern battleship, with a casemate protected by 3in 
steel over 1in iron, and traverses of 1in – 1 ½in steel along with rope mantlets built between 
battery positions.190 ‘Dummy men were arranged and “animals, if necessary, to be located in 
the battery”. Old guns, a torpedo and filled cartridge cases were positioned in the battery to 
better gauge the damage results.191 Three photographs of these 1888 – 1889 trials against the 
aforementioned casemate are shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. Even today, the pictures are 
remarkably chilling.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
187 Ibid 
188 Ibid p.200 Note that FitzGerald was on active duty out of the country at the time the experiments were held 
189 See for example his concluding remarks following the discussion on his near-legendary paper ‘On the 
Designs for the New Battle-Ships’ TransINA Volume XXX (1889) p.209 and The Principles and 
Methods... p.119 
190 Brown Op. Cit. p.102 Note that the results as far as casemates went applied equally to cruisers 
191 Ibid 
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Figure 2.4 
 
From album ‘Resistance Experiments, 1889’ held by the National Maritime Museum Historic 
Photographs and Ship Plans collection 
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Figure 2.5 
 
From album ‘Resistance Experiments, 1889’ held by the National Maritime Museum Historic 
Photographs and Ship Plans collection 
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The findings of these trials on board Resistance are briefly summarised below, and give a 
clear insight into the reasons for specific design features in Royal Navy vessels at this time: 
 
 Coal bunkers were very effective against HE shell, both in terms of absorbing blast, 
and preventing additional splinter damage 
 A casemate similar to that employed in the test would defend against all HE common-
shell up to 6in, while the armoured rear of the casemate would, along with traverses, 
effectively limit splinter-damage from nearby 6in HE shell detonations. The extensive 
use of widely distributed casemates by White can be traced back to the results from 
this particular trial 
 4 ½in armour would keep out all HE filled common-shell 
 HE produced more splinters than powder-filled shell, but these tended to be smaller 
and less destructive. It was more likely to produce a large hole in thin plating due to 
its explosion on contact 
 Palliser chilled iron shot was becoming less effective against the latest forms of 
armour, but cost eight times less than forged steel shot, and was retained for its value 
against older, less well protected opponents.192 
 
In general, it was found that a wide distribution of (particularly the auxiliary) armament was 
preferable, and that casemates offered much superior protection to armoured batteries or 
weapons protected by thin shields situated on upper decks, which experience in the Sino-
Japanese war would later confirm to be useless or worse.193 It was found that thin shields 
‘only served to explode shells which might otherwise have passed the gun, sending a blast of 
splinters across the deck to the opposite gun; or if they passed the gun, might be caught and 
exploded by the shield on the far side instead of passing out of the ship.’194 Thin side-armour 
was determined to be useful if well supported against HE or powder-filled shell but was 
valueless against AP shot. Cellular construction in conjunction with coal defence was found 
to be an effective means of protecting the buoyancy and stability of a vessel, and it was 
concluded that the logical limit of protection resided in the strength of the decks.195 The latter 
                                                     
192 Summarised from the Ordnance Board Minutes by Brown, Ibid 
193 Parkes Op. Cit. p.359 
194 Ibid 
195 Manning Op. Cit. p.272 
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point especially would be repeated by White so frequently, in so many papers, letters and 
articles, that it may be considered his shibboleth. 
 
 
The ascendency of the protective deck system in first-class cruisers 
By the latter half of the 1880s, the question of how best to dispose armour protection in first-
class cruisers was provoking considerable (and highly animated) debate both within and 
outside of naval circles. The matter was by no means a simple one, since in the absence of 
conflict there was little practical evidence from which conclusions could be drawn, a point 
that was not always appreciated by the wider public, despite the best efforts of the Board, its 
officials, and a number of serving naval officers.196 Moreover, the introduction of new 
armament technologies in the shape of the quick-firing gun and effective high explosive 
projectiles considered above presented designers with a raft of new challenges. There was not 
even agreement on whether armour should be employed to protect the buoyancy, stability and 
trim of a vessel, or whether it should be employed rather for the protection of the ‘vitals’ –
machinery, boilers, magazines from shell fire.197 Not without reason would Sir William White 
in later years write that ‘discussion on the defensive qualities of modern war-ships frequently 
disclose lack of knowledge of the history of the applications of armour, and a failure to 
appreciate the principles underlying its use.’198 
 
The principle question was to establish, for a given vessel displacement, the most effective 
means of protecting a certain region in the neighbourhood of the water-line, of very moderate 
breadth in relation to the total depth of the ship. There were two general armour 
configurations that could be practically employed in contemporary first-class cruisers: 
external, and internal. John Biles, in his 1887 Institution of Naval Architects paper 
‘Comparative Effects of Belted and Internal Protection upon the Other Elements of Design of 
a Cruiser’ summarised the two configurations thus: 
 
The belted type of protection may be described as a belt or strip of vertical armour, 
forming the side of the ship in the vicinity of the water-line, and surmounted by a flat 
                                                     
196 For example, see Eardley-Wilmot The Development of Navies… p.157 
197 White, in discussion of Penrose-FitzGerald Side Armour… p.88 
198 Sir William White ‘The Principles and Methods of Armour Protection in Modern War-ships’ in T. A. Brassey 
[ed.] The Naval Annual 1904 (London: J. Griffin, 1904) p.108 
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deck of about one-fifth of the thickness of the belt, forming with the belt a shield over 
the machinery and magazines… 
The internal type of protection is usually represented by a steel deck extending from 
side to side of the ship, but, instead of ending with a belt of armour, it is sloped down 
at the side, joining the outside bottom at approximately the same point that the bottom 
of the armour does. The sloping part of the deck at the side of the ship is usually 
thicker than at the middle.199 
 
The two armour configurations described by Biles are depicted in Figure 2.6 with a section 
from a plate used to illustrate his INA paper.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
199 Biles Op. Cit. p.335 
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Figure 2.6 Belted and protected deck cruiser cross-sections, viewed from aft 
 
Source: J. Biles ‘On the Comparative Effects of side and internal Armoured Protection upon 
the other Elements of Design of Cruisers’ Plate XXVIII TransINA, Vol.XXVIII (1887)200  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
200 To left is a belted cruiser design (Orlando class) with a thick, but shallow external belt of armour rising to 
just above the load waterline (L.W.L.), surmounted by a flat armoured deck of 1/5 the thickness. To 
right is a proposal by Biles for an alternative utilising an internal curved armoured deck rather than 
external armour plate. Note that in this particular design, Biles has placed the flat crown of the deck on 
the L.W.L., a point that received much criticism. 
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What may be justifiably termed the first modern first-class cruisers built for the Royal Navy, 
the Imperieuse and Orlando classes (designed during the first half of the 1880s) were 
protected by the external armour scheme of relatively  thick, though shallow waterline 
armour belts.201 The thick but shallow belt was, as detailed in the previous section, imposed 
by the limited resistivity of contemporary compound and steel armour. As previously noted, 
given the considerable weights involved it was not practical for a cruiser, where speed and 
coal-supply necessarily took priority, to carry armour capable of resisting assault from both 
common shell and AP shot over large areas of hull.202 This type of belted protection as 
described by Biles would briefly be joined by an additional configuration of relatively thin 
armour plate covering a far greater area of the side, associated with a thin underwater 
armoured deck. Finding some favour in France, as considered below this scheme was 
specifically designed to counter explosive shell, but was largely ineffective against AP shot. 
 
Owing to the weight problems involved with external armour, the alternative method of 
employing a curved, internal protective steel deck had been gaining traction for some years, 
and by the end of the decade, under the directorship of William White it entirely superseded 
belt armour in first-class cruisers designed for the Royal Navy. This configuration was far 
more complicated than is often realised, and the ‘protective deck’ scheme in fact described 
‘an elaborate system of protection in which the deck itself was only one aspect, albeit the 
most important.’203 There is some question about who was the originator of the protective 
deck concept, but Sir Edward Reed and Lord Armstrong appear to have the best claims and 
should probably receive joint credit.204 In his letter to the 1871 Committee on Designs, Lord 
Armstrong had advocated reducing or entirely eradicating side or belt armour, on the grounds 
that the power of naval artillery was outstripping the resistive capacity of vertical armour, and 
the weight which would otherwise be devoted to it would be better employed elsewhere.205 
The official report took a somewhat more moderate view, but the minority Design Committee 
                                                     
201 The Orlandos were nominally developed as enlarged versions of the Mersey second-class cruisers. Although 
they were principally designed for trade protection, they are generally accounted as early examples of 
first-class cruisers (all being completed post the general fleet reclassification of 1887). Chesneau & 
Kolesnik Op. Cit. p.65 
202 A 1in plate of iron or steel weighs approximately 40lbs to the square foot (or 195.3Kg to the square metre). 
See Norman Friedman Battleship Design and Development, 1905-1945 (New York: Smithmark, 1979) 
p.68 
203 Brown Op. Cit. pp.133-134 
204 Ibid p.132 
205 Lord Armstrong, letter dated 12 April 1871, given in evidence to the Report of the Committee on Designs for 
Ships of War NA ADM 1/6212 pp.xxv-xxvi 
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Report by Admiral Eliot and Rear-Admiral Ryder largely concurred with Armstrong’s views, 
suggesting internal oblique armour only for all ship classes. 
 
While this was not adopted by the service at the time, which favoured vertical armour allied 
to partial protective decks (introduced in HMS Shannon), or partial protective decks over 
machinery only in small corvettes and similar types (introduced in the Comus class) a decade 
later Lord Armstrong at his Elswick warship yard was in a stronger position to put his ideas 
into practice. Working with George Rendel he created the Esmeralda, the first modern cruiser 
devoid of side-armour, and instead relying on a curved internal underwater steel deck for the 
protection of engines, boilers and magazines, and minute subdivision of the waterline region 
associated with cork-filled cofferdams for the maintenance of buoyancy and stability. In Italy, 
Insp. Eng. Benedetto Brin also entirely abandoned side armour, trusting to a similar scheme 
of a curved internal armour deck and cellular construction around the waterline for his Italia 
class. The configuration of the full-length protective deck would be introduced into the Royal 
Navy by Nathaniel Barnaby in the Mersey class second class cruisers. 
 
As Director, White would use a highly adapted version of the protective deck scheme for the 
Blake, Edgar, Powerful and Diadem first-class cruisers, and the basic philosophy would in 
fact be seen in all his first-class cruiser designs. This general approach to armour protection 
does not appear to be well understood by many historians, and vessels carrying internal 
oblique armour are frequently referred to as if they were devoid of any kind of protection at 
all. Possibly this is due to a tendency to focus upon armour belts and regard internal 
armoured decks as supplementary to vertical armour. However, as far as the contemporary 
Board of Admiralty, their professional advisers, and designers such as Biles, Watts and White 
were concerned, almost the reverse was the case: 
So far as experience has gone…  it is in favour of the view that in all classes of ships, 
the primary necessity in defence is the protection of the vitals by a steel deck.206 
 
The focus of attention at the time was thus not upon external vertical armour, but the internal 
oblique armoured decks. Attention would only shift to vertical protection once the strength of 
this deck and the defence afforded by it to the vitals was deemed to be beyond reasonable 
question.  
                                                     
206 TNA ADM 116/446 Confidential Submission of the Director of Naval Construction to the design of New 
First Class Cruisers (“Diadem” Class.)  S.10268, 1895. 
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In the protective deck configuration favoured by White, the flat crown of the armoured deck 
rose as high or higher above water as a typical contemporary thick armour belt, sloping down 
at the sides to a point below water roughly where the lower edge of such an armour belt 
would be, thus protecting engines, boilers and magazines. The angular spaces above the 
sloping internal armoured steel deck were then filled with heavily subdivided coal bunkers, 
which prevented the ingress of much water and also acted as a highly effective ‘stifler’ of 
many types of projectiles, thus forming an efficient protection of the vessel’s buoyancy and 
stability.207 Moreover, given the short battle ranges of the era and the almost flat trajectory of 
incoming projectiles, the curved sides of the armoured deck would result in the majority of 
strikes occurring at an oblique angle, further improving the effectiveness of the defensive 
scheme. Given these gunnery conditions, plunging fire was not regarded as a significant 
threat, particularly for cruisers. Penrose-FitzGerald pointed out in the discussion of Biles’s 
INA paper that the projectile from a modern 8in gun carried 1,100 yards with one degree of 
elevation, and at the time of writing in 1887 there was little to suggest that naval battles 
would be settled at much over 1,000 yards.208 Two example cross-sections of protective deck 
systems are depicted in Figure 2.7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
207 Ibid pp.355-356 See also Brown, Op. Cit. p.134 Since the coal occupied some 5/8 of the bunker space, there 
was little space left to be flooded.  Brown also points out this also applied to loss of waterplane inertia 
which governs the height of the metacentre, so that coal reduced loss of stability on flooding. 
208 Penrose-FitzGerald, in discussion on Ibid p.346 
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Figure 2.7: Protected cruiser cross sections showing internal curved protective deck 
configurations. 
 
Source: E. L. Attwood War-ships: A textbook on the construction, protection, stability, 
turning, Etc., of war vessels (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1904) pp.29-30. 
Edgar class to left, Diadem class to right.209  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
209 Note the ammunition passage (labelled ‘AP’) clearly shown in the cross-section of the Diadem, under the 
protective deck, and coal bunkers 
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As a matter of basic principal White had little use for narrow armour belts located around the 
nominal waterline of a cruiser, considering their practical value to be at best minimal. His 
remarks on the matter were blunt:   
 
For myself, I do not believe in any mystic charm in the 6 or 7 ft. of depth protected in 
a belted ship out of the 30 or 40 ft. of her total depth. The part above the water and 
above the armour, and the part below the armour and below the water, these two parts 
are essential to the floating, to the stability and to the behaviour of the ship. To talk as 
if 5 ft. of height below the still water-line, or 5 ft. depth below the still water-line, 
embraced the whole portions of the structure which need to be considered, or to 
assume that there is a mystic point below which no attack by artillery fire shall be 
considered to be likely to take effect, is to my mind absurd.210 
 
Since it is clear that with such a narrow belt (roughly representative of that fitted to the 
Orlando class vessels) only a very moderate degree of roll would expose the hull below the 
armour to gunfire, his point was clearly valid, particularly given the fact that this was also the 
era in which the light – medium calibre QF gun was rapidly rising to prominence. The hull 
would also be potentially exposed to such fire through the normal rise and fall of waves, and 
the wave-profile created by the vessel’s passage if at moderate – high speed. Although it was 
unlikely to be deliberately attacked in this way, the gunnery environment of the era by nature 
increased the likelihood of such a hit, and it matters little whether the shot that causes 
crippling or fatal damage was deliberately aimed at this region or not.211 Worse still, as 
occurred in both the Imperieuse and Orlando classes, any growth in weight during the 
construction or service life of the vessels (or errors in the weight calculations during the 
design stages) could lead to their narrow belts being completely submerged.212 Rodger 
suggests that the effect of this on the ship’s fighting capabilities was probably much 
exaggerated, but it seems clear that the potential dangers of this occurring were real enough, 
and more so since the belted type was rarely as well subdivided, nor employed such 
                                                     
210 White, in discussion on Biles Ibid. p.354 
211 Given these basic principles, it is clear (and may be demonstrated by calculation) that if external armour is to 
be employed with an object of protecting the buoyancy and stability of a vessel, then the longitudinal 
extension of a very narrow vertical belt would be substantially less effective than would be a shorter 
belt of similar thickness but greater vertical extension, associated with careful subdivision of ‘soft’ 
ends. 
212 N. A. M. Rodger ‘British Belted Cruisers’ The Mariner’s Mirror Vol.64 No.1 February 1978, p.33 
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comprehensive coal-protection as a vessel designed with the internal armoured deck 
scheme.213 
 
White held an equally withering view of the alternate approach of employing a more 
extensive coverage of thin side-armour if it was incapable of resisting penetration by 
medium-calibre QF guns (the 6in being the commonly-assumed default). Although there was 
a brief flurry of popular interest in this configuration following its employment in the French 
cruiser Dupuy de Lome, the approach never found favour in the Royal Navy, nor with private 
British firms.  
 
There was an essential difference in philosophy between these two contemporary approaches 
to external armour that should be stressed. The object behind the thick, but narrow belt was, 
as described, primarily to protect the vitals and the buoyancy and stability of the vessel from 
assault by any type of projectile likely to be fired against it. Conversely, the principle behind 
the alternative approach of employing thin side-armour across a much larger area of the hull 
‘may be considered to be based upon the fundamental conception that the explosion of shells 
with large bursting charges of high explosives shall be made to occur on the sides of the 
ship.’214 This focus upon protection against the high explosive shells then becoming available 
appeared reasonable, but there were severe caveats which were pointed out by White, 
Barnaby, Biles and others. Firstly, considerable risks were run when firing the new high 
explosive shells from rifled guns, and this questionable reliability, coupled with the 
possibility that the shell might cause more damage to the ship it was being fired from than the 
ship it was aimed at, could result in an overestimation of the value of these projectiles, at 
least for a time.215 Another consideration, which would never be affected by such reliability 
issues, was that thin plates of the contemporary steel / nickel-steel armour, fitted with a 
specific view to defending against high explosives, were of little use against assault from 
armour-piercing projectiles. In the Resistance experiments cited above, it was found that 
enormous damage could be caused behind this armour by employing cheap Palliser chilled 
iron shot. Thus the net result of the fitting of thin side armour to defend against one form of 
                                                     
213 Ibid 
214 TNA ADM 116/446 
215 Sir William H. White ‘Cantor Lectures: Modern Warships, Lecture V’ Proceedings of the Society of Arts, Vol. 
LIV (1906) p.880 
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attack would simply enable the assailant ‘to vary his form of attack and at less risk and cost to 
inflict very serious damage.’216  
 
Those who saw the results of the attack with Palliser projectiles on the decks behind 
the thin armour of the “Resistance” will realise how serious was this matter and to 
what distance from the point of impact the injuries done by mitraille and splinters 
extended. It was the consideration of these facts which led to the introduction of the 
system of the isolation of individual guns in separate casemates, and the danger seems 
to have been greatly overlooked in many foreign ships when the lighter QF guns are 
concentrated in batteries protected by thin armour.217 
 
A further issue with the fitting of thin side-armour, and possibly the most significant, was that 
it did not take into account the rapid pace of artillery development that was occurring in this 
time, particularly in terms of the light – medium calibre QF weapons that cruisers in 
particular would be expected to face. With the increasing power of these QF guns, the 
relatively thin steel / nickel steel armour available would have quickly become vulnerable, as 
indeed proved to be the case with the Dupuy de Lome, and this had been recognised by 
designers such as Biles, Watts and White. That fitted to the Dupuy de Lome and her 
successors, the smaller Amiral Charner class vessels (which had a rather smaller extent of 
their side plated with even thinner steel armour) was at best marginal even when constructed, 
and 6in HE would have produced considerable wrecking effect which would have all but 
destroyed the side armour.218 Its defensive properties against AP shot, almost from the start, 
were minimal.  
 
Considering that the first-class cruisers designed for the Royal Navy from ~1888-1894 were 
designed for traditional cruiser functions: commerce protection and scouting, the protective 
deck system employed appears to have been the best compromise given the gunnery 
environment of the era and the modest defensive capability of the armour plate available.  
The contention by the Admiralty and its officials that it was preferable to throw the weight of 
defensive material into internal oblique armoured decks combined with extensive coal-
protection and subdivision thus appears to be well founded, and was supported by the results 
                                                     
216 TNA ADM 116/446 
217 Ibid 
218 White The Principles… p.118 
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obtained at the battle of Yalu in the First Sino-Japanese war, which it was concluded 
demonstrated the value of protective decks in cruisers ‘and not the necessity of water-line 
belts.'219 
 
Fought 17 September 1894, the engagement took place in and off the Yalu river littoral. The 
Chinese was the numerically superior, possessing two en echelon battleships in addition to 
eight cruisers and a handful of smaller craft; the opposing Japanese fleet was composed of 
protected cruisers, with even fewer smaller or auxiliary vessels. Intercepting the Chinese fleet 
off the mouth of the river, the Japanese fleet in line astern was led by a flying squadron / fast 
division of four of their latest vessels (three of which were Armstrong built, two to designs by 
William White). By contrast, the Chinese fleet attempted to fight in an indented zigzag or 
wedge-shaped line-abreast formation, with two loose divisions, possibly with the intention of 
attempting to ram.220 The difference in tactics is marked, with the Japanese largely adopting 
contemporary British practice in this respect, while the Chinese approach appears to reflect 
those common to the earlier ‘ironclad’ era. The Japanese fleet was substantially faster 
(notably the four vessels of the fast division), and possessed a massive advantage in having a 
primary armament almost entirely comprised of QF guns with more reliable projectiles, and 
were better worked-up than their opposition.221 It is possible that Chinese tactics would have 
proven somewhat more effective had their fleet been better trained or handled, but in action 
they struggled to keep formation, and were comprehensively out-manoeuvred and out-
fought.222 Though Japanese tactics and ship handling were themselves far from perfect and 
would have been far riskier against better opposition, they were sufficient for the 
circumstances in question. Figure 2.8 shows the plan of the battle as drawn by Philo Norton 
McGiffin, the American born commander of the Chinese en echelon turret ship Zhenyuan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
219 Marder Op. Cit. p.284 
220 See TNA ADM 1/7201 Battle of the Yalu, 7 Sept. 1894: Report by Lt. Sir Robert Arbuthnot  
221 See Philo N. McGiffin ‘The Battle of Yalu’ in The Century; A Popular Quarterly Vol.50 Issue 4 (Aug 1895) 
pp.588-589. Parkinson Op. Cit. p.226 gives the total of 66 as against 2  
222 S. Paine The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 : Perception, Power, and Primacy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) The precise reasons for this remain a subject of conjecture and debate 
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Figure 2.8: Plan of Battle of Yalu, 17 September 1894 
 
Source:, Philo N. McGiffin ‘The Battle of Yalu’ in  
The Century; A Popular Quarterly Vol.50 Issue 4 (Aug 1895) p.592 
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The most significant aspect tactically speaking of the engagement was the contribution of the 
Japanese flying squadron. Following the initial pass across the front of the Chinese fleet, 
which itself allowed them to employ their broadside weapons, they were dispatched from the 
rest of the rest of the fleet to operate as a semi-independent body, covering the retreat of the 
gunboat Akagi, the converted liner Saikyo and the rather slow cruiser Hiei. The division 
forced the Chinese fleet to split its fire between two different groups, the circling flying 
squadron being able to pass the Chinese wing several times.223 The main body of the Japanese 
force turned approximately 16 points to starboard, cutting off two of the Chinese fleet’s port 
wing ships and passing behind the main Chinese division, while the flying squadron circled 
approximately 2 ½ times in front of the remainder of the Chinese force (2nd detachment 
including the lighter vessels), and passing the right wing of the main Chinese squadron.224 
The Chinese lost five ships with another three badly damaged, largely wiping out their naval 
capability. By contrast four Japanese vessels were badly damaged, two others lightly, with no 
losses. 
 
The NID report on the Yalu engagement concluded that it emphasised the ‘supreme value of 
gunfire… to the practical elimination of the ram and torpedo.’225 The decisive gunfire in 
question was from Japanese QF guns, the volume of fire at relatively close range doing the 
greatest damage. McGiffin reported that a 4.7in projectile pierced Jiyuan’s conning tower 
from side to side ‘shattering its inmates into a shapeless mass’ and confirming that armoured 
control positions were vital.226 Shell from such weapons could also cause severe fires, and 
several of the Chinese vessels were lost primarily through its uncontrolled spread. While on 
some vessels fire-fighting was alleged to be good, the parties were rapidly overwhelmed, and 
hoses ‘cut through and through’ by the hail of QF projectiles.227 The battle was also regarded 
as being a useful demonstration of the tactical value to a fleet of possessing a fast division, 
and an excess of speed over an opponent more generally. The ability to turn a line, envelop an 
opponent, force him to divide his fire, and to strike from several directions could provide a 
significant advantage, while also conferring the strategical benefits of rapid dispatch and 
transit times. For its own part, the Constructors department, and especially the DNC found 
few surprises. While in France Yalu was largely taken as emphasising the value of thin side-
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armour, White’s rather more cautious view was that the experience in that engagement was 
not worth much in forming an opinion on that point, particularly given the at best 
questionable state of repair of some of the Chinese vessels.228 Despite his apparently non-
committal expression the remainder of White’s report, written some ten months after the 
battle, made it clear that his own views had not changed in the slightest, and that he continued 
to favour internal oblique protective decks with the available armour, over narrow external 
waterline belts or extensive thin side-plating.229 
 
The Chinese lost both belted and a protected cruiser at Yalu, but the seven most powerful 
Japanese vessels were protected types, none of which suffered serious injury. Certain 
qualifications were noted: the Chinese weapons and projectiles were not of a high quality and 
their fleet was poorly handled. Nevertheless, protective decks appeared to prove their worth 
and the QF gun was clearly effective, confirming the validity of contemporary Royal Navy 
practice. This may be extended further: Yalu points to the fact that, although not ideal for 
close action, first-class protected cruisers of this kind would have been quite capable of 
performing fleet tasks such as those outlined by Admiral Long and hinted at by Eardley-
Wilmot, and could have formed an effective fast wing of a battlefleet, providing they were 
sensibly handled and not drawn into a protracted close-range gunnery duel with more heavily 
armoured battleships. Indeed, given the primacy of the QF gun during the 1890s, these early 
battle-cruisers, as Long unofficially termed them, would have been less vulnerable in a fleet 
role than the big-gun vessels of the early 20th century, since they actually carried protection 
capable of defending against the primary armament of the era. 
 
 
White Elephants? 
In October 1891, the British Naval Attaché at St. Petersburg, following up on Russian 
intentions regarding large first-class cruisers reported that ‘I have been told the Government 
desire to have 10 of these cruisers, with the object of destroying the commerce of an 
enemy.’230 On the available evidence this was certainly a credible communiqué, since the 
Rurik, a large side-armoured vessel credited with exceptional performance had been laid 
                                                     
228 TNA ADM 116/446 New First-class Cruisers It was rather more useful from White’s perspective of silencing 
critics of the so-called ‘soft ends’ of battleships employing a central armoured citadel, with subdivided 
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down in the middle of the previous year, and it was known that two vessels of similar 
dimensions were about to be constructed.231 The following month, the Controller, Admiral Sir 
John Hopkins, discussed the matter with White, and an investigation was made based on the 
available information regarding the likelihood of the Rurik achieving her design goals.232 The 
conclusions were inevitably speculative, White being sceptical of the claimed coal-
endurance, which was said to allow steaming from Cronstadt to Vladivostok without re-
coaling, also believing Rurik would be considerably over-draught.233 He was subsequently 
proven correct. However, based on the weights devoted to machinery he also suspected that 
the sea-speed had been deliberately under-estimated in the official claims made for her.234 In 
this, and the desire to provide a counter to these Russian commerce-raiders, lay the origins 
for the two Powerful class cruisers. On 3 February 1893, ‘White was ordered to design a new 
super-cruiser for the 1893-94 program specifically to be individually superior to the Russian 
ships.’235  The type was described to Parliament later that year, and laid down in 1894.236 
 
The Powerful and Terrible were the largest cruisers and the longest warships of any type 
constructed to date, at some 14,200 tons and 500ft between perpendiculars (538ft overall).237 
Figure 2.9 shows the elevation and deck plan of the class from the 1902 edition of The Naval 
Annual.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
231 Ibid The two vessels referred to were clearly the Rossia (ld.1894) and Gromoboi (ld.1897) 
232 Manning Op. Cit. p.306 
233 Friedman British Cruisers of the Victorian Era p.226 
234 Manning Op. Cit. pp.306-307 
235 Friedman British Cruisers of the Victorian Era p.228 
236 HCPP ‘Navy (Her Majesty's first class cruisers ''Powerful'' and ''Terrible''). Copy of description of the first 
class cruisers ''Powerful'' and ''Terrible,'' to be built by contract, and for the commencement of which 
provision is made in the navy estimates for 1893-4.’  1893-94 (387) LIV, 603 
237 Chesneau & Kolesnik Op. Cit. p.67 
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Figure 2.9: Powerful class cruiser elevation and deck plan 
 
Source: T. A. Brassey [ed.] The Naval Annual, 1902 (Portsmouth: J. Griffin & Co., 1902) 
Plate 14 
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The substantial jump in dimensions over earlier first-class types was determined by the 
Admiralty’s requirements that they should possess a more powerful armament, and have 
equal protection and radius of action to what was claimed or expected based on the available 
information of the Russian vessels, while also being capable of a minimum sustained sea-
speed of 20 knots (22 knot maximum).238 Initial model trials were successfully carried out on 
13 April 1893 (1/36 scale), indicating some 22 ¼ knots would be achievable on the 
anticipated power.239 These were followed by further trials in June and July of the following 
year.240 The Powerfuls were the first major RN vessels to employ Belleville water-tube 
boilers, 48 feeding 4-cylinder triple-expansion engines coupled to two shafts.241 The vast 
boiler-array was required to obtain the necessary power outputs for sustained high-speeds 
without employing forcing.242 The 4-cylinder TE engines were also a first, and would become 
a feature of all the Royal Navy’s first-class cruisers until the introduction of the steam 
turbine. In such engines, the final (third) low-pressure expansion stage was split between two 
cylinders. This was largely due to size and weight considerations, but also had benefits in 
markedly reducing vibration and improving responsiveness. 
 
Maximum coal-capacity in the Powerful class was 3,000 tons giving an enormous theoretical 
operational radius of 7,000nm at 14 knots, although in practice efficiency was not as good as 
expected, 2,200 tons being needed to carry them 4,400nm ‘at 12 ½ to 14kts in relatively calm 
weather.’243 Defence was achieved by means of a comprehensive protective deck system, with 
6in steel on the slopes and 2in steel on the flat, the crown of the deck being approximately 3ft 
6in above the load-waterline. The angular space between the sloping deck and the side was 
topped with the usual heavily subdivided coal bunkers.244 The casemates and turrets had 6in 
steel armour. They were the first British cruisers to have an ammunition passage running 
below the protective deck, which circumvented the need for stowing ready-use ammunition 
in the casemates, and provided a well-protected route for carrying propellant and projectiles 
from magazines and shell-rooms to the widely dispersed QF battery.245 
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The question of armament for the vessels provoked considerable discussion. In the initial 
design sketches, White provided for a uniform battery of 20 x 6in QF guns. It was contended 
that 
 
The uniformity of calibre in the 20 –6-inch QF guns will be a distinct advantage [over 
the Rurik] in regard to the supply and use of ammunition ; and these guns will 
compare well with the 8-inch B.L.R. guns in the “Rurik,” while they can be much 
more rapidly handled… 
In offensive power the new cruisers will compared favourably with many so-called 
battleships, when the character of the armament and its protection are taken into 
account.246 
 
However, in a memorandum dated 23 March 1893 the DNO lobbied hard for a mixed battery 
of 14 x 6in QF in casemates with 4 x 8in chase guns mounted in pairs on the forecastle and 
poop.247 The debate continued for several months, with White contributing a lengthy 
memorandum on the 19th April complete with diagrams showing the various dispositions of 
armaments proposed for the new cruisers, along with that of recent major foreign vessels 
(USS Brooklyn, the Rurik and the Dupuy de Lome).248 The question was ultimately dealt with 
at a Board meeting on 8 June. The First Naval Lord Sir Frederick Richards offered a third 
proposal, in which twelve 6in guns would be carried in casemates, with two turret mounted 
9.2in, protected by 6in armour, one on the forecastle and one on the poop.249 This was 
preferred to the option of 8in guns, which would have been an entirely new design, and 
owing to objections to mounting a pair of guns on the same turntable.250 
 
Historians have had fun with the Powerful class, with them even featuring in a mischievous 
book on the world’s worst warships.251 They have often been arraigned as under-armed and 
under-protected for their size, and the best that is often said of them is that they were white 
elephants, since the capabilities of the Rurik (and the two later cruisers largely developed 
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from her) had been greatly over-estimated. These criticisms however fail to appreciate the 
realities involved. It was not possible to give the Powerfuls a heavier armament without 
sacrificing protection, accepting a reduced ammunition supply or reduced range.252 Since QF 
guns were the primary armament of the day, each weapon required a large quantity of 
ammunition, and Royal Navy practice was generally to carry substantially more than most 
foreign vessels. They also needed to be large in order to achieve their speed, sea-keeping and 
range goals. Although naturally less able to engage in extended close-action than later side-
armoured types, the internal protective deck scheme, with coal-defence and elaborate 
subdivision was as illustrated above by no means as weak as is commonly believed, and was 
certainly superior to a narrow waterline belt or more extensive coverage of thin non-face-
hardened side armour of the types available at the time of their design. The evidence of the 
Battle of Yalu on the effectiveness of the protective deck system indicates that, in a single-
ship action, they could have disputed terms with later types such as the French Gueydon class 
with a good chance of success. 
 
It is quite true to say that the Russian vessels the Powerfuls were designed to counter were 
certainly not as fast nor as well protected as had been initially believed. Their armour belt 
was narrow, of mediocre quality steel, and not highly thought of by contemporaries who were 
well versed in the subject. Captain Eardley-Wilmot, in his 1892 book The Development of 
Navies remarked that ‘it is curious to observe the fidelity with which Russia has adhered to 
external armour instead of relying upon protective decks as we have done.’253 As to their 
armament, Marder cites Theodore Ropp in commenting that the Rurik’s armament layout was 
so bad that the French thought it had been stuck on as an afterthought.254 While containing an 
obvious element of wry humour, it is difficult to argue with this assessment; the armament 
configuration of Rurik was thoroughly bad, with a bastardised broadside arrangement and 
very poor protection to the guns and ammunition supply routes.255 
 
The Powerfuls should not be criticised because the vessel they were designed to counter 
proved less capable than was feared though. Although this to an extent did render them white 
elephants on account of their size and high running costs (both in terms of material and the 
large crews required), a vessel should be judged on whether it achieves its design goals, and 
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if assessed in this light the Powerfuls were very successful. At the time of their completion, 
they were the most powerful cruisers in the world, having effective protection, a well-
balanced armament with good ammunition supply, high speed and great range. They suffered 
from considerable problems with their boilers, but many of these issues were more a 
consequence of engineering officers and crews being unfamiliar with the type rather than 
with severe inherent problems with the Belleville itself.256 The design smooth-water speed of 
22 knots was easily achieved (Powerful making 21.8 knots on trials in bad weather), as was 
the minimum 20 knot continuous sea-speed, both Powerful and Terrible maintaining almost 
21 knots for 30 hours.257 They were considered excellent sea-boats, partly thanks to their 
enormous freeboard at mean draught.258 Both participated in the 1897 Manoeuvers as part of 
the Channel Squadron, and like the Blakes acquitted themselves well, their high sea-speed 
allowing them to serve as heavy scouts and support for smaller second-class vessels.259  
 
With the benefit of hindsight the two Powerful class cruisers were strategically unnecessary, 
but to suggest that they should not have been built on these grounds implies that the 
Admiralty was possessed of a crystal ball. Although they have been called a knee-jerk 
reaction to a single vessel, the knowledge that Russia was building three large commerce-
raiding cruisers and had expressed the intention of building ten should be factored into the 
equation. In the absence of comprehensive data, an assessment needed to be made on the 
information available. In this case, White may have been partially culpable in exacerbating 
the problem, since the design of the Rurik changed repeatedly, thus any early information he 
might have received from his private international network of correspondents (normally a 
great asset) would quickly become outdated. Since much of Sir William’s private 
correspondence is no longer in existence this will likely remain a matter of speculation. 
Ultimately, since Britain had the capacity to create the Powerfuls nothing was lost, and a case 
can be made that they served a purpose by illustrating that the Royal Navy would respond to 
challenges in kind if required. 
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Conclusions 
A significant factor to be borne in mind is that the period 1888-onwards in effect saw the 
continuation of a general construction policy that had existed to a large degree for several 
decades. Granted, the official designations changed in the fleet reclassification of October 
1887, as detailed in Chapter One, but as far as first-class cruising vessels were concerned, the 
general functions of operating on the high seas and trade defence did not materially alter. If 
anything, the change in terminology simply underlined, or at least made more obvious, these 
basic functions. This inherent fact has been largely masked, initially by a basic 
misunderstanding about the nature of the mid-Victorian Navy, and latterly by a greater 
appreciation of the strategic objectives of the main battlefleet which has tended to divert the 
majority of scholarly attention away from cruising types. Where the former saw a 
fundamental transition from coast-assault back to a seagoing model, the latter had never lost 
their blue-water functions. What did start to change however was the notion of the use of 
cruisers with the battlefleet, and their potential duties. 
 
The period saw the first use of the term ‘battle-cruiser’, a term normally associated with the 
big-gun era. On the face of it the soubriquet appears fraught with issues, several of which 
William White pointed out. It should also be emphasised that the phrase was entirely 
unofficial and was not adopted by the service. The British first-class protected cruisers of the 
period 1888-1894 were designed primarily for commerce protection and optimised for 
fighting single-ship actions, not close-quarter gunnery duals with more heavily armoured 
opponents. Nevertheless, Rear Admiral Samuel Long, Captain Sydney Marrow Eardley-
Wilmot and a handful of other progressive thinkers made a fundamental point by noting the 
demarcation in capabilities between the first and smaller classes of cruisers, and the heavy 
scout and supporting role for smaller vessels was perfectly practical, as revealed in the annual 
Manoeuvres; equally they would have been useful in assisting finish off crippled enemy 
vessels. It is not unreasonable to suggest they could even have been employed as an effective 
fast wing for turning an opposing battle-line, providing they were handled with sense and not 
exposed to enemy fire for an extended time; a point demonstrated at the Battle of Yalu during 
the Sino-Japanese war (albeit against an inferior fleet).  
 
These vessels, interestingly, have received relatively short-shrift from many historians, and 
are often compared negatively to ‘revolutionary’ cruisers such as the French Dupuy de Lome. 
The majority of the charges however, as illustrated above do not stand up under careful 
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assessment. The Admiralty and Constructor’s department had access to a mass of data from 
the Resistance and other experiments (notably on the Nettle) far superior to any available to 
other nations, and based upon the results obtained, declined to employ thin side-armour on 
cruisers, while also rejecting thicker but narrow waterline armour belts. Later experiences in 
the Sino-Japanese war, most notably the Yalu engagement largely bears out their view that 
with the armour materials available, the internal protective deck scheme was the most 
effective means of securing protection for such vessels. Large size was necessary for range, 
effective sea keeping, and high continuous sea speed, without resorting to excessive forcing 
of boilers. 
 
Overall, despite engine and especially boiler issues, the two Blakes were successful designs, 
and the following Edgars even more so. The two Powerfuls proved with the benefit of 
hindsight to be excessive, since the capabilities of the Russian cruisers they were intended to 
counter were highly over-stated. However, the fact remains that they were the most powerful 
cruisers in the world at the time of their completion, and it is not unreasonable that the Board 
should plan for a worst-case scenario. In strategic, tactical and material terms, the Royal 
Navy’s first-class cruisers had a significant edge over any foreign rivals built or building from 
1888-1894, and under the Spencer Programme, the protected-deck type would see a final 
refinement. The vessels themselves however would be, and to this day still are, little regarded 
in the face of changes that would occur in the operational paradigm, and it is those changes 
the following chapter addresses. 
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Chapter 3 
Technological Change and the Battlefleet Paradigm Weakened 
 
 
The previous chapters established the origins of the first-class cruiser in the Royal Navy and 
considered the development of the protected type, with its internal armour of a curved steel 
deck associated with close subdivision and coal-defence. Principally intended for the trade 
defence role, these were the first vessels to be termed ‘battle-cruisers’, albeit unofficially. As 
has been indicated these types were by no means as vulnerable in the contemporary gunnery 
environment as is often believed and while better adapted to single-ship actions, if well-
handled they could have formed an effective heavy scouting force for, or even fast wing of, a 
contemporary battlefleet. In fact, given that the primary armament of the era was the QF gun, 
they should have proven somewhat less vulnerable in this role than the dreadnought 
battlecruisers that followed a decade later were within the contemporary big-gun dominated 
paradigm. 
 
This chapter examines the presence and development of the first-class cruiser in the Royal 
Navy in the period 1894-1901. As in the previous chapter, throughout this period the 
principal naval rivals were regarded as being France and Russia, both of whom laid a 
considerable emphasis on developing new cruisers (and in the case of Russia, second-class 
battleships), although close attention continued to be paid to the naval activities of other 
Powers.  It was a period which initially saw a consolidation of existing strategic views and a 
continuation of the general policy of splendid isolation (which would not formally end until 
the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902). To this end naval expenditure would 
continue to rise, most notably during the middle years of the decade with the Spencer 
Programme. In addition to considering the general strategic environment and requirements 
upon the contemporary Royal Navy, the chapter also examines some of the material 
developments that occurred during the final years of the Nineteenth Century, most notably the 
emergence of new forms of armour plate. These would result in a dramatic advance in the 
capability of the first-class cruiser, allowing the type to move far beyond the trade-defence 
and even the heavy scout remit, as had been predicted by some of the more progressive 
thinkers like Samuel Long as early as 1893. The transition that occurred would profoundly 
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shake the ‘traditional’ battlefleet model and have a significant impact upon the future of the 
service.  
 
 
Commerce protection 
During the period 1894-1901, the strategy of focal-area defence as envisioned by Milne 
continued to be the preferred means of trade protection. With the battlefleet having regained 
its ocean-going capacity and Britain establishing an isolationist position for much of the 
period, coast-assault had almost entirely fallen by the wayside, the fleet’s primary focus 
shifting toward fighting at, rather than from, the sea. In 1894, as in 1893, the annual 
Manoeuvres concentrated upon simulating operations in the ‘narrow seas’, how to establish 
command of these seas, and how fleet divisions might best be joined if they were within 
range of torpedo-boat flotillas based upon the opposing shore.1 Assuming such a command of 
the European waters could be obtained, which the Manoeuvres indicated was practicable, this 
would in itself severely hamper an opponent’s ability to attack British commerce.  
 
Convoy continued to be regarded by the Board as impracticable, while the alternative method 
of constantly patrolling trade routes was completely out of the question owing to the 
enormous number of vessels required given the global reach and scale of British interests and 
shipping. Milne’s memoranda on the subject had, as noted in previous chapters, been 
supported by the FIC paper of 1885 ‘The Protection of Commerce by Patrolling the Ocean 
Highways and by Convoy’, which essentially refined and expanded on the general theme set 
out by Milne. The 18 focal points where shipping density was highest were reassessed, and 
the number of vessels expected to be, or permanently stationed in these locales adjusted 
according to the quantity of trade passing though. This would be further refined in a detail 
sense during this period, and the number of these focal areas increased as the French and 
Russians gained more bases across the globe.2 This remained a relative concept though; the 
blockade strategy adopted by the main fleet in conjunction with focal area defence remained 
in place since there was little indication in the annual Manoeuvres that the strategy would 
prove ineffective. Focal area defence would be indorsed once again in a paper of November 
1898 by Admiral Beaumont. Sanctioned by the Board in February 1900, it was printed with a 
                                                     
1 S. Grimes Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918 (London: Boydell, 2012) p.25 The 
primary assumption being that Britain was at war with France 
2 N. Friedman British Cruisers of the Victorian Era (Barnsley: Seaforth, 2012) p.19 
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view to being distributed to merchant ships in time of war.3 This paper largely confirmed 
existing policy, and what mercantile vessels could expect during a period of maritime 
conflict. Protection would be available to them from British defended ports and coaling 
stations, and also from special protecting squadrons stationed at important convergences of 
trade routes –the focal areas identified by Milne and successors who refined his original 
concept.4 It was also emphasised that the Admiralty did not propose to employ the convoy 
system except under ‘special circumstances’, and that no British lights, navigation buoys or 
similar aids would be extinguished in wartime.5 The pamphlet, which was never distributed, 
also provided directions for approaching home and defended ports.  
 
The concept of focal area defence would, given the nature of the contemporary threat, likely 
have proven very effective in practice. Its principle drawback was that shipping losses might 
initially be quite high until enemy raiders were hunted down and, along with their bases if 
possible, finished off. The question of what type of cruiser would allow this strategy to be 
most effectively executed though continued to be a matter of contention, particularly in terms 
of the perennial argument over quantity verses quality, and whether it would be better for the 
service to possess a small number of extremely capable cruisers (the primary means of 
protecting commerce) or a larger number of less individually powerful vessels. Second-class 
cruisers were seen as extremely useful for the majority of the period, and were constructed in 
large quantities, for general purpose duties ranging from scouting for the battlefleet, 
independent operations and commerce protection. In the first half of the 1890s in particular, 
the type appeared to be a reasonable compromise for a wide range of duties. They had a slight 
speed advantage over most contemporary battleship designs, which extended further when 
compared to earlier low-freeboard coast-assault types, were agile, could be constructed in 
large quantities relatively cheaply, and appeared to be well-able to dispatch smaller craft, 
notably the torpedo-boats common to the period, with their respectable QF armament. A 
noteworthy example took place during the 1896 Manoeuvres when HMS Thesis defeated six 
opposing torpedo-boats and a torpedo gunboat in an action lasting 1 hour and 1 minute, of 
which 23 sufficed to finish off the torpedo-boats themselves.6 The exercises for that year 
                                                     
3Ibid p.18 
4 The National Archives (henceforth TNA) ADM 116/866b Secret. Memoranda / minutes of meeting at 
Admiralty on ‘The Protection of Ocean Trade in Time of War’ 31 April 1905 
5 Ibid Friedman remarks that these ‘special circumstances’ were essentially for troop ships or similar cases 
where losses could not be tolerated under any circumstances, but that this was (unsurprisingly) not 
stated in the document itself 
6 TNA ADM 231/27 NID Report 474 Report on the Naval Manoeuvres of 1896 pp.35-36 
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heavily exploited such vessels, its general object being for one side to employ them to watch 
an opposing fleet in port and communicate any movements to its own battle squadron, which 
was to be ‘lying in readiness at a chosen anchorage, so that no opportunity may be lost of 
bringing the first Fleet to action’.7 Nevertheless, as alluded to in the previous Chapter, three 
years earlier Blenheim had illustrated the wider capabilities of the first-class type and during 
the second half of the decade, as France and Russia again turned their attentions toward 
commerce raiding, so it would become keystone to the focal defence strategy, while its 
potential fleet-employment began to receive greater consideration.  
 
 
The Spencer Programme 
As detailed in Chapter Two, by the late 1880s the Jeune École had largely given way in 
France to the reinvigorated guerre d’escadre –a situation which would essentially continue 
through the first half of the 1890s. Despite this, interest in the guerre de course, which had 
been incorporated into the overall Jeune École concept, continued on an international basis 
with Russia slowly developing the infamous Rurik, and France laying down the four small 
Amiral Charner class vessels between 1889 and 1890, and the one-off Pothuau in 1893, with 
a handful of large protected types known to be following.8 The Gervais programme had been 
the French reply to the 1889 Naval Defence Act, in principle undermining the stated deterrent 
purpose of the British policy, and at least in part confirming the contention that it was a major 
contributing factor in the initiation of a naval arms race.9 
 
With relations between Britain, France and Russia deteriorating due to disagreements over 
colonial matters, there was increasing concern that British naval construction was not 
meeting the ‘two-power’ standard formalised under the provisions of the Naval Defence Act. 
In February 1892, the NID forwarded an empirical formula for required naval strength if 
faced by two powers: B = F + R + X. B represented the necessary British forces, F the total 
forces of one opposing power (France), R the total forces of the second opposing power 
(Russia), and X the number of additional British ships required to protect the much greater 
                                                     
7 Ibid p.5 
8 R. Chesneau & E Kolesnik [eds.] Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships 1860-1905 (London: Conway 
Maritime Press, 1979) p.304 
9 See Chapter Two. It is probably excessive to state that the Naval Defence Act was the sole cause, since such 
events are generally the result of a complex series of interlinked factors involving wider national 
policies, but it is beyond doubt that it was a, and possibly the, primary reason. With that said, the 
British programme still left the RN with a significant practical advantage 
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maritime interests of the Empire.10 This appeared to become even more significant post the 
drafting of the Franco-Russian alliance 18 August 1892.11 
 
In fact, the situation was by no means as extreme as the bald figures appeared to suggest, and 
the Liberal government which had been elected in 1892 initially resisted demands for an 
increase in naval building.12 Simple formulae such as that provided by the NID have been 
described as ‘an attempt to establish a clear basis for arriving at the required British naval 
strength.’13 This is rather dubious since the NID from its inception had a tendency to produce 
reports emphasising naval weakness even when having access to material that contradicted 
this.14 While naval officers and indeed officials and advisors regularly produced tables and 
formulae following the fashion of the era, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the NID, 
under Cyprian Bridge, would have well-appreciated that the value of such simple formulae 
depended on the quality of the data input, and that within certain broad trends the resulting 
figure could be manipulated to provide any desired outcome. In the case of NID’s formula, it 
was accepted that X was a floating value that varied with the magnitude of the interests 
requiring protection (i.e. that it fluctuated depending on how much British tonnage was 
actively engaged in trade during a given or projected period). But the values of F and R were 
also both subject to interpretation: specifically, what would be included. The term ‘total force’ 
in itself means nothing. It could be interpreted as all the vessels listed in a given service, but 
this takes no account of their age, state of maintenance and readiness, type, armament, 
protection, speed, range or a vast array of other factors too numerous to be sensibly listed. 
 
If this is taken, as well it should be, as too broad a coverage, then it may be narrowed to what 
were sometimes termed ‘effective fighting vessels’, but this again is subject to interpretation: 
the majority of the factors referred to above are equally applicable, and the end product B is 
of little actual value. Similar formulaic methods had been created in an attempt to show the 
                                                     
10 The National Archives (TNA) ADM 231/21 Naval Intelligence Department (NID) report 297 ‘The Dangers to 
Which Maritime Trade would be Exposed in War and the Most Effective Measures for its Protection’ 
11 Note that the Franco-Russian alliance did not become officially final / formal until 4 January 1894. Although 
the provisions of the text purely referred to, and the alliance itself was nominally intended to be a 
counter to the Triple Alliance, by extension it obviously had implications for Britain or other potential 
rival powers 
12 J. Sumida In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914  
(London: Unwin Hyman, 1989) p.16 
13 B. Ranft ‘The protection of British seaborne trade’ in B. Ranft [ed.] Technical Change and British Naval 
Policy 1860-1939 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977) p.9 
14 R. Parkinson The Late Victorian Navy: The Pre-Dreadnought Era and the Origins of the First World War 
(Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2008) p.95 
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comparative fighting values of warships; Captain Gerard Noel had presented such an idea to 
the INA some years earlier, which was heavily criticised (albeit politely) for precisely these 
reasons in the subsequent discussion.15 Philip Colomb attempted something similar at the INA 
in 1895, albeit via the use of enormous tables, and Professor Francis Elgar read another 
example in 1897; while the latter was mildly qualified by the remark that the formula should 
not be applied across dissimilar vessel types it too was subject to the same problems, and was 
demolished in debate.16  
 
Although the alleged weakness of the Royal Navy relative to France and Russia was based on 
dubious supporting evidence, as discussed in Chapter Two,  George Hamilton urged a 
supplementary estimate to make up for the perceived shortfall in British construction. This 
proposal was rejected, Sir Ughtred Kay-Shuttleworth, Secretary to the Admiralty, supported 
by Sir William Harcourt, asserting that the superiority of the Royal Navy over the other 
navies of the world had never been so great as it was then.17 The latter, one of the great 
Liberal Statesmen of the era, was unquestionably somewhat predisposed to minimising 
expenditure on the navy, being largely focused upon domestic legislation. Be that as it may, 
with the advantage of historical hindsight, Kay-Shuttleworth and Harcourt appear to have 
been fundamentally correct in their belief that the Royal Navy was capable of handling any 
likely threat or combination of threats. Even Kennedy points out that while the British 
continued to be anxious over the combined Franco-Russian naval challenge until the 
annihilation of the latter’s fleet at the hands of the Japanese at Tsushima in 1905, it seems that 
many contemporaries significantly overestimated the danger, concentrating only on 
weaknesses in the British fleet and forgetting those of its projected opponents.18 The French 
navy, though seemingly impressive on paper  
 
suffered from constant political interference and strategical controversy, and its 
ineffectiveness was fully revealed during the confrontation at Fashoda in 1898, where 
the obvious superiority of the Royal Navy provided Salisbury with one of his 
                                                     
15 Captain G. Noel ‘A Practical Measurement of the Comparative Fighting Efficiency of Ships of War’ TransINA 
Vol. XXVI (1885) pp.1-29 
16 Vice-Admiral P. H. Colomb ‘The Elements of Force in a Warship’ TransINA XXXVI (1895) pp.151-190; 
Professor F. Elgar ‘The Classification and Relative Power of Warships’ TransINA Volume XXXVIII 
(1897) pp.64-84 
17 Arthur Marder The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought 
Era, 1880-1905 London: Frank Class, 1964) p.175 
18 P. Kennedy The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Classic Penguin, 2001) p.179 
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strongest trumps. The Russian navy was in an even worse state, its fleets lacking 
homogeneity in speed and size, and its sailors, confined for much of the year to land, 
lacking the necessary gunnery practice and even the elementary navigational skills to 
take on their British counterparts; its’ pathetic performance in the war against Japan in 
1904-5 showed how overrated it had been.19 
 
Despite the rejection of Hamilton’s proposals, the majority of senior naval officers and 
several prominent politicians continued calling for increased naval construction, a call which 
was also strongly supported in the press. Marder cites the Times of 6 November 1893, which 
vented its ire upon the perceived villainy of Gladstone, who was unyielding in his opposition 
to increased naval expenditure on both personal and political grounds,   and Harcourt.20  The 
leader in question was actually the first of a series on ‘The Strength of the Navy and the Need 
for a New Programme’, which denounced current policy and Gladstone and Harcourt in 
particular.21 This article and its successors would be partially supported by Admiral Sir 
Geoffrey Phipps-Hornby in a letter to the editor of 22 November, condemning the 
contemporary strength of the navy, albeit more upon the grounds of a lack of reserves 
(particularly of good seamen), than on any real want of vessels.22 
 
The primary serving naval voice demanding greater funds was Sir Frederick Richards, who in 
November 1893 succeeded Sir Anthony Hoskins as First Naval Lord. Richards was a 
superlative administrator, and his ‘stern exterior, indomitable will, stolidity, and disdain for 
verbiage made him a standing terror to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and those politicians 
who had too much regard for fiscal considerations.’23 On 21 November, the naval lords 
formulated two possible five-year construction programmes, a ‘minimum’, and a ‘desirable’, 
                                                     
19 Ibid 
20 Marder Op. Cit. p.190  
21 ‘The Strength of the Navy and the Need for a New Programme’ The Times Monday 6 November 1893 p.7 
Parts 2 – 4 would appear on 13, 17 and 20 November. There is little archival evidence to support it, but 
it is interesting to speculate that Fisher may have had some indirect involvement; while lacking the 
carefully manipulated data of the old ‘Truth About the Navy’ articles, there is an undeniable 
resemblance 
22 Admiral Sir G. Phipps-Hornby ‘The Navy’ The Times –letters to the editor, Wednesday 22 November 1893. 
Hornby is generally perceived as one of the primary figures behind the ‘big navy’ movement. While to 
a large extent true such bald remarks also do him something of a disservice in historical terms, since 
Hornby possessed far more refined strategic views than measuring capability by simplistic vessel 
numbers, as his letter to the Times illustrates (which is not to say he was not above playing this card on 
occasion). His tenure as C-in-C Mediterranean fleet is regularly spoken of by historians in terms of his 
tactical activities, but his knowledge of administrative and logistical matters played just as crucial a 
role, even though he evidently took little pleasure in the routine slog of paperwork. 
23 Marder Op. Cit. p.176 
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based on numbers of first-class battleships, the former of which would give nominal parity 
with the combined forces of France and Russia, the latter providing a slight margin.24 With 
the naval lords threatening mass resignation, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Earl John 
Poyntz Spencer, largely accepted the ‘minimum’ programme as far as battleship numbers 
were concerned, but the proposals for cruiser construction saw the greatest arguments since 
the numbers forwarded by the naval lords were considered completely excessive, most 
particularly in financial terms. Spencer can be commended in many respects for his 
navigating a fine political tightrope of conflicting financial, party, public relations, and 
personal interests –ironically, true strategic necessity was probably not the principal concern 
of the majority of interested parties. Notwithstanding predictably gloomy (if not doom-laden) 
NID reports on comparative fleet numbers and the supposedly intractable nature of Richards, 
the Board did not resign en masse when it was made clear that they would not get all of the 
vessels they had proposed: a strong indication that they were deliberately presenting 
excessive figures. 
 
After much political acrimony, Gladstone resigned on 1 March 1894, retiring from public life 
forever.25 With his departure, a new five-year construction programme (1894/95 through 
1898/99 Estimates) was agreed by Cabinet on 8 March, authorising 7 new battleships, 20 
cruisers of various rates, and more than 100 miscellaneous smaller craft at a total cost of 
£21,263,000.26 The programme itself was named for Spencer, the immediate result sometimes 
being stated as a net increase of some 20 per cent in the Estimates for 1894/95 over the 
previous year.27 In fact, the 1894/95 Estimates did not increase by quite that amount, but the 
16.9 per cent rise was far from being insubstantial.28 Spencer had not yet finished though, and 
drove through a new Naval Works Act, which provided separate funding for such 
constructions (harbour construction, maintenance and defences, barrack building &c.), thus 
freeing up monies in the Estimates for other use, particularly vessel construction.29 
                                                     
24 Ibid p.191 
25 P. Padfield The Battleship Era (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1972) p.147 
26 Sumida Op. Cit. p.16 The convoluted history of the Spencer Programme, as Sumida notes, is extensively 
covered by Marder Op. Cit. pp.174-205 
27 Sumida Ibid 
28 See House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (henceforth HCPP) ‘Navy Estimates for the Year 1893 – 94 
with explanatory observations by the Financial Secretary, and explanation of differences’  1893-94 (85) 
LIII 1 and HCCP ‘Navy estimates for the year 1894-95, with explanatory observations by the financial 
secretary, and explanation of differences’ 1894 (5) LIV 1 
29 HCCP ‘Naval works. A bill to make provision for the construction of works in the United Kingdom and 
elsewhere for the purpose of the Royal Navy, and to amend the law relating to the acquisition of land 
for naval purposes.’ 1895 (173) V 159 
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One major policy difference between the Naval Defence Act and the Spencer Programme, as 
noted by Sumida, was that the former allowed unexpected balances to by carried over to the 
next financial year; owing to the administrative difficulties entailed, this was not repeated, 
but since the funding authorised by Parliament in the yearly Estimates was never exceeded 
due to the yards being at the limit of their capacity, this was not a major hindrance to vessel 
production.30 The programme was generally well received by the majority of the press. In its 
second effective year, post the 1895 election and victory of the Conservative / Unionist 
coalition under Salisbury, the Times remarked that the year’s naval programme was of ‘a very 
comprehensive and satisfactory character. ‘31 The paper did qualify its praise somewhat by 
adding that the new shipbuilding programme alone was not of the dimensions that would 
satisfy all critics of the Admiralty, but acknowledged that these should be judged alongside 
other complementary preparations, and the stated government policy of accelerating the 
construction of vessels in-hand rather than laying down  
 
…a greater number which cannot be speedily completed. There are now under 
construction eight battleships, 21 cruisers, and 40 torpedo-boat destroyers. To these it 
is proposed to add :–Five battleships (improved Renowns), four first-class cruisers 
(Diadem class) three second class cruisers (Talbot class), six third-class cruisers 
(Pelorus class), and 28 torpedo-boat destroyers. 
These vessels are to be laid down –three of the battleships, one first-class cruiser, and 
one third-class cruisers in the public yards as soon as slips become vacant, the 
remainder by contract.32 
 
The Times went on to note the intention that the ‘whole of the ships, both of the new and old 
programmes, are to be completed for sea by July, 1899.’33 This was an overly optimistic 
assessment, since of the five battleships provided in the 1896/97 Estimates (the first five 
Canopus class, the final unit, Vengeance being laid down under the 1897/98 Estimates) none 
completed by the summer of 1899, and only the name ship, Canopus, completed that year at 
all (in December).34 Nonetheless, the effects of increased funding were being felt, with major 
                                                     
30 Sumida Op. Cit. p.17 
31 The Times ‘Mr. Goschen’s Proposals’ Tuesday 3 March 1896, p.7 
32 Ibid 
33 Ibid 
34 Chesneau & Kolesnik Op. Cit. p.35 
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new first-class vessels under construction, both of the battleship and cruiser [nee ‘battle-
cruiser’ in Samuel Long’s parlance] type. 
 
 
Cursed gems –the twilight of the protective era 
Of all the first-class cruisers developed for the Royal Navy in the late Nineteenth Century, the 
eight-strong Diadem class are probably the least well-regarded. It must be acknowledged that 
this is a relative statement, since few of the first-class cruisers developed in the 1890s garner 
copious attention. However, the Diadems are interesting because their contemporary 
reception was extremely negative, scathing assessments frequently appearing in the press, 
journals and transactions of professional bodies, whereas their predecessors, though not 
without critics, had been mostly well-received.35 
 
The Diadems were designed, like all British first-class cruisers to date, primarily for the 
purpose of commerce protection and trade defence in general. As envisioned, their duties 
would have been to counter and overwhelm raiders such as the Dupuy de Lome, Amiral 
Charner class, and equivalent cruisers from other rival maritime powers. In addition to these 
vessels, the type was also needed as an effective counter (like the Blakes before them) to the 
swift, long-range converted liners which continued to be regarded as a significant potential 
threat. Like their predecessors, it was anticipated that they would usually operate singly or in 
small groups from focal areas in conjunction with smaller second-class types; they were not 
intended for operations with the battlefleet, although as indicated, if well-handled, they 
should have been able to perform such duties in the event of their being required. As they 
came into service however, there was a growing additional interest in how to utilise first-class 
cruisers (which would come to prominence during the Fisher era considered in Chapter Five): 
that of employing them in a dedicated hunting squadron attached to no specific fleet, but 
capable of being dispatched to different locations as required in time of conflict. It would also 
be potentially useful in peacetime for visiting foreign stations in the guise of showing the 
flag. 
 
                                                     
35 See for example the negative comparisons raised by Admiral Sir Edmund Freemantle in the discussion on 
Philip Watt’s paper ‘Elswick Cruisers’ TransINA Volume XLI (1899) pp.297-298. For a more ‘popular’ 
publication, F. T. Jane [ed. A. Preston] The British Battle-Fleet: Its Inception and Growth throughout 
the Centuries (London: Conway, 1997) p.284 
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The eight vessels of the class were constructed in two batches of four units, the first under the 
1895/96 Estimates, the second for the 1896/97 period.36 The design stages mostly took place 
during 1894, with the initial steps taken during the final months of 1893. In a letter from the 
DNC to Mr Dunn dated 23 November 1893, he was asked to confer with the Engineer-in-
Chief and have put in hand as soon as possible a sketch-design for a ‘Modified Blenheim’.37 
Throughout the development process and indeed during construction the Diadem class were 
regularly described in this way (and less regularly as ‘New Blakes’) and were required to be 
intermediate in size between the Blake and Powerful classes.38 The considerable increase in 
length over the Blakes (some 60ft) was ‘the minimum that can be accepted in connection with 
the use of the water tube type of boiler and the provision of a single submerged torpedo room 
which will be forward of the boiler rooms.’39 The first sketch design for the new type was 
submitted to the Board for their consideration in June 1894. A significant governing condition 
laid down in view of favourable reports from the Crescent and Royal Arthur, which had been 
modified from their Edgar class sisters with a higher forecastle, was that the new cruisers 
should have a similar long, high forecastle, rather than adopting a flush-deck arrangement.40 
In overall design terms, the Diadems can be loosely considered as reduced Powerfuls.41 
Figure 3.1 shows the deck plan and side elevation from the 1902 edition of The Naval 
Annual.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
36 Friedman British Cruisers of the Victorian Era p.237 
37 NMM Diadem class ship cover, DNC to Mr Dunn, 23 November 1893 
38 NMM Diadem ship cover, S9454/94 ‘Design for a New First Class Cruiser: Modified “Blenheim”’ Since the 
Powerful class was designed for a specific role, the Diadems can be viewed as more realistically 
representing the service’s general desires / requirements for first-class cruisers at this time 
39 Ibid 
40 NMM Diadem class ship cover: ‘Submission of the Director of Naval Construction to the design of New First 
Class Cruisers (“Diadem” Class)’ S.10268/1895 –A slightly edited version of this lengthy report is 
provided in Appendix II 
41 The emphasis here is upon ‘loose’; the description serves for general illustrative purposes, just as it does when 
considering the Edgars as reduced versions of the preceding Blenheims. It should not be taken literally, 
since these types, while sharing obvious general similarities with their immediate predecessors, were 
dedicated designs rather than being scaled replicas of these vessels.   
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Figure 3.1 
Diadem class cruiser deck-plan and side-elevation 
 
Source: T. A. Brassey [ed.] The Naval Annual, 1902 (Portsmouth: J. Griffin & Co., 1902)  
Plate 6 
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On a nominal 11,000 ton load displacement and 462ft 6in between extremities, the class 
averaged 20.5 knots on full-power trials with 30 Belleville water tube boilers serving two sets 
of 4 cylinder triple expansion engines.42 The design target was a continuous practical sea 
speed of some 19 knots, approximately 1 knot higher than the Blakes, although 19.72 knots 
was obtained in the name ship on a 30 hour trial at ¾ power.43 After repeated debates of the 
various options, a uniform armament of sixteen 6in QF was eventually selected, this being 
favoured by the First Naval Lord.44 These were disposed in mirror-imaged double-deck 
casemates fore and aft, two central main-deck casemates per side, and paired weapons on the 
forecastle and poop provided with shield protection.45 Given the duties the vessels were 
intended for, White also favoured the uniform 6in QF armament, as did the Controller, John 
Fisher. Both had favoured such an armament for the previous Powerful class but been 
overruled; in the case of the Diadems they carried their argument.46 Technically, the Diadems 
were the last British first-class cruisers to be equipped with the 6in QF gun proper, which had 
propellant charges loaded in brass cartridge cases. With improved breech mechanisms, it was 
possible to load and fire a 6in just as quickly with the propellant charge in silk bags rather 
than the bulky brass cartridge cases, and all later cruisers would be equipped with these new 
BL weapons rather than the QF. There was space for over 2,000 rounds of ammunition for the 
6in in all, or more than 125 rounds per gun.47 
 
The Diadems were also the last British first-class cruisers where the primary defence was 
provided by a comprehensive protective deck system, the curved steel internal armour being 
2 ½in on the flat and 4in on the slopes, the crown of the deck rising approximately 3 ½ feet 
above the design load-line with 1,000 tons of coal on board, the lower edge of the 4in slope 
being some 4 feet below the waterline.48 The total weight of armour in the protective deck 
                                                     
42 Friedman British Cruisers of the Victorian Era p.237 The second batch of four vessels (Ariadne, Argonaut, 
Amphitrite and Spartiate) were given slightly higher power machinery to lift maximum (trials) speed to 
20.75 knots 
43 NMM d’Eyncourt collection DEY/2 Tennyson d’Eyncourt, future DNC, appears to have collected data on 
cruiser trials as a matter of course, presumably because of the strong associations the Armstrong 
company, who he worked for at the time, had with such types 
44 Friedman British Cruisers of the Victorian Era p.237 
45 The original vessels were to have fifteen 6in QF, with only a single weapon on the quarterdeck; a second was 
added later. The second batch of vessels were intended from the outset to carry sixteen 6in 
46 In the light of which Fisher’s oft-repeated comment regarding the uniform 6in armament of the later 
Monmouth class, cited in the previous chapter (viz. ‘Sir William White designed the County class but 
forgot the guns’) is hypocritical in the extreme, particularly given the trade defence nature of both types 
47 Friedman British Cruisers of the Victorian Era p.235 
48 NMM Diadem class ship cover S.10268/1895 
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was some 1,200 tons.49 Protection was of similar scale on the casemates, 12in being provided 
on the conning tower. The total weight of protective material, excluding coal defence, was 
some 1,850 tons, or approximately 1/6 the total displacement.50 Ammunition passages were 
provided below the protective deck and coal bunkers to provide a protected means of rapid 
transit from the shell rooms and magazines to the widely dispersed guns. This was a great 
improvement over the Blake and Edgar classes, where the ammunition had to be transported 
longitudinally above the protective deck, or along the gun deck.51 Total coal bunkerage 
provided for was 2,000 tons, with a normal load of 1,250 tons.52 The bunkers above the 
protective deck were divided by a longitudinal cofferdam, the outer bunkers containing some 
750 tons of coal, it being assumed that they would be the last to be consumed, and thus 
providing a significant addition to the total protection.53 Assuming full bunkers, endurance 
from the remaining 1,250 tons was calculated to be 5,000 nautical miles at 10 knots.54 
 
The principle objections raised by the types detractors can be summarised as being:  
 
 The lack of ‘heavy’ guns  
 An apparently low speed compared to other vessels (be they of foreign construction, 
or by private firms such as Armstrong’s for foreign naval clients) 
  Excessive size compared to rivals 
 A high freeboard coupled with the use of the protective deck system rather than 
external armour.  
 
These critiques appear to have been echoed for the most part by historians with little further 
consideration. A more careful assessment though indicates that many of the objections 
levelled at the type are at best over-simplistic, and largely based upon very basic assumptions 
and tabulations of general features which took little or no account of the less obvious, but 
critical aspects of vessel design. An example of the sort of table commonly seen is provided 
in Table 3.1. Sir William White, strongly defending the Diadems from attacks in the press, 
pointed out in the 1904 edition of Brassey’s Naval Annual that for the services they were 
                                                     
49 Ibid 
50 Ibid 
51 NMM Diadem class ship cover S9454/94 
52 Ibid 
53See Chapter Two for more on coal defence 
54NMM Diadem class ship cover S9454/94 
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designed to fulfil, and when compared with foreign cruisers built or projected at the time of 
their design (1894), the Diadem and her sister ships were efficient protectors of commerce 
and communications.55  
 
White did acknowledge that several of the second batch of four vessels occupied an 
extraordinarily long period in construction, with the result that their entry into the service was 
severely delayed. But he also made the reasonable point that it was inappropriate to compare 
the type to vessels designed years later, embodying all the advances in technology that had 
occurred in the intervening time.56 The main cause for the delay in completing several of the 
second batch of vessels was the late delivery of their machinery from the contractors.57 
Although White, as the responsible designer cannot be considered unbiased, his remarks 
appear as objective as can be expected and are perfectly logical. Nevertheless, however 
reasonable, they also appear almost an apology for the type, which is surprising since it is 
easy to demonstrate that the Diadems have been significantly underestimated by their many 
detractors, and were far more capable than was and is generally appreciated. A reanalysis of 
the class and the criticisms levelled at it is well worth making, since it also provides some 
background to design choices of subsequent classes, and the reasons behind these. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
55 Sir William White ‘The Principles and Methods of Armour Protection in Modern War-ships’ in T. A. Brassey 
[ed.] The Naval Annual 1904 (London: J. Griffin, 1904) p.125 It is significant (and slightly ironic) that 
White’s article appeared in The Naval Annual, which was itself the source of many of the tables that 
caused White and the Admiralty so many problems 
56 Ibid 
57 Chesneau & E Kolesnik Op. Cit. p.68 The most notable delays were in Ariadne and Spartiate, which did not 
complete until June 1902 and March 1903, respectively 
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Table 3.1 
An example of a simplistic tabular comparison between the basic features of  
five cruiser classes 
 
T. A. Brassey [ed.] The Naval Annual, 1898 (Portsmouth: J. Griffin & Co.) 1898 p.458 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
58 Note, for example, the simple statement of maximum armour thickness, with no consideration given to area 
covered (e.g. height and length of a belt), proportion of displacement given over to armour, protection 
given to guns, height of guns above the water, ammunition supply, conditions in which maximum 
speed was obtained (displacement at time, boiler forcing, period of run, location of run) etc. 
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Considering the main points of criticism referred to above, the uniform 6in armament was a 
Board decision made after a variety of armament configurations had been discussed at length, 
including options with 9.2in or 8in chase weapons.59 Given the contemporary gunnery 
conditions where, as considered in Chapter Two, rapidity of fire counted above outright gun 
power, this can in many ways be considered an ideal configuration for the circumstances, 
while also possessing the advantages of a uniform calibre in terms of ease of supply and 
convenient logistics. Although heavier chase weapons, as had been fitted to other first-class 
vessels, would have been useful in providing extra punch in a close range engagement, the 
6in could defeat most rival cruisers’ protection at the time of their design, and was more than 
capable of completely demolishing unarmoured areas.60 The fact that it was employed as the 
‘secondary’ battery in RN battleships into the early years of the 20th century underlines this 
point. Thus the alleged weakness of a uniform 6in QF armament does not stand up, 
particularly for single-ship actions between cruisers operating in the trade defence role.  
 
The two real issues with the armament configuration were that the paired 6in chase weapons 
fore and aft possessed only shield protection, and the main-deck guns were nominally too low 
to the water to be effectively worked in poor weather conditions. The former of these points 
was clearly less-than-ideal, above all in an environment dominated by the QF gun, where 
explosive shell and splinters could potentially cut down the weakly protected crew of the 
chase guns. Armoured gun-houses would undoubtedly have been preferable, but it would not 
have been possible to employ them on the 11,000 ton displacement without accepting 
compromises elsewhere. While the Diadems possessed good stiffness and a respectable range 
of stability, they could not have carried the additional top-weight without compromising this 
further than either White or the Board were willing to accept.61 This was clearly stressed by 
the DNC in the early design stages,  pointing out that ‘it must also be understood that in 
working out the designs it will be necessary to steadily resist any proposals for changes 
                                                     
59 The full discussion was detailed in report G4441/94, the decisions also being summarised by the DNC in 
S10268/1895 contained in the ship cover. The possibility of a new design of 8in weapon based on the 
Elswick 8in/40-calibre was one that appeared several times during the 1890s, but never progressed 
beyond the concept stages, although the later 7.5in weapon could be loosely seen as the result of these 
debates. 
60 Although chase weapons might be expected to provide long range fire in a stern chase, given the lack of 
effective fire control during this period, this would have been rather more theoretical or optimistic than 
otherwise. As in the case of the battleships, the larger pieces of artillery would likely have been of 
greatest value as ranges dropped, and they could use their additional penetrative power and / or larger 
bursting charges to assault the vitals 
61 Based on the weights of contemporary turrets and gunhouses, the extra top-weight would likely have been in 
the order of 150-180 tons 
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which would tend to further raise the centre of gravity and so diminish the stability.’62 Quite 
apart from being basic good sense, White’s reputation had been made by his ground-breaking 
work on stability in the early 1870s.63 Moreover, few can have been better aware of the 
dangers of making additions to a vessel during the construction period. This had plagued 
many Royal Naval vessels built during the mid-Victorian era, and also adversely affected 
many contemporary French designs.64  
 
The matter of main deck guns being too close to the waterline is consistently raised regarding 
White’s cruisers from the Powerfuls onward, and this was indisputably a severe disadvantage 
to the configuration.65 What the critics consistently fail to suggest though is any realistic 
alternative means of carrying the number of 6in guns required by the Board, while achieving 
equivalent protection for the weapons, their crews and ammunition supply routes. As was 
illustrated in the previous chapter, the decisions regarding the use of casemates were based 
upon data obtained from the Resistance experiments. A vessel could have been designed with 
weapons located on the upper deck. Since a box-battery would be the only realistic means of 
achieving this though, the protection would have been substantially weaker, as confirmed by 
the Resistance trials. The 6in guns would necessarily be grouped much closer together in 
such a configuration, reducing their independent defence and that of the ammunition supply 
routing. Owing to the significantly raised centre of gravity, stability would have been reduced 
for a given hull form with an upper deck battery, and it is highly probable that a larger vessel 
would have been necessary to obtain both equivalent stability and the required speed, it being 
accepted that the nominally increased level in offensive power came at the price of vessel 
                                                     
62 NMM Diadem class ship cover S10268/1895 
63 See Chapter Two 
64 See John Beeler Birth of the Battleship: British Capital Ship Design 1870-1881 (London: Caxton, 2003) 
pp.211-212 The slow build times of the era were partly to blame, since this gave ample opportunity to 
modify vessels under construction to add the latest developments. One of the few types which actually 
benefited from this were the two Trafalgar class coast-assault vessels, which had their intended 5in BL 
replaced with the far superior 4.7in QF. This resulted in an increase in displacement & draught, but for 
their intended coast-assault role in the Mediterranean theatre this was considered rather a benefit than 
otherwise and made them better fighting ships than as originally designed. White was happy enough to 
pursue this, presumably because he was able to keep a close eye on the total weights to ensure they did 
not become excessive, and because the type, which he had inherited and had no enthusiasm for, marked 
the end of the coast-assault tactical (and strategic) paradigm. Had they been blue-water combatants, he 
may well have reduced the number of QF to ensure no reduction in buoyancy and stability; since the 
QF gun had a substantially greater rate of fire (and correspondingly required a greater quantity of 
ammunition) even a further reduction in the number of guns would have brought with it an increase in 
total firepower 
65 This also applied, to an even greater degree, to Watts’s two Duke of Edinburgh class vessels –see Chapter 
Five. It is strange that RN vessels should be criticised for this issue while many foreign vessels, which 
carried weapons no higher in practice above the waterline, rarely receive similar notice. 
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size, cost, and weakened defence. These points regarding the use of maindeck casemates, and 
the objections to them apply consistently to all of White’s first-class cruisers from the 
Diadems to the Devonshire class. The two Powerfuls may have been an exception; little 
criticism has been directed toward them on this front, and they had a reputation of being both 
excellent sea boats and inherently dry.66 
 
The claim of apparently low speed in the Diadems (and to an extent the subsequent Cressy 
class) is also difficult to support if more than simple trials figures are considered. For 
comparative purposes, the baselines employed for the different vessels / types must be 
identical, and this was rarely if ever the case. Vessels built by private firms for foreign clients, 
and indeed much foreign construction seldom had to undergo trials as stringent or carefully 
conducted as those Royal Naval vessels were subjected to. Results could be subject to a 
considerable degree of creative interpretation, described as ‘jockeying’ by Sir Edward Reed, 
with highly exaggerated top speeds sometimes claimed.67 The simplest example of such a 
numerical sleight of hand was to use the maximum figure obtained in favourable conditions 
on a short run, rather than an average value taken over an extended period or periods.68 On a 
more technical level, forced draught was frequently employed in many foreign vessels and 
those built in Britain by private firms, and this itself could be disguised in many ways. The 
fashion for high boiler pressures had largely expended itself in the Royal Navy by the early 
1890s, and following the introduction of the Belleville in the Powerfuls forced draught was 
largely discontinued in service first-class cruisers until White’s final Devonshire class.69 An 
example of a Belleville type of (large diameter) water-tube boiler is shown in Figure 3.2. 
                                                     
66 See C. E. W. Bean With the Flagship in the South (London: T. Werner Laurie, 1909) pp.24-25, also Anthony 
Preston The World's Worst Warships: The Failures and Repercussions of Naval Design and 
Construction, 1860-2000 (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 2003) p.45 
67 E. Reed ‘Trials of Steam-Ships at the Measured Mile’ TransINA Volume VIII (1867) pp.100-110 Reed gave 
examples of methods by which artificially high top speeds might be claimed. See also K. C. Barnaby 
The Institution of Naval Architects 1860-1960: An Historical Survey of the Institution’s Transactions 
and Activities over 100 Years (London: Royal Institution of Naval Architects, 1960) p.54 As dryly 
noted by Barnaby, Scott Russell, in the discussion on Reed’s paper, generously offered to tell him a few 
more ways that he had not mentioned in his paper! 
68 By the turn of the century, one element of the RN standard trial was eight hours’ trial at natural draught, and if 
applicable, three or four hours at forced draught. See discussion on Philip Watts ‘Elswick Cruisers’ 
TransINA Volume XLI (1899) p.306 
69 The true measure of what was extracted from the boilers, and the degree of stress they were subjected to, was 
horse-power developed per square foot of grate / per square foot of heating surface. In the Royal Navy, 
a fixed limit on horse-power compared to heating surface was applied, whether forcing was employed 
or not. This varied depending on the type of boiler, be it cylindrical, large diameter water-tube or small 
diameter water-tube. A further point of interest is that while forced draught is normally referred to in 
association with closed stoke holds, if openings were kept to a small size (and number) it was still 
possible to significantly increase power with fans without ever actually closing the stokeholds at all 
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Although a very mild degree of forced draught was available in the Diadems, it was rarely 
employed in practice, and was essentially reserved as a redundancy for obtaining the design 
power even if one boiler room were to be disabled in action or otherwise rendered out of 
commission.70 As a result stresses on the boilers in the Diadems (and their successors) were 
relatively low compared to many rivals, and they were able to maintain full power and high 
speed for longer than would have been possible with greater levels of forcing.71 The price was 
a greater number of boilers for a given output. Over any reasonably extended chase, this 
would have almost entirely offset any theoretically higher sprint capabilities of vessels 
employing considerable forced draught.72 Their size and high freeboard also made them 
superior sea boats to smaller vessels, further increasing their edge in terms of practical sea-
speed, irrespective of what the modest figures obtained on trials might suggest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
70 T. A. Brassey ‘The Progress of the British Navy’ in T. A. Brassey [ed.] The Naval Annual, 1898 (Portsmouth: 
J. Griffin & Co., 1898) pp.3-4 
71 NMM Diadem class cover S.10268/1895 ‘Enclosure to docket containing general description of the design’ 
72It should though be noted that severe problems with the Belleville were initially encountered, although as 
described in Chapter Four, this had more to do with crew training than inherent flaws in the Bellevilles 
themselves 
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Figure 3.2 
Belleville type water-tube boiler 
 
Source: L. S. Robertson [trans. & ed.] Marine Boilers: Their construction and working 
dealing more especially with tubulous boilers. Based on the work by L. E. Bertin (New York: 
D. Van Nostrand Co., 1906) p.36 
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The greatest criticisms of the Diadems concerned their size and lack of external armour 
protection, coupled with a high freeboard which increased the target area for an opponent. 
Considering the former point first, this was a consequence of Board requirements for a coal 
capacity, seakeeping (i.e. freeboard), ammunition supply and protective arrangements, the 
details of which were often overlooked in basic comparisons between types. These all tended 
to be greater in service vessels than those built by, or for, foreign rivals, which naturally 
tended to result in greater dimensions, although they were also to an extent saddled with 
excessive equipment weights, which many officers would have been happy to see reduced.73 
Much the same would apply to their immediate successors, although criticisms by this point 
were fading. 
 
On the subject of armour, the Diadems, as the last British first-class protected cruisers can be 
regarded as the victim of an unlucky combination of circumstances. In addition to being 
faced with the usual criticisms levelled at the protective deck system, the Diadems had the 
bad luck to be under construction at a time when great strides were being made in protective 
material, and, as White pointed out, to be repeatedly compared with slightly newer types 
incorporating the new armour technology. But at the time of the design in 1894 the internal 
armour scheme was considered by the Admiralty and the Controller’s department to retain a 
slight edge in practice for cruisers. In the Powerfuls and Diadems the protective deck system 
reached its ultimate refinement, the main difference between the types being a matter of 
scale: the Powerfuls, being larger, had a thicker deck and casemate armour than the Diadems. 
In other respects, the protective schemes employed in the two types were very similar. This 
was as previously illustrated an excellent defensive arrangement for the mid-1890s, and even 
afterward would have provided capable protection against both explosive shell and AP shot 
fired from QF and medium-calibre guns in a single-ship action. The same could not be said 
for the alternative arrangements of external plate, given the armour technology available at 
the time of their design. 
 
When all of these factors are considered, a very different and much more favourable picture 
of the Diadem class emerges, and it seems highly probable that they would have proved 
significantly superior fighting ships to any rival cruisers dating from the same design period 
or earlier. The soft steel belts of, for example, the Dupuy de Lome, Amiral Charner and 
                                                     
73 See the remarks of Freemantle in the discussion on Watts ‘Elswick Cruisers’ Op. Cit.   
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Pothuau classes were very thin and would have been easily penetrated by 6in QF firing AP 
shot at typical battle-ranges.74 Although the former had cofferdams to 4ft above water, their 
protective decks were quite thin to free up weight for their belts, rendering them vulnerable to 
AP shot from 6in QF. Likewise, the small Italian armoured cruisers of the early 1890s would 
not have posed formidable opposition, all being at most some 60% of the Diadem’s 
displacement. Equally, there seems no reason to suppose that a Diadem could not have 
successfully engaged the Rurik discussed in Chapter Two, given their efficient protective 
arrangements, armament and respectable practical sea-speed.75 
 
Possibly the most formidable contemporary opposition up to the time of the type’s design 
would likely have proved the New York and Brooklyn of the slowly expanding United States 
Navy.  These cruisers were somewhat closer in size to the British vessels than many other 
rival, were respectably armed, and possessed an unusual armour scheme that featured a 
reasonably thick protective deck associated with narrow strips of thin armour across the 
machinery and boiler spaces. Nominal speed and seakeeping were fair, though range was 
modest in relation to British vessels. The American cruisers also relied upon forcing to obtain 
high power from a small number of boilers, and employed two sets of three-cylinder TE 
engines coupled to twin shafts rather than the single set of smoother running 4-cylinder 
engines per shaft employed in the Diadems.76 As such, they are realistically better compared 
to the Blakes, and notwithstanding the rhetoric from Secretary Tracy, would have at best 
equalled the earlier British types.77 
 
All British first-class cruisers employing this form of defence were subject to criticism from 
proponents of external (belt) armour. As a faintly despairing White remarked 
 
It has been my painful lot to hear ships described as “unarmoured,” which, to my 
knowledge as their designer, were carrying about the world enormous weights of 
                                                     
74 Chesneau & E Kolesnik Op. Cit. pp.303-304 
75 Assuming a similar level of crew training  and equally favourable conditions, the result of an engagement 
between a Diadem and Rurik as she was completed would likely have been a heavy defeat for the 
Russian vessel with a high casualty rate for the crew owing to the inadequate protective scheme 
employed. Realistically, the Rurik could neither run from, nor fight a Diadem on equal terms, despite 
possessing four nominally heavier weapons 
76 Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War I (London: Studio Editions, 1990) p.54 & p.140 
77 Norman Friedman US Cruisers: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984) pp.36-
37 Given the displacement, dimensions, engine and boiler configuration and nominal coal capacities of 
the US vessels, the ranges claimed for them at the time appear to be significantly exaggerated 
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protective material in decks, casemates, and other defence. On the other hand, ships 
which happen to carry a few hundred tons of thin plating (3 in. to 4 in.) on their sides 
are described as “armoured,” although their total weight of defensive material is much 
less than that of so-called “unarmoured” vessels with no armour on their sides.78 
 
Despite complaints from those who preferred external plating, until the development of face-
hardened armour the Admiralty’s preference in cruisers for throwing the majority of available 
weight for defensive materials into protective decks appears to be entirely correct. In the 
absence of direct battle experience, conclusions were drawn from a mass of full-scale 
experimental data and tests, notably from the Resistance and oft-forgotten Nettle trials. It is 
instructive to note that later naval engagements demonstrated many of these conclusions to be 
correct. From the middle of the 1890s though, dramatic improvements were made to armour 
plate, which had a profound impact upon the design and development of first-class naval 
units, both of the battleship and cruiser types, and would ultimately result in a step-change in 
the strategic character of the Royal Navy and other naval services during the final years of the 
Nineteenth, and first years of the new century. The new types of armour and their major 
impact on the first-class cruiser type and their operations are considered below and in the 
following chapters. 
 
 
The armour revolution: process developments and a paradigm shift 
British first-class protected cruisers, from the Blake to the Diadem classes, all employed steel 
for their curved internal armour decks, and for vertical armour on or around the conning 
tower, funnel uptakes, ammunition hoists, casemates, gun shields and gun houses. As 
described in Chapter Two, the introduction of nickel-steel armour in the late 1880s-early 
1890s is sometimes taken by naval historians as a revolutionary advance in protection. In 
reality, this was not the case. The introduction of nickel was significant but it was not in itself 
a major advance.79 Compared to a homogenous solid steel plate the alloy under contemporary 
                                                     
78 Sir William White, in discussion on Elgar Op. Cit. pp.82-83 
79 Note that although the armour trials at Annapolis in September 1890 are frequently stated to have been the 
first trial of a nickel-steel plate (from the Schneider / Creusot works) several much less publicised trials 
predate this. The first of these appears to have been a 2in plate produced by a Mr. Riley, that was 
shown at the Iron and Steel Institute Meeting in 1889, and had been fired at by a 3 or 6-pounder gun. 
On seeing the results, the DNC (William White) publically stated the Admiralty would be willing to 
fire at a similar plate if one were to be made available for trial. Mr. Hall of Messrs. William Jessop & 
Sons provided a 4in thick nickel-steel plate that was fired at on board the Nettle 16 April 1890. See the 
remarks made by William White in the discussion following Mons. J. Barba ‘Recent Improvements in 
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conditions had the potential for increasing both the resistance to cracking and penetration, but 
this was relative, being only a few percentage points of improvement, and tests indicated that 
neither solid steel, nor nickel-steel alloys were in themselves significantly superior to 
compound armour.80 An equally important development, though one that is less frequently 
discussed, was the introduction of the Tressider process which provided a more effective 
means of chilling, and thereby hardening, the face of an armour plate.81 
 
Traditional dipping methods were of limited effectiveness for face-hardening large armour 
plates. It was difficult to harden a single face using these processes, but more significantly 
there was a tendency for a steam envelope to form around the immersed article. The steam 
held the water away from the face of the plate and slowed both the rapidity and the 
uniformity of the chilling process. Tressider, working at the Atlas Steel Works in Sheffield 
patented a method in which a very high-pressure spray or douche of water (though oils were 
not excluded) was forced against a desired surface, eliminating the possibility of a build-up of 
steam, and thus improving both consistency and the rapidity of the cooling.82 In his 1894 INA 
paper ‘Recent Experiments in Armour’ Charles Ellis, the Managing Director of John Brown 
& Co. Ltd., stated that Tressider’s initial experiments were on compound plate, since John 
Brown (and their Atlas Steel Works, where manufacturing was concentrated) was at the time 
primarily manufacturing armour of this type.83 He also stated that ‘it subsequently became 
apparent that the hardening process was more suitable to homogenous than to built-up or 
compound plates.’84 Ellis did not provide any reasons for this in his paper, but the probable 
explanation is that that the differential cooling rates stressed the weld between the iron back 
and steel face of a compound plate sufficiently for them to delaminate under attack. The test 
results were extremely interesting however, a trial at Shoeburyness 4 August 1892 being 
noted in particular: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Armour Plates for Ships’ TransINA Volume XXXII (1891) p.160, and in the discussion on Mr. Charles 
Ellis ‘Recent Experiments in Armour’ TransINA Volume XXXV (1894) p.236 
80 See Barba Ibid and the subsequent discussion for further details. 
81 For details on the metallurgical processes involved in face-hardening, see N. Okun Table of Metallurgical 
Properties of Naval Armour and Construction Materials 
http://www.navweaps.com/index_nathan/metalprpsept2009.htm -accessed 4 January 2012 
82 Tolmie John Tressider ‘Manufacture of Armour Plates’ US Patent No. 475,364 dated 24 May 1892, p.1 Note 
that Tressider also patented his invention in Italy (30,334 dated 30 September 1891) and France 
(215,886 dated 3 September 1891) 
83 Ellis Op. Cit. p.220 
84 Ibid 
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The dimensions of the plate were 8 ft. by 6 ft. by 10 in., and it was attacked by five 6-
in. Holtzer projectiles, weighing 100 lbs. each, with a velocity of 1,976 ft. per second. 
Captain Orde Browne describes the result of the trial as follows :- “The whole of the 
projectiles broke up with very little penetration. The plate, after the trial, appeared to 
be nearly as stiff and strong as at first.”85 
 
The Tressider process alone was not frequently employed on homogenous mild-steel or 
nickel-steel plate before it became incorporated into more complex armour types which could 
better exploit its effectiveness through cementing the face of the armour plate, and thereby 
increasing the potential hardness that could be achieved. The first of these was what has come 
to be known as Harvey plate, named for its nominal inventor, American industrialist Hayward 
Augustus Harvey. A matter which should be stressed particularly from this point in the 
development of armour plate is that is that the names given really only define a general, or 
generic armour type. The details of the alloy employed and the hardening processes it was 
subjected to varied somewhat between manufacturers as much as they had previously, and as 
improvements were sought and made over time. 
 
Harvey armour consisted of a steel or nickel-steel plate that was strongly carburised on one 
face by covering it with a thick layer of (usually animal or bone) charcoal, surrounding the 
rest of the plate with non-carbonaceous granular material, and heating to a high temperature, 
typically around the approximate 1,200 degrees C. melting point of cast iron.86 This 
cementation process raised the carbon content in the face to between 1 and 1.1 per cent, 
which gradually decreased beneath the surface until the carburising effect finally vanished.87 
The length of time the plate was exposed to heat (for ship armour, typically between 2 – 3 
weeks) was the primary factor in determining the depth of the carburisation within the plate.88 
When first developed the heated plate was uniformly oil quenched and then water quenched, 
resulting in a differential hardening: the highly carburised face was hardened to a Brinell 
value of 575 or higher while the non-carburised back was toughened, with a relatively 
                                                     
85 Ibid Ellis does not state whether the plate in question was of a compound or homogenous steel / nickel-steel 
type, though the August 1892 date suggests that it was almost certainly a solid plate of steel 
86 Hayward A. Harvey US Patent 460,262  ‘Decrementally Hardened Armour-Plate’ Application date 1 April 
1891, granted  29 September 1891. The process itself predated the patent application. It was necessary 
to surround the other sides with granular material since at the temperatures involved, were any part of 
the plate to be exposed to air, it would rapidly melt 
87 Naval Ordnance and Gunnery (Washington DC: US Govt. Printing Office, 1955) Chapter 12, 1206 
88 Harvey patent 460,262 
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gradual transition through the plate.89 The majority of manufacturers quickly replaced the oil 
and water quenching procedure with the more effective Tressider process described above, 
and it was later discovered that if a plate were then annealed at a low temperature, the total 
thickness could be reduced by some 10 – 15 per cent without loss of strength.90 The end result 
was a plate possessing an increase in resistivity of some 37.5 per cent over previous types of 
non-face-hardened steel or compound armour, and an ultimate figure of merit of some 2:1 
over traditional wrought iron.91 
 
In the United States, nickel-steel was the favoured material for the plate; when employed in 
Britain, mild steel was generally employed rather than a nickel-alloy, it being considered that 
‘the value of the nickel alloy was not sufficiently proved by later experiments to make its 
adoption universal.’92 An interesting side-note to the history of armour development in the 
1890s which is rarely noted is that there is some question about how much the specifics of the 
Harvey process owed to other parties. Sir William White, in a speech made at the Jubilee 
meeting of the Institution of Naval Architects in July 1911, stated 
 
In regard to the use of Harveyed armour, it has not been mentioned… but it is a fact, 
that a great deal had been done in that direction in this country before Mr. Harvey 
attained the success which he did in the United States –a success for which he 
deserves the greatest credit. When the Harvey process was introduced to us at the 
Admiralty it was in a state of development which left much to be desired, and its 
                                                     
89 Okun Op. Cit. 
90 Naval Ordnance and Gunnery [revised derestricted edn.] (Washington DC: US Govt. Printing Office, 1957) 
p.42 
91 Admiralty, Manual of Gunnery for His Majesty’s Fleet (December 1915 edn.) Volume III. p.96 Also cited by 
Brown Op. Cit. p.150 
92 Charles E. Ellis ‘Armour for Ships (1880 to 1910)’  TransINA Volume LIII (1911) p.343 There remains some 
speculation on this point. In theory, the nickel-steel should have been tougher, but contemporary 
practice was another matter, and the test results appear to show only a small difference, just as had been 
the case between earlier forms of non-face-hardened mild steel and nickel-steel.  T. Vickers, in the 
discussion on Ellis’s previously quoted 1894 INA paper (p.239), remarked that in the course of trials 
his firm had found no advantage, the reason given being ‘that nickel steel is affected in its crystalline 
structure at a lower temperature than ordinary steel, and will harden at a much lower heat. 
Consequently the nickel steel is affected deleteriously by the long and continued heating in the 
“Harvey” furnace, and thus loses the advantage which nickel should afford.’ There appears to be some 
truth in this, but since later armour types employed nickel as an alloying agent, it seems more likely 
that in this case, the manufacturers were still learning how best to exploit new techniques. Nickel at the 
time was also relatively expensive, but since Vickers in the same remarks also stressed his belief that 
the use of nickel in non-Harveyized armour was desirable, it does not seem probable that economic 
considerations were driving this particular instance 
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further development was due to the work of British firms of armour plate makers 
aided by Admiralty grants for experimental purposes.93 
 
Although this statement is possibly controversial, it is a matter of fact that the Harvey process 
itself quickly adapted, the most obvious change being the general shift toward Tressider’s 
method of rapidly chilling the face of a plate with numerous high-pressure water-jets, 
replacing earlier less effective dipping methods. While it was never employed for decks or 
belts in British first-class cruisers, Harvey plate was the first major advance in armour 
technology since the introduction of solid steel and compound plate.94 It also was the first 
stage in a process of rapid development which would make it realistically possible for first-
class cruisers to carry a useful quantity of vertical protection.95 The next stage in the evolution 
of armour plate would be the Krupp Cement (KC) type. 
 
Although Harvey plate had proven a significant advance (although it seems probable that a 
forged nickel-steel plate, face-hardened via the Tressider process, followed by a low 
temperature anneal would have been close in capability to early examples) it was quickly 
discovered that the back was not sufficiently tough to withstand racking effects when 
assaulted by forged steel shot.96 During the 1880s several armour producers experimented 
with adding chromium into a low alloy of nickel-steel; the resultant nickel-chrome steel alloy 
when properly heat treated showed exceptional hardness potential, but proved extremely 
difficult to manufacture.97 The Krupp Arms Works were the first to overcome these problems 
in 1893, and were able to consistently produce large ingots in which a low carbon steel was 
alloyed with 3 ½ - 4 per cent nickel and 1 ½ - 2 per cent chromium.98 Brown notes that some 
manganese also featured, and that a small percentage of molybdenum may have been used.99 
This seems reasonable since molybdenum is often used in applications which involve 
extreme heat, either in use or manufacturing, since it does not significantly expand at high 
                                                     
93 Sir William White, in discussion on Ellis ‘Armour for Ships’ p.347 
94 As is illustrated below, it was employed in several classes of French first-class cruisers 
95 The only major British vessels to carry Harvey armour were the 2nd class battleship HMS Renown (although 
like many swift 2nd class battleships, she was not far removed from being a 1st class cruiser) and the 
Majestic 1st class battleships 
96 Ellis ‘Armour for Ships’ p.343 
97 Naval Ordnance and Gunnery [1957 edn] p.42 
98 D. Brown Warrior to Dreadnought: Warship Design 1860-190 (London: Caxton, 2003) p.151 
99 Ibid 
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temperatures. Another chemical analysis of a Krupp plate indicated that trace levels of 
silicon, phosphorus and sulphur were present.100 
 
The production process of Krupp Cement armour was refined and modified over time, and 
was considerably more involved than any prior type. Initially, Krupp used illuminating gas 
(methane) as the carburising agent rather than coating it with a solid hydrocarbon, the gas 
being continually blasted across the face of the plate while it was held at a constant 
temperature within the sealed oven.101 The majority of manufacturers continued with solid 
hydrocarbons though, presumably for cost reasons.102 Brown describes the typical production 
process in some detail: the low-alloy steel was cast into an ingot of up to 60 tons, and allowed 
to cool until solid enough to be lifted. It was then re-heated to a uniform temperature, and 
using a hydraulic press, formed into a slab which was passed through rolling mills until 
slightly thicker than the final intended size. After rolling, the plate was placed in a low 
temperature furnace, where it was softened by sprinkling with water, and planed flat. It would 
then be covered with a mixture of animal and vegetable charcoal to a depth of 6in, another 
plate would be laid on top, and the ensemble run into a furnace where it would be kept at high 
temperature for up to three weeks. Immediately on being withdrawn, it would be bent into the 
final shape and toughened by reheating and cooling in an oil bath, after which the edges were 
cut and holes for bolts plugged with clay.  
 
The face was then heated to a higher temperature than the back by protecting the latter 
in the furnace and the plate was suddenly chilled on both sides by water jets. The face 
was now very hard whilst the back, which was not carburised, and was heated to a 
lower temperature, remained tough. The plate was checked and any adjustment made 
in the press with the plate nearly cold. Any final adjustments were made by grinding 
as the face was now too hard to be cut but holes in the back could still be drilled and 
tapped. The process was complicated, temperature control being vital, and took a 
considerable time, manufacturers quoting 9 months for delivery from receipt of 
orders. The hard face was deeper in Krupp plate than in Harvey and could not be 
varied independently of the hardness required.103 
 
                                                     
100 Naval Ordnance and Gunnery [1955 edn.] Chapter 12, 1208 
101 N. Okun Op. Cit. 
102 Ibid 
103 D. Brown, Op. Cit. p.151 The previous paragraph is based on text from this source 
 133 
 
KC armour was initially some fifteen per cent more efficient than Harvey, and was gradually 
developed to bring a further ten per cent gain.104 The much refined production and improved 
decremental hardening process allowed for an even harder face, with a more gradual, 
controlled transition to an extremely tough, ‘fibrous’ back.105 Figure 3.3 shows the cross-
section of a Krupp Cement plate. In comparing the resistance of various general types of 
armour plate to uncapped projectiles, the Admiralty Gunnery Manual of 1915 gives the 
following values 
 
15in of wrought iron is the same as: 
12in of compound 
12in of all-steel 
7 1/2in of Harvey 
5 3/4in of Krupp106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
104 Naval Ordnance and Gunnery [1955 edn.] Chapter 12, 1207 
105 Ibid 
106 1915 Gunnery Manual [Vol.III] p.96 & Brown Op. Cit. p.150 
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Figure 3.3 
Cross Section of a Krupp Cement Armour Plate 
 
Naval Ordnance and Gunnery (Washington DC: US Govt. Printing Office, 1955) Chapter 
XII, 1212: Plate V 
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Thus, with a figure of merit of 2.6:1 against wrought iron, and 2.087:1 against compound or 
all-steel, KC armour was a massive advance in passive protective capacity, and the balance 
between guns and protection clearly shifted slightly in favour of the new types of armour 
plate during the latter stages of the pre-fire-control era.107 In 1895, the Naval Intelligence 
Department produced a lengthy report and assessment of armour manufacturing in the major 
industrial nations, including an assessment of the most recent foreign trials, and the 
Admiralty made the decision to switch from Harvey to KC plate.108 By the end of 1896, three 
of the main British manufacturers of armour acquired licenses to produce plate using the KC 
process.109   
 
 
French developments 
In the mid-1890s, French naval strategists once again turned their attention to the guerre de 
course, after a brief period during which the guerre d’escadre found favour following the 
decline of the wider Jeune École. By 1896, in light of the recent advances in material 
technology (most particularly, armour) Admiral Francois Fournier was strongly advocating 
the construction of large, moderately armed cruisers exploiting the new armour technology 
for operating against the commerce of ‘perfidious Albion.’110 These, he stressed, must always 
strive to exploit their greater speed to avoid fighting with superior British forces. Fournier 
also argued that deliberately seeking combat with a more numerous enemy  
 
made little sense when the opponent’s vital interests could be more effectively 
attacked by other means. Rather than attempting to contest command of the sea, 
                                                     
107 The figures of merit given are possibly slightly exaggerated given the 1915 date and the fact that KC armour 
was steadily, if incrementally improved from the time of its introduction, but serve as a general 
guideline and certainly do not detract from the huge step forward in protective ability that occurred 
during this period. 
As a matter of academic speculation, one wonders what the respective figure of merit would be for a standard, 
non-cemented nickel-steel plate (or compound faced with the same), if face-hardened by the Tressider 
process. Using Orde Brown’s description of such a plate, and comparing  to the extensive tabulated 
contemporary test data provided by Ellis ‘Recent Experiments in Armour’ and Mons. L. Bertin 
‘Hardened Plates and Broken Projectiles’ TransINA Volume XXXIX (1897) pp.1-25, it seems 
reasonable to infer such plate had an approximate improvement of  25% compared over the base 
material. This would equate to 9in offering the same level of protection as 15in of wrought iron, or a 
respectable figure of merit of 1.67:1 Whether the back would have been tough enough is another 
question, although Orde Brown did not indicate any issues even under assault from 6in Holtzer forged 
steel projectiles, and there seems no reason to suppose it would have been inferior to Harvey in this 
regard. 
108 TNA ADM 231/26 NID report no.427 Details of Harvey Armour Plate Trials 
109 Parkinson Op. Cit. p.225 –the manufacturers in question, referenced in Brassey’s Naval Annual of 1897 
110N. Lambert Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2002) p.25 
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Fournier believed that the easiest and cheapest way France could strike at Great 
Britain would be to wage a systematic guerre industrielle.111 
 
This style of naval force-structure largely rejected the strategic views of Mahan and Colomb, 
with Fournier and his fellow proponents of industrial warfare exerting a strong influence over 
French naval strategy for some years.112 Between 1895 and the signing of the Entente 
Cordiale 8 April 1904, France laid down some 11 battleships in six classes, as against 15 
large cruisers.113 The most notable early fruit of this shift in strategic direction back toward 
the guerre industrielle was the laying down of the Jeanne d’Arc in October 1896. Generally 
held as the first of a new breed of first-class cruisers, she was supposedly 
 
a large, high-speed, long-range, armoured cruiser that was purposefully designed for 
raiding commerce on the high seas. In theory the great length of the hull coupled with 
a huge coal capacity would enable her to outpace and outdistance any more powerful 
adversary. But the most remarkable feature of this warship was the provision of an 
armoured belt along the complete length of the hull…  this meant that the hull of the 
Jeanne d’Arc, and all subsequent French side-armoured cruisers, was virtually shot-
proof against the armour-piercing shells fired from the 6-inch guns that composed the 
main batteries of the British cruisers with the speed to catch them.114 
 
In terms of overall principle or objective this is a reasonably accurate statement, though there 
are certain significant caveats regarding the execution that are overlooked. The Jeanne d’Arc, 
with her face-hardened armour, was a significant advance over previous French cruisers, 
although in a broad sense the massive jump in dimensions was as much responsible for the 
increased capabilities as the production processes of her belt material. It should also be stated 
that she was not an unqualified success, missing her design speed by more than a knot and 
                                                     
111 Ibid 
112 It is unfortunate that Colomb’s writing should have been marginalised relative to that of Mahan, since, 
although it is easy to over-simplify Mahan, Colomb generally appears the more flexible strategist when 
the writings of both over an extended period are considered. Mahan, with his early lectures and The 
Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 was largely attempting to re-educate US naval 
officers in the general principles of blue-water naval warfare after years of littoral operations. Colomb, 
serving in the Royal Navy, with somewhat broader contemporary commitments, appears slightly less 
dogmatic in his views, particularly when considering combined operations 
113 The Dupleix class were arguably second-class types, but since their displacement was roughly equivalent to 
the British Edgars they are included here 
114 N. Lambert Ibid p.21 
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being extraordinarily unhandy, with a miserable 2,200yrd tactical (turning) diameter.115 In 
comparison, the Diadems, of similar displacement, had a tactical diameter of some 1,000yrds 
for which relative unhandiness compared to other British first-class cruisers they were 
regularly criticised.116 Perhaps most notably though, care must be taken when assessing the 
true value of the French vessels’ armour protection. It was not until the Leon Gamberetta 
class, laid down from January 1901, that French armoured cruisers would carry KC plate. 
The Jeanne d’Arc, the three Gueydon, three Dupleix and five Gloire class vessels all were 
protected by Harvey nickel-steel.117 While as detailed above a significant improvement on 
previous types, 6in Harvey would have been borderline against assault from Holtzer or 
equivalent forged-steel armour-piercing shot from the latest models of 6in gun.118 Lambert 
cites remarks by White in a minute dated 22 January 1897 ‘Type of Battleship to be 
Contemplated in 1897 – 98’ which acknowledge the protective capacity of 6in Harvey against 
then-current 6in AP projectiles.119 However KC armour rather than Harvey was ultimately 
employed for the 6in belt of vessels in question (the Canopus class). The only major 
combatants built for the Royal Navy with Harvey armour were the one-off Renown and nine 
units of the preceding Majestic class battleships –in the latter case 9in thick, and in all vessels 
associated with a strong protective deck.120 The extent of the Jeanne d’Arc’s belt is also 
susceptible to exaggeration. Nominally 14ft 2in deep, the upper strake was of 4in (tapering to 
1.6in at the ends), while only the lower 8ft 2in were of 6in, and this also reduced to 2in at the 
                                                     
115 Chesneau & E Kolesnik Op. Cit. p.304 
116 Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War I (London: Studio Editions, 1990) p.54 
117 It seems that there were several causes for this; partly it was due to the (expensive) purchase of production 
rights to the patented Harvey process, and the somewhat smaller number of heavy engineering firms 
manufacturing armour for warships. A similar situation had been claimed some years before, when the 
French government encouraged armour manufacturers to purchase the rights to produce compound 
plate and gear their plants toward its production –a highly expensive proposition. This was done, and 
compound was extensively used, rather than homogenous steel. Although these allegations were 
particularly strongly made by representatives of the Schneider firm, which produced steel rather than 
compound plate, and cannot be considered neutral, Schneider generally still produced to capacity, and 
there is some evidence to support the contention. 
118 See TNA ADM 116/446, Sir William White S.11584, 10 June 1897. Memorandum / notes on Cressy Class 
design. Copy also held in Cressy Class ship cover at NMM. A slightly edited version of this paper / 
notes is included in Appendix II. Also see previous sections on armour protection in this chapter, and 
Chapter Two. The baseline assessment was taken as 100lb Holtzer projectiles (6in) at a striking 
velocity of 2,000 ft. / sec. 
119 Lambert Op. Cit. p.21 & pp.314-315 
120 Per the Admiralty figures cited above, the Majestics should have had a slight edge, 6in of KC being roughly 
equivalent to 7.826in of Harvey. The Canopus type was intended as a fast battleship for use in the far 
east though rather than for the European theatre, and, while not quite a second-class design, they were 
smaller and faster ships than the Majestics, and in concept could be regarded as a marginally enlarged 
Renown with a heavier armament –an additional pair of 6in QF, and 12in, rather than 10in guns, White 
arguing that 12in was the minimum required to penetrate the thick (albeit narrow) belts of Harvey 
armour then being fitted to contemporary French battleships. See TNA ADM 116/878 DNC ‘The 
Characteristics and Dimensions of Battleships’ 13 December 1895 
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bottom edge.121 Thus, despite being coupled with two thin armoured decks, the space between 
the two being heavily subdivided into the cellular layer that would become a feature in 
several French designs, the passive defensive abilities of the Jeanne d’Arc and the following 
three classes of French armoured cruisers can be somewhat overstated. 
 
The assumption that the Jeanne d’Arc and her immediate successors, with their Harvey 
vertical protection, were ‘big and fast enough to outclass Britain’s most powerful protected 
cruisers’ is also a more questionable proposition than is often assumed, since the 
effectiveness of the protective deck system is typically underrated.122 With their high 
sustained sea speed and large batteries of QF weapons, it is far from certain that a Powerful 
or Diadem would have been as comprehensively outclassed by the French vessel as is 
popularly believed. 
 
 
Fleet cruisers and a new breed of capital ship 
It has recently been stated that ‘the true function and purpose of these big armoured cruisers 
[viz. the Jeanne d’Arc] extended considerably beyond mere commerce raiding and 
independent operations in distant seas.’123 As evidence, the 1899 edition of The Naval Annual 
is cited as mooting another function: 
 
The role proposed for the Jeanne D’Arc is that of an advanced guard to a fleet of 
battleships, seeking for and maintaining touch with the enemy. Cruisers of this type… 
should be able to fight a battleship for a short time.124 
 
This is at best a questionable statement given the timings involved; the Jeanne d’Arc was laid 
down in October 1896, and such roles do not appear to be consistent with the strategic 
philosophy that ostensibly created her, while her immediate successors (the Dupleix class) 
were smaller, more lightly armed and quite weakly protected. Therefore it seems likely that 
                                                     
121 Tapered armour cost substantially more than uniformly thick plate due to the more complex production 
processes involved 
122 Sumida Op. Cit. p.19 
123 Parkinson Op. Cit. p.221 There is a certain ambiguity in the phrase from Brassey’s that Parkinson quotes, viz. 
‘should be able.’ This could be taken to mean that they were capable as a matter of course, or that they 
should be designed to have this capacity   
124 Parkinson Op. Cit. p.221 There is a certain ambiguity in the phrase from Brassey’s that Parkinson quotes, viz. 
‘should be able.’ This could be taken to mean that they were capable as a matter of course, or that they 
should be designed to have this capacity   
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the potential for fleet operations was only seriously considered in France sometime after the 
Jeanne d’Arc’s design.  
 
In Britain, the DNC had also been paying considerable attention to the developments being 
made in face-hardened armour, and its application to first-class cruisers. On 29 April 1897, 
White instructed assistant-constructor W. E. Smith to prepare a preliminary design for such a 
vessel.125 The first memorandum of significance outside the constructor’s department 
followed on 10 June, and as far as the wider Royal Navy is concerned, it is in this report that 
a major shift in vessel capability, and general duties, is first indicated 
 
The fundamental ideas on which this design is based are as follows:- 
Special adaptation for service with the Channel & Mediterranean Fleets; & the 
performance of all duties hitherto devolving on First Class Cruisers attached to Fleets. 
1. Capacity for close action, as adjuncts to battleships 
2. Suitability for employment on detached services; if required to be used for the 
protection of shipping, commerce & communications. 
3. Armament, protection, speed & coal endurance to be such that the new 
cruisers should be formidable rivals to the best cruisers built or building for 
foreign Navies.126 
 
It is the phrase ‘the capacity for close action’ that provides the clearest signals of the 
increased fighting capability of the first-class cruiser brought by the introduction of face-
hardened, and particularly KC plate. Of no less interest though is the remark ‘if required to be 
used for the protection of shipping, commerce & communications.’ This does not appear to fit 
satisfactorily with the idea of the vessels being a response to the new French cruisers, as was 
stated by the First Lord (Goschen) to the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Hicks-Beech) on 23 
July 1897: 
 
“In view of the extra exertions made by France specially in respect of very fast 
cruisers” the navy required money to lay down immediately four (later increased to 
                                                     
125 NMM Cressy Class ship cover. White to Smith 29 April 1897 
126 NMM Cressy class cover Notes on Cressy Class design. Original underlining 
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six) large cruisers with the necessary speed to run down the French vessels. Three 
days later the House of Commons voted the necessary sum.127 
 
The reason for the apparent discrepancy seems to be that the new designs owed substantially 
more to recent developments in Italian, not French, cruiser construction. Owing to financial 
restrictions in the latter half of the 1890s, the Italian naval authorities were unable to pursue 
the construction of a traditional style of battlefleet, and were instead forced to adopt a fleet 
structure based around large cruisers, with sufficient levels of protection and firepower to 
enable them to operate with existing battleships. White had spent some time with the Italian 
naval constructors in 1896, while travelling on account of his health (although his visit to the 
Ministry of Marine was of a semi-official nature), and became very familiar with the Carlo 
Alberto and Garibaldi classes which embodied these principles, and which he regarded as 
exceedingly well designed.128 Although they were over-gunned for their displacement, and the 
armament itself was over-complicated, with three major calibres in the Garibaldis (10in, 8in 
and 6in), they were respectably well protected, reasonably (though not overly) fast, and 
probably the ideal type of vessels for the Italian navy given their circumstances. White stated 
that his personal inspection of the vessels 
 
…confirmed the opinion I had previously entertained: viz., that the time had arrived 
when it had become necessary to construct cruisers for fleet-work, which should be 
capable of taking part in fleet-actions as adjuncts to battle-ships.129 
 
Thus there appears to have existed an interesting divergence of views regarding the function 
of the new vessels. The constructor’s department evidently viewed the type as having a 
primary emphasis on fleet work, while the First Lord appeared to view them at this time as a 
counter to a possible cruiser guerre de course. Whether Goschen genuinely believed this or 
whether it was a case of the Board determining what would be the most convincing case to 
present to Parliament in order to obtain funding is more open to question. Goschen appears to 
have revised his views in later speeches before Parliament, apparently in reflection of the 
                                                     
127 N. Lambert Op. Cit. p.22 
128 F. Manning The Life of Sir William White (London: J. Murray, 1923) p.349 
129 TNA ADM 116/446 Notes on Cressy class design 
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modest speed of the Cressys (although their sea speed in many practical conditions would 
have been at least as high, or higher, than many commerce-raiding types).130 
 
This idea of cruisers not just operating with battleships, but acting as fleet units has been 
called a ‘dangerous concept,’ and the whole idea of cruisers engaged with the battlefleet 
‘incorrect.’131 But the introduction of KC armour significantly altered the balance between 
guns and protection to the extent where it was quite practical for a first-class cruiser, in 
tactical conditions dominated by intermediate-calibre artillery, to operate in such a fashion. 
Previous protected types could, as discussed, have held their own for short periods against 
many rival battleships, particularly older or second-class types, but they were not designed 
for such activities, being largely meant to fight single-ship rather than fleet actions. A similar 
but not quite identical situation existed with the later big-gun first-class cruisers, as is 
illustrated in Chapter Five. 
 
The six Cressy class cruisers laid down under the 1897/98 programme are often described as 
belted editions of the Diadem type, and while this is an exaggeration, they were of generally 
similar appearance. Figure 3.4 shows the deck-plan and side-elevation of the class from the 
1902 edition of the Naval Annual. On 12,000 tons and 472ft between extremities they carried 
single 9.2in chase weapons fore and aft, with 12 x 6in in the same casemate arrangement as 
the Diadem class. Length was modestly restricted in order to ensure they could easily 
manoeuvre with battleships if called to do so.132 The 9.2in made a return, according to White, 
due to their intended fleet role and the more widespread use of face-hardened armour plate.133 
Both the 9.2in and 6in were of new marks (the Mk X and Mk VII, respectively), which 
caused a short delay in issuing contracts for their construction.134 The 45 calibre 6in BL Mk 
VII was particularly significant in that it, along with the Mk VIII, it would form the primary 
armament of all British first-class cruisers until the Duke of Edinburgh class.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
130 Hansard, Supplementary Navy Estimates 1898-99 H.C Deb., 22 July 1898, vol. 62 cc854-967 
131 Chesneau & E Kolesnik Op. Cit. p.62 
132 Friedman British Cruisers of the Victorian Era p.239 
133 TNA ADM 116/446 Notes on Cressy class design 
134 The Naval Annual 1898, p.12 
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Figure 3.4 Cressy class cruiser deck-plan and side-elevation 
 
Source: T. A. Brassy [ed.] The Naval Annual, 1902 (Portsmouth: J. Griffin & Co., 1902) 
Plate 7 
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4 cylinder TE engines were again employed with twin shafts, fed by 30 Bellevilles with 
natural draught, for a design smooth water speed of 21 – 21 ½ knots, which would have 
provided a continuous sea speed of almost 20 knots: in service the class had a reputation for 
being good steamers.135 Freeboard was over 30ft, and their hull form similar to the Diadems, 
albeit slightly fuller with finer ends to compensate for the additional weights, and they had a 
respectable GZ curve, with maximum righting lever occurring at 35 degrees.136 Cressy’s first 
captain (Tudor) is reported to have been pleased with his new ship, which he regarded as a 
good sea boat, albeit rather wet:  
 
‘the waves in a very slight seaway, dash against the projections – casemates, shoots 
etc. – and squirt up the side coming down in sheets of spray over the boat-deck.’137 
 
The armour scheme employed was closely analogous to the Canopus class battleships 
primarily designed for the China Station and use in the Far East.138 Slightly more than 230 
feet amidships were protected by 6in KC plate over a depth of 11 ½ft, from the main deck to 
5ft below the normal waterline, being sealed with 5in bulkheads at each end, 2in steel armour 
extending to the bow to provide splinter protection.139 Two protective decks were fitted, the 
upper being the main deck itself, 1in thick; the lower, 1 ½ in thick, curved down to meet the 
bottom edge of the vertical armour, the space between the decks being largely given over to 
heavily subdivided coal bunkers.140 Before and aft the central armoured citadel, which almost 
completely protected buoyancy and stability, the lower protective deck extended to the 
extremities, increasing to 2 ¼ in thick abaft the belt and 3in over the steering gear.141 In 
comparison to the Diadems the thinner armoured lower deck was less heavily curved.142 
Barbettes and gun-houses had 6in KC, the casemates 5in, and CT 12in.143 
 
By any contemporary measure the Cressys were formidable combat vessels and could have 
formed an extremely effective fast wing to a main battlefleet, rather than being simply a 
modern counterpart to the frigate from the sailing era, serving purely as scouts for the 
                                                     
135 Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War I Op. Cit. p.52 
136 Brown Op. Cit. p.158 
137 Cited in Ibid 
138 Cressy class cover, White to Smith Op. Cit. 
139 TNA ADM 116/446 Op. Cit. 
140 Ibid 
141 Ibid, see also Chesneau & E Kolesnik Op. Cit. p.68 
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battlefleet and for detached service protecting commerce and communications.144 The 
development of KC armour had blurred the distinction between ship types, and the Cressys 
may be regarded as the first vessels in the Royal Navy which the term ‘battle-cruiser’ 
accurately described, if the usual assumptions are set aside and the term is simply taken to 
describe a cruiser that possessed the ability to fight with and against first-class battleships.145 
White’s memorandum is sometimes even taken to be the genesis of the big-gun battlecruiser 
type, although the preliminary details had as shown actually been worked out somewhat 
earlier.146 
 
The annual Manoeuvres for 1897 saw the first major use by the RN of first-class cruisers with 
the battlefleet, albeit in the scouting role and to provide heavy-support for smaller types 
rather than as a fast division. This was in part a result of the large number of battleships and 
cruisers having been assembled at Spithead for the Diamond Jubilee Naval Review, which 
allowed more extensive operations than usual; the exercises of the Channel and Reserve 
Fleets were entirely distinct, a division of each manoeuvring against each other.147 The 
Channel Fleet operations are of particular interest, with numerous modern front-line vessels, 
including Blake, Blenheim, Powerful and Terrible. Cruisers attached to one division were 
tasked primarily with screening ‘their Battle Squadron from observations, and, on the other 
side, to get touch with that Battle Squadron in spite of its Cruisers, and communicate with 
their own Admiral.’148 The exercise area was ‘within a circle of 350 miles radius drawn from 
Blacksod Bay, and bounded by the 52nd parallel of latitude and the 7th meridian of longitude, 
‘war’ being declared at midnight on 7 July.149 The general idea for the exercises was that 
 
In anticipation of war a Squadron (Second Division) puts to sea from Blacksod Bay, 
leaving one Cruiser behind to bring on the news that war has been declared. 
This cruiser, under orders to proceed direct to a rendezvous at a fixed speed, is 
followed some hours after she has started by two Cruisers of an opposing Squadron 
(First Division) with the object of discovering the position of the enemy-squadron and 
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informing their own Admiral, who has put to sea from Lough Swilly, so as to enable 
him to prevent the return of the Squadron to Blacksod Bay by intercepting it at sea.150 
 
The fleet-scouting role of cruisers and their integration with battleships and torpedo-boats 
into a cohesive, recognisably ‘modern’ fleet largely dated to Sir Geoffrey Hornby, and their 
scouting duties in particular was a matter that had received considerable attention from 
Captain [later admiral Sir] Arthur Wilson during his time in the Mediterranean in 1893, where 
he worked on their searching formations and signalling.151 The 1897 Manoeuvres appear to 
have extended some of Wilson’s work, giving an extensive trial to ‘curves of search’ that had 
been worked out.152 Figure 3.5 shows an example of a search curve employed during the 
Manoeuvres. The ‘intercepting’ First Division’s movements, including those of the Powerful 
and Terrible, which operated as this Division’s two independent heavy scouts, are shown in 
Figure 3.6. As may be anticipated, the Second Division’s dispatch cruiser was Blenheim, 
Blake being attached to their battle-squadron’s (second-class) cruisers as heavy-support.153 
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Figure 3.5: Example cruiser Search Curve 1897 Manoeuvres 
 
Source: HCCP ‘Naval Manoeuvres, 1897’ 1898 (c.8803) LVI, p.7 
A Squadron stationed at point ‘B’ learns of the departure of an opposing Squadron in their 
direction from Point ‘A’ & commences a search 
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Figure 3.6: Movement of First Division battleships & Scouts  
(including Powerful & Terrible) 
 
Source: HCCP ‘Naval Manoeuvres, 1897’ 1898 (c.8803) LVI, p.21 
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The Powerful and Terrible were unsuccessful in their first independent search for the 
Blenheim and re-joined their division; the latter would later locate the Second Division 
battlefleet and used her high sea-speed to report to her Flag while avoiding interception; an 
error in relaying her sighting information by the Terpsichore resulted in a severe delay, and 
Powerful was obliged to repeat her sister’s performance. The Second Division disregarded 
several of the rules of the exercise, deliberately dispatching most of the main cruiser force 
before the official commencement of hostilities to convoy the Blenheim, while also ‘being 
calculated to deprive the Chasing Cruisers of the First Division of any chance of identifying 
[Blenheim]… from which the position of the rendezvous was to be obtained.’154 The tactic 
was successful, helped in part by the Blenheim’s somewhat creative interpretation of the 
location of the entrance to Blacksod Bay. After joining her Division without being 
intercepted, she and her sister were employed as detached heavy scouts.155 Despite the 
problems, largely caused by the Second Division ignoring the rules of the exercise the 
Channel Fleet Manoeuvres were valuable in that they confirmed the value of first-class 
cruisers to a battlefleet, primarily due to their high sustained sea-speed which allowed them 
to locate or evade an enemy force without significant fear of interception.  
 
The annual RN Manoeuvres of 1898 were cancelled on June 18 owing to a continuing strike 
in South Wales collieries and a concern that they would deplete reserves at a time of 
diplomatic uncertainty.156 This is usually linked to concern over Russian naval expansion, 
which was indubitably a factor (certainly as far as navalist agitators were concerned), though 
as Seligmann points out that British naval attaché’s dispatches on the state of Russia’s naval 
infrastructure at this time were ‘far from complimentary’.157 As much a factor behind the 
cancelling of that year’s Manoeuvres was likely the outbreak of the Spanish-American war. 
This provided the first examples of cruisers being used as capital ships in combat since the 
Yalu engagement four years earlier. In the Far East the United States would employ their 
cruisers as their battlefleet itself. Under Commodore George Dewey, the Asiatic Squadron 
gained considerable fame at the Battle of Manila Bay on 1 May in which the Spanish Pacific 
Squadron, also comprised of cruisers was largely wiped out. Dewey’s cruisers would 
subsequently lend land forces artillery support, assisting in the taking of Manila itself. The 
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Caribbean campaign would see a similar role and importance attached to such types. The 
Spanish Caribbean Squadron under Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete comprised four first-
class cruisers supported by two destroyers. Though at first glance the use of cruisers in the 
combined US North Atlantic Squadron under Rear-Admiral William Sampson and the Flying 
Squadron under Winfield Schley was less significant, a closer inspection reveals anything 
but. Both US flagships, the New York and Brooklyn were first-class cruisers, while the 
Oregon, notwithstanding the myriad design-faults of the type, approached being a crossover 
type vessel.158 Irrespective of the later controversy that erupted between supporters of the two 
US senior officers the Battle of Santiago de Cuba, which saw the complete destruction of the 
Spanish Navy’s Caribbean Squadron again underlined the value of possessing high speed 
first-class vessels to chase down opponents and provide greater tactical manoeuvring options. 
159 With the Spanish fleet emerging in file from harbour, the Brooklyn in particular performed 
the fast-wing / fast-unit role later demonstrated to even more emphatic effect by the Japanese 
armoured-cruisers during the Russo-Japanese war. The engagement also largely confirmed 
the relative importance of the QF gun that many naval officers and constructors believed, and 
which had been illustrated at Yalu.160   
 
The Santiago action was naturally of interest to the Royal Navy and was studied in Britain, 
but it appears the prevailing attitude in the service was one of mild ambivalence, at least as 
far as vessel design and seagoing tactics were concerned. From that perspective, other than 
confirmation of the two aforementioned general points neither side especially distinguished 
itself at the battle, despite some worthy individual examples. The defensive capabilities of the 
three Spanish Infanta Maria Teresa class cruisers was poor, with a partial narrow waterline 
belt associated with a thin protective deck, and only shield protection to their heavy weapons 
and essentially none to the main battery of 5.5in guns sited on the exposed upper deck. Little 
of particular value could be learned in this quarter, or from the Cristóbal Colón since her 
protective scheme was not put to the test; given the poor performance of Spanish projectiles, 
much the same may be said for the USS Brooklyn while the New York, like the Cristóbal 
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Colón,  was not struck. Of slightly more interest was the use of first-class cruisers as capital 
ships, both in the Caribbean and the Pacific. This would in fact set a pattern for the United 
States, which would subsequently give State names to their largest first-class cruisers, 
underlining their capital-ship status. From 1902, the US Caribbean Squadron consisted 
entirely of cruisers; the American South Atlantic and European Squadrons were also 
envisioned to be cruiser-based; over time they would also become the primary US capital 
ships employed in the Pacific, as the battleships were concentrated in the North Atlantic.161 
More broadly, it did confirm the value of an amphibious force invading an enemy's territory 
with the intent of attacking a fleet at its home base; a matter that continued to be worth 
‘serious consideration’.162  
 
Back in Britain, rather than committing to a new cruiser class for 1898/99, the Board decided 
in August 1897 to expedite the vessels already under construction or confirmed as far as was 
possible, while paying close attention to rival programmes abroad, since in addition to France 
and Russia, Argentina, Chile, Germany and Japan were all constructing such types.163 With 
eight Diadems building and the six Cressys about to be laid down the Board’s decision to 
wait made strategic sense, as well as ensuring that materials and funding were not 
dissipated.164 A reconsideration of the programme for the following year would occur just a 
few weeks later when further information became available on foreign cruiser construction, 
particularly new vessels projected by France, which cut back on first-class battleship 
construction in order to continue building armoured cruisers in large numbers.165 These were 
the Dupleix and Gueydon classes; smaller and substantially less capable than the Jeanne 
d’Arc, with little real capacity for fleet action. Nevertheless, over the course of two 
intelligence meetings on 10 December 1897 and 7 January 1898 with the Naval Lords, DNC 
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and DNI, it was decided that steps should be taken to develop a new type.166 On 17 February 
1898, in the usual yearly paper to Cabinet summarising the Navy Estimates for the coming 
twelve months, Goschen remarked to his colleagues that 
 
The French, so far as their policy can be gauged, have begun to recognise that it is by 
cruisers rather than battle-ships that they can damage us most… With our immense 
commerce, we naturally require a very much larger number of cruisers than any other 
Power. But during the last three or four years the efforts of the French, who are 
building first-class armoured and protected cruisers of extraordinary speed, specially 
designed to prey upon commerce, have made the Spencer programme quite 
insufficient…167 
 
Goschen acknowledged that little could be done that year, particularly since the designs were 
still in a preparatory stage and required considerable discussion, but bluntly added    
 
We cannot possibly afford to fall behind in the fastest class of powerful cruisers. The 
escape of one or two of these with 23 knot speed would be disastrous if we could not 
catch them. It is absolutely essential therefore to strengthen ourselves in this direction, 
and I propose to commence the construction of four first-class armoured cruisers to be 
so built as to realise 23 knots speed.168 
 
The 23 knot vessels Goschen referred to would become the Drake class, and are sometimes 
described as being the Royal Navy’s direct response to the Jeanne d’Arc and similar large 
high speed armoured cruisers.169 This assessment is true enough as far as it goes, but it is not 
the whole picture for in addition to rival cruisers, the Board had other targets for the new 
vessels in mind. The latter half of the 1890s saw an resurgence of interest in the second-class 
battleship, or those approaching such status, with a reasonable number of these vessels being 
built by the navies of Russia and Germany, while even some of the smaller French vessels 
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were bordering upon such types.170 The German vessels were for general purpose use, but 
those built elsewhere, most significantly the Russian Peresviet class, were intended for 
service on foreign stations, especially in the Far East. Like the earlier British Centurions and 
Renown, they typically had a slightly higher speed than first-class battleships, with a lighter 
‘main’ armament and the usual QF battery, which in principle was rather well adapted for the 
gunnery conditions of the 1890s. There is no direct evidence in the Drake ship cover to 
suggest countering these vessels was a specific design consideration, references to opponents 
focusing upon cruisers. Nevertheless, the new type would retain the same armour and 
capacity for close-action as their Cressy class predecessors, and were thus well adapted for 
overwhelming second-class battleships like the Peresviets, which were far inferior in speed, 
comparatively poorly protected with a shallow, tapered waterline belt of Harvey topped by a 
flat armour deck, and possessed a less-numerous QF battery. The steady increase of Russian 
naval power in the Far East during the latter half of the 1890s and first years of the Twentieth 
Century would become an increasingly significant aspect to British policy (naval and 
broader) though, and is considered in more detail in Chapter Four.  
 
With speed a priority and a heavy preference for natural rather than forced draught to the 
boilers, dimensions increased back to approximately the size of the Powerfuls to attain 23 
knots under the relatively stringent Royal Naval standards, although the DNC suggested that 
it might be preferable to have less length and accept the necessity of higher engine power in 
order to economise on the weight and cost of armour plating.171 This proposal was not met 
with enthusiasm by the naval lords, although the First Lord would certainly not have 
objected, since while he was in favour of responding to the French construction, he was 
alarmed at the rapidly escalating costs involved. Goschen in fact held out as late as 31 March 
for one of the smaller of the four sketch designs worked up by the Constructor’s department 
in response to the Board requirements.172 The question was not so much that of the vessel size 
itself, but rather the severe strain on manning resources such cruisers entailed, which 
Goschen believed the service could ill spare, and  
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which [would] have to be furnished by heavy sacrifices in the direction of largely 
reducing the number of ships which we could send to sea.173 
 
In contrast to their political master, the naval lords were strongly in favour of a return to the 
dimensions of the Powerful class, arguing that the new vessels should be able to fight any 
possible opponent, existing or projected, at the time of their design.174 Carrying their point, 
the type became known as ‘Lord Goschen’s mighty cruisers’ on account of their dimensions –
a soubriquet Goschen was unlikely to have relished given the circumstances.175 The four 
Drakes were White’s statement first-class cruisers, since the final two types for which he was 
responsible designer would, as is shown below, be significantly compromised by 
requirements for reduced dimensions. There was far greater debate over the design 
characteristics of the new cruisers than had been the case with previous vessels, one of the 
more interesting memoranda being ‘Tactics of new armoured cruisers as affecting their 
design’ produced by the then-Controller (Arthur Wilson) in early 1898.176  
 
Wilson is an interesting figure in the history of the Royal Navy’s first-class cruiser. An 
austere man, albeit a frequently generous one, he played an important role in assisting 
develop fleet tactics and cruiser formations in the early-mid 1890s. Although known as 
‘Old ’Ard ’Art for his refusal to consider the cares and comforts of his men’, Wilson was not 
immune to common feeling.177 He was attached to John Jellicoe who served briefly as 
Commander of his battleship HMS Sans Pareil in the Mediterranean, and helped look after 
him while he was recovering from the effects of ‘Malta fever’ (Brucellosis), and the 
immersion he received following the accidental sinking of HMS Victoria.178 During his time 
in the Mediterranean under Sir Michael Culme-Seymore, he devoted special attention to the 
establishing of specific tactical principles for cruisers serving as scouts for the main battle-
squadron, and also designed a new form of mast-head semaphore to facilitate 
communications at longer visual distances.179 A torpedo specialist, during the 1870s he was 
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closely involved in the early development of the Whitehead torpedo and mines, a role he 
would reprise in the late 1880s when he assisted develop submarine torpedo tubes, new twin-
launchers for torpedo-boats and net-cutting apparatus.180 Promoted Rear-Admiral in 1895 
Wilson was given command of an experimental Torpedo Squadron, flying his flag in the 
second-class cruiser Hermione and tasked with assessing the capabilities of the new torpedo-
boat-destroyers then being commissioned.181 These would be instrumental in the supersession 
of the traditional small torpedo-boat by the new, somewhat larger destroyer type.  
 
From 1897-1901 Wilson would serve as Controller. He inherited a substantial building 
programme including the eight Diadems that had been established during the tenure of his 
predecessor (Fisher). He established a reasonably effective working relationship with the 
DNC, and while his reluctance to delegate may be reasonably said to have been a limiting 
factor, his excellent technical and practical backgrounds meant he possessed a depth of 
material understanding and how they would be used that few of his service contemporaries 
could match. Wilson was extremely wary of attempts to restrict vessel displacement, correctly 
regarding attempts to do too much on a limited size as the primary cause of many prior 
failures.182 This extended from attempts to save weight in machinery and fittings, limiting 
their reliability, through to the impact lack of space could have on efficient working.183 His 
prior experience was evidently reflected in some of his preferences, including his desire to 
introduce an 8in gun for cruisers to match those employed in many Elswick vessels and 
others built abroad (e.g. Rurik, Brooklyn etc.).184 In this he was partially supported by the 
DNO, but both gave way to the rest of the Board and the DNC in face of the valid point that it 
would unnecessarily introduce another calibre into the service.185 Accepting their views, the 
annotations he made in red ink on a handwritten memorandum by White, who was deeply 
wary about judging a vessel’s firepower on the basis of total energy per minute delivered on a 
given bearing, demonstrated his thinking on the matter.186 Wilson largely agreed with the 
DNC, with certain qualifications, specifically that in his view ‘total energy per minute is a 
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good guide as long as the structure attacked can be penetrated.’187 In the absence of his 
favoured twin 8in chasers for cruisers, he was happy to accept the 9.2in with the heaviest 6in 
QF battery consistent with proper fields of fire, ammunition supply, and achieving the design 
speed, range and overall protection remits.188 
 
White’s memorandum had been written largely in response to the aforementioned minute by 
Wilson on the ‘Tactics of new armoured cruisers…’ With a 23 knot trials speed required for 
the new Drake class (based on the design speed of the Jeanne d’Arc) and a 21 knot 
continuous sea speed anticipated based on previous practical and experimental experience, 
Wilson had raised the question of whether it may be advantageous to make some sacrifice of 
stern fire in the new cruisers in order to obtain superior fire ahead and on the broadside. 
 
The paper was essentially predicated upon the assumption of independent operations for the 
new vessels against enemy commerce raiders, arguing, undoubtedly correctly, that it would 
be ‘profoundly to their [viz. enemy commerce raiders] interest to avoid action unless they can 
fight on terms very advantageous to themselves.’189 The truth of this view would be 
repeatedly demonstrated during the two World Wars, perhaps most notably with the errors of 
judgement that ultimately led to the loss of Von Spee’s squadron at the Battle of the Falkland 
Islands, 8 December 1914, and Kapitän zur See Langsdorff’s decision in 1939 to ignore 
Admiral Erich Raeder’s orders not to engage enemy warships.190 Under these conditions, 
Wilson suggested, enemy raiders would almost invariably attempt to flee from British 
cruisers rather than stand and fight. The latter, with a higher projected sea speed, would likely 
be able to outstrip the raiders, but since a stern chase was almost inevitable, this would take 
time. On this basis, in Wilson’s view, the new cruisers would require ‘good protection to the 
bows, good and well protected ahead fire, good and well protected broadside fire and 
moderate astern fire with much less protection than is necessary for the bow.’191 The emphasis 
on protection to the bow and ahead fire would be advantageous for obvious reasons in a 
protracted stern chase, while similarly strong broadside protection and fire would become 
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valuable when the range had closed and the opposing vessel was forced to stand and fight. 
Within this remit, Wilson’s views make a great deal of sense, although they would have had 
greater utility to the earlier protected cruiser types, where the overriding design remit was for 
commerce protection and single-ship actions. Despite his preference for an emphasis upon 
end-on fire and protection for the new vessels, which was ultimately rejected, Wilson was 
however largely responsible ‘for establishing the foundations of the fleet handling systems 
used in both world wars; his success in the 1901 annual manoeuvres established the system of 
cruising in columns and deploying into line just before battle that was used by his disciple 
Jellicoe at Jutland.’192   
 
While the Drake class were largely an answer to the big French commerce raiders, their 
protective scheme was essentially similar to that employed in the Canopus and Cressy classes 
(though on a larger scale), and an important consideration was that they should have the same 
capacity for close-action as the Cressys. This was emphasised in the written discussion that 
resulted from Wilson’s paper, the Junior Naval Lord (Captain Arthur Moore) remarking that 
 
Personally I should deprecate any sacrifice of stern fire, believing that powerful 
armoured cruisers would prove on occasions most valuable auxiliaries to the Battle-
Fleet, and that on such occasions with constant manoeuvring the want of sufficient 
stern fire would be felt –at the same time this class of vessels should necessarily have 
a more than usually powerful ahead fire –but I would rather gain this by arrangement 
of guns that would admit of 5 firing ahead and 3 astern.193 
 
The First Naval Lord concurred with Moore, adding a preference, as had been the case with 
the Cressys, for a mixed 9.2in and 6in armament, a configuration that was generally 
supported over a uniform 6in given the introduction of face-hardened armour in rival cruisers, 
the fleet use potential of the new vessels, and the fact that they may reasonably be expected to 
fight second-class battleships on foreign stations.194 The Drakes eventually, on 14,150 tons 
nominal displacement and 500ft between points (533ft 6in between extremities), carried two 
9.2in Mk X guns as chase weapons in single turrets fore and aft, and sixteen 6in Mk VII on 
the broadside in four double-decked casemates per side. Draught was set to enable them to 
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transit the Suez canal.195 Figure 3.7 shows the deck-plan and side-elevation of the type from 
the 1902 edition of The Naval Annual. Making over 31,000ihp with natural draught they had 
the most powerful reciprocating engines ever fitted to Royal Naval vessels, 43 Belleville 
boilers feeding two sets of 4 cylinder TE engines.196 The continued use of the Belleville 
reflected a useful compromise in total weights for a given power, the less efficient cylindrical 
types being substantially heavier, even if a high level of forcing were used, while the smaller 
tube types, though lighter, were not yet sufficiently reliable nor capable of sustaining the 
necessary output over extended periods.197 
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Figure 3.7 Drake class cruiser deck plan and side elevation 
 
Source: T. A. Brassey [ed.] The Naval Annual, 1902 (Portsmouth: J. Griffin & Co., 1902) 
Plate 6 
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Sir William White guaranteed the trials speed of 23 knots laid down by the board, while 
privately anticipating they would exceed this –a practice that he had regularly employed at 
Elswick.198 This proved to be the case; Drake made 23 knots on her original progressive trials, 
but it was felt that there was excessive slip at high speed and she could give more with 
increased propeller blade area. According to White’s Presidential Address to the Institute of 
Civil Engineers, the original screws were 19 feet in diameter, 24 ½ feet pitch, and each screw 
had 76 square feet of blade-area.  
 
…with 116 revolutions per minute and 30,860 HP. a speed of 23.05 knots was 
reached. The new screws were of the same diameter, pitch 23 feet and blade-area 105 
square feet. With 122.4 revolutions and 31,450 HP. a speed of 24.11 knots was 
attained –a gain of fully 1 knot in speed. From the progressive trials it was found that 
with 116 revolutions and 26,000 HP. the new screws gave a speed of 23 knots, or a 
saving of 4,860 HP., as compared with the first screws.199 
 
Effectively the Drakes were 24 knot or higher vessels, the name ship making 24.28 knots on 
31 October 1906, and all allegedly exceeded their trials speeds on a regular basis in service.200 
Their 30ft of freeboard forward also allowed them to easily achieve or exceed the intended 
continuous sea speed.201 This high sustained speed capacity was underlined by the 
transatlantic race between the vessels of the Second Cruiser Squadron in late November 
1906. Drake (Flag) and the Monmouth class HMS Berwick made a record for the Atlantic of 
3,327 miles (between Sandy Hook barrier split, New York Bay, and Gibraltar) in 7 days, 7 
hours and 10 minutes, at an average 18.504 knots.202 This was over half a knot faster than the 
previous record for naval vessels; Drake herself would likely have set an even faster time, but 
was hampered by using American rather than the more efficient Welsh coal, and the need to 
repair a steam leak from around the port high-pressure piston rod where some of the packing 
had been squeezed out during poor weather.203 Although in itself largely a showpiece, the 
transatlantic race served a useful purpose in demonstrating that high speeds could be 
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sustained over extended periods, and the strategic value of such a capacity for rapid transits, 
along with the tactical value for chasing down possible commerce raiders.  
 
Although largely derived from the protective scheme of the Canopus and Cressy classes, 
some changes were introduced in the Drakes, which Wilson approved of. The vertical armour 
was 6in KC for 257ft amidships over a similar height to the Cressys, but instead of 
terminating in a bulkhead, it was tapered to 2in and extended to the bow. Significantly, the 
thicknesses of the two protective decks were reversed, with the main deck at the top of the 
belt becoming the thicker of the two. Both changes provided greater protection at longer 
ranges, and were of particular value in a stern chase, when the constant bearings and 
relatively slow range rate made longer range gunnery slightly more practicable. The 
additional thin vertical plating gave useful protection against raking fire and splinters, which 
could reduce the speed of the ship through flooding, while using a thicker upper protective 
deck increased the defended height of buoyancy and stability against higher trajectory 
projectiles which were likely to be encountered in such chase conditions.204 The lower 
protective deck remained as a splinter deck to further reduce the possibility of debris 
penetrating the vitals.205 
 
It is surprising that later first-class vessels designed during Sir Philip Watts’ tenure as DNC 
should be regularly praised for their uncluttered upper works, which reduced target area, 
since considerable effort went into the Drakes to reduce unnecessary superstructure, and 
having a largely casemate based armament their upper-decks were clear of the extra gun-
houses found in many later types. Later vessels admittedly had the advantage of reductions in 
Board requirements for ancillary equipment on the upper decks, but White’s cruisers, post the 
Cressys, were not especially badly off in this regard, and are in fact quite impressive for their 
stark upper works. Given the QF dominated gunnery environment this was significant, since 
the risk of fire was potentially high and anything that could be done to reduce the target area 
and flammable upper works within the Board requirements was valuable. 
 
The annual Manoeuvres from 1899-1901 continued to place some emphasis upon cruiser 
operations, with particular reference to their use with fleets. Until the new side-armoured 
types became available these continued the trend of employing first-class types as heavy 
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scouts and support for smaller cruisers. For 1899 the principal object was ‘to obtain 
information as to the most advantageous method of employing a considerable body of 
Cruisers in conjunction with a fleet.’206 A subsidiary object was ‘to throw some light on the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of speed and fighting strength.’207 The general idea 
behind the exercises for that year was the simulated attack by a hostile squadron of fast ships 
(‘A’) upon a slow convoy escorted by a single fast cruiser (‘C’) on passage from Halifax to 
Milford Haven; after an interval a superior British Squadron of slower ships (‘B’) was to be 
sent to a pre-arranged rendezvous protect the convoy and bring it into Milford.208 The 
exercises saw the first use of the Diadems, five being present, with a single Edgar and 
Orlando class vessel also employed.209 Grimes notes the contribution of destroyers in the 
exercises, which again illustrated their effectiveness against torpedo-boats.210 Unfortunately 
the primary object of assessing cruiser operations and functions was almost entirely negated 
by the poor conditions in the exercise area off the west coast of Ireland, dense fog and later, 
heavy weather, impeding ‘A’ fleet’s search for the convoy for the first three days of the 
Manoeuvres. While ‘B’ fleet’s cruisers were sighted several times, the latter successfully 
brought convoy ‘C’ to Milford Haven without any major engagement occurring.211  
 
The following year’s exercises were more successful, both Blakes participating, along with a 
number of Diadems, Edgars and Orlandos.212 A renewed emphasis in France in a cruiser 
guerre de course combined with torpedo-craft resulted in the NID shifting the emphasis in 
the manoeuvres toward an assessment of the observational blockade system that had first 
been integrated with broader commerce protection by Commander [later Admiral] George 
Ballard in his 1897 Gold Medal Prize Essay ‘The Protection of Commerce During War’.213 
This was not the first time such an integrated approach had existed; Milne had created 
something similar quarter of a century before, albeit with a battlefleet focus upon coast-
assault rather than blockade. Ballard would have a substantial influence on RN strategy in the 
first years of the Twentieth Century, and laid some emphasis on large cruisers to handle 
contemporary Franco-Russian vessels that evaded the main fleet’s blockade of their ports, for 
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which he advocated employing advance-bases.214 As a result the Manoeuvres for 1900 and 
especially 1901 were designed to include such scenarios in addition to the main object of 
obtain information on the working of a fleet comprised of vessels of all classes, fighting for 
command of the sea.215 While this itself was not achieved, the cruisers again proved their 
value in shadowing the opposing Fleets.216  
 
Some of the Umpire’s recommendations regarding coaling and especially the suggestion that 
the respective C-in-C’s should not be informed in advance about the date and time of the 
commencement of hostilities were adopted for the 1901 Manoeuvres. These were the first 
exercises where no rules governing the conditions under which ships would be put out of 
action were laid down, the Umpires for that year judging each case based on what was 
probable in wartime conditions.217 Although noted for Arthur Wilson’s introduction of 
cruising a battle-squadron in columns, deploying into line immediately prior to battle, the 
cruiser operations were also significant, seeing one of the first major clashes between 
predominantly first-class types in the annual Manoeuvres.218 This took place between the 
opposing ‘X’ and ‘B’ cruiser squadrons shortly after the commencement of hostilities on the 
morning of 29 July off the Scilly Isles, the dispositions being shown in Figure 3.8. Two small 
second-class cruisers from ‘B’, having been dispatched to reconnoitre the Scillies were 
chased down by almost the full ‘X’ cruiser squadron, standing to the NW from its rendezvous 
35’ south of the Lizard.219 An hour-long gunnery duel in misty conditions between the two 
main bodies ensued, three ‘X’ and a further four ‘B’ squadron vessels later being judged out 
of action.220 Throughout the exercises, the first-class cruisers were regularly employed 
independently of the main fleets by both sides, either as large squadrons, or (usually) in pairs 
as heavy scouts, Edgar and Amphitrite  of ‘B’ fleet being utilised several times in this role 
ahead of the main battle-squadron, largely on account of their high sea-speed, and later 
independently to investigate ‘X’ vessels in the Scillies.221  
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Figure 3.8: Disposition of cruisers in action of Scilly Isles 29 July 1901 Manoeuvres 
 
Source: HCCP ‘Naval Manoeuvres, 1901’ 1902 [104] LXI, 507 Plate I 
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The Manoeuvres in the latter half of the 1890s and first years of the Twentieth Century 
generally appeared to confirm the value of first-class cruisers to a fleet, as they had when the 
Blenheim first became available. There seems to have been little hesitation about their 
employment with the Royal Navy’s fleets, while the Yalu engagement and those of the 
Spanish-American war provided confirmation in combat of their utility. The introduction of 
the new breed of side-armoured fleet-cruisers would only enhance this capacity, and an 
argument can be made that they rendered the ‘traditional’ line-of-battleship slightly moot, if 
not quite obsolescent, at this time. Although never officially applied, the ‘battle-cruiser’ 
designation is a highly accurate one within the context of the Cressys and Drakes design and 
operational milieu, since they were as capable of dealing with many contemporary or older 
foreign battleships as they were operating independently.222 This would have been particularly 
apposite in the case of the four Drake class ships, since they were specifically designed with 
an excess of speed, range and fighting power to completely overwhelm contemporary rival 
types, while also possessing the ability to fight as part of a main battlefleet if required. 
Strategically speaking such vessels were probably more useful to, and better met the British 
Empire’s global requirements than battleships, until such a time as there was a significant 
direct challenge to the Royal Navy via the guerre d’escadre. Goschen acknowledged this 
when presenting the 1898/99 Estimates to the House, asserting 
 
…at present the general tendency in shipbuilding of some of our rivals—I do not 
know by what other name to call them, and I certainly do not call them foes—for 
power on the sea has been transferred rather to cruisers than to battleships, and it is to 
cruisers accordingly that we are directing our main attention.223 
 
It is a little ironic that it was accepted that ‘for the Royal Navy there could be no question of 
the substitution of cruisers for battle-ships’ since theoretically, the new type of armoured 
cruiser endowed the service with much greater operational flexibility. Although slightly more 
lightly built than their battleship contemporaries, they typically possessed longer range, 
greater speed and a similar number of QF weapons (although in cruisers the necessity of 
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employing main-deck casemates severely reduced the effectiveness of some of these weapons 
owing to their proximity to the water).224 
 
While abandoning battleship construction was clearly a step too far for the contemporary 
service it was certainly not an entirely original idea for contemporaries, given the rise of the 
Jeune École in the 1880s, the gradual re-emergence of the guerre de course in the mid-late 
1890s, the latest cruiser developments in Italy and Japan, and the fact that throughout the 
mid-Victorian period, alternatives to heavily armoured battleships had been advocated in 
response to the material limitations of the era. The fact that White should even mention the 
idea demonstrates that, while rejected, it had garnered some consideration. As it was, the 
introduction of the first-class armoured cruiser marked the start of a period in which the 
Royal Navy can realistically be said to have possessed two distinct types of capital ship. 
Whether fundamentally necessary or not, the growing importance of the type cannot be 
denied or underestimated, above all given the enormous increase in spending on such vessels 
along with their battle-ship counterparts; a policy which would have severe financial 
implications for the service, and the nation as a whole. 
 
 
The quest for modest dimensions 
Strategically speaking, there had since the mid-Victorian period been an argument over 
whether it was better to possess a modest number of individually powerful ships, or a larger 
number of less capable fighting vessels. The argument never really went away, and while 
most commonly associated with battle-ships, it applied to an similar, and arguably greater 
extent, to cruiser types. 
 
The case was by no means a simple one, since while there existed first and second classes of 
both types of vessel, the vessels that comprised these classes were not created equal. The case 
against dedicated second-class battleships was fairly clear-cut, and notwithstanding 
occasional extremist ideas, there was little interest in pursuing the type after HMS Renown. 
Second class battleships were provided by a natural process when older, less capable types 
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that could no longer realistically form part of a battle-line could be profitably employed in 
lower-risk roles; building new ones generally resulted in vessels of limited capability, with a 
short practical life. The case was less obvious when it came to cruisers; with their rather 
different duties spanning the globe, the second-class type was regarded as valuable.225 A 
similar situation existed within the remit of the first-class vessel types, since size, design 
objectives and fighting capability varied within this generalised classification. The same 
arguments tended to be made both in favour, and against more numerous vessels of lesser 
fighting power. 
 
With concerns over the strength of the navy fanned by navalists in the light of increased 
construction abroad, on 17 June 1898 Goschen indicated that a supplementary building 
programme later in that Parliamentary Session would be introduced; it was presented only a 
few weeks later, on 22 July.226 Goschen’s statement was remarkable in that it specified 
outright that the Supplementary Estimate for the year was a response to Russian construction: 
 
In stating the supplemental Estimate, I regret that it should be my misfortune to have 
to introduce the name of any foreign Power, but it is impossible to conceal the fact 
that it is the action of Russia, and the programme on which she has entered, which is 
the reason for our strengthening our fleet, and taking parallel action with her. 
…From the latest information the new Russian programme provides for four cruisers 
to be commenced this year, and we propose to commence an equal number of 
cruisers: that is to say, four cruisers in addition to those provided for already.227 
 
The First Lord in his speech to the House claimed that the British response was not 
‘aggressive in the slightest degree’, and that the action of Russia was not ‘simply taken as a 
menace to this country or is directed against us.’228 The verisimilitude of this claim may be 
assessed against the fact that it was included in a speech before Parliament proposing a 
supplementary Estimate of some £7,000,000 additional funding to construct four additional 
battleships and four additional first-class cruisers over the original programme for that year. 
Goschen was evidently attempting to be as tactful as possible under the circumstances –a 
point emphasised later in the debate, when an unnamed Member enquired ‘what waters’ he 
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was referring to in his remarks upon the battleships, which were of shallow draught in order 
to allow them to pass through the Suez canal: the First Lord’s frigid response was that he 
‘should have thought that the honourable Member would read between the lines.’229  
 
The new Russian Bogatyr class were modestly sized 6,000-7,000 ton, 6in armed protected 
cruisers, continuing from the Pallada class of 1895, and the one-off Variag and Askold types, 
while a new class of medium-sized side-armoured vessels were also planned.230 For its part, 
following the Jeanne d’Arc France embarked upon building six smaller armoured cruisers of 
modest speed intended for the commerce raiding role (the previously mentioned Dupleix and 
Gueydon classes) with another five (the Gloire class) planned. In addition to these, the 
Admiralty also needed to counter dedicated commerce-raising types. In 1890 the United 
States Navy had laid down two very lightly armed, swift protected cruisers. Commissioned in 
1894, the Columbia and Minneapolis were sufficiently admired for similar types to be 
developed elsewhere. The best known of these, and the vessels that most closely followed the 
American model were the French Guichen and Chateaurenault, displacing around 8,000 tons 
and with the benefit of water-tube-boilers, were designed for a higher trials speeds of 23 
knots.231 The latter was designed to present ‘a silhouette somewhat like that of an Atlantic 
liner, so that she could approach her victims without unduly alarming them.’232 A slightly 
smaller and more heavily armed third vessel, Jurien de la Graviere was also designed for 
commerce raiding, although she carried a much reduced coal supply.233 Various high-speed 
types existed in the navies of other powers, albeit in smaller numbers, two apiece in the 
navies of Japan, Argentina, Chile and China, although it was believed that the majority relied 
upon short-period forcing to obtain the speeds with which they were credited.234 
 
The Monmouth class was the British response, the Russian programme providing the initial 
impetus, at least as far as the First Lord and the Supplementary Estimate that paid for them 
were concerned. Wider factors were clearly at work though. The large number of moderately 
sized armoured cruisers under construction by foreign powers caused little real anxiety in the 
Admiralty: performances were often exaggerated, and there  was considerable doubt about 
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whether many of the French and Russian vessels would be completed on time.235 However it 
did cause a shift in the Board’s approach away from fleet cruisers toward a smaller 23 knot 
type with a sustained sea speed of 21 knots, which could be built in greater numbers for a 
given budget. The reasoning forwarded by the DNI, Beaumont, was that providing the Royal 
Navy could wield vessels ‘at least equal to those of the enemy in speed and fighting power, 
and we have sufficient numbers, it is believed that the opportunities for successfully 
attacking… commerce are no greater now – if so great – than they were in the past.’236 The 
Board were also evidently hoping to address the wants of Station Commanders, who had 
regularly been requesting faster cruisers, as economically as possible. A Confidential letter to 
Sir Evan MacGregor, Permanent Secretary to the Board of Admiralty dated 27 January 1898 
from Admiral Sir John Hopkins, C-in-C Mediterranean Fleet, is typical of such 
communications: 
 
…Be pleased to  inform their Lordships that it appears to me desirable to draw their 
attention to the advisability of providing on this station faster Cruisers than we have 
(either built or building), in order that the Trade Route in the Mediterranean may be 
more efficiently protected in time of War. 
The French Coast on the Algerian shore… has several harbours which fast vessels 
could use as a base, and thus be in a position to give us a great deal of trouble from 
our inability to bring them to action when at Sea.237 
 
The DNC, who also had an excellent grasp of the strategic and tactical environment of the 
day, did not care for this change in direction, and following his retirement he stated 
categorically that he was simply fulfilling the requirements of the Board, and that his 
personal opinion was always in favour of thicker armour and a powerful armament, accepting 
the corresponding increase in size and cost.238 The ten Monmouth class vessels were provided 
over a three year period, the first two under the supplementary estimate of 1898/99, a second 
pair under the 1899/1900 Estimates, with the remaining six following in the 1900/01 
programme.239 Figure 3.9 shows the deck-plan and side-elevation of the class from the 1912 
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edition of The Naval Annual. Far larger than the Bogatyrs that had nominally instigated them, 
on a nominal 9,800 ton displacement and 463ft 6in between extremities carrying fourteen 6in, 
disposed in twin turrets fore and aft as chase weapons, with the remainder being in 
casemates, double-decked abreast the fore and main masts, and single (main) deck 
amidships.240 The turrets were of a new electrically powered design but suffered from 
reliability problems, while the gun-houses themselves were cramped and the guns proved 
difficult to align as they shared a cradle.241  
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Figure 3.9 Monmouth class cruiser deck-plan and side-elevation 
 
Source: Viscount Hythe [ed.] The Naval Annual, 1912 (Portsmouth: J. Griffin & Co., 1912) 
Plate 12 
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As was the case with the Diadems, the 6in armament is one of the most heavily criticised 
aspects of the Monmouth design. For their trade defence role though, little had changed and 
the 6in would have been quite adequate for fighting the vessels they were intended to counter. 
The performance of the Kent at the Falklands in 1914 confirms that the 6in was acceptable, 
though when faced with heavier opponents, a Monmouth or any deliberately under-sized 
cruiser should avoid action. 
 
31 Belleville boilers were used in the majority of the class, though Niclausse and Babcock 
boilers were employed in three of the vessels, feeding the usual pair of 4 cylinder triple 
expansion engines, coupled to twin screws, for a design 22,000ihp.242 They were the only 
first-class cruisers to be designed under White to have three funnels. As in the Drakes, the 
DNC had guaranteed a 23 knot speed, which would have enabled them to easily outstrip their 
equivalently sized armoured cruiser rivals and as a minimum match smaller protected 
commerce raiders like the Guichen.243 With the original propellers this was missed by three 
tenths of a knot, at 22,500ihp and 147 revolutions. Based on experience with the Drakes, new 
propellers with fifty per cent greater blade area and slightly less pitch had already been 
ordered for the class, and on new trials, 23.6 knots was attained for 22,700ihp and 140 
revolutions, with a sustained 21.64 knots, up from 20.5, over 30 hours at 16,500ihp.244 
 
Passive defence in the class was provided by 4in non-cemented Krupp for the amidships belt, 
which was extended, as in the Drakes, to the bows with 2in plating.245 In the sketch designs, 
this was intended to be 11ft tall, rising to 6 ½ feet above the nominal waterline, and 225 feet 
long, terminating with a 3in bulkhead aft.246 The vessels as finalised had an extra 6in of height 
to the belt, which was also lengthened to 242ft, and the bulkhead aft thickened to 5in.247 
Protective decks were arranged in a similar fashion to the Drake, with a 1 ¼in main deck and 
3/4in lower splinter deck.248 Barbettes and turrets were also protected by 5in, the casemates 
and ammunition hoists with 4in – 2in, and the CT with 10in. This armour was sufficient to 
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defend against explosive shell from < 6in calibres, and in performance terms was roughly 
akin to 5in of Harvey.249 AP shot or the new AP shells that were being developed from 6in or 
near equivalents were a much greater threat, and the armour lacked capability against any 
projectiles from heavier weapons; a situation confirmed during trials in early 1902, and 
emphasised at the Battle of Coronel in 1914, although Monmouth survived a respectably long 
time in the face of overwhelming odds.250 
 
The Monmouth class were, like the Diadems, subject to considerable acid comment in the 
press and from some areas of the service, being compared with foreign or privately built 
vessels of similar or lesser displacement that appeared on paper to exhibit superiority over 
them in a variety of areas; principally speed, gun-power and armour protection. In his speech 
before the House presenting the supplementary programme, Goschen insisted that the Board 
was acting on its own convictions, and that he could  
 
…honestly say that we have not added a single ship or a single man to the Navy in 
consequence of any outside pressure, from whatever quarter it has come. We have 
followed our own system from the first, and I strongly hope that that may continue to 
be the policy of successive Boards of Admiralty, and that they will be sustained by the 
authority of the House of Commons.251 
 
The First Lord’s statement appears at best contentious, since the Board had in the past yielded 
to outside pressure on various matters. Along with the increased size and improved armour of 
the latest French cruisers (the Gloire and Léon Gambetta classes) the criticisms directed at 
the Monmouth class both from within and outside the service evidently had some effect, since 
major changes were made for the six first-class cruisers provided under the 1901/02 
programme. 
 
The six Devonshires of the 1901/02 programme saw a modest increase in size over the 
Monmouths. From the surviving documentation in the class ship cover, the DNC was no more 
enthusiastic about the type than he was about its immediate predecessor, although at this time 
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White was suffering from a nervous breakdown following the debacle over the near-capsizing 
of the new Royal Yacht, and was unable to contribute as much as when he was in his prime. It 
is notable that his usual assessment of foreign construction is conspicuous by its absence in 
his preliminary notes on the design, the majority of the general requirements being stipulated 
by the Board without contributions from the Constructor’s department. Had White’s health 
been better, it is possible he would have fought harder for a larger type, although this is by no 
means certain as he did not appear to make any stubborn efforts to influence the Board at the 
time the requirements for the Monmouths were being discussed, despite the fact that he did 
not approve of the type. Nevertheless, four general sketches were worked up for that year’s 
cruiser programme. Of these, Design No.3, of which there were two variations, was the most 
interesting: the first featured eight 7.5in guns in twins fore and aft with eight 6in in maindeck 
casemates, while the second would have carried six 9.2in in single turrets at the ends and 
twins amidships with the same eight maindeck 6in. These designs were thought too 
expensive.252 It would appear that Design No.4 had been largely settled upon by November 
1901.253 
 
1,000 tons larger than the Monmouths, the length and beam of the Devonshires were greater 
by 10 feet and 2 ½ feet respectively. Although often said to be purely enlarged versions of the 
previous class, the design was in fact worked out independently of its immediate 
predecessor.254 Figure 3.10 shows the deck-plan and side-elevation of the type from the 1912 
edition of The Naval Annual. All had six cylindrical boilers in the aft boiler room; the 
forward boilers rooms of the six vessels were outfitted with a variety of different water-tube 
boilers, this following a recommendation from the Committee on Naval Boilers that had been 
set up in the wake of initial reliability issues with the Belleville.255 With roughly similar 
power outputs to the Monmouths the type was marginally slower, with an advertised design 
trials speed of 22 knots, making for a practical sea speed of 20 knots or higher.256 
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anticipating, a higher speed than advertised / required. 
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Figure 3.10 Devonshire class cruiser deck-plan and side-elevation 
 
Source: Viscount Hythe [ed.] The Naval Annual, 1912 (Portsmouth: J. Griffin & Co., 1912) 
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A note dated 19 March 1902 from the new DNC (Philip Watts, who took over the design) to 
the Controller (Rear-Admiral Sir William May) regarding the ‘new Monmouths’ states that 
the results of firing trials at a target of the Monmouth indicated that the protection was 
overmatched by 6in AP projectiles, and that the new cruisers should be better protected.257 
The matter was discussed in the First Lord’s room on the 17th & 18th instant, and it was 
decided to replace the 4in armour with 6in armour on the new design.258 To compensate for 
the additional weight, the belt was reduced in height by a foot. The protective scheme 
otherwise generally resembled that of the Monmouths. There was some debate over whether 
cemented armour should be employed.259 The return to the 6in belt was a marked 
improvement over their immediate predecessors, but the reduced vertical height partially 
offset these gains.  The newly developed 7.5in Mk I were carried in single turrets as chase 
weapons fore and aft, and the forward double-deck 6in casemates were replaced by single 
wing 7.5in gunhouses on the upper deck while building.260 They were the only vessels to 
carry the 7.5in Mk I, subsequent types being equipped with the 50 calibre Mk II. Six 6in Mk 
VII were also carried in single maindeck casemates amidships, and double deck casemates 
abreast the mainmast. 
 
The Monmouth and Devonshires were the last time, at least until the post-war years, that a 
serious attempt was made to limit the size of first-class cruisers in the Royal Navy. Following 
the introduction of the I-class big-gun battlecruisers, preliminary sketch designs would be 
made for a reduced type with 9.2in artillery, but these did not proceed further than the design 
offices and general discussions. 
 
Viewing the two classes in perspective, taken as trade defence vessels specifically intended to 
counter ‘corsair cruisers’ and modestly sized armoured cruisers designed to prey on British 
shipping, the Monmouths were reasonable. They had the speed to chase down commerce 
                                                     
257 NMM Devonshire class ship cover. Memorandum Watts to May, 19 March 1902 The remarks are unlikely to 
have come as a great surprise, and it should be emphasised that the Monmouth type was intended, in 
the words of the DNC, to deal with ‘swift [contemporaneous] French and Russian armoured cruisers up 
to about 8,000 tons displacement’ NMM Kent class ship cover ‘Design for new Cruisers…’  
258 Ibid 
259 NMM Devonshire class ship cover ‘New First Class Cruisers…’ p.40 Given the relatively minor extra cost of 
between £5,000 - £10,000 per vessel estimated by the DNC, cemented would appear to have been the 
better choice 
260 Brown Op. Cit. p.160 The decision was taken at the same time as it was determined that the last four Duke of 
Edinburgh class vessels considered in Chapter Five should be modified with four single 7.5in upper-
deck barbettes and gunhouses replacing their maindeck 6in battery. See Friedman British Cruisers of 
the Victorian Era p.262 
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raiders, while their uniform 6in armament (plus assorted light weapons) was as adequate for 
the duties they were designed to perform as it had been for the Diadems before them. For use 
in focal areas, they served the purpose, providing a larger and more powerful type did not 
appear, in which case they would have had greater problems unless a small group operated 
together, rather negating one of the arguments in favour of a larger number of vessels, viz. 
that they could cover more ground. 
 
Objections were raised about their hollow waterlines forward potentially increasing pitching, 
Admiral FitzGerald claiming that when he viewed them in dock ‘you could nearly have got a 
dinghy inside the hollow,’ but there appear to be few significant complaints about their 
performance in service.261 The greatest compromises that had been made in the class was in 
their protection. The extent of the coverage and its configuration were good, but on the 
restricted dimensions it was not possible to provide them with thicker armour while also 
providing for the speed and coal endurance mandatory for their role.262 Although like their 
armament this was acceptable enough for the trade-defence role at the time of their design, it 
rendered them vulnerable to heavier weapons should such be encountered: the problem with 
passive defence, as White was fond of pointing out, is that once designed and built into a 
vessel, it is essentially fixed and very difficult to improve upon, whereas the powers of attack 
would steadily improve over a typical operational lifespan. 
 
In comparing the proposed cruisers to foreign vessels White assessed them as superior to 
‘corsair cruisers’, medium-sized armoured cruisers up to the Dupleix class, and that they 
would be capable of fighting the French Gueydons or forthcoming Russian Bayans on a 
roughly equal or slightly advantageous footing, but added the strong caveat that there were 
already built or building types of similar displacement which possessed superior fighting 
efficiency obtained by making sacrifices elsewhere. In particular, he was thinking of the 
Japanese (Elswick built) Asama class, which traded speed and range for a heavier armament 
and, in certain respects, greater protection. Evidently increasingly irritated by criticisms of 
Service vessels, he also addressed the subject of two more Elswick-built vessels then being 
widely praised. On the subject of the O’Higgins, he pointed out the limited extent of the 
protection, with a partial belt only that was nearly awash when the bunkers were filled, dryly 
adding that ‘there is little doubt this vessel will be treated herewith as a more powerful 
                                                     
261 Admiral C. C. Penrose FitzGerald ‘On the “Lines” of Fast Cruisers’ TransINA Vol. XLV (1903) p.32 
262 NMM Kent class ship cover ‘Design for new Cruisers…’ 
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fighting machine than the new cruiser, and her weak points left unnoticed.’263 Regarding the 
Esmeralda, he noted that she would on paper also appear a formidable rival to the 
Monmouths, 
 
…with her reputed speed of 23 knots, partial belt of 6in armour, and armament 
including 2-8in, 16-6in and other guns. But this speed is not one realised except for 
short periods, and her sustained sea speed would undoubtedly be much lower than that 
of our cruisers, probably 2-3 knots less. Her partial armour belt is a fictitious 
protection, and there is only shield protection to the guns.264 
 
The Monmouth class achieved the objectives set by the Board, and by those criteria, they 
were a highly successful design. They also appear to have been as Brown remarks, somewhat 
better fighting ships than they are generally given credit for.265 However, the basic 
requirements were flawed. From the perspective of technical design, a larger trade defence 
cruiser employing the protective deck system (for example, an improved Diadem) could have 
been produced for the same cost, offering higher speed, greater range and / or greater gun-
power, while possessing equivalent or superior qualitative protection to the thin belt and deck 
of the Monmouths. Alternatively, a vessel of similar size, speed, protection and gun-power 
could have been produced following the protective deck system at a lesser cost. If a trade-
defence cruiser was demanded then either of these options appear preferable to the 
compromise that was ultimately chosen, and indeed Sir William evidently held this view.266 
The greatest drawback though was demanding a medium-sized cruiser in the first place. 
Corbett would strongly argue some years later that the true role of cruising vessels was to 
exercise the command of the sea gained by main battle forces, and given the extent of the 
Imperial requirements and the Royal Navy’s global commitments, the favouring of a more 
numerous class of individually less powerful vessels is understandable.267  
 
Particularly in light of the greater number of potentially vulnerable regions as the number of 
bases available to commerce-raiders increased relative to the 1880s and early 1890s, and the 
growing interest of naval rivals in the guerre industrielle, the favouring of a greater number 
                                                     
263 Ibid 
264 Ibid 
265 Brown Op. Cit. p.161 
266 NMM Kent class ship cover ‘Design for new Cruisers…’ 
267 Sir Julian Stafford Corbett Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988) 
pp.112-113 
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of vessels makes sense if the focal area-defence strategy was to be continued. However, by 
deliberately restricting the dimensions of first-class cruisers, outright capability was 
sacrificed, which inevitably resulted in rapid obsolescence.268 This was a point well 
appreciated by the DNC and the Controller, who wrote a memo on White’s paper listing the 
strategic and tactical disadvantages of building a larger number of smaller vessels.269 Wilson 
calculated that approximately ten Monmouths could be built for the same price as seven 
Drakes, would cost substantially more to man and run, possess inferior protection, gun 
power, and radius of action, in the order of 8:7.270 Many of the arguments raised a few years 
later for the all-big-gun types and their increased in size and power over earlier vessels were 
presaged by Wilson’s comments. Wilson indeed strongly argued that all four vessels of the 
Supplementary Estimate should be Drakes; ultimately, the Supplementary Estimate was split, 
providing two Drakes in addition to the pair that had been ordered under the normal yearly 
Estimate, and two of the new cruisers. 
 
Assessing the Devonshire type is slightly harder than that of the Monmouths since while 
an obvious improvement on the earlier type in terms of outright fighting capability, they were 
inherently as much of a compromise as their predecessors of the Monmouth class were. With 
the Devonshires the Board attempted to counter the latest French vessels, without a 
substantial increase in size or cost. Although having a reasonable edge over the Glories, the 
Léon Gambetta class had similar speed and armour to the Devonshires, but a greater number 
of lighter weapons and were around 1,500 tons heavier. Thus it seems the Board had fallen 
into a trap that periodically occurs in warship design: that of trying to achieve too much on a 
restricted displacement. This had occurred with the Orlando class of the early-1880s, and 
regularly cropped up in the battleship designs of the mid-Victorian era, when attempts were 
made in types such as the Ajax, Colossus and Admirals to cram first-class capabilities into a 
restricted tonnage.271 While the Devonshires were well designed vessels for their dimensions, 
the Royal Navy would have been far better served by abandoning attempts to restrict the size 
of first-class cruisers, particularly since more powerful vessels were already in existence, 
with more projected. 
 
                                                     
268 Friedman British Cruisers of the Victorian Era p.253 
269 TNA ADM 1/8724/93 Remarks of Admiral Wilson on White ‘Report on the Design for New Cruisers, 
Supplementary Programme 1898-99’ in appendix of Commander S. King-Hall ‘The Evolution of the 
Cruiser’ 
270 Ibid 
271 Beeler Op. Cit. p.204 
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A Monmouth, encountering the Jeanne d’Arc or a Leon Gambetta could be reasonably 
expected to avoid action and if possible fall back upon, or request support from, a larger first-
class cruiser. A marginally larger, more heavily armed and protected Devonshire would quite 
likely have been obliged to force an action. While strategically the advantage lay with the 
British vessel, since even a minor amount of damage could potentially curtail a commerce 
raider’s activities, and even using up a large quantity of its ammunition would severely 
hamper its effectiveness, the risks involved would also have been quite high. Worse, although 
the Devonshires possessed greater armour and gun power over the Monmouths, the gains 
were insufficient to enable them to operate practically as fleet cruisers, while the loss of half a 
knot of speed would have reduced their ability to chase down commerce-raiders.272 The 
question of quantity verses quality is always a difficult balance, but in the Devonshires, the 
Royal Navy had a vessel that was arguably less capable of catching commerce-raiders than 
the Monmouths but also lacked any real fleet capability. 
 
With that said, it is significant that, while the class were under construction, they were 
modified with two additional 7.5in gunhouses were substituted for the foremost 6in double-
deck casemates, bringing the total number of 7.5in guns to four. This was partly due to the 
unsatisfactory nature of these casemates in the Monmouths, but it was also a response to the 
heavier armament of contemporary foreign construction, most notably the latest French 
cruisers, which were matched in possessing four heavier weapons, but had a significant 
numerical advantage over the British vessels in lighter weapons (sixteen 6.4in). Furthermore, 
it was appreciated that as the armour of foreign vessels improved, something heavier than the 
6in gun would be needed, and a greater number of these heavier weapons would be 
necessary. The 7.5in fired a 200lb projectile as against the 100lb of the 6in and thus 
represented a useful advance over the smaller weapon. Table 3.2 gives penetration values of 
the three intermediate gun calibres employed in the contemporary Royal Navy firing common 
pointed capped (CPC) shell. Thus, the Devonshires were the first British first-class cruisers 
completed which reflected the gradual decline of the evergreen 6in as a primary armament for 
large naval vessels. 
 
                                                     
272 This point should be considered against their greater size and displacement, which may have offset the 
reduction in effective trials speed and resulted in similar practical sea-speeds, particularly in poor 
conditions. It is probable that the Devonshire’s stability was reduced by replacing the foremost 
casemates with upper-deck turrets, just as occurred with the Warriors (see Chapter Five), making them 
superior gun-platforms 
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Table 3.2 
Penetration of Krupp Cement (KC) plate by common pointed capped (CPC) shell at 5,000yds 
and 30° impact 
Gun (calibre inches) Mark SVel (ft/sec) Penetration (in) 
9.2 X 1826 6.5 
 XI 1928 7.0 
7.5 I 1640 4.5 
 II 1683 4.5 
6 VII 1321 2.0 
 XI 1502 3.0 
 
D. K. Brown The Grand Fleet: Warship Design and Development 1906-1922 (London: 
Caxton, 2003) p.33 
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Conclusions and status at the turn of the century 
Through the period covered by this chapter, first-class cruisers, in addition to their 
‘traditional’ role in protecting commerce increasingly came to be viewed as practical fleet-
units. Their fighting capacity had been demonstrated at Yalu, and additional confirmation was 
provided during the Spanish-American war of 1898. The Royal Navy’s annual Manoeuvres 
regularly explored scenarios in which the type had a major role, and in general the exercises, 
especially from 1897 onward, tended to illustrate the value of such vessels to a battlefleet, 
supporting smaller types and functioning as heavy scouts. The new side-armoured type would 
increasingly blur boundaries between types however around the turn of the century. Although 
the idea of cruisers joining a battle-line is still often dismissed as a ‘fallacy’, the truth was 
that during the few short years around the turn of the 19th into the 20th century, the first-class 
armoured cruiser was not just an addition, but a genuine alternative to the battleship. While it 
was a step too far for most contemporaries to advocate ceasing battleship construction in 
favour of the new large cruisers, the genesis of a navy based around first-class armoured 
cruisers as the principle capital ship had begun. The fighting capability and overall versatility 
of the first-class cruiser had increased steadily thanks to the advances that had taken place in 
protective materials, and careful consideration given to armour configurations. Harvey plate 
had paved the way in foreign services, particularly in France, but the introduction of Krupp 
Cemented armour was the single most important material advance for first-class cruisers 
since the introduction of the triple-expansion steam engine. 
 
This increase in capability had been clearly recognised by the Admiralty, and was starting to 
be exploited, first with the Cressy class fleet-cruisers, and then with the even larger Drake 
class. It must be stressed though that this new-found fighting capacity against battleships was 
a result of the contemporary gunnery environment being dominated by rapid-firing 
intermediate-calibre weapons like the 6in. The Admiralty and their professional advisers as of 
1897 could not anticipate the rapid advances that would occur in fire-control, the improved 
long-range accuracy, and the rise of the big-gun. Granted, it was increasingly apparent that as 
armour continued to improve, so heavier weapons would be needed to penetrate it, and that 
battle-ranges would increase (particularly in fleet actions) due to concerns over the threat 
posed by torpedoes. With the Devonshires, the first moves toward providing first-class 
cruisers with a heavier battery were made, reflecting the slowly changing gunnery conditions, 
and the gradual decline of the 6in as the primary armament. This was also reflected in their 
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King Edward VII battleship contemporaries, in which the 6in gun was supported by the 
addition of four 9.2in in single wing turrets.273  
 
Having established fleet-cruisers, the Board could be assessed as having made a mistake in 
creating two more modestly-sized types in reaction to French and Russian cruiser 
programmes. A smaller number of more powerful vessels of the Drake class would have been 
a more versatile and cheaper solution over the longer term, and the Monmouth and 
Devonshires were ultimately a false economy. Yet this to an extent followed the pattern of the 
past decade, in which large types were followed by more numerous smaller vessels. With the 
global nature of the Royal Navy’s commitments and the gigantic nature of Imperial shipping, 
the choice in favour of numbers was understandable, most especially in light of the preferred 
strategy of trade-protection, which continued along the lines established by Milne of focal-
area defence. The strategic position was not entirely clear-cut. As foreign powers gained more 
bases globally from which potential commerce-raiders could operate, and as France in 
particular began to place a heavy emphasis upon the strategy of the guerre industrielle so 
more vulnerable focal zones would be identified, and more vessels required. Thus the two 
‘County’ classes were created.274 This approach was fine providing more powerful vessels 
were not encountered, but since there were more powerful vessels in existence and more were 
projected it was unlikely that it could continue for an extended period. That the Admiralty 
also recognised this fact is demonstrated by the abandoning of attempts to restrict the 
displacement of first-class types following the Devonshires –although the practice would rear 
its head again some years later, in the big-gun era. Chapter Five considers this period, and 
how the first-class cruiser would become the basis for all of the Royal Navy’s capital-ships of 
the big-gun era. 
 
Before assessing this transition though it is necessary to examine the practical operations and 
roles of the first-class cruiser in its heyday, during the first years of the 20th Century. Chapter 
Four provides a case-study of these in the Far East, which owing to its scale, locale, varied 
                                                     
273 The introduction of the 9.2in gun in the KEVII class battleships also forced the abandonment of casemate 
protection for the 6in in the class since there was insufficient space available for independent 
casemates, a central battery being used instead.  With its armoured walls and bulkheads this effectively 
raised the height of the protection by another deck, the trade-off being the increased likelihood of a 
single hit disabling multiple weapons and their crews. The introduction of the 9.2in gun in the KEVIIs 
was not a success since fire-control quickly became impossible at longer ranges, although at the 
somewhat shorter fighting ranges still contemplated at the time of their design, this would have been 
less of an issue 
274 An entirely unofficial term 
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geographical nature and complex political and trade interests was one of the most important 
regions covered by the service. Owing to these factors, the first-class cruiser was a vital 
component in the Royal Navy’s East Indies and China Squadrons, making the region an ideal 
exemplar of their contemporary operations. 
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Chapter 4 
The First-Class cruiser in the Far East 1901-1904: 
A case-study 
 
 
Chapters Two and Three charted the growing role of the first-class cruiser during the late 
Victorian era. The purpose of this chapter is to consider their presence on the Royal Navy’s 
foreign stations, their operations and the administrative and logistical issues that arose from 
these, with the situation in the Far East used as a case-study. Outside Europe, this was one of 
the most critical areas of deployment for the service, with a complex political and economic 
situation resulting from a wide variety of rival commercial, colonial and local interests. The 
situation in China between 1894-1905 has been described as ‘overshadowing all other 
international issues’, since it was widely anticipated that the Chinese Empire would collapse, 
presaging ‘an Armageddon between the European Powers struggling for [its] ruins.’1 While it 
is possible to argue that such an assessment contains a degree of hyperbole, the ‘China 
Question’ and the colonial rivalries engendered were of sufficient importance for it to seem 
permissible given the circumstances. Considering the Far East on a purely naval basis, many 
of the vessels British first-class cruisers were designed to counter were stationed there, and 
thus they necessarily formed a major part of the British squadrons in China and the East 
Indies. They were also a significant component in the Japanese fleet, which was largely 
British built and followed RN practices and tactical thinking. Following the conclusion of the 
Russo-Japanese war, first-class cruisers would become the Royal Navy’s sole capital ships in 
the region and as such, it is clearly worth careful study.  
 
The Sino-Japanese war, and China’s defeat in the conflict was a major driving factor in the 
Russian expansion in the region. Using the post-conflict situation to its advantage, Russia 
was able to establish an advantageous economic position and considerable political clout over 
the Chinese government from spring 1895, in part through loaning China the capital to pay a 
significant part of the indemnity owed to Japan.2  A further Russian object was to obtain a 
railway concession to build part of the Trans-Siberian track inside Chinese boarders in 
                                                     
1 T. Otte The China Question: Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation 1894-1905 (Oxford: OUP, 2007) pp.1-
2 –latter Rosebery cited by Otte 
2 N. Papastratigakis Russian Imperialism and Naval Power: Military Strategy and the Build-Up to the Russo-
Japanese War (London: Tauris, 2011) p.125 
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northern Manchuria, which was granted in return for a defensive alliance against Japan, in the 
event the latter attacked either nation, or Korea, where both had significant interests.3 This 
further heightened colonial rivalries, particularly with Britain for whom the region remained 
a major trading centre and trade route. At the turn of the Nineteenth Century the British 
Empire’s once highly profitable opium trade was in decline, partly due to an increase in the 
general income of the Indian government which meant it was no longer the bulwark against 
bankruptcy that it had been in the past.4 The closing of Indian mints to the free coinage of 
silver and the consequent appreciation of the Rupee caused further damage to this aspect of 
trade, and the period 1894-1905 saw revenue from it drop to an approximate annual average 
of £3 million, sterling: just 60% of what it had been for the previous 14 years.5 Despite the 
dwindling profits from this area of trade though, the Far East continued to be of considerable 
economic value to the British Empire, and given the fiscal difficulties Britain began to 
experience during the early Twentieth Century, its importance should not be underestimated. 
Table 4.1 shows the latest figures of foreign trade in China available to the British 
Government at the time of the Boxer Uprising, and demonstrates the significant economic 
value of the area to the UK economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3 Ibid 
4 D. Owen British Opium Policy in China and India (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934) p.330 
5 Ibid 
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Table 4.1: 
Foreign Trade of China 1899 
 
Country   Total Trade (in pounds sterling) 
Great Britain   8,118,549 (direct) 
Hong Kong 28,491,264 (including trade of all countries through 
Hong Kong) 
Germany   3,598,200 
France    9,292,206 
U.S.A.    6,596,169 
Russia    1,286,508 (by sea) 
    1,498,115 (by Kiakhta) 
Japan    7,972,183 
  In percentages (for British control of the shipping trade) 
    1898   1899 
British    65%   61% 
Foreign   35%   39% 
  (For values of goods carried) 
British    54%   53% 
Foreign   46%   47% 
Source: L. K. Young British Policy in China 1895–1902  
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970) 
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From 1897 the Boxer Uprising led to an escalation of colonial rivalries, despite the notional 
cooperative nature of the Eight Nation Alliance in the summer of 1900. While Russia and 
Britain had reached an agreement in 1899 regarding spheres of influence and railway 
concessions in China, this did not eradicate their mutual antagonism over Far Eastern 
interests.6 A similar situation applied in the case of Russo-Japanese relations. In April 1895 
the Treaty of Maguan ceded the Laiotung peninsula to Japan, but the formal retrocession of 
this, and Russia’s subsequent leasing of the area and the strategically significant Port Arthur, 
which provided them the warm-water port on the Pacific Ocean they desired, caused 
considerable resentment in Tokyo. As a result, a degree of Russian retrenchment in Korea 
was made from 1898, in an attempt to appease Japan.7 In the post-Boxer climate at the end of 
1900 though much of this would be reversed, when 
 
the apparent implosion of all central authority in China led to a renewed Russian 
expansionist drive in the northernmost provinces of the Chinese Empire. The resulting 
Manchurian crisis marked the nadir of Anglo-Russian relations.8 
 
The shift in policy, from one of at least professing to support the increasingly rickety 
framework of the Chinese Empire into something that appeared to be an attempt at hastening 
its collapse in order to facilitate a total annexing and absorption of Manchuria, would become 
the primary cause of the Russo-Japanese war of 8 February 1904 – 5 September 1905.  
 
The concomitant, inevitable growth of Russian naval power in the Far East would also 
become an increasingly significant component in British policy, most notably from the spring 
of 1901 onward, when it was thought that a notionally combined Franco-Russian fleet in Far 
Eastern waters ‘of seven modern and two older battleships and twenty cruisers would greatly 
outnumber the RN’s China Squadron of four battleships and sixteen cruisers.’9 This can be 
overstated. The litany of difficulties with such a course (ranging from physical matters of 
differences in material, signalling systems, command structures, dissimilar languages, tactics, 
lack of combined practice and even more abstract matters of culture) were well known, 
                                                     
6 Papastratigakis Op. Cit. pp.159-160 
7 Ibid 
8 Otte Op. Cit. p.216 
9 Papastratigakis Op. Cit. p.199 
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rendering joint operations more a matter of fantasy than a realistic possibility.10 This view is 
confirmed by a strategic war game held at the Royal Naval College in early 1903, when even 
if such a combined fleet was assembled, a smaller RN squadron was adjudged the superior.11 
Indeed, recently several scholars, notably Papastratigakis and Seligmann have begun to 
reassess whether the Franco-Russian naval challenge in general around the turn of the 
Nineteenth Century was as serious a threat to British interests as has often been assumed. 
While these nations were indubitably Britain’s principle political rivals, on a purely military 
level it is argued that from 1900, as better intelligence on particularly the Russian fleet 
became available the Admiralty ‘was less convinced about the quality of the naval challenge 
posed by their fleets.’12 There is certainly much to be said for this view, and the previous 
chapters have, within the context of the first-class cruiser, the RN was generally ahead of 
rivals both strategically and in terms of material. Nevertheless, while the Admiralty 
considered the naval challenge of the Dual Alliance to be rather weaker than many 
contemporary and later observers believed, they remained the primary focus of the annual 
Manoeuvres, fleet exercises and academic debates until 1905.13 Nor were the independent 
forces in the region and especially the growth of the Russian Far Eastern fleet regarded with 
complacency either, since countering it necessarily further dispersed the Royal Navy’s total 
strength, weakening it in the Mediterranean and home waters.14 Though the actual dangers of 
such an eventuality can be considerably overstated, it remained a consideration that Selborne, 
the First Lord of the Admiralty took seriously.15 
   
William Waldegrave Palmer, Second Earl of Selborne, was sworn of Her Majesty’s most 
Honourable Privy Council on 12 November 1900.16 He was made First Lord of the Admiralty 
by his father-in-law, Lord Salisbury, in a Cabinet reshuffle, and retained the position until he 
left to become High Commissioner to South Africa in March 1905.17 A capable First Lord, he 
                                                     
10 Seligmann ‘Britain's Great Security Mirage: The Royal Navy and the Franco-Russian Naval Threat, 1898–
1906’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 35:6, p.865 
11 TNA ADM 231/38 ‘Précis of Strategical War Game carried out at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, in the 
early part of 1903’ NID Report 706 October 1903 p.7 
12 Ibid p.863 
13 S. Grimes Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918 (London: Boydell, 2012) p.41 
14 Otte Op. Cit. pp.292-293 
15 Ibid 
16 The London Gazette No.27246 (13 November 1900) p.1. 
17 R. Massie Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War (London: Pimlico, 2004) p.289 
& 498 
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is generally viewed in a positive light by naval historians.18 Well aware of the need to cut 
naval expenditure, he pursued economies when possible.19 However, with the support of the 
experienced Hugh Arnold-Forster, whom the Prime Minister had insisted he take as his 
Parliamentary Secretary, he was  prepared to fight for the service and undaunted by 
complaints of fellow Ministers.20 His political shrewdness and attention to detail were 
impressive, and he was a key participant in advocating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, signed 
30 January 1902, which he believed would ‘diminish the probability of a naval war with 
France or Russia singly or in combination.’21  
 
For its part, France had by the turn of the century established French Indochina, while also 
gaining a lease of Guangzhouwan on the southern Chinese coast from where squadrons might 
operate, and typically a number of commerce-raiding cruisers were present. There was also a 
move to make a number of more permanent bases on the Cape to Far-East route from which 
cruisers might be based. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance effectively marked the end of British 
attempts to maintain an isolationist stance, a policy which had begun to weaken with a 
proposal for an Anglo-German declaration of support for Japan by the Foreign Secretary, 
Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquis of Lansdowne, and which in the medium-term would 
yield multiple strategic benefits.22 The potential was noted almost immediately, not least by 
the C-in-C China Station [Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge] who in a private letter of April 1902, 
written while returning from a northern cruise remarked on the strategic implications for the 
Far Eastern commands, and the ripple-effect for the wider naval environment: 
 
…I presume to think that the Anglo-Japanese alliance is a good thing. Anyone who 
knows anything of Japan must have seen that she was determined to range herself on 
                                                     
18 See A. Marder The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought 
Era, 1880 – 1905 (London: Frank Class & Co., 1964)  pp.425-426; also Nicolas Lambert Sir John 
Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2002) pp.32-33 Lambert’s 
remarks on Selborne refusing to be hurried into making a decision until he had researched it to his own 
satisfaction appear to be reflected in his quoted remarks to Bridge. 
19 N. Lambert Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution pp.36-37 
20 E. Grove The Royal Navy Since 1815: A New Short History (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 86 
21 TNA CAB 37/58/81 Memo Selborne ‘Balance of Naval Power in the Far East’ See also Otte Op. Cit. p.293 
22 Otte Op. Cit. p.255 Lansdowne’s proposal came to nothing, and as Otte points out, notwithstanding 
established scholarly consensus, even if it had been adopted it was rather more subtly nuanced than an 
outright abandoning of Salisbury’s previously assumed policy of isolation. Nevertheless, it marked a 
weakening of the British stance 
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the side of some Power, and it would be deplorable has she been left to range herself 
with those who are against us.23 
 
The Alliance substantially reduced, though did not eradicate, the likelihood of problems in 
the Far East between Britain and Japan. It hampered Russian expansion in the region and 
safeguarded British interests in that quarter without Britain needing to become directly 
involved in a European alignment against Russia, while mildly steadying Japan’s colonial 
enthusiasm.24 In the Alliance, the foundations were established that allowed the withdrawal of 
RN battleships from the China Station, and though they would be retained for several years, 
the intent to recall them for use elsewhere was very quickly raised.25 Following the 
extermination of the Russian Second and Third Pacific Squadrons at Tsushima in 1905 they 
were withdrawn to strengthen the quality of the battle squadrons in home waters and the 
Atlantic. This left the first-class cruiser as the Royal Navy’s sole capital ship in the Far East, 
which were well adapted for the role given that the French squadrons were largely cruiser-
based. There are suggestions that that the withdrawal of the battleships owed much to the 
similarity of views between Admiral Lord Fisher and Prince Louis of Battenberg, with the 
latter’s favouring of the armoured cruiser shedding 
 
…important new light on his attempts as DNI to bring home the battleships from 
China... when he first made this suggestion he had not envisaged increasing the 
number of battleships in home waters; he had wanted to substitute them for two Royal 
Sovereigns which he thought belonged in reserve.26 
 
Whilst Fisher and Battenberg certainly favoured armoured cruisers, such assertions appear to 
overlook the rather more significant matter of the drastically altered naval situation in the Far 
East, which allowed the adoption of such a policy in the first place.27  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
23 NMM BRI 15 pt.4 Draft letter from Bridge dated Hong Kong (24 April 1902) 
24 Young British Policy in China p.318 
25 Grove The Royal Navy p.130 
26 Lambert Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution p.109 
27 Ibid pp.108-9 
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Far Eastern Station characteristics and requirements 
From 1831–1844, Chinese waters were a subordinate division of the wider East Indies and 
China Station.28 Following the Opium War 1839–’42 and the establishing of the Hong Kong 
colony, the status of the East Indies and China divisions was reversed, with the former 
becoming a subordinate command under a captain holding the rank of commodore, second 
class.29 In 1865 the station was divided into two entirely separate commands, the East Indies 
Station under a Rear-Admiral, and the more senior China Station under a Vice-Admiral.30 
From this point until the early Twentieth Century the China Station was regularly the largest 
area of deployment for the Royal Navy outside European waters, and even briefly exceeded 
the size of the prestigious Mediterranean Squadron in terms of the number of vessels 
deployed.31 Map 4.1 shows the vast littoral zone of the Chinese coast, which included two of 
the longest rivers in the world, both of which were navigable by vessels of considerable size, 
along with neighbouring Powers.32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
28 TNA FO 17/12 Backhouse to Wood, draft memorandum, (23 March 1836) 
29 Gerald S. Graham The China Station: War and Diplomacy 1830–1860 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978) p.267 
30 The station C-in-C could be promoted during his period in command, which occurred on the China Station 
during the 1901-1904 period 
31 E. Grove ‘The Century of the China Station: the Royal Navy in Chinese Waters, 1842-1942’ in Harding, 
Jarvis and Kennerley [eds.] British Ships in China Seas: 1700 to the Present Day (Liverpool: National 
Museums Liverpool, 2004) pp.7-8 See also the Confidential List[s] of Her / His Majesty’s Ships in 
Commission covering the mid-Victorian through Edwardian eras held by the National Archives 
(ADM8/139-174). ADM 8/166 for example indicates that during October 1887, the China Squadron 
comprised 20 ships, being followed by the North America and West Indies Squadron with 13, and the 
East Indies Squadron with 12. 
32 The Yangtze and Yellow Rivers, being respectively the third, and sixth longest in the world. The West River  
was also extremely substantial, at some 1,350 miles, although as a nominal tributary of the Pearl, the 
stated length varies dependent upon the sections employed in the classification 
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Map 4.1 
 
Source: Gerald S. Graham The China Station: War and Diplomacy 1830–1860 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1978) 
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The 1903 Standing Orders issued by the Admiralty for the guidance of the Commander-in-
Chief (C-in-C) China Station stated the boundaries as being 
 
N. –On the North from the meridian of 95° of east longitude, in 10° north latitude, 
along that parallel to the West Coast of the Malay Peninsula ; thence by the shores of 
Asia, as far as the meridian of 180° 
W. –On the West from the latitude of 10° north, by the meridian of 95° east longitude, 
to 10° of south latitude. 
S. –On the South from the meridian of 95° east longitude by the parallel of 10° south 
latitude to 130° east longitude ; thence north to 2° north latitude and along that 
parallel to 136° east parallel to the meridian of 180° 
E. –On the East by the meridian of 180° from 12° north latitude to the point where 
that meridian reaches the shores of Asia.33 
 
Unlike several other foreign stations, these boundaries were unaffected by a significant 
rearrangement of station limits that came into effect on 1 August 1903.34 This was a notable 
event in itself, though seldom referred to: most significantly, the rearrangement saw the 
creation of a new South Atlantic Station, while of particular interest to this chapter, the East 
Indies Station was (further) reduced in size, the northerly limit of the Cape of Good Hope 
Station being extended to include the islands of Madagascar, Mauritius, the Seychelles and 
their dependencies. The East Indies Station did however continue to encompass the northern 
Indian Ocean, as well as retaining responsibility for the Red Sea, and thus the southern 
entrance to the Suez Canal.35 As such, the scale of the East Indies Station, though reduced, 
should not be underestimated either: although reduced as the boundaries were shifted and 
new Stations created to better adapt to the needs of protecting British interests and commerce, 
it still covered a vast region, including India and the Persian Gulf. Map 4.2 shows the new 
southerly limit of the East Indies Station, post the August 1903 rearrangement; the extreme 
Western boundary of the China Station may be seen to the right. Map 4.3 shows the 
                                                     
33 TNA ADM 116/967 Standing Orders for the Guidance of the Commander-In-Chief on the China Station, 
Confidential Memorandum (15 August 1903), p.3 
34 TNA ADM 125/56 Evan MacGregor, circular letter for information of Commanders-in-Chief at home and 
abroad M.062, (28 February 1903). 
35 Ibid 
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boundaries of all the Royal Navy’s foreign stations from this date, and the lines of submarine 
and land telegraph cables as drawn by the NID.36  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
36 TNA ADM 231/42 NID Report No.746 British Colonies China Station. Resources and Coast Defences 1905 
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Map 4.2 
Naval Stations Showing New Limits 1903 
 
Source: TNA ADM 125/56 Circular Letter from Evan MacGregor (Permanent Secretary to 
the Admiralty) to Commanders-in-Chief and Senior Officers at Home and abroad  
28 February 1903 
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Map 4.3 
Naval Station boundaries from August 1903 including submarine and overland telegraph 
cables  
 
Source: TNA ADM 231/42 NID Report No.746 British Colonies China Station. Resources 
and Coast Defences 1905 
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Owing to their varied geography, the presence of colonial and trade rivals, and the strained 
nature of local and internal politics, the Royal Navy’s Far Eastern stations posed an 
interesting series of operational requirements for vessels and crews alike. Chinese waters are 
particularly notable in this regard, since the provisions of the 1889 Naval Defence Act 
included two second-class battleships specifically designed for use in this region (and on the 
Pacific stations).37 As reduced versions of the Royal Sovereigns these modestly sized vessels 
were intended to counter big Russian cruisers stationed in the region, and designed with a 
shallow 26ft draught specifically to allow operations on Chinese rivers.38 During the 1890s 
they formed the backbone of British naval power in the Far East, Centurion commissioning 
as Flag of the China Squadron in February 1894, and Barfleur as R/A Flag China Squadron 
September 1898, supporting the smaller cruisers and gunboats that comprised the bulk of the 
vessels on the station.39  
 
By the middle of the decade however thoughts were already turning toward the employment 
of something more formidable, largely due, at least in the opinion of the DNC, to the 
reinforcement of the Japanese fleet by Chinese vessels captured during the Sino-Japanese 
war, ‘which obviously must have a bearing in the types and numbers of ships of the Royal 
Navy required for the defence of our interests in Eastern Seas.’40 The resultant Canopus class 
battleships, like the two Centurions were thus specifically intended for use in the Far East, 
with a shallow draught to allow transit through the Suez Canal and operations on the major 
Chinese rivers.41 These ships would also be supported by the cruisers, dispatch vessels and 
gunboats typically employed on foreign stations.42 Yet the new century brought further 
developments, and by 1902, views on the composition of the station were changing once 
again. 
 
In March 1901 Vice-Admiral Sir Cyprian Arthur George Bridge was appointed C-in-C China 
Station, and instructed to hoist his Flag aboard the Canopus class battleship HMS Glory, 
which was to be sent to meet him at Nagasaki.43 He held the position until he was succeeded 
                                                     
37 D. Brown Warrior to Dreadnought: Warship Development 1860 – 1905 (London: Caxton, 2003) p.131 
Although never employed there, they were of course also well suited for use on the East Indies Station 
38 Ibid pp.131-132 The shallow draught also made transit through the Suez Canal easier 
39 O. Parkes British Battleships: A History of Design, Construction and Armament 1860 – 1950 (London: Leo 
Cooper, 1990) p.370 
40 White, cited in Parkes British Battleships p.392 
41 Brown, Warrior to Dreadnought p.144 
42 The Centurions would also still be found on the station, supporting the larger vessels, until mid-1905. 
43 NMM BRI 15 pt.6 Letter, Evan MacGregor to Cyprian Bridge (25 March 1901) 
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on his retirement in March 1904 by Vice Admiral Sir Gerard Noel.44 Cyprian Bridge came 
from a naval background, one of his great-uncles having fought under Rodney, and he was 
nominated as a naval cadet by Admiral Sir Thomas Cochrane, to whom his father had been 
Chaplain.45 An intellectual with a keen interest in naval and wider history his career was 
distinguished; he had been an able Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) 1889-1894, and upon 
his promotion to Rear-Admiral, appointed C-in-C Australia station. Bridge was a founding 
member of the Navy Records Society and was, with John Laughton, Reginald Custance and 
Philip Colomb, largely responsible for the development of scholarly study of Britain’s naval 
past and strategic doctrine during the 1890s.46 A measure of his standing may be seen in a 
message from the King, who had served under him during his time in the Royal Navy, 
expressing his sympathy to Lady Bridge upon the Admiral’s death in 1924, and perhaps more 
significantly, a similar message from Japanese naval officers who remembered him from his 
time in China, these including Admirals Togo and Yamamoto.47 
 
Bridge published widely on naval strategy and tactics, many of his texts being well received 
by contemporaries and remain of considerable interest.48 His views on the value of the 
convoy system in particular were rather more measured than many of his contemporaries, and 
while he noted the potential economic and strategic pitfalls, like Samuel Long and Philip 
Colomb he did not rule it out entirely.49 He was also a firm believer in the value of reducing 
administration, which he saw as frequently wasteful and diverting the attention of officers 
from more important professional issues. An example of this may be found in the records of 
the East Indies Station, where the C-in-C, with considerable exasperation, was obliged to 
became embroiled in ‘the question of stationary required by the Engineer Officer of the 
Torpedo Sub-Depot at Bombay.’50 Bridge’s dryly expressed view upon such matters was ‘it is 
                                                     
44 NMM BRI 15 pt.2 Letter, Evan MacGregor to Cyprian Bridge (14 May 1904) 
45 The Times Obituary, Admiral Sir C. Bridge: Long and Varied Service (August 18 1924) p.12 
46 Grimes Op. Cit. p.12 
47 The Times The Late Sir Cyprian Bridge: Message from the King (August 20, 1924) p.13 
48 Of particular note are ‘Naval Strategy and Tactics at the Time of Trafalgar’ TransINA, Volume XLVII (1905); 
The Art of Naval Warfare: Introductory Observations (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1907); Seapower 
and other Studies (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1910) –the last is a collection of some of Bridge’s many 
published essays, including the INA paper mentioned. In general, Bridge’s views lack the strategic depth 
of understanding that Corbett in particular brought (Bridge was anti-Corbett’s approach), nor did they 
always keep pace with the latest Admiralty thinking, such as on Economic Warfare. Despite their 
somewhat more simplistic approach however, they also contain much sound common sense, and Bridge 
had a gift for putting concepts across in a clear and concise fashion 
49 Bridge The Art of Naval Warfare pp.145-153 
50 TNA ADM 127/23 Letter Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Bosanquet, 7 September 1901. A century later, one still 
feels for Bosanquet; while no phoenix as a naval commander, he certainly had little desire to be faced 
with such nonsense 
 199 
 
not remembered as often as it should be that if the packet carrying to headquarters all the 
returns and reports of exercises in a particular fleet or squadron were to go to the bottom with 
her mail bags, the efficiency of the fleet or squadron concerned would not be affected one 
way or the other.’51 
 
On 14 December 1901, during his private correspondence with Selborne, Bridge remarked on 
there being two general functions that the China Squadron was expected to undertake.52 The 
First Lord picked up on this point with aplomb; the initial remarks in his lengthy response, 
dated 11 February 1902 dealt with the Admiral’s concern regarding the new extended 
dockyard at Hong Kong not being large enough (although requesting the C-in-C’s fuller 
views on this subject ‘when the news which will be published today have reached you, news 
which will not make it necessary for us to retain as large a fleet on the China Station as we 
should otherwise have had to do.’)53 Moving to Bridge’s more theoretical views, he 
continued: 
 
What you write as to the China Station, that two Naval questions of totally different 
character have to be solved upon it, is absolutely true. Two squadrons composed of 
two totally different classes of ships have to be maintained there. One is maintained 
for political purposes vis-à-vis the Chinese and the commercial rivalry of foreign 
nations, the other is maintained strictly for naval purposes... Can or cannot the 
squadron of ships which will be practically useless in Naval war be reduced in 
number? I am prepared to take nothing for granted without such an examination. We 
are so conservative in our habits and ideas that we clothe with all the merit of 
profound policy what is often the hoary result of sheer accident. All the ships which 
we maintain for political purposes in China may be necessary; but I am not prepared 
to believe it merely because the Foreign Office, who dislike our diminishing the 
number says so, or because I am told at the Admiralty that “it has always been 
considered necessary to maintain these ships.” It may be necessary but I want to know 
why it was necessary and whether it still is necessary.54 
 
                                                     
51 Bridge The Art of Naval Warfare pp.27-28 
52 NMM BRI 15 pt.3 Letter, Bridge to Selborne, (14 December 1901) p.2 
53 NMM BRI 15 pt.3 Selborne to Bridge (11 February  1902)  p.2 A clear reference to the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, publically announced on the 12th February 1902 
54 Ibid pp.2-4 
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Although the need to make economies was well-known to Selborne (see Chapter Five), and 
his query in part rather suggests a man actively in search of savings, there is also much of 
merit in terms of his strategic appreciation, and his refusal to accept anything on blind faith. 
The remarks about vessels maintained for ‘political purposes’ is evidently referring to small 
types such as the gunboats used in littoral zones throughout the Far East, about which he 
rightly had severe reservations.  Bridge’s reply to Selborne’s letter of 11 February took the 
form of an official memorandum, ‘Duties and Classes of Ships on the China Station’, in 
which he addressed the various questions Selborne had raised in a semi-official capacity, 
including reviewing the major roles of the China Squadron. 
 
The First Lord has asked for an answer to questions as to the proportionate number of 
ships on the station maintained for what may be called local political reasons and as to 
the suitability of different classes in Chinese waters. The Following is submitted in 
reply. 
The First Lord has drawn attention to the fact that the British fleet in China has two 
ends in view. One is the “local political” object above indicated, which is to show the 
Flag at the ports and in the rivers of China so as to intimate to the Chinese the 
constant availability of the power behind it and to serve, in emergent cases, as a direct 
protection to our fellow-subjects residing at different places in the Chinese Empire. 
The second object is more purely naval. It is to keep an adequate force of effective 
cruising ships in a sphere in which other naval nations are strongly represented on the 
sea and in which it would be a grievous strategic error on our part to allow ourselves 
to be outnumbered by any important rival or union of rivals.55 
 
Although slightly pre-empting events, these two semi-formal letters between the First Lord 
and the C-in-C may be said to mark the initial step toward a change in the composition of the 
China Squadron, toward a more unified force structure in which the first-class cruiser would 
come to play an increasingly dominant role.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
55 NMM BRI 15 pt.4, Duties and Classes of Ships on the China Station (March 1902) para.2 
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The first-class cruiser in the Far East: functions and operations 
In time of war the principal military role of the first-class cruisers attached to the China 
Squadron would have been commerce protection, heavy scouting for the battlefleet (while the 
battleships remained on-station), support for smaller cruisers and, per the Royal Navy’s 
general strategic approach of the time, the protection of trade routes and communications to 
other parts of the Empire, notably to the UK mainland, India and, perhaps less obviously, but 
still profitably, Australia.56 A major reason for their presence was of course thus to counter the 
threat by rival powers of a guerre de course in this region. Russia in particular had stationed 
dedicated commerce-raiding vessels at their own possessions, in line with the general policy 
of guerre industrielle. Included amongst these was the infamous Rurik referred to in the 
previous chapters, forming with her immediate successors Rossia and Gromoboi the 
backbone of the Russian Pacific cruiser squadron, with varying support from smaller second-
class protected types like the Bogatyr. Further to these, two of the Peresviet second-class 
battleships, which had been heavily influenced by the British Centurions were also in the Far 
East.  
 
Somewhat ironically Cyprian Bridge was not particularly well-disposed toward large first-
class cruisers in principle, favouring greater numbers of modestly sized vessels over a small 
number of larger and militarily speaking more powerful ones. Following his retirement, he 
would summarise his views on such vessels as a preference for constructing the smallest and 
least costly ships that could play their part in war, ‘rather than the biggest that the naval 
architects and engineers were able to design and build.’57 This opinion is operationally 
confirmed by his reply to Selborne’s letter of  11 February, in which the First Lord had also 
enquired ‘whether you [Bridge] consider that big cruisers like the Terrible, Argonaut or 
Blenheim are the right type for the China Station.’58 In answering this, Bridge stated that 
 
…In the question put, the First Lord was pleased to refer specially to cruisers of great 
size –the “Terrible”, “Argonaut,”, and “Blenheim”. In my opinion ships of these 
classes are not the best for the China station. I think this even whilst remembering the 
kind of cruisers which the Russians, for example, have in these seas. Strategic and 
                                                     
56 For the latter, see TNA ADM 1/6862 NID Report No.140, Vice-Admiral Vesey Hamilton The Protection of 
British Trade between China and Australia  (6 May 1887) 
57 Cyprian Bridge ‘American and British Naval Preparations’ in Current History: A Monthly Magazine of The 
New York Times Volume XIII, Part II, No.3 (March, 1921) p.380 
58 NMM BRI 15 pt.3, Selborne to Bridge (11 February 1902) p.4 
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tactical reasons, together with experience, as recorded in President Roosevelt’s very 
valuable naval history of the war of 1812, make it highly probably that 8 cruisers of 
the “Eclipse” class with an aggregate displacement of 22,000 tons would be more 
likely to frustrate the activity of the “Rurik” and 2 similar ships than the “Terrible”, 
“Argonaut”, “Amphitrite”, and “Blenheim” displacing together 45,000 tons.59 
 
Bridge’s assessment shows a consistency of opinion from his time as DNI a decade before, 
when during the naval manoeuvres he was largely responsible for planning, second-class 
cruiser types had featured heavily.60 His analysis of the War of 1812 is somewhat unusual, 
since the naval engagements of the conflict are more usually assessed as demonstrating the 
value of possessing vessels more powerful than those of an opponent. Since the Powerful 
class in particular had been specifically intended to counter the Rurik and her immediate 
successors, and were naturally attached to the China Squadron, this placed Bridge almost 
completely at odds with Board policy regarding commerce protection, although he was not 
alone in holding such views. He did, however, appear to take a marginally more positive view 
of some of the new side-armoured types, commenting that he counted the Cressy, which had 
recently been dispatched to the Far East, as being attached to, ‘if not actually one of, the 
battleships.’61 This at least matched the intentions for this class of first-class fleet-cruiser 
(along with the subsequent Drakes), and is a perfect illustration of the crossover in 
capabilities between battleships and first-class armoured cruisers that occurred during the 
first years of the Twentieth Century, and how this was reflected operationally.62 
 
Cruiser operations formed a significant part of the station exercises held during the early 
months of 1903. Little of the documentation appears to have survived, but it is possible to 
piece together some details from wider correspondence. Selborne noted them briefly in a 
private letter dated 29 June 1903, commenting that he had read the account of the exercises 
‘with great pleasure and interest.’63 He dwelt upon these at greater length in a further letter of 
11 October 1903. During these exercises, it appears that Bridge had deliberately kept his 
                                                     
59 NMM BRI 15 pt.4 Duties and Classes of Ships para.16-17 
60 See Chapter Two  
61 NMM BRI 14 pt.3 Bridge to Admiralty: Memorandum on the value of large cruisers (5 July 1902) p.2 
62 F. Manning The Life of Sir William White (London: John Murray, 1923) p.366 As noted in Chapter 3, Cressy 
had armour protection roughly equivalent to Bridge’s Canopus class battleships. Quite what he would 
have made of the Monmouth and Devonshire classes in his guise as C-in-C China Station is somewhat 
more open to question, although since they were roughly akin to the Blake and Diadem classes in size, it 
is improbable that his preference for second-class cruisers would have altered significantly 
63 NMM BRI 15 pt.1 Selborne to Bridge (19 June 1903) p.4 
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vessels at sea for as long as possible, something he had already written to the First Lord 
about, shortly after taking command of the China Squadron. Selborne noted in this regard that 
 
Nothing can be worse economy in my mind or more mischievous in tendency than 
your fleet should not be able to keep the sea, and I would rather you curtailed every 
other duty which consumes coal rather than curtail or diminish by a single day the 
combined exercises of the squadrons under your direction to which the Board attach 
the highest value and without which the proper training of your officers and crews 
cannot be carried out. It would also be deplorable if it were true that our ships keep 
the sea less than the French, or Germans or Russians...64 
 
It appears that for these exercises Bridge concentrated upon the role of trade defence, 
grouping cruisers together into hunting elements, while occasionally detaching the largest 
protected types to operate singly, retaining side-armoured vessels to operate with the 
battleships. He also appears to have paid some attention to the use of torpedoes and 
submarine mines, both in terms of the deploying of, and defending against, these weapons, 
just as he had when planning the annual Manoeuvres during the early 1890s.65 Much of this 
was done within the context of small-scale blockade and assault on enemy harbours, for 
which the cruisers would be employed along with the battleships. This last was mirrored by 
plans on the East Indies Station for similar assaults on enemy harbours in time of war, 
notably Diego-Suarez.66 That both blockade and amphibious and coast-assault were under 
contemplation ties closely to the contemporary NID’s views, the echoes of which may be 
traced back to the 1860s and earlier.67 
 
Outside of the exercises, the first-class cruisers stationed in the Far East on both the East 
Indies and the China stations engaged in regular patrols of major commerce routes and ports 
kept an eye on various ports, even if they were not themselves visiting at that time. Showing 
the Flag was one of the primary peacetime functions of the Royal Navy’s foreign squadrons. 
This was equally directed at the indigenous populations and rival colonial powers. As may be 
anticipated, this could progress into more coercive forms of gunboat diplomacy as a natural 
                                                     
64 NMM BRI 15 pt.3 Selborne to Bridge (11 February 1902) 
65 NMM BRI 15 pt.1 Selborne to Bridge (11 October 1903) 
66 TNA ADM 116/1228B 
67 A. Lambert ‘Economic Power, Technological Advantage, and Imperial Strength: Britain as a Unique Global 
Power, 1860 – 1890’ International Journal of Naval History, Vol.5 No.2 p.26 See also Grimes Op. Cit. 
p.32  
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policy progression if required. Thus, in the Far East during the period 1901–04, there were 
two major requirements. The first of these was to demonstrate a military presence to local 
powers, and if necessary to prevent any possible civil disturbances on the part of the local 
population against British possessions or interests. Equally, the second was to intimate to 
rival colonial powers that the self-same British possessions and the trade from and through 
the region were carefully guarded. 
 
Considering such operations for the ‘local political object’ (viz. dealings with indigenous 
powers and populations), except at the major coastal ports, these duties had traditionally been 
carried out by small gunboats and sloops such as the Woodcock class. On the China Station, 
typically, these vessels were based at Hong Kong, Singapore, or Hankow, and patrolled the 
various tributaries, or, frequently, remained in place at a particular river port or anchorage for 
a season at the request of a local Consul. By the early 1900s the merit of this policy was 
beginning to be questioned, as Selborne’s letter to Bridge indicated. The C-in-C’s reply 
confirmed the suspicions of the First Lord, stating he was of the opinion that there was no 
real necessity for such, since the Chinese population following the Boxer uprising did not 
have any deliberate intention to attack British subjects living in the area, and that any acts of 
aggression toward them would be less a matter of reasoned decision and more of 
unpremeditated impulse, which would not note the presence of such small gunboats.68 In this 
he was almost certainly correct, and in truth the majority of these small vessels, rarely over 
1,000 tons displacement and very lightly armed, were valueless for military purposes, while 
draining resources.  
 
In the “low river” season on the Yangtze they cannot go above Wuhu, they are sure to 
be neaped: they cannot get to and leave Foochow at will: reaching Tientsin is quite 
beyond them: and they can only get to Wuchow, if at all, when the West River is high. 
They are quite unfitted for the reception for a considerable number of refugee 
foreigners. The “Algerine” took a brilliant part in the attack of the Taku Forts; but no-
one will contend that it was her 4 inch guns alone which forced the abandonment of 
those works or that guns of that nature – more especially in very small numbers – are 
the right weapons to use for cannonading coast fortifications.69 
                                                     
68 NMM BRI 15 pt.4 Duties and Classes of Ships para.4 
69 Ibid para.6 ‘Neaped’ here referring to the probability of the vessels being grounded until the next cycle of 
(high) spring tides when they would hopefully be able to float off. The attack referred to in which HMS 
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As such, there was little wonder that Bridge adopted a different policy as far as he was able at 
a station level, which objectively speaking was less wasteful of resources. As referred to 
above, the Canopus and Centurion class battleships had both deliberately been developed 
with an eye to operations on the Chinese rivers, and also for passing through the Suez canal, 
though in the case of the former, as their load-draught was some 26ft 2in, and the maximum 
draught for the Canal, until 1902 was 25ft 4in, they had to transit light.70 Significantly the 
same shallow draught requirement to allow passage through the Canal (and for other reasons 
of hydrodynamic efficiency) meant that many of the first-class cruisers, particularly the 
slightly earlier and smaller units such as the Edgar class were also capable of similar 
operations on the major rivers of China, despite no such operational requirement having been 
specified by the Board.71 While such first-class cruisers drew substantially more water than 
the small river gunboats, in many cases the latter as referred to above also struggled to reach 
upriver ports and were they to do so, were liable to being neaped in the low-river season, 
rendering them incapable of withdrawal and erasing their already minimal military value. 
Thus, despite appearances larger types were often at less of a disadvantage relatively 
speaking than might be initially believed, and during the first years of the Twentieth Century 
there was an increasing move toward using first-class cruisers for such duties when possible. 
 
If used in short visits to those ports they could reach on a regular basis, while the smaller 
craft were employed in a like fashion for ports further upriver during the seasons they could 
be easily attained, this resulted in a far more effective demonstration of British naval 
presence, and one which was more likely to be capable of taking coercive action should the 
need arise. The far heavier armament of these cruisers was also clearly a huge improvement 
over the small ships, even though their batteries of flat-trajectory QF or rapid-firing breech-
loaders were far from ideal weapons for use in shore bombardment. Sub-optimal though they 
were for such a role, they certainly would have been a rather marked improvement as 
compared to the handful of 4in or lighter weapons typically carried by gunboats. As a further 
bonus, their size also would have enabled the embarking of numerous refugees if necessary, 
while their high speed meant relatively rapid seagoing transit times were they to be called 
from other parts of the Station. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Algerine, a Phoenix class (steel) screw-sloop, participated, took place during June 1900 in the latter 
stages of the Boxer Uprising.  
70 Brown Warrior to Dreadnought p.144 
71 S. Morse [ed.] War Machine Issue 90 (London: Aerospace Publishing Ltd., 1985) p.1794 
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This new policy of visiting ports rather than constantly patrolling and / or having a vessel 
almost permanently in place also tended to wean Consuls at British colonial (rather than 
Treaty) ports of the habit of expecting the presence of an R.N. vessel.72 The visit of HMS 
Endymion to Hankow is one of the best examples of the use of first-class cruisers on the 
Chinese rivers: 
 
Endymion is the heaviest man-of-war that has ever been to Hankow... and I think the 
ship’s presence had a good effect. We found no difficulties of navigation, and you 
could take your flagship [Canopus class battleship HMS Glory] up without risk. I 
have a mass of statistics about the forts, which I will condense shortly, also I have had 
taken a number of photographs –these must go down to Shanghai to be enlarged...73 
 
The visit of a major combatant like Endymion to a city so far upriver, indicating that the 
China Squadron was capable of, and prepared for operations hundreds of miles up the 
Yangtze was of great significance.74 Endymion herself was a well-known vessel since she had 
taken part in the suppressing of the Boxer uprising a short time before, and the psychological 
impact of seeing a reasonably large cruiser (some 7,700 tons in the case of the Edgar class) 
so far upriver should not be underestimated.75  
 
During the early years of the Twentieth Century, the threat of local disturbances in the Far 
East necessitated the presence of major units on several occasions. Whilst these were 
nowhere near the scale of the Boxer uprising of 1900 in China, with its massive implications 
for European economic and political interests, they were still taken seriously.76 Generally, a 
first-class cruiser was the preferred vessel for dispatch in China, and when possible on the 
East Indies Station, usually for the reasons discussed above, and because their speed enabled 
them to reach troubled areas more quickly than the full battle-squadron, which would join it 
should this prove to be necessary.77 For example, a cruiser was almost invariably stationed at 
Hong Kong specifically ‘for prompt dispatch to a treaty port or elsewhere in the event of a 
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sudden emergency.’78 This was as much, as hinted in the cited remarks, a question of 
perception on the a diplomatic and political levels as it was a military question; the use of 
large vessels, independent of their fighting capacity sent a clear message of intent to rivals.79 
Such vessels brought with them prestige, and this was of exceptional utility in projecting a 
suitable image in the international arena. Just as the battlecruisers of the dreadnought era, 
their pre-dreadnought equivalents were rather more ‘glamorous’ than other vessels in the 
fleet, it can be argued that they also exemplified the Royal Navy’s characteristically offensive 
stance / image. It is notable that cruisers frequently gained the highest scores in gunnery 
competitions, possibly assisted by their often having slightly younger and technologically 
minded officers than their battleship counterparts. For example, it was by no means 
uncommon for over 70 per cent of rounds fired to register as hits in the China Squadron at 
typical contemporary battle ranges and in competition, as officers adopted Percy Scott’s 
methods (notably continuous aim techniques), which had been partly developed and refined 
during his time as Captain of the Terrible in the Far East.80 
 
The Royal Navy’s Far Eastern squadrons had been instrumental during 1901 in assisting at a 
local level the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and unsurprisingly Cyprian Bridge of the China 
Station in particular was later thanked upon his retirement and the transfer of his command to 
Vice Admiral Gerard Noel for ‘the admirable manner in which you so successfully carried out 
the various detailed Naval arrangements consequent on the Japanese Alliance, requiring both 
tact and judgement.’81 Since he had been C-in-C Australia, and had also spent time as a 
captain some years earlier on the station, serving as Deputy Commissioner for the Western 
Pacific, he was rather more familiar with the Far East, and the wider area than many other 
senior officers from his time, which undoubtedly helped him in his task.82 It is quite possible 
that this was a factor in his being given the command. Two years later, the Russo-Japanese 
War would see the most dramatic instances of first-class cruiser operations to date. 
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The conflict was of particular interest to Britain since, notwithstanding the alliance with 
Japan and the fact that the Japanese navy was largely British built and had adopted much of 
the RN’s tactical thinking, the geographical relationships involved between Japan and the 
Asian continent were almost identical to those of Great Britain and Europe.83 Thus, strategy, 
tactics and material all bore close relations to British practice and were tested operationally 
against one of the main rivals envisioned, albeit one that the service did not regard especially 
highly.84 First-class cruisers would play a considerable role in the maritime conflict on both 
sides, especially the Japanese, where they would be a major component in both the major 
fleet-actions of the conflict, as well as an engagement with their counterparts. At the Battle of 
the Yellow Sea on 10 August 1904, the two small Italian-built Japanese armoured cruisers 
Nisshin and Kasuga  joined the rear of Admiral Togo’s battle-line before the action, and 
during the early stages would in fact  lead the Japanese line, which, following Togo’s initial 
manoeuvring, was in reverse-order.85 The remaining Japanese cruisers under Admiral Dewa 
performed respectably, but the rather poor cohesion of the Japanese force arguably hampered 
their ultimate effectiveness.86 Four days later off Ulsan however, cruisers of the belligerents 
would engage in a second action, the three large Russian commerce-raiding vessels Rurik, 
Rossia and Gromoboi of the Pacific cruiser squadron based at Vladivostok meeting with four 
Japanese armoured cruisers and two smaller second-class protected types.87 The intention had 
been to attempt a rendezvous between the two Russian fleets, though owing to a delay in the 
cruisers sailing there was little likelihood of their being in time to assist the Port Arthur 
squadron at the critical passage of the Tsushima straights, assuming the latter had been able to 
break the Japanese blockade.88 Having escaped under cover of darkness the Russian force 
found itself cut off from Vladivostok by the Japanese cruisers and over the course of an 
action that lasted some four hours, the Rurik was sunk from a combination of shellfire and 
scuttling, and the Rossia and Gromoboi severely damaged. The action was a relatively one-
sided affair, the Japanese force breaking off the chase when it was believed (incorrectly) that 
their ammunition supply was almost expended, the surviving Russians making a similar 
conjecture that such an eventuality had saved them from destruction.89 
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Nine months later at Tsushima, the Japanese cruisers would play the most significant part 
such vessels would ever have in a fleet engagement, two-thirds of the twelve Japanese capital 
ships being such types, two being attached to Admiral Togo’s four battleships to form the 
First Division, the remaining six operating as the Second Division fast wing of the fleet under 
Vice-Admiral Kamimura, who had commanded the Japanese cruisers at Ulsan. Tactically the 
Japanese followed typical RN preferences for placing the most powerful vessels at the ends 
of the line, maximising flexibility since the division could turn together and retain the same 
fighting power.90 Kamimura’s division performed the classic fast-division role, exploiting its 
speed to gain advantageous tactical positioning and support the battleships, almost precisely 
the objectives held for the RN’s Cressys when designed in 1897. Under the medium-close 
range combat conditions of the battle, the cruisers had much the same striking power as the 
battleships since their 8in weapons had a much higher rate of fire than the 12in and adequate 
armour-piercing capacity.91 
 
The Russian cruisers were quite easily defeated in the Ulsan action by the Armstrong-
designed Japanese vessels, which were themselves inferior to Royal Navy types, having a 
lower sustained sea-speed, a smaller armament and far inferior protection than either the 
Cressy or Drake classes. The protected-deck Powerfuls and Diadems would also likely have 
fared well, given their well-protected armament, conning tower and vitals –much of the 
heavy loss of life on the Russian vessels was due to the lack of armour around their artillery, 
though despite the mediocre quality of their belts, the Russian cruisers stood up quite well to 
QF fire, which remained a ship-disabling rather than sinking weapon. As far as the Royal 
Navy was concerned, the Yellow Sea engagement ultimately had the greatest impact of any of 
the engagements in terms of information and lessons that could be gleaned, and this was 
largely a matter of determining the future lay with the big gun, since at the Yellow Sea, fire 
took place at several points at extraordinary ranges for the period of over 14,000 yds.92 
Tsushima pointed to a rather different conclusion, suggesting the primacy of the QF gun 
remained, especially at short-medium range, but the former was preferred by gunnery 
specialists like Bacon and others, who were set to begin exploiting the latest technological 
developments in fire-control.  
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Far Eastern logistics and the first-class cruiser 
The Royal Navy’s global strategic capacity through the late Nineteenth and early years of 
Twentieth Centuries hinged on two critical areas of infrastructure: communications and a 
global network of not just coaling stations, but dry docks.93  
 
As noted in Chapter One, the globe-spanning electric telegraph network provided the 
cornerstone to the former.  The advances wrought in long-distance communications during 
the Nineteenth Century, ‘although essentially commercial, were aided, directed and 
influenced by the application of Government funds.’94 The development of this, the first 
global high-speed communications network, the reliability, speed and breadth of which were 
continually enhanced over time provided the means by which the British Empire could be 
welded into a single strategic entity, allowing easy reinforcement of threatened areas.95 British 
control over the majority of the submarine telegraph network was a critical advantage over 
colonial rivals, and while the advent of wireless telegraphy and improvements by rivals in 
their own networks began to erode this somewhat, Britain still retained an edge. The 
advantage this brought was not lost on contemporary RN senior commanders, both in the 
Admiralty and on foreign stations, and were continually exploited. Some breakdowns did 
occur however, and were taken seriously, an example occurring between Cyprian Bridge and 
Day Bosanquet’s successor as C-in-C East Indies Station, Charles Drury. During early spring 
1903, the C-in-C China Station expressed considerable displeasure in a bluntly-phrased letter 
to the Secretary, complaining that several ‘foreign men-of-war have reached the China 
station, without having been reported between the Suez canal and some port on this station.’96 
He cited the instance of the French Gueydon class armoured cruiser Montcalm, which was 
reported on leaving Port Said and was then largely ignored until a chance sighting of her 
passing Singapore on the way to Saigon.97 The Admiralty concurred in this view, drawing the 
attention of the C-in-C East Indies  
 
…to the failure to report movements of foreign ships of war to or from China Station, 
and Colonial Office has also been approached for the purpose of instructing the 
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Master Attendant at Colombo to report such movements to you direct as well as to the 
C-in-C East Indies, and the Admiralty.98 
 
The ability to centralise control and divert resources where required to deter possible 
challengers or threats to the empire had resulted in the 1860s in the establishing of the Flying 
Squadron under Geoffrey Hornby, and while largely an economy measure introduced under 
the Liberals, was also relatively practical given the contemporary near-stranglehold on the 
global telegraph system.99 The dedicated cruiser squadrons of the 1890s and later were 
effectively its direct descendent. Bridge was a strong supporter of the concept, commenting 
in July 1902 that the largest first-class cruiser types could be usefully organised into such 
squadrons attached to no individual station ‘but visiting in succession each of several 
stations.’100 Assuming that foreign stations maintained a number of smaller, but ‘moderately 
large’ cruisers on a permanent basis, it was suggested that two or three visits from such flying 
squadrons of large first-class vessels would increase its strategic and tactical effectiveness, 
and demonstrate that reductions were not contemplated –an echo of the arguments that 
created Hornby’s original Flying Squadron.101 The late modification of certain French naval 
squadrons, it was submitted, was ‘…in reality nothing but the partial adoption of the ‘flying 
squadron’ principal. Our reply to it, I submit, ought to be adoption of the same principal, not 
partially, but in full.’102  
 
Closely linked, and key to the success of the strategy was the establishing and maintaining of 
bases capable of servicing vessels properly, since this was the only way a fleet or squadron 
could realistically operate in distant waters for any length of time. This was far more than a 
question of simple coaling-stations or harbours though; the steam-age brought with it an 
increasing requirement for dry-docking, primarily for ensuring hulls were kept clean, but also 
for more general maintenance requirements. Even for the world’s dominant sea power, the 
establishing of a global network of such bases took time, which had itself been a factor in the 
service retaining sail as long as it did for some classes of vessel. It was also an extremely 
expensive process, particularly since future size requirements needed to be taken into account 
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when designing and constructing the stone docks themselves, while suitable areas needed to 
be surveyed and if required purchased since such structures required substantial foundations, 
even with suitable underpinning geology.103 The general Admiralty policy until around 1890 
had been to encourage commercial dock construction which would be available to service 
vessels, and provide facilities in key areas where the seaborne economic activity was 
inadequate to support them.104 As a result, the number of dry-dock facilities available to the 
RN was far greater than those available to most other colonial powers, and steadily expanded 
over time as a key component in the service’s ability to operate, and if required, fight, on a 
global scale. Ultimately this allowed Britain to maintain its position as the dominant world-
wide seapower, which, though it could not destroy a major rival power, could ‘exhaust their 
military and economic resources and ultimately break their political will.’105  
 
Since the largest types of first class cruiser were typically rather longer than their battleship 
contemporaries, they would not physically fit many existing installations. This naturally had 
significant implications for many of the foreign stations, and the Far East was no exception to 
this. Although capable of visiting numerous ports, providing they required little in the way of 
care and maintenance, there were relatively few places throughout the world where full 
docking facilities were available for their use. To an extent, the limited number of global 
support-facilities for the largest first-class cruiser types was responsible for the reinvigoration 
of the visiting flying-squadron principal, which reduced the requirements for permanent 
installations capable of maintaining such types. In the Middle and Far East Aden and Bombay 
could handle such types, albeit not without some difficulties, the long-planned Trincomalee 
was not fully developed at this stage, and while the HQ bases of Singapore and Hong Kong 
could accept them, the latter was also borderline for some of the largest types (such as the 
Powerfuls). It was planned to effect a considerable reconstruction and extension of the latter’s 
naval base, but these plans were overtaken by wider events and not put into effect.106 Outside 
of local British colonial possessions, Japan provided by far the best facilities in the Far East, 
though the charges for their docking facilities were high.107 The various C-in-Cs of both the 
East Indies and the China stations sporadically requested senior Captains and Commodores to 
furnish comparative reports regarding docking charges: those of one Japanese facility are 
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shown in Table 4.2. With several cruisers such as the Diadems displacing over 11,000 tons, 
the high cost involved in using these facilities can be easily appreciated, when considered in 
addition to the battleships.108 The 12,000 ton Cressys and 14,200 ton Powerfuls made this 
even more of a problem.109 As a result, the largest types would only employ foreign docking 
facilities as a last resort, and it was rare that these were used.110  
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Table 4.2: 
Japanese Admiralty Docking Charges -Mitsubishi Granite Dock, as of 1902 
Size in tons Charges 1st 3 
days: Yen 
Daily Charge 4th 
day & after: Yen 
Below 300 500 50 
300-400 520 55 
400-500 540 60 
500-600 560 65 
600-700 580 70 
700-800 610 77.5 
800-900 640 85 
900-1000 670 92.5 
1000-1200 700 100 
For a vessel over 
1200 tons for 
every 0.050 
additional ton 
 
00.50 0.05 
 
Source: TNA ADM 125/56 China Station Records Volume XLII 
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Hull condition and cleaning was the primary routine requirement for dry-docking throughout 
the globe, especially in warmer climes, since operations in tepid waters resulted in the rapid 
fouling of hulls, despite the use of sheathing or the early forms of anti-fouling paints then 
emerging, such as Holtzapfel’s ‘International’ and ‘Moravia’.111 Most of the vessels stationed 
in the Middle and Far East were so-equipped, although cleaning requirements naturally 
varied with conditions and duties; following a largely fresh-water cruise on the Yangtze, the 
captain of Endymion commented that the bottom was in perfect condition, 2 ½ months after 
she had last been dry-docked.112  
 
Dry-docking aside, engine and boiler refits and repairs were as might be expected the most 
significant maintenance issues experienced by first-class cruisers in the Far East. This was a 
general problem irrespective of type in this region, where the high relative humidity increased 
corrosion levels compared to other localities. The introductory problems with the Belleville 
type boilers, discussed in the previous two chapters, were exacerbated under such 
environmental conditions. While this applied to all vessels, the first-class cruisers were 
particularly affected owing to their sheer number of boilers and the somewhat higher 
pressures often involved. It should be noted that this applied to both the Belleville and the 
traditional cylindrical types. Leaving aside construction issues described in previous chapters 
such as the replacement of the patent packing of the Belleville with an inferior type, which 
did nothing for its reliability, the latter scored somewhat over the former in greater ease of 
maintenance owing to its simpler construction and physical configuration, and, equally 
significantly, as described in earlier chapters, greater familiarity on the part of engineering 
officers and crews. As a result of these combinations of factors, the Belleville boilers, 
regarded with considerable suspicion by many upon their introduction, were especially 
unpopular in the Far East. HMS Terrible was out of commission for several months while 
serving in China when being refitted and re-boilered, provoking acid comment from the C-in-
C.113 Complaints regarding protracted maintenance periods of first-class cruisers and the costs 
involved would continue, most notably in the case of the Cressy, arguably the most 
                                                     
111 Brown Warrior to Dreadnought p.158 Brown dryly comments that these substances, which contained copper, 
mercury salts and arsenic, probably killed a large number of painters as well as the unfortunate 
barnacles. They also happened to be extremely expensive. 
112 NMM BRI/14 Letter Paget to Bridge (10 September 1902) p.1 
113 NMM BRI 15 pt.5 Memorandum, Bridge to Selborne (22 April 1903) p.1 With 48 Bellevilles, this was never 
going to be a cheap or quick process, and it must be admitted that the protestations do not sit easily with 
the C-in-C’s dislike of very large protected cruisers, although in fairness few commanders of foreign 
station were likely to be pleased at one of their main units being unavailable for extended periods, 
whatever their personal views regarding the merits of the type 
 216 
 
formidable capital ship to be found in the Far East, with it being suggested that she should 
revert to the cylindrical boiler type owing to the increasingly dark views of many 
commanders about the Belleville, and water-tube boilers in general. Selborne ultimately 
(though politely) rejected the majority of such complaints on a matter of general principle, 
and especially notably on the basis that as crews gained experience with how best to use and 
maintain the boilers, so the repair bills decreased.114 
 
The issue of fuel and its supply in the Middle and Far East would also become problematic 
around the turn of the century. While it affected all vessels present, the first-class cruisers 
exacerbated the problem, given their large bunkerage, high speed coal consumption and the 
high level of deterioration in the fuel itself in the more southerly latitudes. The problems of 
supplying such vessels, along with the rest of the squadron in times of conflict seemed to be 
relatively easily addressed on the East Indies station, where stockpiles in India and Ceylon 
were available, and supplies in the western regions were anticipated to be reasonably 
practical through the Suez canal, even during time of conflict. The China Station was another 
matter however, and a lengthy argument between the C-in-C and the DNI developed during 
1902-’03. Bridge, as previously noted, had been C-in-C Australia Station some years earlier, 
a post he had taken following his stint as DNI. During this time, he had recommended that 
the China Squadron adopt West Port coal from New Zealand, as it was relatively cheap, 
appeared to be of equal (or near equal) quality  to Welsh coal, and considerably simplified 
logistics, as well as reduced the risk of possible interception.115 Since these arguments were 
clearly persuasive, the Board had been happy to adopt West Port coal for this use, once its 
quality had been proved to their satisfaction. However, when C-in-C China Station, Bridge 
was extremely dissatisfied with the quality of the coal the squadron received and requested 
that they revert to using the Welsh mineral. The reason for his dissatisfaction with the New 
Zealand coal stemmed from the inferior power and economy it provided compared to Welsh, 
the large pall of smoke vessels burning this fuel produced, and the critical problem this would 
cause his cruisers in hunting commerce raiders.116 This would of course been most notable in 
the first-class types, and particularly the largest of these, such as the Powerfuls and Diadems, 
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with no less than 48, and 30 Bellevilles, respectively.117 He further intimated that, partly 
owing to the poor economy this coal provided, his ships could not keep the sea as much as 
the French or Russian vessels in the area did. 
 
The Admiralty rejected his initial proposal outright, understandably having little wish to 
revert to the Welsh product for use in the Far East unless no other practical alternative were 
available.118 Bridge, evidently attempting to barter with the Board, subsequently sent a more 
modest suggestion for a supply of such fuel to be made available for use in wartime only.119 If 
he was employing the strategy of deliberately making an outrageous request with an eye to 
getting a more modest one accepted, the C-in-C was to be disappointed in his intention, for 
this proposal was also rejected by the Admiralty, primarily due to the extreme distances such 
fuel would need to travel and the potential for deterioration in the quality over the journey, to 
say nothing of the possible disruption to such supply in wartime and the additional costs 
involved. The First Lord did attempt to smooth relations in his private correspondence, 
politely expressing that it was  
 
…a matter of very sincere regard to me that on the subject of coal supply for the 
China Station the Admiralty have taken a different view from yourself. Believe me 
that when we have differed form you it has been most unwillingly and only because, 
after giving as much pains to the question as I know you have, the facts seem to us to 
lead us to a different conclusion to that to which they have led you... 
It is very disagreeable to me to have to decide between two such opinions as yours 
and Lord Walter’s, but I am not prepared to suggest to the Board to put aside the 
views of Lord Walter and the D.N.I.120 
 
In fact the matter was not exaggerated, and many of the issues were later traced to an 
incorrect, inferior quality of coal to that recommended by Bridge when he was C-in-C 
Australia Station being sent to the China Squadron.121 The mines and suppliers also lacked a 
similar level of quality control to those of the Welsh producers. Some of these were resolved 
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by the time Gerard Noel became C-in-C China Station in 1904, and the rest Noel addressed in 
extremely short order. With a heavy force comprised entirely of first-class cruisers, Noel was 
understandably keen to eliminate any problems of this kind. It is noteworthy that Selborne 
exhibited a keen eye for the wider strategic situation when he remarked that the vessels of 
rival squadrons in the area would be in an even worse position for fuel supply, both in terms 
of quantity and quality during a conflict with Britain. Thus the relative loss in performance 
and efficiency experienced by the vessels of the China Squadron would be cancelled out, 
since even the questionable New Zealand coal was ‘much superior to anything the enemy 
could continuously burn in time of war.’122 
 
The final major logistical matter of direct relevance to the first-class cruisers in the Far East 
was related to gunnery. The principal issue that needed to be addressed was that of magazine 
and shell storage facilities on shore. Once again, it seems that the East Indies was somewhat 
better off than the China Station, although the later expansion of the base at Trincomalee 
suggests that things were still not optimal. The facilities at Hong Kong in particular left much 
to be desired, and the question of magazine capacity for the China Station became an even 
more involved and  long-running debate than that of coal quality and supply. Naturally, as 
with the matters of coal supply and general maintenance this affected all vessels attached to 
the China fleet. Nevertheless, the presence in the Far East of some of the latest, very large 
first-class cruisers such as the Terribles, Diadems and Cressys, with their large batteries of 
QF guns equal to their battleship contemporaries, resulted in severe problems of ammunition 
and propellant accommodation.123 A memorandum from G. E. Woodward to the Commodore 
appointed to oversee the proposed developments of magazine and projectile capacity drew 
attention to this, pointing out that the introduction of the 6in B.L. Mk VII and VIII guns, 
using silk-cloth rather than the brass cartridges of the earlier 6in QF, had the effect  
 
…of increasing the magazine accommodation required for the former, and 
diminishing the ammunition store accommodation required for the latter. This effect is 
already felt at this dept. since the “Leviathan”, “Centurion” and “Cressy” joined the 
squadron.124 
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124 TNA ADM 116/939B Letter: Woodward to Commodore, China Station (21 September 1904) [original 
underlining] The brand-new Leviathan, of the latest Drake class was possibly the most formidable 
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Even with access to the less-suitable locations of Singapore, and the modern, but small 
Kellets Island store, ‘Group 1, Division 1’ of the China squadron alone had a deficit of some 
15,309 cubic feet of storage space.125 The situation was even worse in Hong Kong; while 
storage space itself was less of an issue, although still insufficient to meet the requirements of 
the China Fleet, the arsenal itself was totally unsuitable. Less-than-conveniently, live 
ammunition needed to be wheeled across the busy Queen’s Road (which was subject to a plan 
for widening!) to reach the loading areas.126 Unsurprisingly, this situation was seen by most 
parties as being ‘a favourable opportunity to separate Naval and Military Ordnance stores in 
this place.’127 More bluntly, it was a major problem, and a potential disaster waiting to 
happen. Regrettably (if unsurprisingly, given the less-than-stellar record of co-operation 
between the services), these proposals met considerable difficulty and arguments between the 
Admiralty and the War Office, which owned a very suitable piece of land but refused a direct 
transfer unless replacements were provided elsewhere at the Admiralty’s expense.128 
 
The withdrawal of the battleships following the victory of the Japanese over the Russians at 
Tsushima in May 1905 eventually resulted in the abandoning of the various proposals for the 
China Station, since the storage problems for the first-class cruisers and other remaining 
vessels eased, though were not fully resolved, given the out-dated nature of many of the 
facilities and the possibly lethal need to haul propellant and projectiles across a thoroughfare 
in Hong Kong. In the East Indies, as noted, these would in the medium-term be partly 
addressed by the expansion of the base at Trincomalee, and somewhat less drastic alterations 
at other major facilities, especially in India. By this time however, a new order was emerging 
under Sir John Fisher; a matter considered in the following chapter. 
 
 
Conclusions 
The Middle and particularly the Far East were key strategic deployment regions for the Royal 
Navy at the end of the Nineteenth and beginning of the Twentieth Centuries. The first-class 
                                                                                                                                                                     
fighting ship in the world at the time of her completion, possessing 2 x 9.2in and no less than 16 x 6in, 
plus a large number of miscellaneous 3in and 3-pounder quick-firing guns 
125 Ibid 
126 TNA ADM 116/939B Letter Stanley Bank, Supervisor, to Admiralty, (21 September 1904) 
127 TNA ADM 116/939B Letter, Under Secretary of State for War (12 May 1902) 
128 TNA ADM 116/939B Minutes of Conference on proposed separation of Ordnance Establishment, Hong 
Kong (27 July 1905) 
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cruiser was a major component of both the squadrons, and operations on the China Station in 
particular illustrate the considerable flexibility of the type. 
 
The usual functions of patrolling focal areas, sections of trade routes, and the visits to various 
ports around the station in the classical peacetime role of showing the flag are all as may be 
expected, although littoral regions do not automatically come to mind when considering such 
vessels. Nevertheless, they were extensively used for this role, and it is particularly notable 
that a first-class vessel should be employed for a visit of this nature several hundred miles 
upriver. While a single instance like Endymion’s visit to Hankow is far from definitive, a 
gradual move away from gunboats and similar types in favour of more viable combat types 
began from around this time, somewhat in advance of the change customarily attributed to 
Fisher’s reforms largely set out in Naval Necessities. The two Centurions had been built to be 
able to carry out similar functions, but, though somewhat more capable than they are often 
given credit for, first-class cruisers like the Edgars were ultimately a more flexible and useful 
vessel type.  
 
The presence of the Powerfuls in the Far East is understandable since they were intended to 
counter the Rurik, a task they would have had little difficulty in performing in the event of an 
encounter; it is interesting though not surprising to note the odium theologicum with which 
Cyprian Bridge when C-in-C China Station regarded the largest first-class protected vessels, 
since his strategic views were largely grounded in a preference for numerical rather than 
qualitative superiority for cruiser types. While having distinct limitations insofar as their size 
significantly restricted where they were able to put in, let alone dock, the presence of these 
enormous, essentially rather luxury items on the station will have automatically lent a certain 
prestige, and their fighting capabilities within their design remit, as discussed in Chapters 
Two and Three was high. Stationing a cruiser at Hong Kong, as a one-vessel flying squadron 
capable of rapid dispatch around the Station follows wider RN strategy of having at least one 
first-class cruiser at a focal point, which could be contacted via telegraph or wireless 
telegraphy. This was itself a local illustration of wider grand-strategy; while the RN did not 
write its strategic doctrine down in the Nineteenth Century, this does not mean it lacked one, 
a point also made in the first chapter.129 With its dominance of the global undersea telegraph 
network eroded but not eradicated, and greater access to dry docking facilities the service was 
                                                     
129 See too A. Lambert Economic Power… p.30 
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able to exploit its position to maintain a policy of deterrence, a major component of which 
would become squadrons capable of rapid deployment to locales requiring reinforcement. 
The strategic value of speed, dramatically demonstrated by the race of the second-cruiser 
squadron between New York and Gibraltar referred to in the previous Chapter was also 
critical in the success of this approach –a strategy that inherently worked, since Britain did 
not become embroiled in a war with any major rival until 1914, which post-dated a change in 
strategic direction toward a continental approach for Britain that contravened all precedent, 
and ultimately the national interest.130 The grouping of cruisers into flying squadrons was a 
matter of considerable interest to many in the service, and was strongly advocated by Cyprian 
Bridge, a former director of the NID, while on the China Station.131 
 
While the battleships remained on-station, the employing of Cressy with them and the 
counting of her as their equivalent exactly matches the intentions for the type, and since her 
armour scheme was almost a precise equivalent of the Canopus class vessels this will have 
been little hardship. With the withdrawal of the battleships following the Japanese victory 
over Russia at Tsushima in 1905, under Noel the backbone of the China Squadron would 
become side-armoured cruisers.132 Although reduced, the East Indies station already heavily 
exploited such types, though with no rival local powers, the deploying of a battle-squadron 
had been unnecessary in any event.  
 
Logistically, the presence of first-class cruisers on foreign stations clearly caused difficulties, 
some of which were foreseen, others less immediately obvious but still telling. The 
maintenance requirements, especially of Belleville water-tube boilers are clearly shown to 
have caused problems, although as noted many of these could be traced back to lack of 
experience on the part of crews, officers and engineers.133 Irrespective of the precise reasons, 
the fact was that re-boilering and maintenance time was difficult, especially given the number 
of these involved in the largest types. Somewhat more of an issue was the fact that they didn’t 
fit many installations, the majority of which in the region were commercial and unused to the 
                                                     
130 See A. Lambert ‘Wilson, Sir Arthur Knyvet, third baronet (1842–1921)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
131 A rare event when a C-in-C was arguing for fewer rather than a greater number of ships permanently attached 
to his command  
132 A rather sad irony for the new C-in-C since Noel’s personal strategic views generally favoured battleships 
over cruisers 
133 As well as moving away from the originally intended patent packing in the feed system –see Chapter Two 
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largest (particularly the longest) types. Coal consumption, and the necessity of sufficient 
supplies for these large vessels with their considerable fuel requirements meant supply routes 
and sources needed to be carefully established and, significantly, quality maintained. The 
difficulties that could arise are clearly shown from experiences on the China Station 
described above, and while the East Indies station could be seen as somewhat better off in 
this regard, it was not a matter that could be taken lightly. Any magazine storage issues on 
shore could also potentially be exacerbated by these vessels with their large armament of 
rapid-firing intermediate-calibre weapons, particularly when the true 6in QF with its brass 
cartridge case was superseded by the equally fast-firing later 6in models, which reverted to 
silk bags. While more convenient in manufacturing and cost terms, the latter posed some 
problems ashore, since they needed more careful storage and handling, all of which ate into 
available storage space.  
 
In general however, the Royal Navy’s grand strategy was working well during this time. The 
cruisers would increasingly become the main heavy naval vessels employed on foreign 
stations, and the Middle and Far East were no exception, especially following Tsushima when 
the Russian Navy was, in practical terms, wiped out as a global force for the immediate 
future. The Japanese fleet, closely aligned in tactical thinking and to an extent material with 
the Royal Navy demonstrated their value to even greater effect than had been the case ten 
years before at Yalu, or during the Spanish-American war of 1898, largely confirming views 
that had been held by an increasing number of designers and officers in Britain, and these 
would be heavily exploited by the service in the following years.  
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Chapter 5 
Fear God and dread nought: 
Sir John Fisher and the drive for a cruiser-based navy 
 
 
Chapters One to Three considered the origins and development of the first-class cruiser in the 
Royal Navy from 1884-1901, and the paradigm shift in capability brought by the introduction 
of face-hardened armour within a tactical environment dominated by rapid-firing 
intermediate-calibre guns. Chapter Four provided a case study of these vessels’ operations 
during what may be considered their zenith, the first years of the Twentieth Century, and 
demonstrated how the global strategic requirements of the Royal Navy increasingly tended to 
rely upon these types. 
 
From a vessel intended principally for the trade-defence and heavy-scouting role, the largest 
first-class cruisers had gained a genuine capacity for close-action roughly equivalent to 
several classes of contemporary battleship. Indeed, the Cressy class were specifically 
designed for this role, and though never referred to as ‘battle-cruisers’, officially or 
otherwise, they and their Drake class successors may be realistically considered the first type 
in the Royal Navy where the term could be employed as a literal description of their abilities. 
Their predecessors, with passive-defence provided by the protective deck system were also 
rather more capable than is often appreciated, and were repeatedly employed during the 
annual Manoeuvres as heavy-scouts, while at Yalu they proved that, well-handled, they could 
face side-armoured opponents. However, with the Cressys and Drakes the Royal Navy had 
vessels that could close with and fight battleship contemporaries if required. Within a 
gunnery environment dominated by quick-firing intermediate-calibre weapons, large first-
class armoured cruisers were substantially less vulnerable in a fleet action than the officially 
entitled battlecruisers were a decade later when operating under very different conditions 
dominated by heavy naval ordnance. 
 
Following the introduction of these large types, two more moderately-sized classes of 
armoured cruisers had been developed specifically for the trade-defence role, in response to 
contemporary French and Russian construction, which for a time favoured more modestly 
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sized vessels.1 Built in large numbers (ten Monmouths and six Devonshires) they were of 
much more limited capability than the Cressys and Drakes, and while equalling their foreign 
rivals, did not exhibit any marked superiority either. They also lacked capacity for fleet 
operations (other than some scouting duties, or possibly finishing off crippled vessels) that 
had been gained following the introduction of face-hardened armour types, especially KC 
plate. The Devonshires, with their heavier though slightly less extensive protection would 
have been more able in such duties than the Monmouths, but their armament fell into an 
unfortunate middle-ground of being both too light and insufficiently numerous to make them 
the equal of the heavier Cressys for such work.  
 
This chapter examines how the first-class cruiser would develop in the period 1902-1909, and 
become the generic basis for all of the Royal Navy’s first big-gun capital ships. This was the 
era frequently referred to as the ‘Dreadnought revolution’, but it was rather more a 
transitional period on both the strategical and material fronts. In this time, the service began a 
gradual move away from countering the traditional French and Russian rivals as the German 
naval challenge became more significant, while the intermediate-calibre guns that had 
dominated naval tactics for some fifteen years were gradually marginalised as the focus 
shifted toward long-range fire with heavy weapons; a change largely permitted by advances 
in fire-control technology and procedures. It was also a time which was largely dominated by 
Admiral Sir John Fisher and his vision for a new Royal Navy that would be equipped and 
operate in a different fashion to what had gone before, but heavily relied upon the 
groundwork established over the previous two decades. In Fisher’s eyes, variations on the 
first-class cruiser would be the capital-ships the Royal Navy required in order to continue the 
strategic doctrine of deterrence that the service had employed since the 1860s, and he would 
do everything he could to ensure that this vision would be carried through. 
 
 
Financial consequences of a cruiser-battleship navy 
From 1889, naval expansion, both in terms of number of vessels and their size and cost, was 
unprecedented in the mechanised era. The yearly Navy Estimates presented to Parliament 
                                                     
1 Note that this was in terms of displacement. The Monmouths, at 9,800 tons, were some 2,200 tons lighter than 
the Cressys, but were the same length between points, albeit 10ft shorter at the waterline, and of 3 ½ft. 
less beam. Conversely, the Devonshires, though at 10,850 tons some 1,150 tons lighter than the 
Cressys, were actually slightly longer, albeit of 1ft less beam. 
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increased between 1889-90 and 1896-97 by some 58.5 per cent.2 Economic conditions were 
reasonably good, in part owing to a lack of major conflicts around the globe which also 
coincided with a period of relative colonial calm. The increased tax yield that resulted, and 
the introduction of graduated death-duties had allowed this to be achieved without greatly 
adding to the burden of National Debt. However, the increasing cost of building large 
numbers of battleships and first-class cruisers, along with expense of the Second Boer War, 
would as demonstrated by Sumida, precipitate a crisis in naval finance.3 
 
The first-class cruisers, which saw a greater relative increase in dimensions across this period 
than did their battle-ship counterparts, played a significant part in the rising expenditure, as 
did the steady introduction of new technologies, particularly face-hardened armour, which for 
all its merits, was also time-consuming, difficult and expensive to produce. As a result, the 
Cressys cost an average of some 37.4 per cent more than their protected-deck Diadem 
predecessors, at a mean of £762,678 compared to the earlier vessels at £554,747.4 The Drake 
class perhaps more than any other underlined the financial consequences of building two 
distinct types of capital ship (whether necessary or not). The four Drakes, with a further 15.2 
per cent increase in displacement over the Cressys, saw the mean cost per vessel rise again, to 
£996,205, with two of the class (Drake and Leviathan) costing over a million apiece, a 23.5 
per cent increase over the Cressys, and 44.4 per cent over the Diadems.5 This placed them at 
virtually the same cost per unit as the London class battleships that had been ordered in the 
same programme.6 Table 5.1 and Figures 5.1 and 5.2 provide a breakdown of mean costs per 
vessel and class costs for first-class cruisers built between 1888-1905.7 
 
 
 
                                                     
2 See House of Commons Parliamentary Papers ‘Navy Estimates for the Year 1889 – 90 with explanatory 
observations by the Financial Secretary, and explanation of the differences’ 1889 (50) L, 1 and ‘Navy 
Estimates for the Year 1896 – 97 with explanatory observations by the Financial Secretary, and 
explanation of the differences’ 1896 (LIII), 1   
3 Ibid 
4 Based on the vessel costs listed in J. Leyland & T. Brassey [eds.] The Naval Annual, 1906  (Portsmouth: J. 
Griffin and Co., 1906). Figures in 1906 were generally revised slightly down from those given in 
previous editions. Note that HMS Spartiate of the Diadem class cost significantly more than her sisters, 
at £654,661 –the mean figure for the class given in the text is given excluding her to provide a more 
representative value 
5 Costs derived from Ibid. In previous editions of the Naval Annual, the Drake class were listed as costing 
slightly more than £1 million apiece 
6 N. Lambert Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999) p.23 
7 Note that the later figures (from the Dukes onward) are inclusive of armament. This does not significantly 
affect the general upward trend in the cost however 
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Table 5.1 First-class cruiser mean costs per vessel and class costs 1888-1905 
Class Name No. vessels in class Mean cost per vessel Cost per class 
Blake 2 £433,031 £866,062 
Edgar 9 £388,517.5 £3,496,658 
Powerful 2 £706,977 £1,413,954 
Diadem 8 £567,236 £4,537,891 
Cressy 6 £762,678.67 £4,576,072 
Drake 4 £996,205 £3,984,820 
Monmouth 10 £751,936.3 £7,519,363 
Devonshire 6 £847,777.33 £5,086,664 
Duke of Edinburgh 2 £1,197,550.5 £2,395,101 
Warrior 4 £1,196,965.75 £4,787,463 
Minotaur 3 £1,415,073 £4,245,219 
 
Costs derived from: 
 
Blake class: 
T. Brassey [ed.]  The Naval Annual (Portsmouth: J. Griffin and Co., 1902) 
 
Edgar, Powerful, Diadem, Cressy, Drake, Monmouth & Devonshire classes: 
J. Leyland & T. Brassey [eds.] The Naval Annual (Portsmouth: J. Griffin and Co., 1906) 
 
Duke of Edinburgh, Warrior & Minotaur classes: 
Viscount Hythe [ed.] The Naval Annual, 1912 (Portsmouth: J. Griffin and Co., 1912)8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
8 Note: costs given to Devonshire class excluding guns & stores. From Dukes onward the costs given include 
guns. An approximate guide figure of £100,000 per vessel may provide a guideline. The Devonshires 
appear mediocre value for money in comparison to the larger first-class types 
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Figure 5.1 Mean vessel cost by class 1888-1905 Pounds sterling 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Cost of first-class protected and armoured cruisers in millions sterling 
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Just as significant as the construction costs of these new first-class types was the cost of 
running, maintaining and particularly manning them. The vast boiler rooms necessitated by 
their high speed (and the requirement for relatively under-stressed engines with boilers 
utilising natural rather than forced-draught) in turn mandated a very large crew: some seven 
hundred and sixty men in the case of the Cressys, and no less than nine hundred in the Drakes 
–the latter being almost two hundred greater than a London class battleship, prompting First 
Naval Lord Frederick Richards to dub them ‘man eating’ vessels upon being presented with 
the initial compliment figures.9 Given the massive expenditure some form of financial 
retrenchment was almost inevitable. The Monmouths were in part driven by this financial 
consideration, although in comparison to the Diadems, which had also been designed for the 
trade-defence role, cost was some 24.5 per cent higher, despite their lesser displacement.10 
The extra engine-power was a minor contribution to this (an extra boiler and slightly more 
advanced TE engines) but the most significant factor was the use of side-armour. Although 
the Monmouths' Krupp armour was non-cemented, it was considerably more expensive than 
the non-face-hardened steel armour used for the Diadems protective deck. 
 
As shown in Chapter Three the DNC did not like or approve of the Monmouth class, 
regarding them as simply a case of giving the Board what they asked for, when in his view a 
protected deck type would have been just as effective for trade-defence purposes as well as 
being substantially cheaper. In this he was undoubtedly correct, and it would have echoes for 
later vessels too, as is suggested later in this chapter. A cruiser employing the protective deck 
system would certainly have been cheaper, and although the area covered by side-armour in 
the Monmouths was good and their general armour scheme superior to most of their foreign 
rivals, 4in non-cemented Krupp armour with thin protective decks was not fundamentally 
superior to, and in many ways less effective than, a well-implemented protective deck system 
such as that employed in the Diadems. Thus while certainly cheaper than the Drake class, 
savings were by no means especially extensive, especially when coupled with the large 
number of the class (10) that were built over a three year period. The real argument for 
building the Monmouths had been a desire to have more vessels for the available money in 
order to counter the threat of a French and / or Russian guerre de course by means of fast 
                                                     
9 TNA ADM 116/878 Richards ‘Shipbuilding Programme 1898-99’ 4 February 1898 Natural draught conditions 
ensured stress on the boilers was minimised, but as noted in previous chapters owing to the reduced 
amount of horse-power extracted per square foot of heating surface, more were required for a given 
output. A direct comparison can be made to a small internal combustion engine employing some form 
of forced induction (supercharging / turbocharging) and a larger, normally-aspirated engine 
10 Leyland & Brassy, The Naval Annual, 1906 Op. Cit. 
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protected or moderately sized armoured cruisers. Not all of the Board agreed with this course, 
as has also been shown, Wilson in particular regarding the construction of the type as a lost 
opportunity to gain a significant qualitative advantage over rival powers.11 That he was 
overruled was unfortunate; Wilson’s strategic and tactical expertise was far in advance of 
most of his contemporaries, and this was reflected in his preferences for material, and the 
opinion he shared with White regarding the types. 
 
The six follow-on Devonshires of the 1901/02 programme in many ways represented a more 
active attempt to reign in the spiralling construction, running, maintenance and manning costs 
by deliberately restricting dimensions. Despite the massive scale of the British construction 
programmes from 1898-1901, France and Russia had both responded with new programmes 
of their own and the margin of superiority was believed slim; of particular concern was the 
Law which in late 1900 passed both the French Chamber of Deputies and Senate, providing 
for 6 first-class battleships and 5 armoured cruisers by 31 December 1906.12 The Devonshires 
were at best a match for their moderately sized contemporary rivals, and as Wilson had 
pointed out when the previous class was developed, given the inevitable tendency for vessels 
and their weapons to increase in size and power over time, deliberately restricting dimensions 
simply hastened the pace at which they would fall back into the second rank.13 That this was 
increasingly appreciated by the rest of the Board is evident, and there were no serious 
attempts to restrict dimensions of first-class cruisers for some years. The first-class cruisers of 
the 1902/03, and 1903/04 programmes (the Duke of Edinburgh / Warrior classes) saw an 
increase in displacement of some 20 per cent, and increase in per-unit cost of nearly 30 per 
cent over the Devonshires.14 The three Minotaur class cruisers of the 1904/05 programme, the 
last in the Royal Navy to be equipped with intermediate-calibre artillery, saw further 
increases of 7.2 per cent in displacement and 15.4 per cent in cost over the Duke of 
Edinburghs.15 These increases in numbers of vessels constructed, along with the rise in unit 
size and costs, resulted in an increase in spending on first-class cruisers from £10,314,565 on 
the 21 protected vessels of the Blake to Diadem classes, to £32,594,702 on the 35 armoured 
                                                     
11 TNA ADM 1/8724/93 Remarks of Admiral Wilson on White ‘Report on the Design for New Cruisers, 
Supplementary Programme 1898-99’ in appendix of Commander S. King-Hall ‘The Evolution of the 
Cruiser’ 
12 TNA CAB 37/56 Confidential Memorandum on Ship-Building, Navy Estimates 1901-1902, January 17, 1901 
p.5 
13 TNA ADM 1/8724/93 Remarks of Wilson Op. Cit. 
14 See Table 5.1 The following vessels in question were the Duke of Edinburgh and Warrior classes, sometimes 
classed together under the former of the two as class-name 
15 Ibid 
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vessels from the Cressy to Minotaur classes.16 The costs involved, a jump of 3.16 times that 
of what had been seen previously, in conjunction with continued expenditure on battleships, 
were both economically and politically unsustainable, above all when combined with the 
concomitant rise in manning requirements, which in turn mandated increased expenditure on 
shore facilities. 
 
The Cabinet had been expressing increasing reservations for several years, and unsurprisingly 
the Treasury and Exchequer in particular were particularly concerned. In Confidential 
Memorandum to the Cabinet on the overall financial situation, Hicks Beech (Chancellor of 
the Exchequer 1895-1902) presented a gloomy outlook, the avowed purpose of which was 
‘an earnest appeal to my colleagues for economy in the preparation of their estimates for next 
year’s ordinary expenditure.’17 Unable to envisage a sufficient surplus to take off even 1d of 
the income tax in 1902/03, despite complaints about its retention at a high 14d level, Hicks 
Beech, taking the case of the Royal Navy first, pointed out that the Estimates had risen from 
18,700,000l in 1896/7, to 30,876,000l in the current financial year, and that he did not know 
of any reason why any further increases should be required. In his view, increases –mostly 
automatic– might be necessary in certain areas, but these  
 
…should be counterbalanced by savings under other heads, e.g., by the completion of 
the reserves of guns and ammunition, and the fall in the price of coal. The rate at 
which we have been increasing our expenditure on new construction and in the 
number of men, in our competition with France and Russia, might now, I think, be 
lessened with perfect safety.18 
 
Hicks Beech did not refer exclusively to the Navy however, expressing similar concerns over 
spending elsewhere, most notably on the Army and Civil Service which were also singled 
out. In concluding his paper, he accepted that the proposed economies would be both difficult 
and unpopular with some of his colleagues, and would doubtless excite the wrath of the Navy 
League, the ‘Service Members’ and the Daily Mail, but that in his opinion, ‘it would be far 
safer and better for our party in the end than continuing in course which leads straight to 
                                                     
16 Ibid Figures excluding armament and stores 
17 TNA CAB 37/58, 109 Sir M. Hicks Beech, Bt. (Chancellor of the Exchequer), Confidential paper to Cabinet 
on the financial situation & a call for economy in estimates, October 1901, p.2 
18 Ibid p.4 
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financial ruin.’19 If Hicks Beech hoped that he would be able to check the rising costs, he was 
to be severely disappointed by the First Lord of the Admiralty’s 21 page response of 16 
November in which, while accepting the need to control expenditure, he stressed the Navy 
also needed to be maintained at its required strength; something he could not do ‘if the 
growth of the Estimates is arrested abruptly or arbitrarily, or otherwise than in accord with a 
definite policy.’20 The country, Selborne continued, expected two things of the Navy 
 
Firstly, that it should be strong enough in Battle-ships with their accessories of 
Cruisers, Destroyers, Torpedo-boars, &c., to have the reasonable certainty of victory 
in any naval war which can be foreseen ; secondly, that it should be strong enough in 
Cruisers to give adequate protection to our mercantile marine in time of war.21 
 
Selborne largely laid the responsibility for the increased estimates at the doors of France and 
Russia, reiterating the claimed ‘purely defensive’ nature of the British fleet that had been 
voiced by Goschen in Parliament several years earlier, a view that was popularly received, if 
not entirely truthful. In a follow-up dated 7 December, he noted increases in both rival fleets 
to be larger than expected, although it was impossible to provide reliable figures.22 His 
original memorandum of 16 November placed considerable emphasis upon ‘the necessity of 
still further increasing the number of our armoured cruisers’ to cope with the rival 
programmes abroad.23 
 
Evidently not satisfied that he had carried his point, Selborne circulated a third memorandum 
among his Cabinet colleagues the following January, in which, in addition to the traditional 
French and Russian rivals, he made the further point that during the previous five years, 
‘three new navies have sprung into existence –those of the United States, Germany, and 
Japan.24 Selborne won the argument over the medium term, since his proposed ‘equality plus 
a margin’ with the combined fleets of France and Russia was finally considered in October of 
                                                     
19 Ibid pp.7-8 
20 TNA CAB 37/59, 118 First Lord of the Admiralty [Selborne] ‘The Navy Estimates and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer’s Memorandum on the Growth of Expenditure’ 16 November 1901, p.2 
21 Ibid 
22 TNA CAB 37/59, 127 First Lord, Confidential Memorandum on Navy Estimates 1902-1903, Comparative 
Statistics, p.1 After 1900, Russia did not provide the British Embassy with copies of their Naval 
Estimates, as they had in previous years 
23 Ibid p.14 
24 TNA CAB 37/56 ‘Confidential Memorandum on Ship-Building’ Op. Cit. pp.6-7 
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1902.25 In effect, it called for a three-power standard as against France, Russia and Germany, 
the latter of whom the First Lord acknowledged was a deliberate challenge to Britain.26 First-
class cruisers played a major part of these proposals, since the Board’s general strategic 
approach was 
 
…not to lay down any more second-class cruisers, but to build first-class armoured 
cruisers for commerce protection and fast third-class cruisers for scouting and station 
work, which will gradually take the place of the old type of second and third-class 
cruisers as the ships wear out.27 
 
The programme outlined called for ‘laying down three battleships and four armoured cruisers 
in each of the four fiscal years from 1903-04 to 1906-07, which Selborne projected would 
entail an initial increase in the navy estimate of from £2.5 million to £3 million, though he 
expressed the hope that there would be no further increases on the same scale within the 
period named.28 
 
On this basis, it was inevitable that the Estimates would (and did) continue to rise, but despite 
his defence of the service, even Selborne recognised that this trend could not continue 
indefinitely; quite apart from the expense in itself, political opposition was steadily mounting 
until by 1904, the First Lord was forced to begin accepting reductions.29 It was within this 
background that Sir John Fisher was appointed as First Sea Lord (the traditional Sea Lord 
title replacing Naval Lord) in October 1904, primarily owing to his promise of bringing 
reductions to the Estimates. 
 
 
Sir John Fisher, the changing strategic situation from 1900, and a new-model navy 
Possibly no single person in modern naval history engenders such controversy as Admiral Sir 
John Arbuthnot Fisher. Born 25 January 1841 to Sophie, wife of Captain William Fisher, 
A.D.C. to the Governor of Ceylon, he entered the Royal Navy aged 13 in 1854 on board 
HMS Victory, and within five years he had witnessed four naval battles, the first of which 
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was the successful bombardment of the fortress and arsenal complex of Sveaborg outside 
Helsinki 9-10 August 1855.30 As an example of naval power-projection, it almost certainly 
created a strong impression on the mind of the young Fisher, as would the three battles he 
took part in (having only witnessed the Sveaborg bombardment) when serving on the China 
Station during the Second Anglo-Chinese war.31 These latter would provide an additional 
lesson: that of the limitations of naval power, although arguably more importantly to his 
career, he served under one of the leading intellects of the contemporary service, Captain 
Charles Shadwell, FRS, who instilled in him an interest in science and technology which he 
would exploit to the full. Lacking the social connections to secure promotion as a matter of 
course (although he possessed an uncanny ability to charm those who could exert a positive 
influence upon his career), he followed the example of Admiral Astley Cooper Key in using 
his interest in and willingness to develop new technologies, particularly in gunnery and 
torpedoes, to further his ambitions and forge a career-path of his own.32 
 
By the time he reached the rank of Captain, it was evident that Fisher would attain high 
command, although by the late 1890s it was far from certain that he would become the 
professional head of the Navy. Fisher’s was an autocratic rather than authoritarian 
temperament.33 As a senior officer he was notoriously Machiavellian in his political and 
service manoeuvrings, vindictive, ruthless with ‘enemies’ (of which he had many), and he 
frequently appeared to contradict himself, although this latter was in part due to a propensity 
for carefully matching statements to people or situations, which did not necessarily reflect his 
real intentions.34 He was at this time a master of manipulating the press, having been 
indirectly involved with Stead’s ‘Truth about the Navy’ articles of 1884.35 He would largely 
continue this practice throughout his subsequent career, and most notably during his time in 
the Mediterranean, following the appointment of Walter Kerr as First Naval Lord.36 Fisher’s 
volcanic energy was legendary, and while no lover of conventional physical exercise, he was 
a gifted ballroom dancer. This appears to have been a genuine personal liking, although he 
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evidently was able to use it order to gain a degree of intimacy with powerful women whom 
he could turn into allies.  
 
As a result of his technical background and expertise, Fisher was often perceptive of 
developments in material, sometimes showing genuine imagination and flair in his 
assessments of their value (or otherwise) but it is also largely true to say that ‘in practical 
judgement and timing he was not reliable.’37 A deeply religious man, he also had a penchant 
for using Biblical texts in his communications, official or otherwise, ‘especially those having 
reference to Smiting, or Coming Swiftly from Behind, or the ruthless and remorseless 
dealings of Jahveh with his enemies, or the disagreeable things that happened to people who 
were not found Watching.’38 The shock-value of his prose and pronouncements, riddled with 
points of admiration, capitalisations, italicisations, use of varying fonts and colours remains 
high more than a century later. Not without reason did the future Lord Hankey, then a Captain 
of Marines, write home from the Mediterranean in September 1899 with an evident mixture 
of relish and trepidation that ‘the new Admiral –Fisher– has just joined the fleet; he is said to 
be a tremendous scoundrel.’39 
 
Having experienced it first-hand, Fisher loathed war, and it was this in addition to intellectual 
disposition that made him both a proponent and exponent of the strategy of deterrence. In this 
he was not alone: it had been, as previously indicated, the unwritten strategic doctrine of the 
service from at least the 1860s onward. From 1892-97 he had been Controller, and later 
commanded the North American and West Indies Station. He was recalled to be the British 
naval delegate to the First Hague Conference, a function which he executed with conspicuous 
success, not least due to the contrast between his ‘restrained diplomatic performance in the 
formal sessions of the conference, and his torrential and frequently lurid conversation during 
the intervals between them’.40 While at the Conference Fisher likely met Ivan Bloch, the 
Polish banker whose great six-volume study of modern industrial war would be published in 
English by Stead as Is War Now Impossible shortly after the Conference.41 How much of a 
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direct influence Bloch had upon Fisher, is, as Lambert notes, sadly unquantifiable, though 
Fisher was almost certainly exposed to his ideas.42 
 
Following the Hague Conference Fisher was appointed C-in-C Mediterranean Fleet, and it 
was in the Mediterranean that the majority of the ideas that he would later refine into Naval 
Necessities, his manifesto on the reformation of the service and the future maritime strategy 
of Britain, first found expression. Fisher’s time as C-in-C Mediterranean Fleet has passed into 
legend: fleet efficiency markedly improved in his tenure; he lectured widely and encouraged 
junior officers to express their own ideas. He returned to the Admiralty as Second Naval Lord 
1902-03 when his considerable (albeit highly erratic) genius helped drive training reforms.43 
Departing the Admiralty to become C-in-C Portsmouth Dockyard, he also sat with Lord 
Esher on the Committee for Imperial Defence. It was during this time that, with support from 
five naval officers he began to refine the ideas that he had initially conceptualised, derived or 
obtained during his time in the Mediterranean into the document (arguably the collection of 
documents) that would become Naval Necessities.44 Fisher was convinced he could reign in 
naval expenditure by means of radical reforms to dramatically increase efficiency, perfectly 
meeting First Lord Selborne’s requirements.45 Largely on the strength of his promise to cut 
the apparently spiralling cost of the service, Fisher became First Sea Lord, as the post was 
now redesignated, in October 1904, and the document, in revised form, was presented to 
Cabinet on 6 December.46 Despite its peculiar structure of intermingled reports and letters 
along with the inevitable lurid Old Testament quotations, it presented what amounted to a 
radical integrated strategic vision for the future service. The most immediate and materially 
dramatic step was an analysis of the Royal Navy’s entire fleet of vessels, which were assessed 
and categorised on the basis of their value as fighting ships. The basic principle / measure 
employed was that 
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Every vessel that has not high scouting speed, or the highest defensive and offensive 
powers, is useless for fighting purposes.47 
 
Those deemed unfit for such duties and were not required for use as depot or special service 
ships: the ‘goats’ (and some ‘llamas’) were to be sold off and broken up as a waste of 
resources and manpower.48 To this vast scrapping programme was added a complete revision 
of manning, with the establishing of nucleus crews (partly freed up from scrapped vessels) 
which would theoretically allow those vessels in reserve to be rapidly brought up to 
operational status. A dramatic reorganisation of fleets and squadrons was also proposed, 
which over the medium-long term were to go hand-in-hand with a major shift in vessel 
design. The ‘Scheme’ was an integrated programme that, it was insisted, needed to be 
executed in full to attain its laudable goals of improving service efficiency, fighting 
capability, and instant readiness for war.49 The view, luridly set out, was that 
 
…It will be obvious then that the whole of this business is a regular case of “the house 
that Jack built”, for one thing follows on another, they are all interlaced and 
interdependent! That’s why it was said to begin with:- 
The Scheme! The Whole Scheme!! 
And Nothing But The Scheme!!!50 
 
The purging of useless vessels from the service made sense from all perspectives, though 
Fisher did to an extent have an advantage of circumstance when it came to economies. While 
the estimates had increased dramatically over the previous decade, the years 1902/03 and 
1903/04 had seen additional short term increases (the purchase of the two Swiftsure class 
light-battleships from Chile and the need to address arrears in repairs) which accounted for a 
proportion of the apparent savings (or at least reductions in the estimates) immediately 
afterward.51 
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For all its drama, Naval Necessities and many of Fisher’s subsequent policy decisions have 
caused enormous debate because he rarely explained exactly what he was doing and why. 
Scrapping programmes and rearrangements of manning were visibly apparent enough, and 
some rationale behind them was stated, but of wider strategic matters little was directly set 
out in writing. While as Seligmann remarks Fisher, rarely a man to entertain doubts, will have 
been certain in his own mind, sharing his ideas was rarely part of his agenda.52 The 
overwhelming personality of the man however can overshadow certain facts, one of which 
being that there was precedent aplenty for his reticence at explaining his views on service 
strategy: Milne, Cooper-Key, Hood and even Richards had to varying extents declined from 
giving voice to, or even explicitly stating in writing, RN strategic doctrine. The reasons on 
occasion varied, although politics was usually a key factor.53 Fisher took it somewhat further 
in refraining from enlightening many in the service however, and in this respect at least, took 
‘secrecy’ too far. It has however provided naval historians with much to discuss and speculate 
over, and the debate over what Fisher was attempting to achieve is unlikely to ever fully abate 
given the lack of written evidence on the matter.  
 
At the turn of the century, the global maritime and imperial challenge posed by France and 
Russia was still regarded by the service as the principal threat to be countered, though the 
mounting naval capability of other nations, particularly Germany, was receiving increasing 
levels of attention, and as noted in previous chapters the RN was unconvinced the Franco-
Russian challenge was as serious a matter as is often believed. Both nations (particularly 
France) had caused the Admiralty some headaches on account of a vacillating strategic 
approach through much of the 1890s, mandating the twin-pronged construction of battleships 
and cruisers to counter the two threats posed.54 This worked both ways though: the lack of 
consistency in France had largely been the result of political tampering and the existence of 
rival factions in favour either of the guerre d’escadre or the guerre de course, which wreaked 
havoc on attempts to create a coherent force-structure and was widely believed to have 
destroyed the aims of the major construction programme of 1900.55 Nevertheless, commerce-
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raiding by various types of first-class cruiser was this point was seen as being at the heart of 
France’s naval requirements.56 
 
The establishing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance from 1901 helped counter the Russian naval 
challenge, such as it was, though this would not be completely negated until the end of the 
Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05, and therefore the effect upon wider RN strategy was 
relatively minor until this time, when it was possible to withdraw the battleships from the 
China Station, leaving a powerful cruiser squadron in its place.57 As such the signing of the 
Entente Cordiale in April 1904 reduced the chance of a conflict with France, or the 
possibility of extensive raiding of British commerce. The financial impossibility of Britain 
being able to maintain superiority over all possible naval challenges was a primary motive 
behind the desire to establish more cordial relations with a European power.58 Other political 
and economic factors aside, from a naval perspective, it was also rather more in British 
interests to reduce or eliminate the French challenge since her fleet was of greater potential 
threat to British trade than that of any other European power, having been largely developed 
for just that purpose. Moreover, despite the significant tensions that resulted from the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, which almost resulted in outright conflict following the North Sea Incident 
of late October 1904, since France was allied with Russia it was likely in the medium term 
that a similar understanding with that nation would ultimately result. In the event, the hoped-
for annihilation of the Russian fleets in the Russo-Japanese war almost eradicated any 
potential challenge from that quarter for the immediate future, and provided considerable 
impetus for the Anglo-Russian Entente of August 1907. 
 
The naval challenge from Germany was of a somewhat different nature. In 1894, the 
Oberkommando of the German Navy issued a memorandum written mostly by Alfred Tirpitz  
on the importance of sea power, in which an emphasis was laid upon a Mahanian battlefleet 
approach, and a general strategy in line with the guerre d’ escadre.59 This document in 
essence formalised views Tirpitz had previously expressed; the recommendations were not 
immediately furthered, but the strategic purpose of the fleet that would later be built up can 
be traced to this document. Germany passed its first Naval Law in 1898, aiming to establish a 
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fleet of nineteen first-class battleships (along with twelve large cruisers and miscellaneous 
smaller craft) and coerce Britain into an entente against her traditional French and Russian 
rivals.60 The Second Naval Law of 1900 was more serious from the Royal Navy’s 
perspective. Tirpitz took advantage of the Second Boar War to bring in a comprehensive 
programme which was to double the number of battleships to 38, increase the number of 
large cruisers to 14, and ensure 34 small cruisers and 96 destroyers.61 Professions of the 
expansion being a purely defensive measure were rather negated by the publication of a 
memorandum attached to the Law, in which Tirpitz’s ‘risk strategy’ was expounded. The fleet 
was to be large enough 
 
…that even “the strongest naval power” could not fight it without seriously 
weakening its own naval power and leaving it helpless against a coalition of other 
naval powers (i.e. France and Russia)… the German battle fleet did not have to be so 
strong as that of the greatest naval power, because the latter would not, as a rule, be 
able to concentrate all its naval forces against Germany. The cold calculation behind 
this doctrine was that England, rather than risk a clash would a powerful concentrated 
German fleet, would prefer to make concessions to Germany in the colonial field.62 
 
As Marder points out, the major flaw in the reasoning was that Britain would always be on 
bad terms with France and Russia, or would accept the challenge without any response, 
whether in kind or through other means. The outlook delineated in Naval Necessities however 
was far broader in conception than a response to the challenge of a single nation, and the 
concentration of battleships in European waters was more a reflection of the altered strategic 
situation and the concomitant reduced need to maintain battle-squadrons on throughout the 
world than a response purely to the increased threat posed by the German naval build-up. The 
German challenge would become increasingly significant over time, and the Admiralty’s 
strategic policy would increasingly be turned in this direction over time.63 However, Fisher 
was well aware of the global scale and requirements of the British Empire, and the service 
could not simply divert all its attention to a single possible opponent. Equally, it seems that he 
believed that recent technological developments, particularly that of the torpedo and torpedo-
craft were undermining the utility of the battleship itself. Nicolas Lambert has in recent years 
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popularised the view that Fisher adopted a strategy of ‘flotilla defence’ whereby the British 
homeland, major colonial stations and ‘narrow seas’ were defended by integrated fleets of the 
latest torpedo-craft, while blue-water operations were conducted by squadrons of fast 
armoured cruisers.64 Whether one accepts the ‘flotilla defence’ thesis or not though, it is fair 
to point out that the battleship’s status as the pre-eminent capital ship was under threat:  
 
Now battleships could be sunk by torpedo craft, surface and sub-surface. What was 
the use of the battleship therefore, he asked. The answer was clear: ‘none… if 
battleships have no function that first class cruisers cannot fulfil they are useless to the 
enemy and do not need to be bought’.65 
 
Although the latter point was radically stated, the threat to the battleship was not an unknown 
concept to the RN. Exercises on torpedo-craft offense and countermeasures had taken a 
significant place in the majority of the annual Manoeuvres of the 1890s, while as shown, 
first-class cruisers had been playing prominent roles in many of these since 1893 as part of 
fleets, while the ‘flying squadron’ principal for reinforcing threatened locations was far from 
being a new strategy. An operational example had recently occurred, when the First Cruiser 
Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Percy Scott was detached in 1908 first to South Africa, and 
later to South America to help promote British interests.66 Equally, as illustrated, existing 
first-class cruisers had the ability to fight battleships, and some had even been designed with 
such duties in mind. Initially however, following Fisher’s instalment as First Sea Lord, the 
Navy would henceforth comprise three main commands in European waters: 
 
The eight battleships of the Channel Squadron would become the Atlantic Fleet, based 
at Gibraltar. The Home Fleet would become the Channel Fleet, reinforced by four 
battleships from the Mediterranean to 12 units. The Mediterranean Fleet would have 
eight units; the China Fleet would retain five battleships until the outcome of the 
Russo-Japanese war became clearer (Fisher wanted to bring them home). Each 
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European Fleet would have attached ‘flying squadrons’ of armoured cruisers ‘ready to 
go anywhere’ as required.67 
 
Blockade however, appears to have been the dominant thesis of Admiralty war planning at 
this time. In December 1903, an NID report ‘advocated a “watch” on France’s Atlantic and 
Channel bases as the most effective means to destroy the French fleet by preventing the 
junction of its various squadrons’ –providing the blockading force did not attempt to get too 
close, it was believed small-craft would not hamper their effectiveness.68 These were 
gradually adapted over time, the 1901 Manoeuvres assessing advance base concepts for 
blockading forces, and these would continue in modified form as the strategic environment 
changed and the threat of the dual-alliance was replaced by the rise of the German naval 
challenge.69 This continued to operate with the policy of focal-area defence for trade-
protection outside the European theatre. Confirmation occurred at a meeting at the Admiralty 
on 30 April 1905, which reviewed the history of trade protection back to an 1874 paper by 
Milne.70 The meeting was nominally convened to ‘reconsider the whole question’ of trade 
defence, and examined the three general possibilities of convoy, patrolling trade-routes, and 
focal area defence. Convoy was once again dismissed, and of the other two options, 
stationing cruisers at focal-points was favoured for the following reasons: 
 
1. Fewer cruisers required 
2. Less coal consumed, wear & tear on machinery & boilers, ergo more ready for action 
at any given moment 
3. May take advantage of moderate weather to keep filled up with coal & stores 
4. Can be more readily found when concentration of force is required 
5. Merchant vessels when passing may keep cruiser[s] constantly informed about what is 
going on 
6. Commander of local squadron on hearing news of an attack may despatch an 
appropriate force to deal with enemy & reinforcements in known location. 
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7. Merchant vessels know where to head if threatened & will lead enemy to our cruisers 
8. Cruiser squadrons, speed at station & at right angles to trade-routes will see more 
vessels they are protecting that in patrolling the routes up & down 
9. Cruiser[s] stationed in squadrons at certain points on trade-routes will form useful 
intelligence bases where information may be collected and from which merchant 
vessels may obtain directions as to the safest routes to follow.71 
 
It was further suggested that neutral waters might not offer as much protection as many 
expected, particularly since the waters of a weak power may be, and often would be violated 
with impunity. Trade, it was proposed, should be limited to specific ‘war-routes’, which it 
was believed would allow commerce to be defended more effectively, and should be seen as 
‘a huge bait to bring enemy cruisers out of port.’72 The outright stating that trade was ‘bait’ to 
draw enemy commerce raiders to their destruction is interesting in itself, although it was 
largely inherent to the focal-defence system. Also present at the meeting was Captain Edward 
Inglefield, who had in 1901 been tasked to expand on the details of the most recent trade-
protection plans; later permanently attached to the NID he had been scouring London for 
wider information on the global trading system, and this has some interesting wider 
connotations.73 Recently, Lambert has argued that as the decade wore on, Fisher’s Admiralty 
would increasingly move toward a strategy of economic warfare, away from the ‘traditional’ 
concepts of blockade. This ‘was predicated upon the twin expectations that the outbreak of 
hostilities would trigger a countdown toward economic and social Armageddon and that 
Britain could manage the descent into the abyss.’74 In effect, it was the British equivalent of 
the German Schlieffen Plan, designed to exploit British dominance over the international 
cable communications networks, shipping, trade-routes, port facilities and key economic 
centres. The strategy Lambert describes was to turn the tables on those who had argued 
British dominance was a weakness that could be attacked via the guerre industrielle, and 
actively exploit it to utterly destroy an opponent’s (specifically, Germany’s) economy in a 
very short space of time, while Britain could remain relatively unscathed. Economic warfare 
itself, like flotilla defence in the Royal Navy, was never fully implemented, but aspects 
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almost certainly fed into the more conventional ‘blockade’ strategy.75 Certainly Inglefield’s 
knowledge of global trading will have made him a valuable presence at the meeting to 
discuss commerce-defence plans (quite apart from his more conventional service experience) 
and lent some wider perspective to proceedings.  
 
The constitution of the fleets in European waters varied somewhat over time as the strategic 
position altered. As of 1904-05, Germany had been just one of multiple naval rivals that 
needed to be considered by the Admiralty (and not necessarily the most significant). With the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance in place and the signing of the Entente Cordiale in 1904 however, 
Britain effectively changed the whole strategic calculus of defence policy.76 France was now 
an ally, while Russian naval strength had been wiped out by the Japanese, leaving only 
Germany as a challenger to British maritime dominance. Possibly as a reflection of this, and 
to head-off demands for cuts to the 1907/08 construction programme, Fisher began to reduce 
the number of commissioned vessels from the main fleets with the stated object of placing 
them in reserve; a policy that was widely seen as a public relations disaster for the Admiralty. 
The First Sea Lord apparently attempted to nullify the storm of criticism that arose from the 
more jingoistic press and fleet commanders by announcing the withdrawn vessels (including 
several of the latest and most formidable types, along with a huge number of torpedo-craft) 
would form the core of a new ‘Home Fleet’ –itself causing even greater protests. However, 
there are indications that this was one of Fisher’s more Machiavellian moves, and was what 
he had intended to do before ever he became First Sea Lord.77 
 
Alternative explanations to Lambert’s exist; Grove has suggested that given its composition 
and when considered in light of the First Sea Lord’s general strategic thinking, it was the 
embodiment of Fisher’s new-model strategic-reserve intended for a global reinforcing role.78 
Recent research by Buckley however, has suggested that with its vast number of torpedo-craft 
plus the Fifth Cruiser Squadron, with the latest armoured cruisers and the first all big gun 
capital ships, it was indeed the force intended to contain Germany in the North Sea.79 If so, 
this reinforces the view that Fisher saw the fast cruiser type armoured ship as his preferred 
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weapon to exploit the 'weather gauge' of high speed against a slower foe (see below). The 
German battleships were no more heavily armed than the later British armoured cruisers and 
would have been at a severe disadvantage against them, especially given the increasing 
availability of the latest big-gun ships.  
 
An addition to the German battlefleet strategy that has lately received considerable attention 
from Seligmann was the possible threat of their renowned high-speed ocean-liners being 
converted into AMCs for use as commerce-raiders.80 This was not a new threat in itself: as 
indicated in Chapter Two the possible use of converted fast liners had been considered by the 
Admiralty since the mid-1880s, and was one that was taken seriously. The possibility 
dwindled in the 1890s as France and Russia developed dedicated naval commerce-raiders, 
but with the new German liners vying for the Blue Riband, and the gradual rise of the naval 
challenge from that quarter, around the turn of the century it was taken increasingly seriously 
once more. Seligmann contends ‘fear of German commerce raiding was both an original core 
issue and an enduring problem that kept Germany at the forefront of the Admiralty’s 
attention.’81 Given the strategic disadvantages Germany laboured under in terms of facilities 
in the homeland and abroad this may be overstated, but the central case that the Admiralty 
was aware of a possible threat is well made and supported, and certainly, the liners had a high 
sustained sea-speed that even a Drake  could not match.82 These may well have had 
considerable influence upon Fisher’s strategic views, and the Invincibles developed largely in 
response –a matter considered below. Ultimately, his intentions were those of a visionary and 
technocrat, heavily exploiting new material in an attempt to create a more efficient, battle-
worthy service better suited to the strategic climate of the day. The first-class cruiser was, and 
would remain a major component in Fisher’s outlook. Before considering how he wished to 
develop it however, it is necessary to examine the status of the type in the first years of the 
Twentieth Century, prior to his appointment as First Sea Lord. 
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A return to larger dimensions 
Well before Fisher became First Sea Lord, and even during the early development stages of 
the Devonshire class, sketches had been prepared for larger vessels with greater outright 
fighting capability; a reversion to the full-sized first-class vessel exemplified by the Drakes.83 
Although unquestionably well designed and powerful vessels for their displacement, 
particularly when modified during their construction to add two further 7.5in gunhouses in 
place of the forward double-deck casemates, the Devonshires also represented an at best 
uneasy compromise between fighting capacity and dimensions. The introduction of the new 
7.5in gun was welcome in light of the gradually improving armour of foreign commerce-
raiding types, which was gradually reducing the utility of the 6in rapid-firing breech-loader as 
a primary armament, but the Devonshires possessed insufficient numbers of either the 7.5in 
or the 6in to achieve a good offensive balance, and the type was little more capable of fleet 
operations than the Monmouths. The latest French armoured cruisers had reverted back to the 
size of the Jeanne d’Arc (and also finally received KC armour), and with the Board also 
increasingly considering the first-class cruiser for the fleet-role as a fast division, a return to 
larger dimensions was necessary.  
 
The 1901 Manoeuvers had like several previous exercises exploited the heavy-scouting role 
of the vessels, and  this tendency would increase over the following five years, while the 
Royal Naval College and NID produced numerous memoranda on the subject. In 1902, 
Lieutenant Tristan Dannreuther at the NID produced a paper on ‘The Tactical Organisation of 
a Large Fleet’ with a number of combat scenarios played out, and in which the van squadron 
was assumed to have / require at least a 3-knot speed advantage over the other vessels.84 
Realistically speaking when it came to existing types this meant the Cressys and Drakes, 
while the use of them as a fast-wing was also hinted at with comments on the use of Lord 
Howe’s frigates and the vital role their concentration of fire on the rear of an enemy line 
played –a remark with a distinct resemblance to the views contained in Samuel Long’s 1892 
INA paper.85  
 
A counterpoint was provided by Captain H. J. May when the Senior Officers’ War Course at 
Greenwich Naval College were instructed to carry out a series of investigations into the 
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matter.86 The rival ships employed for the purposes of the report were referred to as ‘A’ and 
‘B’ but were respectively based upon the Connecticut class battleship and Tennessee class 
armoured cruiser of the United States Navy.87 Presumably the staff at the Naval College felt 
these would make a good comparative basis since their characteristics were known and they 
were also the largest of such types in foreign service. Just as importantly, since the Royal 
Navy was unlikely to fight itself (other than in terms of internal politics), there was little 
purpose in using its own vessels as the yardstick. The report itself was quite comprehensive, 
noting the value of the faster though more lightly armed ‘B’ against a Royal Sovereign class 
battleship of the Naval Defence Act, but concluding that the slower, more heavily armed and 
protected ‘A’ would be preferable if opposing a battleship of more recent design, and was 
generally superior if both sides wished for a decisive battle: 
 
…for fighting in a fleet, the B ships are much inferior to the A’s. Their speed may be 
of the greatest moment strategically, but it is well nigh [sic.] a negligible quantity 
tactically.88 
 
May’s paper is often referred to, but care is needed in drawing too many conclusions from it 
given the assumptions it was based upon: that both sides were equally well-handled and 
equipped, wished for ‘decisive battle’, and that they would be comprised exclusively of one 
type or the other. Under different conditions, where such rigid assumptions were unlikely to 
occur, a rather different set of conclusions arose, as May himself would point out. The first 
war game of 1903 at the Royal Naval College again under May tended to underline the 
importance of the armoured cruiser ‘especially to that power which is specially strong or 
specially weak at sea.’89 A variety of ways in which the types could be used were assessed 
during the exercises held that year, the first of these seeing them employed as part of the 
battle-line on one side, and prolonging the line itself (slightly astern) on the other.90 A further 
exercise saw them specifically employed by ‘B’ fleet, which had an inferiority to the rival ‘A’ 
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fleet in battleships, ‘to make use of their speed, and engage the nearest end of the enemy’s 
battle line’, their usual station being a mile on the outer quarter of either wing of the main 
battle squadron.91 This was deemed to be practical, May remarking that  
 
a very large proportion of “B’s” fighting strength lay in the armoured cruisers which 
provided much more than half the heavy projectiles that could be fired each minuet, 
and also nearly two-thirds of the protected QF fire. Therefore it was absolutely 
essential for “B’s” success that the armoured cruisers should be kept close up in 
support of “B” battleships.92  
 
On the first attempt this did not work out, largely due to the ‘B’ fleet armoured cruisers being 
separated from the main battle-squadron by around two miles at the commencement of the 
action; a second set of exercises that day following the same criteria saw this mostly reversed 
as the cruisers kept closer company, but underlined how vital co-operation between the 
slower and faster divisions was.93 
 
Sir William White had retired from his post as DNC in December 1901, his last official day 
in office being Friday, January 31 1902.94 Succeeding him was Philip Watts, returning to the 
Admiralty from his position of general manager and naval architect to Armstrong Whitworth 
& Co., at Elswick. Watts is a rather more elusive figure than his predecessor. A year younger 
than White, he was born in Portsmouth in 1846, his father being a principal constructive 
officer in the Royal Dockyard. Apprenticing as a shipwright from 1860, he was selected for 
the Royal School of Naval Architecture in South Kensington in 1866. Prior to leaving for 
Elswick, he worked on calculating vessel dimensions, and with Froude at the latter’s test tank 
facility, as well as holding a post as Assistant Constructor at Pembroke.95 The relationship 
between White and Watts appears to have been circumspect, in which there was respect but 
occasional mild clashes. During the discussion on Watts’s 1899 paper on Elswick Cruisers at 
the Institution of Naval Architects, White, needled at being patronised on somewhat 
questionable grounds and evidently wishing to remind those present of the wider history, 
remarked ‘my friend and successor at Elswick (Mr. Watts), whose appointment I had the 
                                                     
91 Ibid p.33 
92 Ibid p.38 
93 Ibid 
94 F. Manning The Life of Sir William White (London: J. Murray, 1923) p.444 
95 For a more extensive background on Watts, see the Obituary in TransINA Volume LXX (1928) 
 248 
 
pleasure to arrange before I returned to the Admiralty, has more than justified in his 
subsequent career the high hopes I had of his future.’96 Despite their being just a year between 
them, it is evident that White still regarded himself as the master and Watts his talented 
junior.  
 
The two Duke of Edinburgh class cruisers provided under the 1902/03 programme (with four 
more slated for 1903/04) saw dimensions jump back to 13,550 tons load displacement, up 
from the 10,850 load displacement of the Devonshires.97 The deck-plan and side-elevation of 
the type is shown in Figure 5.3. The first vessels for which Watts was responsible designer 
after being appointed DNC, W. H. Whiting was in charge of the design, which was loosely 
derived from the studies for more heavily armed Devonshires.98 505ft 6in between extremities 
(a nominal 480ft) their design trials speed was the same 23 knots as the Drake and Monmouth 
classes, 20 Babcock and 6 cylindrical boilers feeding a pair of 4 cylinder TE engines for 
23,500 I.H.P. with the usual two shafts.99 The class were amongst the first cruisers to be fitted 
with oil sprays in the furnaces to increase the combustion and raise power, although the 
smoke cloud was then sardonically likened ‘to that produced by the best Japanese steam 
coal.’100 The double-bottom under the boiler and engine-rooms was utilised for carrying 
this.101 With a maximum coal capacity of just over 2,000 tons, radius of action was 
approximately 8,000 miles at 10 knots.102 
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Figure 5.3: Duke of Edinburgh class cruiser deck-plan and side-elevation 
 
Source: Viscount Hythe [ed.] The Naval Annual, 1912 (Portsmouth: J. Griffin & Co., 1912) 
Plate 11 
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With fewer restrictions on the budget, armament was increased, reflecting both the increased 
levels of protection in foreign cruisers, and the intended fleet capability of the new type. Six 
9.2in Mk X were employed in single turrets, with chase weapons fore and aft, and wing 
turrets abreast the fore and mainmasts giving a 4-gun broadside. The beam turrets were 
intended to provide axial fire, but due to excessive blast effects, their training arcs were 
limited in practice to 30 degrees of the fore and aft line.103 Five of the new rapid-firing 50 
calibre Mk XI 6in were employed on each broadside in central main-deck batteries rather 
than the casemates that had previously been employed.104 In comparison to the previous 45 
calibre 6in BL Mk VII it was slightly heavier at just over 8 tons, had a 35lb charge as 
opposed to the 23lb charge of the earlier weapon, and muzzle velocity was raised 
significantly up to 3060 ft./sec. from 2535 ft./sec.105  The Dukes were the last class of British 
cruiser that adhered to the Admiralty’s policy of providing a secondary armament identical 
with that adopted with first-class battleships of the same date.106  
 
Protection in the class was provided by a 6in thick KC belt extending over 260ft amidships, 
from 4ft 10in below the waterline to just below the main deck. The ends were closed with 6in 
bulkheads, and the belt was extended with 4in armour to the bows, and 2in aft to the stern. 
The belt armour was effectively extended vertically to the top of the maindeck level by the 
6in battery armour. Deck protection was a 1in main deck reduced to ¾in under the battery 
where the armour bulkheads provided additional stiffening, and a ¾in lower splinter deck that 
increased to 1 ½in over the steering gear. The CT had 10in armour, and the turrets 7 ½in 
faces, 5 ½in sides and 4 ½in backs.107 
 
Even before the second of the two vessels (Black Prince) was laid down, significant concerns 
were raised over the proximity of the main-deck 6in battery to the water. Selborne himself 
wrote to the Controller on this point, remarking that he was  
 
…somewhat disturbed in respect of some of the 6 inch guns of the “Duke of 
Edinburgh” class of Cruiser. Will not their gun-ports be even nearer the water than are 
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the main deck gun-ports of the “Drake” class; and if this is so, is not that an error we 
should not be justified in repeating? When we were considering the designs we had 
not the experience of the “Drake” class before us. Now we know that the 6 inch guns 
on the main deck of that class could hardly be fought at all except in a dead calm.108 
 
Watts responded to the First Lord’s query with a memorandum to the Controller on 8 June. It 
was stated that alternative arrangements had been discussed by the Board before the main-
deck battery was selected, including one where eight 6in weapons would be provided in four 
twin turrets on the upper deck, two on each side.109 Watts stated this would entail a reduction 
in side armour to just the belt below the main deck, with barbette protection being provided 
for the bases of the turrets, that this would result in a displacement increase of 150 tons, entail 
an entirely new design, and as a result it would probably not be possible to call for tenders 
before October that year.110  
 
The box-battery configuration had been selected by the Controller because it theoretically 
allowed some ahead and astern fire, which would not have been possible with upper-deck 
gunhouses, since they would be blocked by the wing 9.2in turrets.111 Watts attempted to 
support May, acknowledging that the main-deck battery was lower to the water than in the 
Drakes –a consequence of a desire to keep the upper deck armament of 9.2in guns ‘as low as 
practicable’, stating the forward 6in guns would be better off in moderate weather owing to 
their being positioned further toward the centre of the ship.112 Evidently the dissatisfaction 
with the Duke of Edinburgh’s low-mounted maindeck 6in battery continued throughout the 
year before either of the vessels had even been launched. On 12 December, Whiting 
circulated a memorandum which further discussed the idea of altering the design to replace 
the battery with eight 6in in four twin turrets on the upper deck between the wing 9.2in guns, 
but laying greater emphasis upon a more recent suggestion: 
 
If, as now suggested, an upper deck armament of 7.5” guns be preferred, then 4 of 
these guns can be carried in separate turrets in lieu of the 10-6in main deck guns. 
There will be a small increase of weight (100 to 150 tons) and a small decrease in 
                                                     
108 NMM Duke of Edinburgh class ship cover. S.17442-03, Selborne to Controller, 28 May 1903 
109 NMM Duke of Edinburgh class ship cover. S.17442-03, Watts to Controller 8 June 1903 
110 Ibid 
111 Friedman British Cruisers of the Victorian Era p.260 
112 NMM Duke of Edinburgh class ship cover. S.17442-03, Watts to Controller 8 June 1903 
 252 
 
metacentric height (probably about 3 inches), both of which might be accepted if the 
suggested change of armament be considered desirable and of importance.113 
 
Two months later, Watts reported that experience with recently completed Monmouths 
indicated that the Duke of Edinburghs would complete with a hull weight some 200 tons less 
than that calculated in the legend, and the use of Yarrow boilers in the four vessels of the 
class that were to be constructed as part of the 1903/04 programme would result in a further 
saving of some 85 tons.114 With additional expected minor weight-savings in armour, 
approximately 300 tons of weight would be available for modifications to the armament of 
the last four vessels of the class, which would provide for fitting four 7.5in guns in upper-
deck gun-houses in place of the 6in box-battery, while still retaining the armour of the latter 
to improve protection.115 On 30 March 1904, in a meeting with Naval Lords, Admiral Fawkes 
(C-in-C Cruiser Squadron), Captains Jellicoe, Camble and Madden, it was stated that the 
captains of the Cruiser Squadron were unanimous in their view that the 6in battery would be 
unworkable in any seaway and that  four 7.5in guns in upper deck gunhouses would be 
preferred for the four new cruisers on these grounds, and because they offered superior 
control at longer ranges; this was confirmed in a meeting with the First Lord directly 
afterward, and the design was modified to reflect these changes in the four vessels of the 
1903/04 programme, now officially named Warrior, Achilles, Cochrane and Natal, the  four 
7.5in being the new 50 calibre Mk II pattern.116  
 
Practical confirmation of the limits of the 6in box-battery occurred in the 1906 Manoeuvres. 
On 29th June, the brand-new HMS Black Prince was operating as part of the Blue 2nd Cruiser 
Squadron, engaged in a guerre de course. Ordered to keep away to starboard and rendezvous 
with the rest of her squadron 60 miles north of Cape Villano (Spain), she sighted the Red 3rd 
Cruiser Squadron, including the Drake class Leviathan at 5.48pm. Black Prince deemed it 
advisable to draw them off to the east, inform the location and course of the enemy vessels to 
the Flag of her own squadron, and fight Leviathan ‘on the principle that Black Prince’s four 
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9.2-in., guns which could bear, more than equalled the two 9.2-in. guns and 6-in. guns which 
the former could bring to bear on her. 
 
‘During the engagement, which took place at a speed of 22 knots on both sides, the 
Third Cruiser Squadron had the wind, which was N.E., fresh, with considerable sea 
abeam or slightly abaft the port beam, thus enabling the lee batteries to be engaged. 
On the other hand the “Black Prince,” steaming at this great speed with the wind and 
sea on her port bow, was in a very bad position for fighting her port guns, as green 
seas were sweeping her fore and aft. The “Black Prince’s” guns, although reported 
cleared away, and after a quarter of an hour’s engagement at ranges from 
“Leviathan”  - - 8,000 to 4,000 yds 
“Carnarvon” - - 7,000 to 4,000 “ 
“Lancaster” - - 8,100 to 4,000 “ 
“Suffolk” - - 9,000 to 3,800 “ 
at 6 p.m. the “Black Prince” was put out of action and ordered home, and it was 
decided by the chief umpire at the close of the Manoeuvres that, as her guns had not 
been trained, “Leviathan” had suffered no damage.117 
 
The extra length of the 50 calibre Mk XI gun exacerbated this problem relative to the earlier 
vessels and in March 1916 both vessels were drastically modified, the main-deck battery 
being closed up and six of the 6in fitted to the main deck with shield protection.118 
 
Sometimes treated separately as the Warrior class, the four vessels of the 1903/04 programme 
were, other than the modifications to the armament and upper deck layout, largely a repeat of 
the previous ships, the only other major difference being the use of Yarrow water-tube 
boilers, which were both lighter and physically simpler than many other water-tube types. 
The deck-plan and side elevation of the type is shown in Figure 5.4. Figure 5.5 shows a cross 
section of the Yarrow boiler, indicating its straight tubes, which greatly facilitated ease of 
maintenance. The battery armour in the Warriors was retained per Watts’s suggestion to 
protect the bases of the 7.5in barbettes, and as in the previous two vessels, usefully extending 
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the side-protection vertically to the top of the main deck.119 Maximum coal bunkerage was 
100 tons less than their half-sisters.  
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Figure 5.4: Warrior class cruiser deck-plan and side-elevation 
 
Source: Viscount Hythe [ed.] The Naval Annual, 1912 (Portsmouth: J. Griffin & Co., 1912) 
Plate 10 
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Figure 5.5: Yarrow Water-tube type warship boiler 
 
Source: L. S. Robertson [trans. & ed.] Marine Boilers: Their construction and working 
dealing more especially with tubulous boilers. Based on the work by L. E. Bertin (New York: 
D. Van Nostrand Co., 1906) p.470 
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A problem found was excessive temperatures around the boiler rooms, and there was some 
concern over how this would affect the cordite stowage lockers in the ammunition passages 
that ran beside the boiler rooms.120 It was also discovered that the temperature in the after 
7.5in and 9.2in magazines, which were located near the stoke-holds, was too high, and extra 
cooling was required. This was a significant flaw, which had not occurred in previous vessels, 
when White had refused outright to entertain proposals ‘to place magazines and shell rooms 
in situations where the explosives stored in them would be exposed to the deteriorating 
influences resulting from high temperatures.’121 In general, the surviving plans held by the 
National Maritime Museum appear to bear out White’s remarks; a report on magazine 
temperatures in the Good Hope and Leviathan (Drake class) stated that ‘the magazine 
temperatures were practically unaffected by variations in open air temperature, or by long and 
hard steaming’, the highest temperature recorded being 69 degrees Fahrenheit, despite a 30 
hour full-power trial.122  
 
 The issue of magazine temperatures was partially addressed with considerable extra 
refrigeration equipment, but the lockers were impossible to cool, and after lengthy discussion 
in which the possibility of removing the lockers was seriously contemplated, it was decided 
that they should be employed for temporary stowage only, to reduce the deterioration of the 
cordite.123 It is significant to note that HMS Natal of the class was lost 30 December 1915 in 
Cromarty Firth through after-magazine explosion. A considerable amount of data on the loss 
of the vessel is available, revealing she had on board a quantity of ‘First Use’ charges for her 
9.2in and 7.5in guns which had not been used up, nor landed for the purposes of testing the 
state of the cordite degradation as should have been the case.124 Some of these were very 
elderly, notably lots B.177 and C.499, manufactured in October 1904.125 As revealed in the 
evidence given to the Court Martial of the survivors, the frequent changes of Gunner 
appointed to Natal almost certainly contributed to these omissions.126 Nevertheless, the 
somewhat mediocre magazine arrangements of the class will not have helped matters.  
 
                                                     
120 NMM Duke of Edinburgh class ship cover C.N. 121470/06 Jellicoe (DNO) to Controller 5 February 1907 
121 Sir W. White ‘On the Maximum Dimensions of Ships’ Transactions of the Society of Naval Architects and 
Marine Engineers Volume XIX (1911) pp.34-35 
122 NMM Drake class cover Handwritten report W. E. Smith ‘“Leviathan” magazine temperatures’ 22 May 1902 
123 NMM Warrior class ship cover, Captain R. Bacon for D.N.O. 16 August 1907 
124 ADM 178/123 G01418 1916 Confidential. Report on the loss of H.M.S. “Natal” at Cromarty on 30th 
December 1915 p.533 
125 Ibid Also noted in a letter from Jellicoe to the Admiralty, dated Iron Duke, 4 January 1916  
126 Ibid p.536 para.45 
 258 
 
With the design of the Duke of Edinburgh class modified to general satisfaction, by late 
summer of 1903 attention was turning to the first-class cruisers for the 1904/05 Programme. 
Like the previous classes, these were very much intended as fleet vessels, capable of acting as 
heavy-scouts and a supporting wing for the battlefleet, as well as being able to perform the 
detached duties expected of a cruiser. On 5 August, the Controller informed Watts that a new 
design of armoured cruiser would be required for the following year’s Estimates, and that he 
wished for some sketch designs for the information of the Board, and to assist them in 
coming to a decision.127 The designs were desired for 1 December, latest, and key features 
desired were given thus: 
 
The new design should have all the guns of the Main and Secondary armament in 
Turrets with a good command so that they could be fought in a seaway. 
I should like you to consider for armament a combination of (1) 9.2” & 7.5” guns; (2) 
9.2” and 6” guns; (3) All 7.5in guns. All to be of the most recent type. 
The defence to be practically the same as “DUKE OF EDINBURGH” and if possible 
7” or 8” on the waterline amidships. 
The speed 23 knots for 8 hours 
The draught, mean, not more than 25 ½ feet, other conditions similar to Duke of 
Edinburgh. 
The cost is not to exceed the Duke of Edinburgh and it would be a great advantage if 
this was reduced.128 
 
Eleven designs were submitted for consideration by the Board exhibiting various 
combinations of the armaments specified, all in turrets with a good command that could be 
fought in a seaway. The DNO (MacLeod), reviewing the sketch designs, expressed concern 
over guns being crowded, and spaced too close together, further stating that he did not wish 
to see the 6in gun to be included in any design, nor the 7.5in (however numerous) made the 
heaviest weapon  
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…in view of the role quite likely to be allotted to these high speed, well protected 
vessels. They may very possibly be subjected to battleship fire in the exigencies of 
action and would then find the want of more effective belt piercing ordnance. 
Upon these conditions I favour the two 9.2” pairs and balance in 7.5” pair guns… but 
I would prefer to see two 10” pairs and balance in 7.5” pairs.129 
 
The DNO’s preference for the 10in gun seems to have primarily been a response to the US 
Tennessee class, which carried four weapons of this calibre, although the 10in calibre was 
widely discussed at the time, and was already in use in the Royal Navy, in the Centurion and 
Renown class battleships.130 MacLeod was presumably also influenced by the fact that the 
Royal Navy had a week earlier acquired the two Swiftsure class battleships that had been 
building for Chile, which were also so-equipped. The extra size would have improved 
outright penetration capabilities, but was not seen to have a significant enough advantage to 
be worth replacing the 9.2in. It seems that the cost of the vessels, at well over a million 
apiece came as enough of a surprise that cheaper designs were requested from the DNC, with 
the 7.5in weapons in a box battery or casemates to avoid the expensive barbettes and 
gunhouses, and (theoretically) allow a smaller ship.131 This proposal did not gain much 
traction however, and it was decided that  
 
…the money ought not to stand in the way of having a good design of Armoured 
Cruiser, and they [the Naval Lords] preferred to have a really good ship and to spend 
more money on it, and to reduce the number of ships so that the money spent on new 
construction should not be exceeded as a whole –in fact, they preferred quality to 
quantity, and this was considered especially to be the case as these ships will not be 
built for three years, and vessels now designed should be with the object that they 
shall be up to date 10 years hence.132 
 
With the 9.2in gun as a major feature of the new cruiser’s armament, it was further stated 
outright that under certain circumstances, the new type could take their place in line of 
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battle.133 This had been practiced to sporadic success in the 1903 exercises, while those of the 
following year were somewhat curtailed in the early stages due to poor weather conditions, 
though a cruiser action was fought to little useful effect as the stronger force did not press the 
action.134  
 
The Manoeuvres of 1906 however were much more revealing. These were amongst the 
largest-scale of all the annual Manoeuvres, and were largely done with an eye toward 
Germany, and how best to establish a blockade.135 For that year, ‘in order to make a study of 
two important problems of naval strategy’ they were divided into two distinct periods of 
assumed hostility, separated by a week.136  The first dealt with testing arrangements to counter 
a surprise attack on the Home Fleet and Channel ports, the second with arrangements for 
defending trade against a guerre de course.  During the second period, commander of the 
defending Red fleet was Sir Arthur Wilson, while Sir W. H. May was C-in-C of the Blue 
fleet, which was to engage in the commerce-raiding activities. These exercises saw the most 
extensive use of first-class cruisers to date in the annual manoeuvres for all purposes. In one 
of her final operational outings, HMS Terrible, operating out of Falmouth as part of the 6th 
Cruiser squadron belonging to Wilson’s Red Fleet, once again proved the value of the first-
class cruiser’s improved seakeeping compared to smaller types. With the squadron strung out 
across a 30 mile stretch to give them the best chance of  locating enemy ships that might 
attempt to attack the trade-route, she spotted and easily chased down two opposing destroyers  
which were unable to force against a head sea.137 She later successfully engaged HMS Niobe 
in a single-ship action after HMS Spartiate suffered overheating of her crank heads.138  
 
Throughout the second period of the exercises, Wilson’s primary object had been to bring the 
opposing Blue force to action, using the trade he was to protect as bait to draw the opposing 
forces out to their destruction.139 This was closely in line with the strategy outlined the 
previous year, and it is interesting that the Blue C-in-C had expected to encounter convoys: a 
system Wilson had not the slightest intention of implementing. As had been expected, initial 
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mercantile losses were high, but had the ‘war’ continued into a third week, it was expected 
the majority of the attacking forces would have been destroyed or blockaded in port; the 
dispositions at the end of the NID report strongly suggest this would have been the case. The 
Manoeuvres were adjudged to  
 
…bring out strongly the importance of speed and the necessity for speed endurance, 
or the power to maintain speed, in all classes of ship. 
These points are emphasized in the various concentrations of a widely spread line 
during sweeping operations; in the power to postpone or to force and action; in 
chasing; in conveying information ; and during action. 
…it is impossible to attach too great importance to the maintenance of engines and 
boilers at their highest degree of efficiency, and equally impossible to give too much 
consideration to the question of coal consumption and coaling arrangements.140  
 
The three Minotaurs were the largest armoured cruisers completed for the Royal Navy with 
intermediate calibre armament. The deck-plan and side-elevation is shown in Figure 5.6.  
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Figure 5.6: Minotaur class deck-plan and side-elevation 
 
Source: Viscount Hythe [ed.] The Naval Annual, 1912 (Portsmouth: J. Griffin & Co., 1912) 
Plate 10 
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On 490ft (519ft overall length) and 14,600 tons load displacement their design speed was 23 
knots for an 8 hours trial, 24 boilers (Yarrow in Defence and Shannon, Babcock in Minotaur) 
for a nominal 27,000 I.H.P. feeding two sets of four cylinder triple expansion engines on twin 
shafts.141 Like their immediate predecessors, the Minotaurs were fitted with oil sprays to 
increase combustion when required, and the mixed suite of water-tube and cylindrical boilers 
employed in British first-class cruisers since the Devonshires was dispensed with as the initial 
problems with the water-tube type had been addressed.142 With 2,000 tons of coal, radius of 
action was just over 8,000 miles at 10 knots.143 
 
During the design stages of the Minotaur class, a considerable amount of discussion occurred 
regarding hull forms. These were in reference to a belief among serving officers that the 
hollow entrance at the bow seen in many first-class cruisers increased their pitching and 
reduced their speed in a head sea relative to those with fuller lines, although it was accepted 
that the latter gave more resistance under other conditions and would result in the loss of 
around half a knot of speed.144 The Controller in particular during the development of the 
Duke of Edinburghs had asked for model tests to be made comparing hollow and straight 
waterlines; Froude, the doyen of testing, complained that such comparisons were difficult 
given that it is almost impossible to change one aspect of a hull form without affecting 
several others in the process.145 Watts, whose reputation was heavily built upon his skill in 
designing hull forms, was also strongly against any alterations, in which he was supported by 
Whiting.  
 
Matters finally came to a head when Selborne stepped in on 5 May 1903, and effectively 
came down on the side of the Controller, insofar as the latter suggested the only definitive 
way of ascertaining whatever truth there might be was by full-scale testing, specifically to 
produce an alternate hull form with straight lines, slightly greater beam and shallower draught 
to ensure the same basic displacement. The original intentions appear to have been to carry 
this out with one of the four Duke of Edinburgh / Warrior class vessels of the 1903/04 
programme, but this was not done. Presumably this was because the alterations to the 
armament of these vessels took priority, and it was felt better to delay matters until more 
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extensive design work and tank trials could be carried out. These confirmed the straight lines 
provided no advantages over the hollow and a half-knot loss of speed, but the Controller 
appears to have espoused the cause of straight lines and proposed in July 1904 that one of the 
three new cruisers for the 1904/05 programme, now officially termed the Minotaur class 
should be so constructed to provide a full-sized trial; a suggestion strongly opposed by the 
First Naval Lord.146 Despite the objections of Lord Walter Kerr, Watts, Whiting and Froude, 
final approval was granted on 10 August 1904, and the Shannon of the new cruiser class was 
designed with straight lines, a foot of additional beam, and a foot less draught of water. 
 
Comparative trials were made between Minotaur and Shannon, with her straight hull form on 
3 December 1907. These were deliberately held in exceptionally rough weather since it was 
under these conditions some believed straight profiles superior. The trials almost entirely 
exploded this myth, Shannon making 22.49 knots as against 23.01 for the Minotaur, despite 
generating 28,350 I.H.P., exactly 1,300 more than her sister, and confirming the remarkable 
accuracy of the test-tank results at Haslar.147 Both vessels apparently exhibited good 
behaviour despite the poor conditions, with low levels of vibration and steering well. It was 
also noted that the cooling issues that had occurred in the Duke of Edinburghs / Warriors had 
been addressed.148 
 
Twin mountings and gunhouses were readopted in the class for the 9.2in weapons, a pair of 
the new 50 calibre Mk XI being carried fore and aft as chase guns, providing the same four 
gun broadside as the six single guns in the previous two classes. The mounting itself was the 
same as that designed for the Lord Nelson class battleships.149 Ten 7.5in Mk. V were carried 
in single turrets on the upper deck, five on each beam, the single barbettes and gunhouses 
being favoured owing to the reduced likelihood of a single hit disabling multiple weapons, 
and the higher rate of fire the single-mountings were expected to achieve.150 The total weight 
of broadside was thus an impressive 2,520lbs, with the twin mountings providing improved 
arcs of fire and reduced blast for the 9.2in guns.  Protection followed a similar pattern to the 
Duke of Edinburghs, with a 6in KC belt covering 272ft amidships up to the height of the 
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main deck. This belt was extended to the bows with 4in, and aft with 3in. The battery armour 
that had effectively extended the vertical extension of the belt up to the top of the main deck 
in the earlier vessels was eliminated, the 7.5in barbette mounting tubes  having 7in armour on 
their outside faces with 3in inner instead.151  The main deck was ¾in for the length of the belt, 
slightly increasing to 1in fore and aft, while the curved lower protective deck was also ¾in 
increasing to 1 ½in above the steering gear.  The forward CT had 10in armour, the 9.2in 
gunhouses 7in with 8in faces, the 7.5in gunhouses 6in sides, 8in faces and 4 ½in backs.152 
Some thought was given to telescopic funnels to minimise target area in action, but this was 
not pursued, largely on cost grounds as well as practicality, and the type completed, like the 
Dukes and Warriors with ordinary short funnels, which themselves later had to be raised 
owing to unacceptable smoke interference and to improve draught to the boilers.153 
 
In general, the nine new first-class cruisers created under Watts’s directorship marked a 
welcome improvement over the Monmouth and Devonshire classes, primarily due to the 
Board abandoning attempts to restrict displacement and aiming for fighting power. Although 
since the Imperieuse class there had been a reasonably consistent construction pattern in 
which a modest number of large vessels were then followed by a larger number of somewhat 
less expensive first-class types, until the Monmouths this had not significantly affected the 
capabilities of the vessels relative to contemporary rivals in which a significant qualitative 
advantage was maintained over most potential opponents. With the Monmouths and 
Devonshires, this edge over their rivals began to be eroded, and while superior to several 
smaller types, notably the Dupleix and Bayan classes, they were run much closer by 
contemporaries of similar displacement. With rival powers, notably France, Germany and the 
United States building larger types the Board had little alternative but to return to a 
qualitative based approach and abandon attempts to seriously restrict dimensions of first-class 
cruisers. 
 
The new cruisers were principally designed with a view to their having a fleet capacity as 
well as operating independently in the trade-defence role. Thus their general design 
objectives were very similar to the Cressy and Drake classes, the details of their designs 
reflecting the inevitable evolution of gunnery and desires of the Board. As fighting vessels, 
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they stand up well compared with contemporary French designs, the Dukes and Warriors 
edging the Leon Gambetta and Jules Michelet classes in speed and gun-power, while having a 
similar or superior level of protection. The Ernest Renan roughly matched the Warriors with 
little to choose between the types, notwithstanding the somewhat different approach to their 
design, with the French vessels continuing with a lighter calibre, but more numerous 
armament, and possessing on trials at least a remarkable turn of speed. The Edgar Quinet 
class were in some aspects the equal of the Minotaurs, although their armament was not 
entirely turret-mounted, and given the protracted build times this is something of a moot 
point since by the time they were completed, the Royal Navy had been operating the first 
three I class battlecruisers for several years, with a fourth completing at approximately the 
same time as the French cruisers. 
 
The three types also appear to exhibit a reasonable level of superiority over roughly 
contemporary German designs in most respects. Only the two Scharnhorst class vessels 
approached, though not equalled, them in size. In practical sea speed the British cruisers had 
an edge, and the Warriors and Minotaurs had a much superior armament configuration, with 
all major weapons turret mounted in upper-deck gunhouses rather than a combination of 
turrets and casemates. Armour was similar to the British vessels, with a slight advantage in 
deck protection, which could be considered a trade-off against their inferior broadside weight 
compared to the Warriors and Minotaurs.154 
 
The American cruisers of the Pennsylvania and particularly Tennessee classes were a rather 
more formidable proposition. The British vessels all outstripped their US rivals in speed for a 
similar power and displacement (in the case of the Minotaurs). Much of this can be attributed 
to their superior hull forms, even that of the Shannon, since the Royal Navy had for years 
benefitted from the work of Froude and the Haslar test tank facilities, whereas model testing 
for the US Navy was still quite new, and largely dismissed by Engineer-in-Chief Melville.155 
Equally, the US vessels were designed with more of an eye to their being light / fast 
battleships than cruisers per se, and like White’s Cressy class, they were specifically designed 
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for fleet duties, it being anticipated that they could fight anything including battleships.156 
Thus, some sacrifice of speed was accepted in order to obtain heavier protection. The latter 
was somewhat superior to the British vessels, the thinner belt being compensated for by a 
substantially thicker protective deck. In terms of armament, the American vessels followed an 
approach akin to that of the Cressys, Drakes and Duke of Edinburghs, with relatively heavy 
weapons supported by a large battery of 6in guns (and suffering the same problems 
associated with maindeck guns), whereas the British moved toward a heavier 7.5in secondary 
armament after the Dukes; along with the preceding Devonshires, the Duke of Edinburgh and 
Black Prince marked the point in the service in which the 6in became the secondary 
armament in practice as well as in (official) name. 
 
Despite the improvements in the Duke of Edinburghs / Warriors and Minotaurs over their 
predecessors, and their rough equality – superiority over their contemporary rivals, they were 
not without faults, and in some respects lacked the clarity in design of previous fleet or fleet-
capable types. Most obviously was the unworkable 6in maindeck battery in the first two 
vessels. The maindeck casemates in White’s cruisers had been a significant disadvantage, but 
the battery employed in Duke of Edinburgh and Black Prince, in which a lower freeboard was 
necessary to avoid excessive top-weight from the six 9.2in turrets, was even worse off. 
During March 1916, both vessels were extensively modified with the batteries removed, the 
gun ports closed, and  six 6in mounted on the upper deck. With the proximity of the 9.2in 
turrets and potential blast issues, it seems unlikely that this alteration brought any major 
benefits, while the weapons, their crews and ammunition supply routes would have been 
heavily compromised.157 The relatively low freeboard amidships and aft, along with a 
continuing of the policy that had begun with the Drakes in reducing shell-bursting structures 
and upper-works also resulted in their being wet ships. Although sometimes described as 
being ‘poor sea boats’ their high forecastle enabled them to run at high speed in poor 
conditions, and it is likely that this was more a euphemism for their wetness (exacerbated by 
their main-deck battery) than major objections to their behaviour. 
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Many of the problems associated with the first two Duke of Edinburghs were addressed in the 
four modified vessels of the 1903/04 programme. The eradication of the 6in battery and the 
substitution of four single 7.5in gunhouses on the upper deck was a substantial improvement 
in itself, particularly since the battery armour was retained, providing a respectable vertical 
extent to the side protection. The reduction in metacentric height caused by the increased top 
weight also reduced their stability sufficiently to make them very steady ships and excellent 
gun platforms, able to fight their all-turret mounted guns in almost any weather.158 All six 
vessels though suffered from mediocre deck protection, roughly equal to the smaller 
Devonshires (with possibly a slight edge going to the smaller vessel) and inferior to both the 
Cressys and Drakes. Although at the time of their design battle-ranges ranges were, by later 
standards, still relatively short and the trajectory of projectiles reasonably flat, given the 
steady shift toward a heavier main battery, this was a significant weakness only partially 
ameliorated by the increased vertical height of protection from the battery-armour. The same 
point may be raised for the Minotaurs: while deck armour was necessarily expensive in fiscal 
and dimensional terms when used in conjunction with side armour, the Board had expressly 
favoured quality over quantity, and despite their other merits, the horizontal protection was 
no better than it was in their immediate predecessors, and since the side armour did not 
extend as high, protection was even more reliant upon these weak decks. Notwithstanding the 
fact that the ammunition hoists from the magazines and shell-rooms were provided with 
armoured tubes, the protective scheme was a mediocre compromise, particularly since coal 
defence was not as extensively utilised as it had been in earlier vessels (a consequence of 
their upper-deck gunhouses and the protected tubes beneath them). The decision to build 
Shannon with straight lines is also startling, given the importance attached to the type, which 
approached cost-no-object status, and the fact that all the hard evidence available from 
extensive testing and experience over several decades was firmly against such a move. 
Despite the problems though, in general analysis, the Minotaurs had many positive attributes, 
and they had an edge over their contemporary rivals, albeit with a heavy bias toward offense. 
 
As a matter of pure historical speculation if the Board felt more radically inclined, an 
alternative would have been to employ a design of similar displacement and speed with a 
uniform battery of 9.2in, resulting in a vessel akin to a reduced I class battlecruiser. May 
raised precisely this possibility at the end of 1904, partly with an eye vessels for the 1905/06 
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programme, but also because he was considering changing the Minotaurs then under 
construction.159 Fisher was also considering a type along these lines, and such a vessel was in 
fact loosely described in Naval Necessities.160 An alternative proposal by the Controller for 
the 1905/06 programme vessels called for an armament of eight 12in guns in four twin 
turrets, ‘two side by side on the forecastle and two more superfiring aft on the centreline.’161 
 
 
Ammunition Passages: a re-evaluation 
A feature in all British first-class cruisers from the Powerfuls to the Minotaurs was the use of 
ammunition passages below the protective deck[s], through which projectiles and propellant 
could be rapidly transported from the magazines and shell rooms to the guns.162 Commenting 
in a confidential memorandum explaining the design features of the Diadem class protected 
cruisers, Sir William White stated 
 
Roomy ammunition lobbies into which the magazines and shell rooms converge have 
been provided at each end of the ship. These lobbies are connected by passages 
through which a continuous supply of ammunition will be kept up. Rapid hoisting to 
the gun positions will be effected, possibly by the use of electric motors. The 
conditions of service of ammunition in the “Powerful” class, and these new cruisers is 
greatly superior to other first class cruisers British and Foreign.163 
 
These passages were introduced by White roughly contemporaneously with casemates for the 
quick-firing / intermediate-calibre armament, and were regarded as the most practical and 
safest solution to the problem of rapidly conveying ammunition from magazines and shell 
rooms to the guns. They have subsequently been criticised as a dangerous flaw. Referring to 
the Royal Sovereign class battleships, which also had these passages, distinguished former 
naval architect David Brown categorised them as ‘the biggest weakness of the ship, and 
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perpetuated in later designs. The passage could transmit flash from an explosion, and could 
also spread flooding.’164 In support of this contention, the loss of the Minotaur class armoured 
cruiser HMS Defence at the Battle of Jutland is often raised as an example of the hazards 
associated with ammunition passages.165 Witnesses reported that Defence was hit near her 
after 9.2in turret, and an explosion ‘was seen to travel forward along the magazine passage 
supplying the 7.5in turrets, each of which exploded in turn from aft.’166 Figures like Jurens 
have concurred in leaping to condemn ammunition passages as a dangerous fallacy.  
 
This is however an overly simplistic assessment. Certainly, if a vessel were exposed to heavy 
AP shellfire, they could be a vulnerable point, but this completely ignores the fact that 
Defence and her predecessors were not designed for the tactical environment that existed at 
Jutland but for that of an earlier era, when they were far less likely to face such attack. As has 
been previously established, first-class cruisers (and battleships) prior to the development of 
the all-big-gun vessels were designed for a comparatively unscientific gunnery environment. 
Fire control was in its infancy, anticipated battle ranges were by 1914-18 standards very 
short, while the weapons themselves and the projectiles fired were different from those that 
would be faced during the Great War. When considered in the context of this contemporary 
artillery environment, dominated by flat-trajectory intermediate-calibre weapons, the 
ammunition passages were far from being the security of the ship that Brown and others, 
ignoring the actual operating environment, like to claim. Located behind side armour, 
protective decks and coal-protection, they were no more vulnerable to such assault than other 
parts of the vitals. This was particularly the case in White’s designs, which had stronger 
horizontal protection than later types, and were designed when armour piercing shell was 
comparatively new and solid shot still widely employed, significantly reducing the chance of 
a bursting charge being carried into the vitals.167 More effective armour piercing shell was 
being developed, but by the turn of the century even large-calibre projectiles of this type 
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remained of limited reliability and could only carry bursting charges through relatively thin 
armour (generally un-cemented, and at relatively perpendicular / direct angles).168 
 
At Coronel, both Good Hope and Monmouth (especially the latter, despite her lighter 
protection) survived a respectably long time without a catastrophic detonation of magazines 
or projectiles, despite their poorly trained crews. Even more notable, at the Jutland 
engagement HMS Warrior received approximately fifteen heavy shell hits (11in & 12in 
calibre) and six strikes from 5.9in, without suffering a similar catastrophic fate to Defence, 
demonstrating that even in these changed gunnery conditions, subject to heavy AP shellfire, 
the dangers of ammunition passages, while far from ideal, can be overstated.169 Nor is it clear 
what practical alternatives existed. With the large number of intermediate-calibre guns spread 
along a considerable length of hull, there was no room for each casemate or gun-house to 
have independent magazines and shell rooms, and the passages were certainly a safer means 
of transporting ammunition than existed in earlier classes, which lacked any defended route at 
all for the conveying of projectiles and propellant. On balance then, the use of ammunition 
passages in RN cruisers up to the Minotaurs can at worst be called a case of faute de mieux. 
As long as a mixed armament was employed, independent magazines and shell-rooms, the 
proliferation of which can in any case hardly be exempted from the charge of increased 
danger through greater target area, were unlikely to be a practical or realistic option. It seems 
therefore that under the conditions they were designed for the passages did a perfectly 
acceptable job, and were certainly a far better option than not having any defended means of 
transporting projectiles and propellant to the guns at all, especially in a period when a high 
rate of fire was the most practical means of obtaining hits on an opponent. 
 
 
Fisher, evolving design and Dreadnought: the first big-gun armoured cruiser 
The influence of Fisher during his time at the Admiralty as DNO and Controller has been 
noted in previous chapters. During his time in the latter role in particular, he worked well 
with White; an unlikely partnership given their utterly dissimilar personalities, but one which 
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he greatly benefitted from at the time and later, since as Manning points out, he shared in 
White’s success.170 Despite their cordial working relationship, a point of disagreement 
between the two on the surface at least appeared to have been Fisher’s liking at the time for 
second-class battleships. White, as previously illustrated, 
 
…held very definite opinions upon the necessity for British ships being equal to or 
better than the best built abroad, and had no use for the second best whether from the 
“economical,” “moderate dimensions,” “size v. numbers,” or any other point of 
view.171 
 
Fisher however had largely been responsible for the two Centurion second-class battleships 
intended primarily for the China Station and Pacific, and especially the one-off Renown, 
which notwithstanding their mediocre standing amongst naval historians, were quite well 
received by many naval officers at the time. More pertinently, it seems that Fisher viewed 
them less as second-class battleships, but as crossover vessels, in the grey zone between 
battleship and cruiser, although he does not seem to have explicitly said as much at this stage. 
Fisher would later state outright though that  
 
No-one can draw the line where the armoured cruiser becomes a battleship any more 
than when a kitten becomes a cat! 
The 2nd class battleship Renown is really only an armoured cruiser! You can count 
her whichever way you like according to what you want to prove!172 
 
Behind the dry humour is a perfectly valid point, one underlined in the notes he left for his 
successor (Domvile) as C-in-C Mediterranean Station, where he expressly pointed out that 
owing to a deficiency in armoured cruisers ‘…it is necessary to detail Battleships to work 
with Cruisers.’173 The fundamental point is that nomenclature by nature is an approximation 
and there are invariably grey areas where types cross over. The Cressys were another 
example: classed as ‘armoured cruisers’, they were designed to operate as a fast wing to a 
battlefleet, and were perfectly capable of doing so. In later years, the fast-division role would 
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be fulfilled by ‘fast battleships’, which begs the question: what is the difference between an 
armoured cruiser designed for this particular duty, and a fast battleship designed for the 
same? Assuming no significant variations exist in basic design objectives, realistically the 
terms may be considered synonymous. 
 
Of course, the first-class cruiser had been a genuine second type of capital ship ever since the 
reintroduction of side-armour.174 The most recent Duke of Edinburghs / Warriors and 
Minotaurs moved the first-class cruiser in the direction Fisher had in mind, and he seems to 
have been comparatively quiet about them, despite having been at the Admiralty when the 
former were under development. It is possible that he did not wish to risk clashing with the 
Controller’s province, although it is rather more probable that at the time of their design, he 
had not yet developed his own ideas sufficiently and as such was unwilling to pass much 
comment. The Minotaurs in any case came very close his proposals of March 1902 to 
Selborne on ‘Fast Armoured Cruisers’ for which four 9.2in (originally 10in) and  twelve 7.5in 
were advocated.175 However, with a design 23 knot trials speed (around ½ knot less for 
Shannon), they were not fast enough by his assessment of future requirements –certainly not 
for catching converted fast liners.   
 
Speed was Fisher’s particular obsession, and he was always angling for a good margin of 
superiority over possible rivals, both from strategic and tactical perspectives. In the former 
case he was indubitably right; in the latter, he was also largely correct, with certain caveats. It 
is often suggested that Fisher saw speed as a form of protection in itself for vessels (the oft-
repeated claim attributed to him that ‘speed is armour’).176 In reality, his view was somewhat 
more subtle. Fisher did not regard speed as a form of protection per se, but as means of 
allowing a force to dictate the terms of an engagement. Speed in Fisher’s parlance was ‘the 
weather gauge [original italics] of the olden days. You then fight just when it suits you 
best.’177 As a result, a degree of protection would be obtained, but this was incidental, or at 
least subordinate to the wider object. 
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displacement or cost. Again,  
175 Brown Warrior to Dreadnought. p.180; see also Sumida In Defence… p.43 
176 Parkes Op. Cit. p.489 
177 Kemp The Fisher Papers Vol. I p.28 
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Following his arrival at the Admiralty as First Sea Lord, Fisher and the Board set up a 
Committee on Designs; officially appointed 22 December 1904, its professed task was to 
investigate, consider and report upon the requirements of future ships for the Royal Navy.178 A 
more cynical perspective, such as that voiced by Roberts, was that its principal function was 
to validate decisions that had already been arrived at.179 Though mildly exaggerated, it does 
have a reasonable basis in reality. Ostensibly the Committee, which first met on 3 January 
1905, considered the question of the new-model battleship first, only moving to armoured 
cruiser designs later. This new model battleship would become HMS Dreadnought, the vessel 
Fisher is most commonly associated with, although it is often pointed out that the Invincibles 
(or ‘I’ class) were his real ‘love.’ The policy that created her has been described as ‘in too 
many respects, risky, insufficiently considered, ill-informed and unnecessary.’180 Such 
assessments though are founded upon mistaken assumptions, both as to Fisher’s intended 
strategic approach, and the nature of HMS Dreadnought herself.  
 
As has been suggested most notably to date by Grove, there is substantial evidence pointing 
toward the supposed ‘revolutionary battleship’ HMS Dreadnought herself being closer to 
existing armoured cruisers than battleships in terms of intended mode of operation, and even 
certain design characteristics.181 This was actually stated outright in Fisher’s remarks on the 
‘Fighting Characteristics of Vessels of War’ contained in Naval Necessities: the new 
battleship proposed was nothing other than ‘a glorified armoured cruiser.’182 Perhaps owing 
to his frequently Machiavellian tactics and disingenuous statements, few people appear to 
have taken Fisher’s remarks literally. The ‘armoured cruiser’ name has also had considerable 
stigma since Great War 1914-’18, when many vessels so-named were lost, it being forgotten 
                                                     
178 Parkes Op. Cit. p.472 The Committee Members included: Rear-Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg (D.N.I.); 
Eng. Rear-Admiral Sir John Durston (Engineer-in-Chief of the Fleet); Rear-Admiral A. L. Winslow 
(C.O. Torpedo & Submarine Flotillas); Captain Henry Jackson (shortly to succeed May as Controller); 
Captain John Jellicoe (shortly to succeed Rear-Admiral Henry Barry as D.N.O.); Captain C. E. Madden 
(shortly to become Naval Assistant to Controller); Captain R. Bacon (Naval Assistant to First Sea 
Lord). Civilian members were: Philip Watts (D.N.C.); Lord Kelvin (the famous physicist & 
mathematician); Professor J. Biles (Prof. of Law, University of Glasgow); Sir John Thorneycroft 
(Thorneycroft Shipbuilding Co.); Alexander Gracie (Fairfield Shipbuilding Co.); R. E. Froude 
(Superintendent Admiralty Experimental Works); W. H. Gard (Chief Constructor Plymouth Dockyard 
& shortly to become Assistant D.N.C.); Commander W. Henderson (Secretary to Committee); E. H. 
Mitchell (Assistant Constructor & Assistant Secretary of the Committee). Constructor J. H. Narbeth 
acted as Secretary to the D.N.C. and had responsibility for working up details of the designs 
considered. Fisher himself served as Chairman, though was not technically a member 
179 Roberts Battlecruisers p.19 
180 J. Brooks ‘Dreadnought: Blunder, or Stroke of Genius’ War In History Volume 14 No.2 (April 2007) pp.157-
178 
181 Grove The Battleship is Dead pp.415-427 
182 Kemp The Fisher Papers p.31. Original italics. See Also Sumida In Defence… p.53 
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that in their own operating milieu, they were highly capable fleet-units. Fisher’s use of the 
term then, implies the new vessel was expected to be used as the fast division of a 
contemporary battlefleet.183  
 
The reasons for Fisher retaining the ‘battleship’ name appear to be inherently tied to the 
balancing act he was forced to perform between his strategic objectives and the political 
realities (both internal to the service, and in the wider national spheres) he was confronted 
with. Despite the widely acknowledged capabilities of the armoured cruiser, Fisher was only 
too well aware that to attach such a name to the new vessel would be problematic. This was 
acknowledged by the disingenuous remark in Naval Necessities ‘At the present moment 
naval experience is not sufficiently ripe to abolish totally the building of battleships so long 
as other countries do not do so.’184 In truth, as far as the technologically-radical Fisher was 
concerned, there was more than sufficient experience to abandon the battleship type in favour 
of the first-class armoured cruiser. This is largely a matter of context. The term ‘cruiser’ is 
typically associated with trade defence, and the fast-division duties that emerged at the end of 
the Nineteenth Century are often forgotten. Fisher did not forget:  
 
The most advanced thinkers in the Navy and those having the greatest personal 
experience at sea have come to the conclusion that the battleship is really dead. No 
one need fight a battleship except with submarine boats or destroyers, and the sole 
function of battleships in future wars is to be sunk. They can defend nothing day or 
night with any certainty. 
But this new battleship now proposed will not only be a battleship but a first class 
cruiser superior to any but the very latest, hence for years to come she will be useful 
since whether battleships are or are not used in the future her speed will always make 
her of the greatest value.185 
 
It is probable that Dreadnought herself was not as extreme a vessel as Fisher would have liked, but he 
selected the best compromise solution that was available to him: that of ensuring that the new 
‘battleship’ was a well armoured and exceptionally heavily armed armoured cruiser of relatively high 
                                                     
183 Which by nature would mean a capacity for wider operations if required, a la the Cressys 
184 Ibid p.41 As in above, original italics. Selborne, a confirmed supporter of the battleship, added the notation 
‘Indeed not! The battleship is essential, just as much as 100 years ago. Ask the Japs.’ 
185 Memo on ‘H.M.S. “Untakable” cited by Parkes Op Cit. p.469 
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speed by the standards of the day.186 Such crossover vessels were far from being a new proposition as 
the previous chapters have indicated. Fisher saw Renown in this light, and White had introduced such 
a type with the Cressy class fleet-cruisers, while similar vessels were in service with, or under 
construction for the Italian, Japanese and US navies. The two Swiftsure class battleships acquired by 
the Royal Navy had been intended to counter Argentinian cruisers, while the Canopus and Duncan 
class battleships both made mild concessions in protection in order to obtain a slightly higher speed 
without sacrificing too much in the way of armament. It would later be done again, only by that point 
the nomenclature had changed to ‘fast battleship.’ Thus it may be advanced that the nomenclature is 
ultimately less relevant than the design intention; Fisher merely continued an existing process. The 
chosen name though may have had some particular relevance: the First Sea Lord was very careful in 
his choice of vessel names, and despite his professed disinterest in history, those given to the majority 
of the vessels launched during his tenure were highly evocative. Dreadnought was of course an 
established title for battleships, having a strong lineage stretching back to the Sixteenth Century, most 
recently having been the best-regarded of the mid-Victorian coast-assault breastwork monitors, and 
before that a three-decker. The name, with its grandeur and history  was a reflection of her abilities, 
may also have provided, deliberately or otherwise some reassurance in the face of her more radical 
technical features.  
 
Before the Committee on Designs had even been appointed, Watts began preliminary 
investigations for a large vessel with a speed of 21 knots. One of the first documents in 
Dreadnought’s cover (number four) is a letter from Watts to Froude at the Admiralty 
Experimental Works dated 19 November 1904 on hull lines and necessary power: 
 
I am having some inquiry made as to what is involved by higher speeds for 
Battleships and Cruisers and shall be glad if you can give me some information as to 
I.H.P. required. 
Battleship. Taking Cressy as basis and flattening the form of section as in Lord Nelson 
it is assumed that Cressy Form (Armoured Cruiser of August 1897) can be taken as 
440 x 69.5 x 24 = 11,900 Tons; changing then to 455 x 83 x 27 and fining down 
slightly gives 16,500 Tons. 
Will you be good enough to send me an estimated E.H.P. curve 16 to 22 knots for 
such a form. 
                                                     
186 Fisher would later employ creative nomenclature when he ordered three light-battlecruisers (the Courageous 
class during the Great War 1914-’18, under the designation ‘large light cruisers’) 
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Perhaps you can suggest a better way of obtaining a better form of the same 
dimensions and displacement and if you can please do so. 
A form is wanted which can be driven at 
20 knots for 19 to 20,000 I.H.P. and 
21 knots for 22 to 24,000 I.H.P.187 
 
As is the case with all such documentation, there is a danger of reading rather too much into 
Watts’s query, particularly the reference to the Cressy class armoured cruisers. Since 21 knots 
was desired, it makes perfect sense that an proven existing hull-form of a large naval vessel 
designed for the same speed would be used as an initial basis. Nevertheless, the connection is 
interesting in the abstract, with the speed desired being equivalent to the then-standard fleet 
cruiser.  
 
The brief given to the Committee on Designs for required features set the following 
requirements: 
 
Speed: 21 knots. 
Armament: 12-in guns and a-t-c [light quick-firing Anti-Torpedo Craft] guns. Nothing 
between.  12-in. guns to be as numerous as possible. No guns on main deck, except a-
t-c guns if necessary to place them there. 
Armour to be adequate. 
Must be capable of using docking accommodation at Portsmouth, Devonport, Malta 
and Gibraltar.188 
 
526ft in overall length and with a load displacement 18,122 tons (nearly 22,000 deep load), 
the resulting Dreadnought was a significant jump in size over any preceding British first-
class naval vessel: approximately 2,000 tons over the Lord Nelsons and 3,500 tons over the 
Minotaurs.189 Her deck plan and side elevation are shown in Figure 5.7.  
 
 
 
                                                     
187 NMM Dreadnought ship cover, copy letter Watts to Froude on forms and dimensions 19 November 1904 
188 Parkes Op. Cit. p.472 
189 Grove Battleship or First Class Cruiser? p.415 
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Figure 5.7: Dreadnought class deck-plan and side-elevation 
 
Source: Viscount Hythe [ed.] The Naval Annual, 1912 (Portsmouth: J. Griffin & Co., 1912) 
Plate 3 
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18 Babcock and Wilcox water-tube boilers fed four-shaft Parsons turbines for a design 23,000 
Shaft Horse Power (S.H.P.) and the specified trials speed of 21 knots.190 This was a good 3-
knot margin over most contemporary battleships (excepting lighter types like the Swiftsures) 
and given her considerable size a match for many existing cruisers under practical sea 
conditions, particularly since the turbine was far more efficient in high speed running, and 
possessing far fewer moving parts was capable of maintaining high revolutions over extended 
periods reliably with little wear. The introduction of the turbine was by far the most radical 
aspect of the design, since at that point there was little naval experience with them, other than 
in three destroyers (Viper, Cobra and Eden) before the decision was made to employ turbines 
in Dreadnought. Nevertheless, the potential benefits in reliability, efficient high-speed 
running, physically smaller size and a much improved power-weight ratio over reciprocating 
types were deemed sufficient to take the considerable gamble of making the change. 
 
The armament configuration provoked much discussion; eventually the ten 12in Mk X 45 
calibre guns were disposed in a cramped configuration of three centreline and two wing 
turrets for an 8-gun broadside, and an apparent 4 or even 6-gun axial fire, although in practice 
the blast effects would have caused severe damage to the decks and upper works if the wing 
turrets were fired fore and aft. This disposition was described by the former DNC as 
‘viciously bad’ on account of the blast issues, restrictions of space on the upper deck and the 
multiplicity of magazines and shell-rooms.191 The ideal solution was the superfiring twin 
turrets on the centreline fore and aft, as introduced in the US Michigan class, but this was not 
possible owing to the retention of open sighting hoods in the British gunhouses, which would 
have exposed those in the lower turret to severe blast from the superfiring weapons.192 Despite 
the problems, the paper-potential for heavy axial fire of the configuration ultimately chosen 
had considerable appeal for the end-on tactics frequently advocated by Fisher, who would 
later remark in his memoirs: 
 
                                                     
190 NMM Dreadnought ship cover; Legend dated 12 May 1905; also quoted in J. Roberts The Battleship 
Dreadnought [revised edn.] (London: Conway Maritime Press, 2001) p.13 [Table 5]. Note: SHP (the 
power delivered to the propeller shafts) was typically employed for power figures following the 
introduction of turbines, displacing the IHP previously used (a theoretical value for reciprocating 
engines assuming them to be frictionless in their energy conversion within the cylinders) 
191 Manning Op. Cit. p.477 See also  Sir William White ‘On the Maximum Dimensions of Ships’ Transactions of 
the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers Volume XIX (1911) pp.34-35 
192 There were also concerns over the proximity of the barbettes and the possibility of a single hit disabling 
multiple weapons and raised metacentric height 
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I am an apostle of “End-on Fire,” for to my mind broadside fire is peculiarly stupid. 
To be obliged to delay your pursuit by turning even one atom from your straight 
course on to a flying enemy is to me being the acme of an ass.193 
 
Many of the early sketches, both official and Gard’s unofficial studies, placed considerable 
emphasis upon this ability.194 Axial fire naturally had somewhat more significance for cruiser 
types, especially since in Fisher’s view the enemy would frequently be running away. This 
was of course the critical assumption;  working on this basis, Fisher was perfectly correct in 
emphasising end-on fire capacity. If an enemy remained to fight, the advantage would be 
significantly eroded and arguably would pass to the broadside unless the attacking fleet (i.e. 
that possessing greater axial-fire capacity) had such a significant speed advantage to dictate 
range and positioning. Fisher of course had served through the mid-Victorian period, which 
was largely dominated by littoral combatants, and, should a naval action at sea occur, end-on 
tactics as illustrated in Chapter One were widely favoured and discussed; given this 
background, it is not improbable that he carried some of this mind-set with him, consciously 
or otherwise. Although this appears inconsistent with many of the advances being made in 
fire-control and long-range gunnery, since Dreadnought (and the Invincibles) were designed 
when ranges were still much shorter and single aimed shots were (at least by Fisher) still 
contemplated, such an approach becomes rather more understandable, whether one 
acquiesces with the underlying tactical principle or not.  
 
Despite popularly being seen as a disciple of heavy artillery, Fisher was actually a late 
convert to the all-big-gun approach that was adopted in Dreadnought. Until his departure 
from the Mediterranean, and indeed for a time afterward, his preference was for 
 
…the greatest number of the largest quick-firing guns in protected positions. They 
call it the secondary armament; it is really the primary armament! 
                                                     
193 Fisher Memories (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1919) pp.121-122 Although expressed years after the 
event, Fisher’s preference for end-on-fire was a view he held reasonably consistently for much of his 
career, likely first being developed during his captaincy of the first-class coast-assault ship HMS 
Inflexible in the 1880s 
194 It seems that blast effects, nor the physical space for magazines and shell-rooms were considered in these 
studies, some of which were nevertheless quite interesting, particularly the Fisher-Gard designs, 
perhaps most notably what was known to the Committee as ‘Design E’ featuring super-super-firing 
barbettes all on the centreline, with the particular intention of maximising end-on fire. Design ‘D’ by 
Narbeth, with two twin turrets mounted abreast fore and aft, with a super-firing twin turret on the 
centreline was an alternative proposal for maximising end-on-fire 
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In these days of very rapid movement the huge gun firing (comparatively) slowly is as 
obsolete as the foot solider in the Boer War! 
Whoever hits soonest and oftenest will win! 
…So the problem is to fix the smallest large gun to put at each end of the ship, and the 
largest small quick-firing gun to put elsewhere with the largest arc of fire and the best 
view.195 
 
The smallest large gun to Fisher was the 10in, while he regarded the largest quick-firing gun 
to be the 7.5in. The Swiftsure class light battleships, designed by Edward Reed for Chile and 
purchased by Britain in 1903 to prevent their being acquired by Russia, well matched these 
stipulations.196 Fisher’s view expressed above was inherently a refinement of the gunnery 
approach that had been dominant since the introduction of the quick-firing gun, where owing 
to the relatively short battle-ranges and lack of effective fire-control, outright rapidity of fire 
was what counted, since it increased the likelihood of hitting an opposing vessel. 
 
The effectiveness of rapid-fire was significantly improved around the turn of the century 
when Captain Percy Scott introduced continuous aim techniques. By modifying the ratios in 
the gun’s elevating gear, Scott allowed the gunner to constantly track the target, 
compensating for the roll and movement of the ship. Adding a telescopic sight refined this 
and brought about a remarkable improvement in accuracy. Scott is often credited with the 
introduction of telescopic sights, although the Ordnance Committee appears to have been 
ahead of him in this regard.197 On his return from the Mediterranean to take the post of 
Second Naval Lord in 1902, it appears that Fisher was confronted by advances in gunnery 
that went well beyond his extension of the quick-firing artillery paradigm. The Naval College 
had been conducting comparative exercises between vessels of mixed and uniform heavy 
artillery configurations, while the Controller had also been studying the matter. Moreover, it 
was believed that torpedoes were starting to pose a significant threat to large vessels at the 
3,000 yard battle-ranges then regarded as common. Although almost certainly highly 
overestimated, the fear of the torpedo was sufficient for there to be a general desire to extend 
                                                     
195 Fisher, cited by J. Roberts Battlecruisers (London: Caxton, 2003) p.12 The positioning of the heavier 
weapons fore and aft of course provided reasonable weight of end-on fire as chase weapons 
196 Parkes Op. Cit. p.457 The Swiftsures were the last vessels to be designed by Sir Edward Reed before his 
death, and rather ironically bore almost no resemblance to any of his previous designs, resembling 
more one of White’s Cressys than the heavily armoured types Reed had always strongly advocated 
197 J. Brooks Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland: The Question of Fire Control (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2005) p.41 
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battle-ranges beyond their effective operating window. The conclusions reached by the 
gunnery experts indicated a major shift away from lighter rapid firing weapons in favour of 
the big gun. The primary motives that led away from the mixed calibre armament to a 
uniform heavy battery were: 
 
1. Increasing battle range necessitated by the menace of long-range torpedo attack 
2. Long-range hitting now being practicable, it might very well determine the result of 
an action 
3. Salvo-firing was the only known method of control at long ranges 
4. This necessitated a uniform heavy armament of eight or more guns 
5. The heaviest guns made the most accurate firing with decisive results.198 
 
Salvo firing involved discharging half the broadside armament and observing the fall of shot 
from the splashes. Direction and range were then corrected for, and the other weapons 
discharged, the process being repeated until the range was found and a straddle achieved. A 
mixed calibre armament rendered this largely impractical owing to the difficulty in 
differentiating between the splash of the different calibre projectiles. These conclusions in 
favour of the big naval gun as the decisive weapon would later appear to be supported by 
evidence from the Russo-Japanese war, and particularly the Battle of the Yellow Sea that took 
place 10 August 1904. Study of the Battle of Tsushima 27-28 May 1905 might have led to 
very different conclusions but by then, the decision had been taken in favour of a uniform 
heavy battery with the almost complete suppression of a quick-firing armament (barring light 
anti-torpedo-boat weapons).199  
 
Around this time, it seems Fisher’s preference also shifted toward a uniform main armament, 
but of moderate calibre: in the case of battleships sixteen 10in, and for first-class cruisers 
sixteen 9.2in.200 This appears to have been an attempt at striking a balance between outright 
gun-power and rate of fire, and even suggests a preference for the smaller weapon since it 
                                                     
198 Parkes Op. Cit. p.466 
199 Sir William White, in ‘Notes on the Armaments of Battleships’ Transactions of the Society of Naval 
Architects and Marine Engineers Volume XVIII (1910) strongly advocated the retention of a secondary 
armament of rapid-firing intermediate calibre guns, in association with a heavy but not excessive main 
battery (eight 12in to allow effective long-range salvo-firing) 
200 Although the calibres were only 0.8in apart, the difference in projectile weight was quite marked: 380lbs for 
the 9.2in, as against 500lbs for the 10in 
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could deliver a far greater number and total weight of projectiles in a given time period.201 
Only later would Fisher become a champion of a uniform heavy armament (12in or larger); 
the leading supporters of this in the Royal Navy appear to have been the Controller (Rear-
Admiral May), Captain H. J. May of the Naval College and Captain Reginald Bacon –the 
latter was clearly influenced by papers from the two Mays, and was probably himself the 
major influence upon Fisher in this regard, who was one of the later converts.202 Such a move 
toward a uniform heavy-calibre armament was also being explored elsewhere. Cuniberti’s 
famous article ‘An Ideal Battleship for the British Fleet’ that appeared in the 1903 edition of 
Jane’s All the World’s Fighting Ships brought the idea to wider public attention, in Japan the 
idea was being explored, while in the United States they had also been mooted for several 
years, most notably by Lt.-Com. William Sims.203 The two Michigan class battleships with 
their eight 12in guns were under development as Dreadnought was laid down. 
 
Evidently Fisher was still thinking during 1904/05 primarily in terms of the 8,000yds range 
he had practiced the Mediterranean Fleet at, with expected battle-ranges of around 6,000yds. 
However, this was certainly not what the majority of his subordinates or those advocating 
long-range fire had in mind, who were already contemplating salvo-firing at ranges above 
10,000yds. Despite appearances though, it would be incorrect to accuse Fisher of 
inconsistency in his approach to armament. At a fundamental level he was always attempting 
to achieve the optimal configuration for the contemporary gunnery conditions, and he 
matched the armament, as he saw it, to those conditions as far as possible. The theoretical 
advantages to the all-big-gun armament however largely depended on the ability to rapidly 
acquire the range and hit frequently. Dreadnought’s fire-control system has rightly been 
described as imperfect, and certainly much work was still needed in this critical area, both in 
terms of range-finding, plotting, and allowing fine-control over the gun-mountings.204 Despite 
the problems though, it can also be fairly described as ‘the most advanced gunnery system 
available in an era of very rapid progress.’205  
 
The two main control positions were in the foretop (which owing to the placement of the 
mast behind the foremost funnel to aid boat-handling, located it directly in the smoke and 
                                                     
201 Sumida In Defence… p.53 Some fifty per cent  
202 Brown Warrior to Dreadnought p.186 The reliably cynical Brown remarks that one is reminded of the saying 
‘There they go, I must hurry after them for I am their leader.’ Ibid p.180 
203 Cuniberti was not thinking of long-range fire potential so much as increased destructive power at close range 
204 Brooks Op. Cit. p.44 
205 Grove The Battleship is Dead…p.423 
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heat and rendered it at high speed uninhabitable) and a platform on the roof of the signal 
tower.206 These fed the main or secondary Transmitting Stations (TS) data from 9ft Barr and 
Stroud rangefinders. The TS was equipped with the Mk1 Dumaresq, which automatically 
calculated range-rate and speed across as they changed with bearing.207 It also had two of the 
newly developed Vickers range clocks which continuously indicated the best current estimate 
of the changing range, obviating the need for this to be calculated manually by officers with 
stopwatches aloft.208 Theoretically, Dreadnought could engage two targets simultaneously 
since the main TS was partitioned to allow it to serve the two control positions if required; 
the aft (secondary) TS ‘appears to have been used only to direct the 27 unprotected 12-
pounders disposed around the ship to deal with torpedo boats.’209 
 
The total design weight of protective material worked into Dreadnought was 5,000 tons; 
approximately 27.6 per cent of her load displacement.210 An 11in amidships KC belt tapering 
to 7in at the lower edge was employed stretching from the centre of ‘Y’ barbette stretching 
forward to ‘A’ barbette, where it strangely thinned to 9in.211 This belt was extended with 6in 
KC to the bow; under deep load conditions it was completely submerged, with the only 
exposed vertical armour being the 8in KC upper belt. 11in KC was also employed on the 
barbettes, gun-house faces (sides and back were 8in & 4in) and CT. Horizontal protection 
was a substantial improvement on earlier vessels, with three armour decks: the main deck 
was 1in over the lower conning and signal towers, ¾in elsewhere, the middle-deck 1 ¾in on 
the flat, 2 ¾in on the slopes, increasing to a uniform 3in over A and Y magazines, and the 
lower deck was 1 ½in forward, 2in aft, increasing to 4in at both ends. Underwater protection 
was given special attention, unpierced watertight bulkheads extending to 9ft above the 
nominal waterline and longitudinal bulkheads to protect magazines and shell rooms.212 The 
fact that the Committee on Designs were instructed to consider vessels with uniform 
armament of 12in guns and speed of 21 knots, and that the armour should be ‘adequate’ is 
sometimes asserted to be an indication of Fisher’s lack of interest in armour.213 Reginald 
                                                     
206 Roberts The Battleship Dreadnought p.30 
207 Brooks Op. Cit. p.24 
208 Grove The Battleship is Dead p.423, and Ibid p.25 
209 Grove Ibid 
210 Ibid The data in this paragraph is derived from this Legend and from Roberts’s book 
211 Friedman, in British Cruisers of the Victorian Era  p.243 states Dreadnought had the same 9in KC belt as the 
King Edward VII class battleships; presumably the confusion arose from the thinning of Dreadnought’s 
main 11in KC armour belt to 9in abreast ‘A’ barbette 
212Grove The Battleship is Dead… p.421 
213 Roberts Battlecruisers p.32 
 285 
 
Custance, who had a deep and mutual animosity with Fisher, enquired in March 1913 on the 
question of armour, 
 
…On what principle is it applied? The thickest armour is all perforable by the primary 
guns at fighting ranges, but it is much thicker than is required to keep out projectiles 
from the secondary guns. I am unable to understand the principle on which it is 
applied. I can understand that the armour might be imperforable to the primary guns, 
or to the secondary guns, or to fragments of bursting shell, but to put on armour which 
can be perforated by the primary guns, but is thicker than is necessary to keep out the 
secondary guns or the fragments of shell, would seem to require some explanation.214 
 
Custance’s points appear reasonable: at the relatively short battle-ranges common at the time 
the Committee on Designs sat (typically around 6,000yds or less), no acceptably sized vessel 
could carry sufficient thicknesses of armour to withstand assault from heavy AP projectiles 
while also possessing reasonable speed and armament.215 Equally, that given to Dreadnought 
appears to have been excessive to defend against many intermediate-calibre batteries. 
However, there were other considerations: battle-ranges were slowly increasing, and as the 
range opened, so slightly thinner armour became viable. Also, some of the more recent types 
of battleships were carrying a heavier intermediate-battery, and the weapons themselves and 
their projectiles were also improving. Furthermore, AP projectiles were still, at least in 
Britain, of dubious capability, and assault from such projectiles was not necessarily the 
paramount consideration in developing a protective scheme. The real weakness of 
Dreadnought’s armour was the main belt being submerged under many load conditions. For 
the same 5,000 tons weight available, a continuation of White’s approach of employing 
slightly thinner vertical protection over a wider area, in association with even stronger 
protective decks would likely have worked better, particularly against longer-range fire, and 
even more when it is considered that rivals would be playing a game of catch-up, and thus 
Dreadnought’s armour would be less likely to be exposed to heavy artillery for at least the 
first half of her career.  
 
                                                     
214 Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, in discussion on Alan H. Burgoyne Esq., M.P. ‘Recent Developments in 
Battleship Type’ TransINA Volume LV Part I (1913) p.14 
215 Sumida Op. Cit. p.56 
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Sub-optimal armament and armour configurations aside though, Dreadnought's deployment 
with the latest armoured cruisers allocated to the Home Fleet, whatever the latter's role (see 
above) gives more than a clue to Fisher's thinking. As Grove argues:-      
 
The most modern armoured cruisers were sent to this Fifth Cruiser Squadron as a 
matter of routine from Duke of Edinburgh onwards in March 1906. Where else to 
send Dreadnought, this new, more powerful armoured ship, capital ship even, than to 
work with these fast and powerful assets? Although a knot or two slower in maximum 
speed on the measured mile, Dreadnought’s turbines gave her the advantage over the 
notional ‘cruisers’ in long distance cruising speed. What more powerful or flexible 
force, given the standards of the time, could be imagined in 1907 than Dreadnought 
operating with Duke of Edinburgh, Achilles, Cochrane, Natal, Warrior and 
Leviathan? By the end of 1908 it was Dreadnought, Inflexible, Indomitable, Achilles, 
Natal, Warrior, Defence, Minotaur and Shannon, a formidable force216 
 
The deployment of Dreadnought with the Home Fleet cruiser squadron provides considerable 
confirmation of the strong cruiser-bias in her inherent design, and the objectives of those 
responsible for her creation. Additional confirmation comes from the fact that HMS 
Bellerophon, one of three detail refinements on Dreadnought that Fisher was later press-
ganged into building, was also attached to the Home Fleet. During the 1909 Manoeuvres she 
was under the command of Captain Hugh Evan-Thomas, who would later find fame at 
Jutland in 1916: 
 
Sir William May’s mainly pre-Dreadnought ‘Red Fleet’ was chasing Curzon-Howe’s 
‘Blue Fleet’, with the speedier Bellerophon pushing boldly ahead. Evan-Thomas was 
acting as a single ship fast division and, in doing so, overhauled and ‘sank’ four Blue 
cruisers.217 
 
The fast-division function with the capacity to overwhelm more modestly armed types is thus 
largely confirmed. This ability continued while the majority of the battlefleet were 
reciprocating-engined and would only cease some years later when the entire fleet was 
turbine powered to the same average speed; the introduction of the Queen Elizabeth class 
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vessels (theoretically) capable of 25 knots would repeat the process, continuing, as pointed 
out by Andrew Lambert, the significant fast-wing element in RN tactical thinking.218 
 
 
The New Testament ships 
The vessels officially designated as armoured cruisers (later ‘battlecruisers’) were a much 
purer physical expression of Fisher’s strategic and tactical views, a point which Fisher 
himself made for many years and is now generally accepted.219 In many ways this is likely so, 
though it does not seem the First Sea Lord was too downcast over the Dreadnought. Like all 
of the British big-gun armoured cruisers / battlecruisers they remain mired in a controversy 
that began almost as soon as they were laid down. While much of this was a response to their 
big-gun armament, at its heart was a lack of clarity regarding what the vessels were actually 
for. Fisher was the driving force behind the Invincibles but characteristically refused to 
provide any direct explanation about what he envisioned their role to be.  
 
In his recent work, Seligmann has returned to the explanation for the type provided by 
Reginald Bacon in his biography of Fisher. Bacon, Seligmann points out, knew Fisher as well 
as anyone, having worked closely with him for years at the Admiralty and served as 
Dreadnought’s first captain. His statement is that the Invincibles were developed to supply a 
long-standing desire in the service: ‘a ship fast enough to hunt down any armed merchant 
ship afloat, and at the same time to be able to fight any cruiser afloat...’220 This is an 
interesting point, and Seligmann makes a strong case for it indeed having been the intention 
behind the design, pointing to several reports in 1906 calling for the type to replace armed 
Cunard liners in the role of hunters of German auxiliary cruisers.221 Many senior figures in the 
service were less-than-enthusiastic about arming British liners to counter rival AMCs, with 
good reason, since, not having been designed as naval vessels, they lacked any protection at 
all, rendering an action rather too much a matter of luck and placing considerable onus on 
whoever got in the first shot. Moreover, British liners, with a handful of exceptions were not 
ranked amongst the fastest, so even if they were converted into AMCs themselves, they 
would be unable to catch an equivalent preying on British commerce.  
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The emphasis on the counter to converted liners is important, and does provide support for 
some of the design decisions and characteristics, though care must be exercised given that 
Bacon, as having some responsibility for the decisions of the era, cannot be regarded as 
unbiased.222 Seligmann lays much emphasis on the Admiralty reacting to a perceived shift in 
threat to commerce, away from dedicated commerce-raiding cruisers and toward fast armed 
liners, the implication being that this supports a shift in strategic priorities on the part of the 
Admiralty away from the traditional Franco-Russian challengers and toward Germany, with 
whom AMCs are more commonly associated.223 The evidence provided in support is 
persuasive, noting parliamentary select committees set up to consider the matter as early as 
1901, and which concluded the threat came from Germany. However, it overlooks the fact 
that the potential threat from fast AMCs had been appreciated by the Board since at least 
1885, and there was precedent aplenty for creating a cruiser designed to hunt down and kill 
such types: William White and Lord Hamilton had largely conceived the Blakes for this 
purpose sixteen years earlier.224 Thus, while the Admiralty certainly took increasing interest in 
countering the German naval challenge, Seligmann’s contention that there was something 
particularly novel about developing such a type does not stand up, nor is the support for a 
near-total shift in strategic prioritization for trade-defence as strong as it appears.  
 
The instructions given to the Committee on Designs for the official new vessels stipulated 
that the new vessels should have the following characteristics: 
 
Speed: 25 knots 
Armament: 12-in. guns and a-t-c guns. Nothing between. 12-in. guns to be as 
numerous only as is consistent with the above speed and reasonable proportions. 
Armour: to be on similar scale to “Minotaur” class. 
Docking facilities to be carefully observed.225 
 
This theoretically gave considerable scope to the Committee for selecting configurations, 
dimensions and engine choices. The 12in gun was selected largely with an eye to the new 
vessels having ‘an additional use in being able to form a fast light squadron to supplement the 
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battleships in action, and worry the ships in the van or rear of the enemy’s line.’226 This was a 
classic first-class cruiser function, but despite Bacon’s support for the 12in, as Seligmann 
suggests it was unnecessary for trade-protection where the excellent 9.2in gun would have 
been more than adequate.227 The real reason, as first publically suggested by Philip Watts, was 
probably pressure from Fisher, who was always in favour of RN vessels outgunning rivals, 
and a wish to respond to the Italian Regina Elena class, designed by Vittoro Cuniberti, and 
the Japanese Tsukubas.228 Both of these types had incorporated 12in guns; the former was 
officially considered a light / fast battleship, and carried two 12in supported by twelve 8in. 
The decision to build the latter with four 12in guns in two twin turrets supported by twelve 
6in in casemates was apparently taken based on experience from the Yellow Sea battle, when 
the Japanese came under accurate fire from the Russian fleet at extremely long range.229  
 
The early sketches by May for 12in-gunned armoured cruisers had assumed reciprocating 
engines; turbines were selected for the final design. A letter from the Engineer-in-Chief 
(Durston) dated 12 January 1905 in the Invincible class cover strongly advocated the use of 
turbines, on the grounds that the greater efficiency of turbines allowed similar horse power 
levels to be obtained with less boiler power (an expected ratio of 41:35 in favour of turbines), 
while the size, space and weight savings would be considerable; the latter in the order of 
some 700 tons.230 A major consideration was to reduce the size of the boiler rooms as far as 
was consistent with efficient working and maintenance; it seems this was with an eye to 
reduced internal target area.231 It was likely this that helped tip the balance away from the 
reciprocating 4-cylinder triple-expansion type, which had realistically reached the limit of its 
development potential, in addition to the potential improvements in reliability and efficient 
high-speed running. As with the previous design, a wide variety of configurations for the 12in 
armament were debated. Sketch Designs A through C were derived from May’s studies, 
featuring two twin barbettes abreast of each other and forward of the bridge, various 
configurations being employed for aft barbettes. Sketch ‘A’ had twin superfiring barbettes on 
the centreline, sketch ‘B’ two twin barbettes abreast of each other abaft the mainmast, and 
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sketch ‘C’ a single twin turret on the centreline abaft the mainmast.232 As had been the case 
before, whether there would have been space for these barbettes, let alone their magazines 
and shell rooms is questionable. These configurations were ultimately rejected, partly through 
the space issues, but also due to restricted arcs of fire and severe blast issues. Eventually 
sketch design ‘E’ was selected featuring four twin barbettes in a diamond arrangement, the 
wing gunhouses staggered to allow a mild arc of cross-deck fire assuming the opposite 
gunhouse was disabled. 
 
The new vessels, initially named Invincible, Immortalite and Raleigh were a substantial jump 
in size over their immediate Minotaur class predecessors, having a load displacement of 
17,250 tons, and 530ft between points.233 Figure 5.8 shows the deck-plan and side elevation 
of the type. The names Immortalite and Raleigh were officially dropped on 2 December 1905 
in favour of Inflexible and Indomitable.234 The ship cover for the class is not enlightening 
regarding the reason for this change; however, it is noteworthy that those finally adopted 
were established capital ship names  whereas Immortalite and Raleigh had traditionally been 
associated with frigates and cruisers.235 There was also precedent abroad; as noted in Chapter 
Three, the American ‘Big Ten’ armoured cruisers of the Pennsylvania and Tennessee classes 
had all received State names, underlining their capital-ship standing.  
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Figure 5.8: Invincible (‘I’) class deck-plan and side elevation 
 
Source: Viscount Hythe [ed.] The Naval Annual, 1912 (Portsmouth: J. Griffin & Co., 1912) 
Plate 9 
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31 Yarrow or Babcock boilers fed 4-shaft Parsons turbines for a design 41,000 S.H.P. and 25 
knots, theoretically slightly down from the 25 ½ knots that Fisher had originally favoured. A 
complete absence of vibration was reported, and with a 500 yard turning circle, Captain 
Harding of HMS Donegal stated on Indomitable’s  trials that she steered better than any ship 
he knew.236 All three of the class achieved or exceeded 26 knots on trials, with power outputs 
approximately 10 per cent above the design figure.237 Parkes claims 28 knots was obtained 
under service conditions, but does not provide any source.238 Such a speed seems highly 
unlikely since the later Lion class battlecruisers required over 70,000 S.H.P. for 27–28 knots, 
and their substantially longer hull had an efficiency advantage at higher speeds to that of the 
Invincibles. Be that as it may, the class were exceptional steamers, helped by the remarkable 
efficiency of their propellers, those of Invincible in particular attaining an almost 
unprecedented 57.7 per cent.239  
 
This sustained high speed capability, helped by their considerable freeboard, was a substantial 
improvement over earlier types over long periods, even those like the Drakes with a 
reputation for being excellent steamers. Following her commissioning, Indomitable took 
Prince George (later King George V) to the City of Quebec Tercentenary celebrations, 
escorted by HMS Minotaur and on the return leg was reported to have averaged 25.13 knots, 
slightly exceeding the 25.01 knots the great Cunard liner Lusitania (also turbine powered) 
made between 5-10 July that year.240 In contrast to the high-speed run made by the Second 
Cruiser Squadron two years before no engine trouble or major mechanical failures occurred, 
starkly illustrating the significance of the turbine for high-speed warships: the enormous 
reduction in moving parts and inertia eradicated most of the sources of wear and tear, 
boosting reliability to a significant degree and ultimately reducing maintenance requirements 
and the inevitable down-time needed for refits.241 The turbine’s reliability also meant a 
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dedicated liner-killer was somewhat easier to create than it had been with reciprocating 
engines; liners could use long-stroke pistons since within reason, vertical height was a non-
issue for their engines. A naval vessel required its engines protecting, thus height needed to 
be limited.242 Since balancing horizontally mounted engines was problematic, this had 
typically entailed either increased boiler pressures, or increased revolutions with a short-
stroke to allow smaller engines to fit under protected decks.243 Philip Watts had been a notable 
advocate of the latter with his cruiser designs at the Armstrong Elswick yard during the later 
1890s.244 Both methods tended to impact on reliability, although the RN’s vessels tended to be 
less highly stressed compared to many contemporary rivals and those built privately. As a 
result a large liner, with its inherently superior seakeeping and unstressed engines would 
typically possess a higher sea-speed over an extended period than a naval cruiser, and thus be 
able to evade it. The introduction of the turbine at a stroke (or lack thereof) removed this 
problem, and the I’s 25 knot trials speed may have been selected to give them a significant 
advantage over the fast German liners.245 Also, assuming the medium-term intention was to 
elevate the RN’s main force to the same 21 knot speed as Dreadnought a heavy scout would 
need to possess a 3 – 4 knot margin over her, as had been the case with the reciprocating 
engined battlefleet and their first-class cruiser contemporaries.  
 
The strategic value of high speed was a major subject of debate during the latter stages of the 
1890s and first decade of the Twentieth Century, mainly because for a given vessel 
displacement it could only be obtained by making sacrifices elsewhere. Strategically speaking 
this may be distilled down to the potential reduction in radius of action through increased fuel 
consumption, and thus as Corbett illustrates, raises the fundamental question of whether 
speed or radius of action has the greater strategical value, or lends itself to the greater number 
of strategical combinations.246 Corbett’s paper was by far the most lucidly argued exposition 
on the subject there had been to date. Rejecting lines of argument that tended to cite 
exceptional examples to support their contentions but ignored all others, he considered the 
matter from the perspective of oceanic operations, and movements in narrow seas. By general 
                                                                                                                                                                     
cylinders, and an emphasis upon natural draught to the boilers tended to result in fewer breakdowns 
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consensus, high speed was accepted as being of greater strategic value than radius of action in 
the latter case. But while the obverse may appear to be true for oceanic operations, Corbett 
contended that this did not necessarily apply equally to all maritime Powers. In the case of 
the British Empire, with its dominance of the global trading routes, its multiple colonial 
assets and coaling stations, most of which were denied to potential opponents, coal endurance 
and outright radius of action was less significant.247 This was closely in line with the pre-war 
British deterrence strategy, exploiting the advantage of long-range communications (still 
mostly undersea telegraph) and more numerous bases and dry-docks around the world, flying 
squadrons of cruisers being available for rapid deployment to where they were needed.248 
Though eroded by this time, Britain retained a sufficient advantage for such an approach to 
remain very practical for countering challenges outside the European theatre.  
 
The Invincibles carried four twin gunhouses with 12in 45-calibre Mk X in barbettes disposed 
fore, aft and staggered on the wings. End-on fire was a significant consideration, although as 
with the battleships, blast from the wing turrets would cause severe damage to the decks and 
upper works and all but eliminated this capacity in practice. Mountings in Indomitable and 
Inflexible were standard BVIII, as had been used in Dreadnought, albeit with 6 rather than 3-
cylinder training engines which allowed smoother operation.249 Invincible herself carried 
experimental electrically-powered mountings, to different designs by Vickers and 
Armstrongs. This had been partly at the instigation of Jellicoe in his capacity as D.N.O., since 
electrical operation in theory had some advantages in reduced weight compared to the 
hydraulic mountings normally used. Both proved an expensive failure, and their efficacy was 
under severe question even before they were fitted. Reliability proved atrocious, the 
mountings finally being converted to hydraulic power March-August 1914.250 Owing to 
potential confusion between ‘B’ and ‘C’ when used verbally to refer to the turrets, the wing 
gunhouses were designated ‘P’ (port) and ‘Q’ (starboard); a system also adopted for 
Dreadnought.251 
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The height of the forward 12in gunhouse above the load waterline was 2ft less than in the 
Minotaurs at 32ft, but ample for good gunnery conditions. However, the wing barbettes and 
gunhouses were 6 1/2ft higher than in the earlier type, although the height of the after 
gunhouses was similar between the types.252 Parkes states the class were reported to be good 
sea boats (definition unspecified), but that they were not considered particularly steady gun 
platforms.253 Presumably by ‘good sea boats’ they were found to be reasonably dry ships; 
since they were large, with a respectable level of freeboard and had fewer gunhouses on their 
upper-decks than their predecessors, this is not surprising. The matter of their being mediocre 
gun platforms was likely a result of their needing considerable initial stability to compensate 
for the top-weight of four twin 12in gunhouses carried high. This would in turn have resulted 
in a relatively short period of oscillation, and as a consequence, they would have been more 
susceptible to be set rolling by ordinary conditions at sea than many earlier types.254 
 
The vital matter of fire-control was handled by a modified version of the system introduced 
in Dreadnought. With these official cruisers the ability to hit quickly and accurately at long 
range was just as significant an aspect to the design, as it was partly intended that the type 
should be able to exploit its speed in order to dictate the range where it could optimally 
employ its heavy artillery. While relatively primitive by later standards, it was at the time, 
like that of Dreadnought, better than that in most other vessels. Spotting tops on the masts 
operating 9ft Barr and Stroud rangefinders communicated with two TS on the lower deck, 
equipped with Dumaresq calculators and Vickers range clocks, the constant updates of range 
and bearing being followed on a plotting table.255 The Invincibles had a significant advantage 
over Dreadnought in that their foremast, with its spotting top was located forward of the 
foremost funnel, thus moving it out of the stream of hot air and gasses that crippled the 
effectiveness of the ostensible battleship’s fire control.256 
 
Armour was (as indicated to the Committee on Designs) roughly akin to the Minotaurs. A 
total of 3,460 tons of material, or 20 per cent of the normal load displacement was devoted to 
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the protection, with major characteristics being an 11ft 3in deep amidships belt of 6in KC 
from ‘A’ to ‘X’ barbette, extending 7ft 3in above and 4ft below the load waterline. The belt 
terminated in a curved 6in bulkhead abaft ‘X’, but was extended with 4in KC to the bows. 7in 
KC was used on barbettes and gunhouses, 10in on the forward CT. The magazines had 
additional 2 ½in side armour below the waterline. Horizontal protection was provided by a 
protective deck, 1 ½in thick on the flat and 2in on the slopes behind the armour belt, 
increasing to 2 ½in aft of the belt and decreasing to 1 ½in forward.257 The armour scheme of 
the Invincibles was principally intended to defend against assault from relatively flat-
trajectory intermediate calibre projectiles at ranges up to approximately 9,000 yards. It was 
not expected to provide complete protection from heavier-calibre fire at any range.  
 
Brown makes the point that ‘today’s designers are accustomed to weapons against which 
there can be no practical protection and ships are designed to limit the consequence of such 
hits.’258 However, he overlooks the fact that this was also attempted in the Invincibles (and to 
a lesser extent, as indicated above, Dreadnought). The general system ‘did not provide for 
immunity from damage, but was intended to limit the effects of shellfire by restricting the 
extent of such damage and by reducing the risks to the more important areas of the ship, 
namely the motive power, the main armament, the steering gear, and the control positions.’259 
Thus modest thicknesses of armour were spread over reasonably wide areas, with patches of 
additional plating around the critical magazines and shell-rooms. This approach to armour 
was derived from an analysis of the actions and damage received in the Russo-Japanese war, 
along with British trials results of projectiles and armour, and given the available evidence, 
makes sense since the type was not intended for protracted gunnery duels with more heavily 
protected capital ships.260 The Admiralty and Constructor’s Department, based on the 
performance of British heavy projectiles under test conditions also had considerable 
reservations about APC [Armour Piercing, Capped] shell, but were rather more favourably 
impressed by large-capacity shells and high explosives that could cause extensive damage to 
ships’ structures, thus tended to favour CPC [Common Pointed, Capped] and to a lesser 
extent HE [High Explosive] projectiles.261 This, Roberts contends, explains the strong 
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emphasis in British ships on splinter protection and medium thicknesses of armour, and there 
is little in the ship covers that suggests otherwise.   
 
At the time of their design, the Invincibles (and Dreadnought if stock assumptions over 
definitions are set aside) were the most powerful cruisers in the world; a status they would 
not lose until the commissioning of their successors and the German Von der Tann. Roberts 
classes them as very successful ships taken ‘as an interpretation of their design 
requirements.’262 This seems a fair assessment; they would have had little difficulty catching 
and overwhelming most smaller cruisers (an ability proven during the Falkland Islands 
engagement in 1914), converted ocean liners and given the conditions that existed at the time 
of their design, using them as the fast wing of a battlefleet seems a reasonable proposition. 
Their turbine engines were as successful as they had been in Dreadnought, they fully realised 
the speed requirements set out for them, and with the exception of Invincible’s electrically 
operated gun mountings, with their uniform 12in armament they theoretically outgunned the 
cruisers of Italy and Japan which carried mixed batteries of 12in with smaller 8in or 6in 
weapons. 
 
As with Dreadnought and their intermediate-calibre armed predecessors though, the 
Invincibles are certainly not above criticism. The armament disposition settled upon was 
superior to that of the ostensible battleship as it was less cramped, but the blast effects from 
the wing turrets rendered four or six-gun end-on fire a matter of wishful thinking. On the 
displacement few other options for 12in artillery were available though. The basic balance of 
speed, offensive and defensive power in the Invincibles seems to have been the product of 
conflicting views on their duties though –a consequence, one feels, of Fisher’s reluctance to 
explain what it was he was trying to achieve.  
 
The 12in gun was most likely selected as a response to the latest Japanese and Italian vessels 
being so-equipped (albeit as part of a mixed battery). However, if they were intended for 
killing fast armed liners per Bacon’s contention, then as Seligmann points out the 12in was 
completely unnecessary, and this was appreciated by senior officers like Prince Louis of 
Battenberg. It made more sense for hunting down and killing dedicated enemy cruisers, 
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although was arguably excessive even for this role. In the short term, they could be employed 
as a fast-division for a battlefleet since until a significant number of all-big-gun rivals 
emerged, they would be facing a mostly QF armed opponent, and their protection was not 
relatively badly off compared to the Minotaurs or Warriors –a point overlooked by many. 
However, across that relatively short time period, the fast-division role could be largely taken 
by Dreadnought and her immediate successors, realistically negating any need for them in 
this role. In the medium to longer term, as all-big-gun vessels took an increasingly prominent 
role in rival fleets, their protection rendered them far too vulnerable. On learning the details 
of the armour scheme, the former DNC commented that ‘12-inch guns with 7-inch barbette 
armour do not commend themselves to me.’263 Mark Kerr had similar misgivings, expressing 
his concern to Watts when Invincible was completing that the move toward heavy-calibre 
weapons was opening the range, and that the armour would not be able to defend against 
projectiles coming in at a high trajectory.264 Sir Philip concurred with these views, but stated 
he had not been allowed sufficient weight to create a more heavily defended vessel.265 Given 
the conditions and weights available, the choice of continuing the general theme of 6in belt 
armour seems a poor one except in the case of their being primarily designed for killing fast 
armed liners, since such AMCs were never likely to be equipped with an especially heavy 
armament. It was inadequate given the artillery it would increasingly be exposed to if 
expected to serve in a fleet-role, marginal for countering opposing armoured cruisers given 
the steady move toward heavier armament in general. Assuming a larger ship was not 
permissible, then increasing the protection to the barbettes and throwing the balance of 
weight available into a comprehensive protective deck scheme would likely have worked 
better, and is likely what White would have proposed.  
 
In conjunction with Dreadnought, the three Invincibles formed the material blueprint of the 
new-model service that Fisher wished to develop (at least for the heavy vessels). While the 
First Sea Lord almost certainly felt the former to be less radical than he would have preferred, 
it is also probable that he did not view her as too significant a compromise to his intentions. 
Dreadnought would be followed with the three Bellerophon class vessels; virtual repeats with 
detail refinements, while the design of the three official armoured cruisers would be stretched  
to create the otherwise basically similar Indefatigable. A useful, highly flexible and extremely 
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powerful fighting force (notwithstanding certain weaknesses in terms of the vessel designs) 
could thus be envisioned of four heavily defended and armed vessels of respectable speed 
capable of forming an extremely powerful fast-division to a contemporary battlefleet, with 
four faster, more lightly protected and armed vessels for use killing commerce-raiders, and 
temporarily serve the fast-division role, even if this was likely not viewed as their primary 
function.  
 
 
Consequences and conclusions 
As shown by Sumida, by the beginning of the new century the financial ramifications 
consequent of the policy of constructing two distinct types of capital ship were increasingly 
severe. While this was not an impossibility during earlier, reasonably buoyant financial 
periods, as economic conditions weakened, so the strain on the national purse caused by the 
massive annual naval estimates became less politically viable. Admiral Sir John Fisher, the 
maverick, mercurial genius of Royal Naval history came to office largely on account of his 
promise to reduce spending and improve efficiency; this he initially achieved, although some 
of the savings should be considered in light of the baseline being artificially high. 
Nevertheless, his scrapping programme purged the service of a large number of vessels that 
had little practical use in war, and which had far outlived their fighting value. As is well 
known, this went hand-in-hand with a dramatic structural reorganisation, both of manning, 
and composition of fleets.  
 
Since Fisher rarely explained his intentions, numerous interpretations have been advanced for 
his strategic intentions, which varied over time to meet the changing conditions. It is often 
said that Fisher’s concentration of battle-squadrons in European waters was a response to the 
increasing German naval challenge, but initially it seems clear that it was as much a reflection 
of the altered geostrategic circumstances. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance went some way to 
countering the rivalry with Russia; the subsequent near-extermination of the Russian fleets 
during the Russo-Japanese war effectively neutralised any maritime threat from this quarter 
for the immediate future. Even more significantly the entente with France, though not 
eliminating the possibility of conflict with that nation reduced the likelihood. Since France’s 
fleet had been built up largely to threaten British commerce, notwithstanding political 
interference which had resulted in a vacillating construction programme, this was a major 
shift, although it did not necessarily cause an instant shift in prioritisation, since as Seligmann 
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points out, the Admiralty were wary of a perceived threat to trade from German fast liners 
converted to AMCs. The reduced necessity for maintaining battle-squadrons outside 
European waters inevitably resulted in the recall of many battleships stationed elsewhere, 
since there was no practical requirement for retaining them in such locations. With the rapidly 
increasing German naval challenge though, it was convenient.  
 
In the medium-long term, Fisher’s intention was however to exploit the latest technologies 
available to give Britain a crucial strategic and tactical edge. The revisionist  
flotilla-defence perspective argues that he intended to utilise surface and sub-surface torpedo 
craft and mines to defend the UK homeland and major foreign bases, while first-class cruisers 
would become the service’s only capital ship. These were ideal types for hunting down 
potential commerce-raiders following the service’s continuing policy of focal-area defence 
for protecting trade, since they could rapidly overwhelm smaller types, and had a rapid-transit 
ability. In the first years of the century, although not quite as effective in a fleet action as their 
battleship counterparts, they were perfectly capable of fighting them, and their additional 
flexibility rendered them a more useful type. Whether the flotilla-defence interpretation is 
accepted or not, what is clear is that Fisher never wavered from his preference for first-class 
vessels possessed of a considerable speed margin over rivals. The flotilla aspects themselves 
are more contentious, and whether the technology was ready is another matter that lies 
outside the scope of this thesis. Some moves appear to have been made in this direction but 
the scale of implementation remains a matter for debate.  
 
By the turn of the century, the Board abandoned attempts to restrict dimensions of first-class 
cruisers, and returned to the fleet-cruiser model pioneered in Britain by Sir William White. 
This was largely enforced by rival nations moving toward larger types which the Monmouth 
and Devonshire classes would have struggled to counter unless operating in numbers. The 
heavier main battery introduced also reflected changing gunnery conditions, as well as the 
increased levels of protection of foreign vessels. The vessels were generally sound, though it 
would seem the Board felt the lack of White’s guidance, since though outwardly impressive 
and undoubtedly capable, the new cruisers lacked some of the design refinements and clarity 
the former DNC brought. The oft-criticised ammunition passages in contemporary British 
capital ships was not one of them however, since there was little option but to use them when 
vessels were armed with a large number of intermediate-calibre guns, and in an era of 
comparatively short battle-ranges and flat-trajectories, when heavy armour-piercing shell was 
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less likely to be encountered, they were far from being the significant weakness they are 
sometimes claimed to be. Unworkable 6in box-battery in the Duke of Edinburghs aside, all 
nine vessels matched the requirements of the service well and can be reasonably assessed as 
superior to contemporary foreign rivals, albeit with a bias toward speed and practical gun-
power. 
 
The introduction of the all-big-gun vessels had a significant effect on the wider strategic 
situation, and gave the Royal Navy a decisive technological head-start over other nations, be 
they friendly or otherwise. Although sometimes regarded as a blunder, on the principle that it 
obviated Britain’s lead in existing types and was based upon faulty intelligence data, this is to 
completely misunderstand the complexities of the situation. The existing fleet was not 
instantly rendered valueless; superiority was maintained over equivalents elsewhere, which 
could not simply be ignored, while Britain established a lead over rival nations in new 
construction. This latter was particularly significant, since Fisher’s strategic approach was to 
a large extent predicated upon ensuring technical superiority over equivalent rivals. Uniform 
heavy artillery was an inevitability in any case; the United States and Japan in particular were 
adopting or moving to adopt this approach. From a British (or at least Fisher’s) perspective, 
just as significant was the increase in speed over all earlier types. Both Dreadnought and the 
Invincibles were substantially faster than any then-current battleship; under practical 
conditions, thanks to the introduction of the turbine engine the former was as fast as the 
majority of existing large cruisers (especially over extended periods or in poor weather 
conditions) while the latter could outstrip anything afloat. By constructing two heavily armed 
capital ships with a major speed advantage over all current rivals, Fisher threw foreign 
construction programmes into severe confusion. Since Royal Navy strategy was not fully 
understood abroad (or by many in the UK), attempts to meet it were uncertain and their 
effectiveness initially blunted. This was especially true for Germany, locked into its Navy 
Laws. When counters from foreign powers came, they were with a new generation of 
battleships, often slower and retaining reciprocating engines. However, Fisher was attempting 
to take the Royal Navy in a very different direction, circumventing the mire of the traditional 
battlefleet whether other nations continued to construct such types or not. 
 
This leads to the question of what Dreadnought herself actually was. Normally classified a 
battleship, many of her characteristics at the time of her design and for the first years of her 
life were consistent with existing fleet-cruisers, while her posting to the 5th Cruiser Squadron 
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indicates that she was intended, at least initially, to operate with them as a fast wing for the 
existing battlefleet, with the practical possibility of independent operations as part of the 
cruiser squadron if required. The term ‘cruiser’ itself though may be misinterpreted. When the 
Cressys were created, they were known as armoured cruisers, and designed for use as a 
battlefleet’s fast division. The later Dukes, Warriors and Minotaurs, also had a strong fleet-
emphasis in their design, while the Drakes were perfectly capable of performing in the role 
should they be required to. At the time of her creation, Dreadnought also fell into this criteria. 
Later such types would be known as ‘fast battleships’ –the nomenclature being, as suggested 
above  less important than design characteristics, intentions, and the manner in which it was 
used. It is slightly ironic to reflect that while the Fusion committee set up by Fisher was 
tasked to merge battleship and cruiser features into one vessel type, an existing vessel, 
namely Dreadnought, had already done just that. By any realistic measure, though not 
without flaws she was a very successful vessel. The Invincible class were also successful 
when judged by the criteria to which they were designed, which, like the Minotaurs, was 
heavily biased toward offense. If criticism is due, it should be directed rather toward these 
requirements, which were not as well thought out as they should have been. It is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that, fine designer though he was, Sir Philip Watts was probably too 
reticent on this point, and a better balanced fighting vessel would likely have resulted had his 
more vocal predecessor been in the same position.  
 
Flawed though the British first-class cruisers of the era may have been, they did retain in 
general a good edge in fighting power over rival vessels throughout the period, and made a 
formidable fighting force. This period was the culmination of a general trend in the 
development process of the first-class cruiser that had taken place since the mid-1880s. As 
the new century opened, it was a genuine alternative form of capital ship. Within a handful of 
years, largely thanks to Fisher and especially turbine technology, its two forms: the fleet-
capable type, and the commerce-protector would become the inspiration for all of the Royal 
Navy’s first-generation all-big-gun vessels.  
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Conclusion:  
The first-class cruiser 1884-1909 in perspective 
 
 
The first-class cruiser was one of the most important vessels of the late Nineteenth and early 
Twentieth Centuries, yet there have been no attempts to date to produce an in-depth 
assessment of the type’s development from the mid-1880s until the close of the first decade 
of the Twentieth Century. It is this gap in the historiography that this thesis seeks to fill, by 
examining how it fitted into the service’s changing requirements through this time, how it 
was employed in practice, how and why it rose to increasing prominence, and why it has 
often been overlooked. 
 
 In the early 1880s, the vessel type that would later be officially termed the cruiser was 
steadily leaving behind the tactical morass of the mid-Victorian era. Until comparatively 
recently, this had been considered a ‘Dark Age’ period during which the classical battlefleet 
that had held sway for over two centuries had largely vanished into a heterogeneous 
collection of seemingly bizarre ‘Neanderthals of naval architecture, doomed to extinction by 
the march of enlightened progress.’1 Worse still, the contemporary Admiralty’s ‘ideas of 
strategy were not so much misguided as non-existent.’2 It has been argued that it was largely 
owing to the efforts of three naval theorists; Captain Sir John Colomb, his brother, Vice-
Admiral Philip Colomb, and John Knox Laughton that this period of decay was overturned, 
by showing the ‘historic relevance of a strong battle fleet navy.’3 
 
Cooper Key’s tenure as First Naval Lord in particular has been singled out for exhibiting 
vague ‘tactical and operational thought.’4 His performance before the Carnarvon commission, 
it is alleged, revealed ‘in the starkest terms possible his lack of any strategic insight or 
consideration of trade protection.’5 Yet in their rush to condemn Cooper Key as an inept 
strategist interested only in the minutiae of administration, it seems that many historians have 
                                                     
1 J. Beeler Birth of the Battleship: British Capital Ship Design 1870-1881 (London: Caxton, 2003) p.10 
2 N. A. M. Rodger ‘The Dark Ages of the Admiralty, 1869-85, Part I: “Business Methods”, 1869-74’ in 
Mariner’s Mirror 61/4 (November 1975) p.331 
3 R. Parkinson The Late Victorian Navy: The Pre-Dreadnought Era and the Origins of the First World War 
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2008) p.238 
4 B. Ranft ‘The protection of British seaborne trade’ in Brian Ranft [Ed.] Technical Change and British Naval 
Policy 1860-1939 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977) p.4 
5 Parkinson Op. Cit. p.29. See also Ranft Ibid pp.3-4 
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given little consideration to the possibility that he might not have been especially disposed to 
providing all and sundry with details of Royal Navy strategy. Cooper Key was not overly 
fond of the Foreign Intelligence Committee established in 1882, fearing that it might threaten 
his authority; it is mysterious therefore that it has been assumed he would willingly divulge 
information to other parties, including rank-amateurs who might well cause the service 
problems. It is true to say that the balance of evidence suggests Cooper Key was not an 
Alexander Milne, Geoffrey Hornby, Frederick Richards, or John Fisher. The fact of the matter 
is though, he did not need to be. A general policy, heavily derived from Milne’s studies and 
potentially lethal to naval challengers, was in place, and there was scant reason to change it. 
During the mid-Victorian era, the limitations of contemporary materials had dominated both 
the strategic and tactical imperatives; as Beeler and Lambert have shown however this did not 
mean that there was a lack of thinking on either subject. The Admiralty did have a strategic 
doctrine, but it was not one that the service chiefs were at all inclined to share with politicians 
or publicise in a wider sense.  
 
Since the wrought-iron and simple-stage expansion engines of the era rendered seagoing 
fleets impracticable once gun-power outstripped the protective ability of available armour, 
the service developed dedicated littoral combatants for the European theatre, intended to 
batter their way into defended enemy harbours on outbreak of war and destroy opposing 
forces before they had chance to break out. Coast-assault went hand-in-hand with the 
prevailing strategical climate of the era, before Britain adopted an isolationist policy and 
might, as a primarily maritime power, be expected to assault an opponent’s littoral in support 
of a Continental ally. It was to operate in conjunction with a system of focal area-defence for 
commerce protection; a policy devised by Admiral Sir Alexander Milne. Although adapted 
over time, this would remain the foundation of the Royal Navy's commerce-protection 
strategy for some four decades. The purpose for the reticence on discussing strategy outside 
the service is not difficult to discern. Quite apart from an inbuilt disinclination to explain such 
matters to non-professionals, an aggressive policy of coast-assault was never likely to find 
favour with many politicians, especially in the Liberal party, who in government or 
opposition would have caused a storm of protestation. This was even a factor in the vessel 
designations themselves, with the duplicitous ‘coast-defence’ being substituted for ‘coast-
assault.’ The political and economic ramifications of this policy would indubitably have been 
severe, nationally and internationally, in an era of quickly improving communications and 
literacy, but there was no viable alternative. Ergo, a secretive approach makes sense. The 
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trade-defence strategy of focusing upon specific regions; geographical ‘choke-points’, 
confluences of major trade-routes, or generally areas of high commercial shipping-density 
was also not intended for wider consumption. The price of the strategy was the likelihood of 
high initial losses to shipping until raiders were hunted down; an eventuality that was 
anticipated, and regarded as acceptable. 
 
It was in this mid-Victorian crucible that the first-class cruiser was born. Its precise origins 
are difficult to trace given the rapidly changing material conditions of the era; received 
wisdom has it that they descended from second-class ironclads such as Sir Edward Reed’s 
Audacious class of the late 1860s, later, Sir Nathaniel Barnaby’s HMS Shannon of the early 
1870s, and thence in stages to the two Imperieuse class. This is undoubtedly true as far as it 
goes. However, it can be suggested that the type also had roots in the high-freeboard, masted 
first-class cruising ironclads that reached their zenith with the Alexandra and Temeraire.  The 
Royal Navy ceased constructing the type owing to the difficulty of achieving a reasonable 
level of protection against the latest heavy guns. Yet, in the years following the October 1887 
fleet-reclassification, many of the broadside ironclads would be designated cruisers. Although 
this can be seen as a down-rating of elderly types to keep them on the books, with their 
respectable speed, sea-keeping and range were well-suited to cruiser duties, since they were 
good sea-boats, and their modest protection and armament were less of an issue in the trade-
defence role. On a distant level they, like the Shannon, could be considered a spiritual 
ancestor of the Cressys, and arguably, the earlier Blenheims, Edgars and Diadems. 
 
At this time, and until the late 1890s the first-class cruiser was seen principally as a trade-
protection type. While to an extent other uses were mooted, this remained its main function, 
though as the battlefleet began its concurrent evolution toward a seagoing capacity, so a 
greater interest in its use as a heavy scout arose. The seven Orlandos marked a significant 
step forward in the gestation of the type, and they can be seen as the first truly modern first-
class cruisers built for the Royal Navy. Much of this was due to the more widespread 
availability of new technologies, the most significant aspect being the introduction of steel 
and the triple expansion steam engine, with the attendant improvements in power and range. 
They were a transitional type though, reflecting features of the mid-Victorian period as well 
as providing indications for future types. 
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Sir William White, qualitative superiority and the first ‘battle-cruisers’ 
Of the two figures that are key in this story of British first-class cruiser development, Sir 
William White and Sir John Fisher, White had the greatest impact. Sir Alexander Milne must 
also receive due recognition as the man who created the Royal Navy’s highly effective, but 
necessarily shadowy trade-protection strategy, though his time was rather before the 
beginning of the period primarily covered by this thesis. White, conversely, was a key figure 
for much of the era, moving well beyond the material remit that might be expected of the 
DNC and deep into the realms of service strategy and tactics. His view was that these were 
just as much integral parts of his job: that in order to advise the Board properly and to ensure 
the superiority of service ships, the Director of Naval Construction should know what rival 
powers were constructing, and how the Royal Navy intended to employ its vessels. It was this 
breadth of involvement as much as his design and organisational skills that made White the 
greatest naval architect of his generation. In this, he remains unsurpassed. 
 
The first-class cruiser of the era, though often marginalised in the historiography, was a vital 
part of the service, owing to the nature of the contemporary naval challengers. Although the 
Jeune École is generally accepted as having died out in the early 1890s, the commerce-
raiding elements that had been incorporated into it remained a major strategic interest for 
many naval powers, most notably France and Russia, and, to a lesser extent, the United 
States. All laid down cruisers dedicated to, or with a heavy emphasis upon, attacking (British) 
trade. The Dupuy de Lome in France, Rurik in Russia and Columbia in the United States are 
the most striking examples dating from the early 1890s, and France in particular would place 
a considerable emphasis upon such types for over a decade. Despite the attention given to 
such vessels in foreign services however, the first-class cruisers designed under White 
generally possessed a considerable performance advantage over contemporary rivals in most 
respects as qualitative superiority was demanded. The Royal Navy invested in large scale 
tests, from the highly secret Resistance experiments, from which effective protective 
arrangements were derived, to Froude’s model tests in the large dedicated tank at Haslar, both 
of which White championed. The importance of both, along with the constant armour trials 
on board the Nettle cannot be overstated since they gave the RN a critical technological edge 
over the vessels of potential challengers. 
 
For the majority of the period covered, the dominant naval weapon was the intermediate-
calibre quick firing gun, largely due to their rate of fire which, before the development of 
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effective centralised fire-control was the surest way of hitting something at more than point-
blank range. These intermediate-calibre weapons were quite capable of riddling thin side-
armour or the large undefended areas of hull above a thick but narrow waterline belt. Until 
the development of effective face-hardened steel armour, the optimal means of protection in a 
first-class cruiser was with internal curved armoured decks associated with extensive coal-
protection and intricate subdivision, vertical armour reserved only for barbettes, casemates, 
conning towers and gunhouses. The efficacy of this approach was later confirmed by the 
Resistance trials, and combat experience in the Sino-Japanese war, and it was employed in all 
the Royal Navy’s first-class cruisers from the Blenheims to the Diadems. The former were the 
largest cruisers in the world at the time of their design and the first vessels to be termed 
‘battle-cruisers’ (albeit entirely unofficially) by Rear-Admiral Samuel Long, confirming that 
certain naval officers were seriously considering fleet-duties for first-class cruisers. While 
primarily designed for trade-protection, Long and several contemporary progressive thinkers 
like Eardley-Wilmot appear to have perceived, as the battlefleets regained the capacity to 
fight at rather than from, the sea, so the latest first-class cruiser types could be useful heavy 
scouts, or if handled carefully even function as a fast division or squadron –a point underlined 
at the Yalu engagement during the Sino-Japanese war. Selborne would later make the note on 
Fisher’s Naval Necessities that ‘the experience of the present war [the Russo-Japanese 
conflict 1904-05] shows that protected cruisers like Powerful if they have protected gun 
positions, are much more valuable than I had supposed.’6 
 
With the development of effective face-hardening techniques, the French navy initiated a new 
era by equipping their latest first-class cruiser Jeanne d’Arc with a complete belt of 
Harveyized armour plate. The introduction of face-hardened armour was the most significant 
material advance made during the 1890s, and it in turn effected a step-change in the 
capabilities of first-class cruisers, and ultimately the strategical and tactical environment as a 
whole. The substantially improved defensive capabilities wrought by face-hardened plate 
allowed a first-class cruiser to carry a sufficient amount of defensive armour to make close-
action with battleships a completely practical proposition. The protection of the Cressy class, 
which introduced such armour into British first-class cruisers was in fact broadly equal to the 
Canopus class battleships, outright gun-power being traded for a 3 – 4 knot increase in speed. 
These vessels were designed principally for fleet-duties (with even their length being 
                                                     
6 Lt. Com. P. Kemp [ed.] The Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher Vol.1 (London: Navy Records Society, 1960) 
p.42 
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restricted to facilitate effective manoeuvring with battleships), trade-protection being 
relegated to a subsidiary role. It was only with the following Drake class that the service built 
a nominal response to the Jeanne d’Arc, rather contradicting suggestions that the Admiralty 
was thrown into instant panic by this vessel’s supposed superiority over existing British 
trade-protection types like the Diadems –a superiority that may not have been as significant 
as often believed. This was likely the result of knowing that, hysterical comments in the press 
notwithstanding, British yards generally had greater capacity and quicker build-times than 
those of foreign nations, and therefore a degree of lag was acceptable. The new side-
armoured types in the Royal Navy also possessed a significant advantage over French 
construction both in size and defensive capabilities, since from the reintroduction of vertical 
protection in the Cressys, British vessels carried Krupp Cemented plate. 
 
It is slightly ironic that the Cressys and Drakes were never described as ‘battle-cruisers’ 
(hyphenated or otherwise) since if the term is to be taken in its most literal sense, they were 
the vessels that it most accurately described: within the context of their own QF-gun 
dominated era, their defensive measures were quite sufficient to allow them to trade blows 
with battleships for a reasonable amount of time. They were, in essence, a genuine alternative 
form of capital-ship, having in many respects rendered the ‘traditional’ battleship obsolescent 
if not obsolete. Given the global requirements of the Royal Navy and the fact that the 
principle European rivals placed a general (though somewhat inconsistent) emphasis upon 
commerce-raiding, it can be argued that the new armoured cruisers were in fact better-
adapted for the contemporary service’s needs and the idea of ceasing battleship construction 
though not seriously entertained by the Board, would not have been unrealistic. 
 
It has been suggested that Sir William White came to exercise a dominant influence over the 
Board throughout his tenure as DNC. Much of this assessment can be traced back to King-
Hall’s 1928 staff monograph on ‘The Evolution of the Cruiser’, and to an extent it is true. 
White would often carry the Board with him, but the Board were far from being acquiescent, 
and regularly overruled the DNC. This was most obviously manifested with the Board’s 
request at the end of the Nineteenth Century for a class of more modestly sized cruisers, 
primarily for trade-defence. The resulting Monmouths and subsequent Devonshires can be 
seen as an attempt to get more ‘bang for the pound’ in terms of raw vessel numbers given that 
the principal rival powers were concentrating upon cruiser construction; whether this was the 
best use of resources is far more questionable. On balance, although the number of focal area 
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regions for trade-defence increased over time, the requirement for a large number of cruisers 
with only a marginal superiority over rival vessels seems at best dubious. Since the 
Controllers at the time (Wilson and May) were not in favour of smaller types, it may seem 
surprising that the Board continued with the construction of first-class cruisers of modest 
displacements while fully aware of their limited fighting power. There were extenuating 
circumstances though, and the decision should be considered in terms of the broader context 
of finances. First-class cruiser construction had formed a significant portion of new 
construction in the yearly Estimates since the Naval Defence Act, and this trend increased 
rapidly over time, especially following the introduction of costly face-hardened armour plate. 
The Devonshires were contemporaneous with the rather expensive King Edward VII class 
battleships, thus some degree of practical cost-saving was likely. Nevertheless, it is difficult 
to disagree with White, Wilson and May’s preferences for larger vessels, and twelve Drakes 
or upgraded versions thereof would almost certainly have granted the service greater 
capability than the ten Monmouths and six Devonshires, although this would admittedly have 
mandated upgrades to infrastructure owing to the size of the vessels, and restricted the 
number of ports they could visit abroad. 
 
The service first-class cruisers White had responsibility for were by no means flawless, 
although many of the criticisms can be rejected as based on simplistic or mistaken premises. 
With this in mind, Beeler’s concluding remarks upon Nathanial Barnaby also seems apposite 
to White: though not perfect by any stretch of the imagination ‘he was correct much of the 
time, and under the circumstances that was no mean accomplishment.’7 
 
 
The Watts and Fisher era 
Philip Watts succeeded White as DNC in early 1901, returning to the Admiralty from the 
Armstrong Elswick yard with a stellar reputation for building cruisers. Watts was known for 
favouring a heavier armament on a given displacement than his predecessor, although care 
must be exercised in attributing the increased number of heavier weapons in service vessels 
purely to him. The armaments were Board requirements, with considerable input from the 
DNO in the Controller’s department, just as they always had been. The evidence in the 
surviving Ship’s Covers and Admiralty Memoranda suggests rather strongly that Watts was 
                                                     
7 Beeler Op. Cit. p.214 
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nowhere near as proactive as White had been, and was happier to remain the servant of the 
Board, providing them with what they asked for rather than offering advice in a larger sense 
about what was required. Given that Watts was modestly famous for his cruiser designs, it is 
appropriate that the first Service design for which he had responsibility was the Duke of 
Edinburgh class, which was an improvement on the preceding two types, largely on account 
of greater size, and marked a return to the fleet-cruiser approach of the Cressys and Drakes. 
Their heavier 9.2in battery marked the changing gunnery conditions, with ranges gradually 
increasing, the greater size and protection of rival foreign vessels, and their projected fleet-
duties. They were also the last British first-class vessels to be equipped with the 6in gun.  
 
By the early Twentieth Century the financial burden of constructing two different types of 
capital ship was becoming unsustainable, although this was as much a matter of politics as 
pure economics. On an international level, the strategic situation was changing as Britain 
began to forge alliances with other nations, which had a concomitant impact upon 
construction, and the types of vessels required. In this changing environment, Selborne, the 
First Lord of the Admiralty, appointed Admiral Sir John Fisher as First Sea Lord largely on 
his promise to cut the spiralling Navy Estimates. Exactly what Fisher was planning remains a 
matter of considerable debate, since he rarely explained what his intentions were, his initial 
policy document, Naval Necessities not giving definitive strategic answers, and indeed it is 
probable that his views adapted over time as conditions altered. There are in essence three 
very broad interpretations that have emerged in the historiography. The ‘traditional’ 
perspective popularised by Marder and Parkes holds that with the demise of the Franco-
Russian naval challenge and the rise of that from Germany, Fisher concentrated battle-
squadrons in home waters, and attempted to provide the Royal Navy with a critical 
technological edge by adopting the turbine-powered, all-big-gun Dreadnought battleship in 
classic battlefleet strategy. This would be complimented by the big-gun battlecruisers 
intended to overwhelm all earlier cruiser types, though it is sometimes acknowledged that this 
latter type was Fisher’s real ‘love’ and that he would have happily have built these as the sole 
heavy units for the service for all duties, on the principal that ‘speed was armour’ and they 
could exploit this tactically to avoid serious danger even in a fleet-context.  
 
Conversely, the ‘revisionist’ perspective on the era, with notable contributions from Nicolas 
Lambert, has advanced the idea that the Admiralty did not regard Germany as a significant 
threat until rather later in the first decade of the Twentieth Century, and that Fisher took a 
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rather broader global strategic view rather than focusing on one European nation. His 
technological approach was even more radical that was widely believed, intended to revolve 
around an integrated policy of ‘flotilla defence’ using light forces to defend the UK mainland, 
critical overseas bases and the ‘narrow seas’, while large [battle]cruisers capable of rapid 
deployment around the world to anywhere they would be needed; these vessels could also 
effectively mop up possible threats to British commerce. As time progressed and German 
naval power grew, it is also contended that Fisher’s Admiralty moved toward a drastic policy 
of economic warfare that was to exploit Britain’s dominance of the global trade routes and 
the majority of communications networks. This was expected, unlike conventional blockade 
measures, to be able to win a war rapidly through the near-total destruction of their economy. 
Unfortunately, both of these perspectives often struggle to connect pre-Fisher conditions with 
the Fisher era, especially when it comes to the first-class cruiser and its place in RN policy 
and strategy. This may be because the apparent drama of the Fisher reforms tends to 
overshadow its links to existing service policies and this may be discerned in assessments of 
vessel design and development itself, especially that of the contemporary first-class cruisers 
and their development.  
 
A middle-ground exists, largely established by Sumida which straddles the boundaries 
between the Royal Navy’s global commitments on the one hand, and a concentration upon 
the German naval challenge on the other. Within this broad remit, recent work on broad RN 
strategy and war-planning by Grimes and Seligmann in particular have revealed that the 
service continuously developed, refined and tested plans in light of contemporary strategic 
developments and challenges. The latter has particular relevance for this thesis, since it lays 
considerable emphasis upon service policy from the start of the Twentieth Century, slightly 
before Fisher arrived as First Sea Lord, vis a vis trade defence, and the need to counter an 
increased threat to commerce from Germany while the service was still nominally 
concentrating on the Franco-Russian challenge. By focusing on this area though, it does not 
attempt to make significant connections to existing strategic policy for trade defence, nor note 
precedents in vessel design.  
 
That Fisher did not wish, nor intend to develop a conventional battlefleet is probable, instead 
rather wishing to exploit the greater versatility afforded by first-class armoured cruisers, 
which had been challenging the supremacy of the battleship ever since the introduction of 
Harvey and particularly KC armour plate. This at least is made clear throughout most of 
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Naval Necessities and much of his writing elsewhere, a classic example from the former 
being the following:   
 
Of what use is a battle fleet to a country called (A) at war with a country called (B) 
possessing no battleships, but having fast armoured cruisers and clouds of fast torpedo 
craft? What damage would (A’s) battleships do to (B)? Would (B) wish for a few 
battleships or more armoured cruisers? Would not (A) willingly exchange a few 
battleships for more fast armoured cruisers?8 
 
While overstated, probably for effect, Fisher made a fundamental point, and it seems he went 
some way to attempting to achieve goals along the lines of those unsubtly hinted at above. 
The strategic value of speed to the Royal Navy was very high given its global commitments. 
The term ‘cruiser’ however needs certain qualification since even within the remit of first-
class vessels, types and capabilities varied depending on anticipated function: the 
nomenclature itself can only ever be approximate. On the one hand there were dedicated 
trade-defence types which could be used as heavy scouts for a battle-fleet if required. On the 
other, there were vessels intended to have a capacity for operations not just with the 
battlefleet, but for taking their place in a battle-line, or forming a fast division in a fleet 
action. As things turned out, the first of these would be succeeded by the big-gun 
battlecruisers, considering them purely in terms of function and duties. The second type 
would become what would later be known as ‘fast battleships’, heavier protection and 
armament being possible thanks to the adoption of the steam turbine and greater 
displacement. The term ‘armoured cruiser’ when employed to describe a fleet-cruiser at the 
turn of the century though, and ‘fast battleship’ are essentially synonymous. Despite Fisher’s 
setting up the famous ‘fusion committee’ to combined battleship and cruiser features, HMS 
Dreadnought herself had already achieved this goal: far faster than existing reciprocating-
engined battleships, she, like the existing fleet-cruisers, was well-able to form a fast-division 
to such a battlefleet for the first years of her life, and though naturally excessive, she could 
have performed independent operations if called upon, just like the fleet cruisers. Her being 
attached to the 5th Cruiser squadron, comprising the most modern armoured cruisers at the 
time, is significant: they were the only types that had any chance of keeping up with her, and 
                                                     
8 Kemp Op. Cit. p.41 
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thus their modes of operation would have been akin, a point underlined by Bellerophon’s 
activities in the 1909 Manoeuvres.9  
 
Seligmann has recently returned to Admiral Reginald Bacon’s statements that the 
battlecruisers were created largely as counter to the possibility of commerce-raiding by fast 
(German) ocean liners rearmed as AMCs, and it is likely that these were at least one intended 
target for the new type, though this was hardly a new type of threat and the Royal Navy had 
developed types to counter such possible AMCs before; a point overlooked in the focus upon 
the period from 1900 onward. Overwhelming existing first-class cruisers was also likely a 
broad objective, although the design brief for the type, not least the decision to equip it with 
12in artillery, seems questionable in the medium-longer term. With that said, during the early 
years of their life, they would not have to face all-big-gun vessels in a battlefleet context, 
should they have been required to do so, and their armour was no worse than that of the 
Minotaur class armoured cruisers then under construction. Ultimately, a 9.2in armament 
would have produced a better balanced vessel, and there were moves following the I’s to 
bring it back, possibly for cost-saving, but also likely a reflection that the 12in had resulted in 
an uneasy balance of offensive and defensive powers.   
 
The basic principal behind trade defence during the period covered did not fundamentally 
alter, though the detail varied depending on the anticipated threat, and increasingly commerce 
itself was described as ‘bait’ to draw out raiders which would then be destroyed by fast first-
class cruisers in focal areas, which had been reaffirmed as the optimal means of protecting 
trade in April 1905. A rapid-transit ability had always been vital to the success of such 
operations, with armoured cruisers where necessary shifting to locations where required; a 
strategy that exploited long-distance communications and the greater number of available 
bases for coaling and dry-docking to counter threats on a global basis. The introduction of the 
turbine, with its dramatic improvement in power-to-weight, high-speed efficiency and, most 
important of all, reliability, only made the system more effective. It was put to the test in 
1914, and worked, the most dramatic instance being the annihilation of Von Spee’s squadron 
by the two I class battlecruisers Invincible and Inflexible, with various older armoured 
cruisers at the Falkland Islands engagement.  
 
                                                     
9 Bellerophon being largely a repeat of the basic Dreadnought design, with some detail refinements 
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Under Fisher, the first-class cruiser reached the culmination of a quarter of a century of 
continual development within the service. It began as a trade-defence type capable of 
effective heavy-scouting duties with the protected-deck vessels of the late 1880s and early 
1890s. By the final years of the Nineteenth Century, technological advances in armour 
allowed the production of a high-speed type capable of use as the fast-division of a 
contemporary battle-fleet, or even to take its place in the battle-line. And from 1905, all of the 
Royal Navy’s first-model big-gun types, irrespective of their official designations, had in 
their DNA something of these first-class side-armoured cruisers originally developed by Sir 
William White in the late Nineteenth Century.  
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Appendix I 
Naval Estimates 1884 – 19091 
 
 
Year  Totals £M Year  Total £M 
1884 = 10.8 1897 = 21.8 
1885 = 12.4 1898 = 23.8 
1886 = 12.9 1899 = 26.6 
1887 = 12.4 1900 = 27.5 
1888 = 13.1 1901 = 30.9 
1889 = 13.7 1902 = 31.3 
1890 = 13.8 1903 = 34.5 
1891 = 14.2 1904 = 36.9 
1892 = 14.2 1905 = 33.4 
1893 = 14.2 1906 = 31.9 
1894 = 17.4 1907 = 31.4 
1895 = 18.7 1908 = 32.3 
1896 = 21.8 1909 = 35.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Totals are rounded to the nearest £100,000. Various values may be found depending on which figures from the 
Estimates are utilised. Those in the table above are net, recorded in the House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers in millions sterling. Estimates were given based on a financial year beginning on 
1 April, therefore those indicated as 1884 are the 1884-1885 Estimates &c.  
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Appendix II 
Diadem and Cressy Class Cruisers -Notes on design
1
 
 
 
Confidential 
 
Submission of the Director of Naval Construction to the design of New First Class Cruisers 
(“Diadem” Class.) 
S.10268 
1895 
Minute of D.N.C. on Docket 
 
The Programme of Construction for the current financial year provides for commencing four first 
class cruisers, one at Pembroke and three by contract.  
 
The details of the design have been very fully discussed by the Naval members of the Board on the 
former papers attached. 
 
The details of the armament have been exhaustively considered on G.4441/94, various alternative 
arrangements having been compered before a decision was reached by the Naval Lords. Subject to 
that decision the details of the armament, arrangement of magazines, transport of ammunition have all 
been worked out in conference with the D.N.O. See G399/95. 
 
A provisional complement has also been arranged for the purposes of the design, but the exact 
numbers have yet to be determined, in accordance with the established procedure; and it is anticipated 
that there will be no difficulty in regard to accommodation of the full numbers likely to be required. 
 
The design has now been worked out in detail, and the various calculations completed. 
 
In accordance with the regulations, the Sheer Draught and Midship Section are now submitted for 
Board approval and stamp.  
 
A legend form is also enclosed, on which are compared the various details of the new design, and the 
corresponding details for the “Powerful” and “Blenheim”. 
 
As the class is one of considerable importance a descriptive account of the principle features of the 
design has been prepared and is herewith submitted for information and consideration. 
 
It will be noted that Board approval of the design was given on S.5241/95 so far as the legend of 
weights and principle dimensions and particulars are concerned.  
 
                                                     
1 The notes presented here are an abridged and slightly edited version of the reports by Sir William White 
contained in the respective ship covers held by the National Maritime Museum Ship Plans Collection 
(Woolwich Arsenal). A copy is also available in the National Archives NA ADM 116/446. 
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This was done previously to submitting a description of the class to Parliament in a special paper 
(copy herewith). 
 
(signed) W.H. White 
13
th
 July 1895 
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ENCLOSURE TO DOCKET CONTAINING GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE DESIGN 
 
 
Origin of the design 
In the consideration of the five years Programme of Construction it was contemplated to 
include a number of first class cruisers which should be intermediate in size and cost between 
the “Powerful” and the “Blenheim.” 
In round figures it was assumed that the cost per ship if built in a Dockyard (exclusive of 
incidental charges and armament) would be approximately £500,000. 
 
The first sketch design was submitted for consideration in June, 1894, and certain principal 
features were then provisionally approved by the Naval members of the Board. 
 
One governing condition laid down, in view of the very favourable reports received from the 
“Crescent” and “Royal Arthur,” was that in these vessels a long high forecastle should be 
provided as in the two earlier ships named, instead of following a flush deck arrangement 
which had been adopted for the “Blake” and “Edgar” classes.  
 
Further that over the lighter quick-firing guns mounted on the upper deck amidships, shelter 
decks should be built similar to those provided in the battle ships and in vessels of the 
“Powerful” class. In the previous first class cruisers no similar shelter decks were provided.  
 
It was also laid down that the ships should have their bottoms wood sheathed and coppered.  
 
Comparison to the “Blenheim” class. 
Various suggestions for embodiment in any future cruisers of the “Blenheim” class, have 
from time to time been received, notably the provision of facilities for the transport of 
ammunition below the protective deck, greater boiler power, high forecastle, and shelter over 
the midship guns. These evidently lead to increase of size.  
 
These points have received careful consideration in this design. It has been found necessary to 
increase the length considerably for the following reasons:- 
 
(1) To complete the triple side below the protective deck throughout the length 
of the compartment occupied by the propelling machinery. 
(2) To accommodate machinery and boilers which should be capable of 
developing sufficient power to give the vessel a high continuous sea speed. 
(3) To maintain a good stowage of coal conveniently near the furnaces. 
(4) To provide ammunition passages below the protective deck.  
 
The length required for propelling machinery and coals in the new ships subject to the 
foregoing conditions is 197 feet as against 161 feet in the “Blenheim.” 
 
The arrangements by which the longitudinal transport of ammunition is effected below the 
protective deck are as follow:- 
 
Roomy ammunition lobbies into which the magazines and shell rooms converge have been 
provided at each end of the ship. These lobbies are connected by passages through which a 
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continuous supply of ammunition will be kept up. Rapid hoisting to the gun positions will be 
effected, possibly by the use of electric motors. The conditions of service of ammunition in 
the “Powerful” class, and these new cruisers is greatly superior to other first class cruisers 
British and Foreign.  
 
These considerations fully account for the increase of 60 feet in length over the “Blenheim.” 
 
The following comparison summarised the points in which the new cruisers differ from the 
“Blake” and “Blenheim” and the introduction of which necessitates the additional size and 
cost per ship:- 
 
1. Armament 
14 12-prs. and 12 3-prs. substituted for 18 3-prs. 
Military rig with three fighting tops instead of plain with no tops. 
2. Protection of Armament, viz:- 
12 6-inch Q.F. guns in casemates in “Blake” the three remaining 6-inch guns in 
present vessel being in the open but protected by shields. 
3. Transport of Ammunition. 
Two ammunition passages below Protective Deck enabling the 6-inch and 12-pr. 
ammunition to be transported under protection; large protected hand up trunks are 
provided, and arrangements are made by which the service of ammunition will be 
facilitated, possibly by the use of electric motors. 
4. Addition of Forecastle and fore and aft bridges:- 
By this arrangement 6 6-inch Q.F. guns can be fired right ahead and the men working 
the 12-pr. guns on the upper deck are fairly well sheltered. 
5. Ship sheathed with wood and coppered.  
“Blake” has steel bottom. 
6. Possibility of maintaining a continuous sea speed of 19 knots in smooth water, a 
distinct advance on “Blake.” 
7. Stowage for 2,000 tons of coals as against 1600 tons in “Blake.” 
8. Much improved W.T. subdivision of coal bunkers above Protective Deck. 
9. The provision of a wing passage bulkhead beneath Protective Deck giving greater 
protection against torpedoes and ramming in action and also against grounding. 
10. The provision of a disposable weight (or Board Margin) of 150 tons. 
 
Dimensions and proportions. 
These are stated in detail on the accompanying Legend.  
 
The most careful consideration has been given to the choice of dimensions and form of the 
vessel, sand [sic] due regard has been paid to the suggestions made during the discussions in 
Parliament by Sir Edward Harland in regard to a closer approximation to the proportions used 
in merchant steamships, and especially to increase of length and diminution of beam and 
draught as favouring speed and carrying power. 
 
Our investigations, however, based on the particular recommendations which Sir Edward 
Harland made for vessels for the “Powerful” type and supplemented by carefully-conducted 
model experiments indicate that it is not possible to give effect to his recommendations or to 
secure the advantages which he anticipated. 
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Briefly summarised the conclusion reached is:- that subject to the essential condition of 
securing sufficient stability in association with a form adapted to economical propulsion at 
high speeds the recommendations of Sir Edward Harland cannot be carried into practical 
effect in a war cruiser. 
 
Doing the best that seemed possible on the lines laid down by him for a vessel of the 
“Powerful” class, it was found that the form needed to give the carrying power and stability 
was not nearly so well adapted to propulsion at the higher speeds as that actually adapted for 
the vessels as they are now building.  
 
But beyond this question of propulsion it is of great importance to note that in a war-ship 
increase in length necessarily carries with it diminished handiness and manoeuvring power, as 
well as a larger target for gunfire and an increased weight of protective material and structure.  
 
This statement is made in order that their Lordships may be assured that we are always 
desirous of impartially considering any suggestions that may be made for possible 
improvements coming from gentlemen who are experienced in ship-building.  
 
The radical differences, however, of type, and distribution of weights in war-ships and 
merchant ships have not been sufficiently appreciated in the recommendations by Sir Edward 
Harland.  
 
Gun Armament 
The full discussion of this matter appears on G4441/94. The final decision of the Naval Lords 
was in favour of a uniform armament of 15 6-in. Q.F. guns, rather than association of a lesser 
number of 6-inch guns with 8-inch or 9.2-inch guns. Twelve of these 6-inch guns are 
provided with casemate protection and three (on forecastle and quarter-deck) with revolving 
shields.  
 
Six of these guns can be fired in line ahead, and five directly astern. 
 
On each broadside 8 6-inch guns will be available. The second 6-inch gun on the forecastle 
can also be brought to bear for a considerable arc of training on either bow, which is a matter 
of great value in chasing. In addition to the 6-inch guns the vessel will carry 14 12-prs. and 12 
3-prs. besides smaller guns.  
The details of the disposition of the armament, and the horizontal arcs of training of the guns 
will be more clearly understood from the small scale drawing attached; which also gives a 
general idea of the external appearance of the vessel when completed for sea.  
 
Fighting Tops and their Armament. 
The number and dispositions have been decided on G776/94 attached. There will be three 
fighting tops, two on the foremast and one on the mainmast, each containing 3 3prs. Q.F. 
guns.  
 
Torpedo Armament. 
Three torpedo discharges have been arranged for two in a submerged room forward, firing on 
a fixed bearing on the beam, and a third at the stern above water firing in line with the keel, 
and provided with a protective mantlet.  
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In the “Powerful” on account for her much greater size, it has been possible to provide two 
submerged torpedo rooms; but in these cruisers space can be found for only one, as in the 
“Blenheim.” 
 
Speed. 
It is anticipated that the measured mile speed with natural draught will be 20 ½ knots when 
the ship has on board 1,000 tons of coal, and is in other respects complete for sea. As 
compared with the “Blenheim,” the new cruiser would be about ½ a knot faster with natural 
draught on the measured mile trial, and about 1 ½ knots slower than the “Powerful.” 
 
For continuous steaming at sea it is estimated that a speed of 19 knots will be maintained in 
smooth water and with clean bottoms.  
 
Owing to the adoption of the water tube type of boiler it is anticipated that the new cruiser 
will be about 1 ½ knots faster than the “Blenheim” for long distance steaming at sea.  
 
The corresponding sea speed for the “Powerful” is estimated at 20 knots.  
 
Propelling Machinery and Boilers. 
The arrangements of propelling machinery and boilers proposed for the new cruisers are very 
similar to those adopted for the “Powerful.” The “Belleville” type of water tube boiler is 
proposed, for reasons which have been stated fully in recent discussions. (See summary 
attached). It is not proposed to introduce forced draught.  
 
On an eight hours contractor’s trial it is estimated that 16,500 horse power should be 
developed, and at sea that it will be possible to develope [sic] continuously 12,500 horse 
power, which would correspond in smooth water and with clean bottom to 19 knots 
mentioned above.  
 
Coal Supply and Bunker Capacity 
The total bunker capacity arranged for is about 2,000 tons. All the spaces that can be 
conveniently assigned for coal supply have been appropriated for that purpose. In the Navy 
List displacement and at the designed Load Draught (in accordance with recent practice), half 
this bunker capacity, that is, 1,000 tons, is included. When the bunkers are completely filled 
with coal the ship will be immersed about 20 inches more than the normal load line; when the 
reserve feed tanks are also filled she will be about 22 inches deeper than the load line. 
 
Her freeboard amidships in this fully laden condition will be about 14 feet; and the conditions 
of stability as explained in detail hereafter will be satisfactory.  
 
In this deep load condition the speed would be diminished by about half a knot in smooth 
water. The consumption of coal when the vessel is at sea will of course gradually bring her to 
the normal load line which may be taken as representing about the mean condition of load.  
 
Coal Endurance. 
Taking the standard speed of 10 knots for cruising and allowing for the consumption for 
auxiliary purposes, it is estimated that starting with bunkers full the new cruisers could steam 
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over 8,500 knots in smooth water with clean bottoms before their coal was exhausted. This 
endurance is about 25 per cent greater than that on our latest type of battle ship (the 
“Majestic” class).  
 
The corresponding estimate for the “Powerful,” gives a radius of action of 11,000 knots, and 
for the “Blenheim,” 7,500 knots.  
 
It is difficult to make any trustworthy comparison of coal endurance for British and Foreign 
cruisers. Published figures for the latter in many cases obviously grossly exaggerate their real 
capabilities in this respect. 
 
But the actual maximum weights of coal carried are known in most cases and indicate that our 
vessels must have the greater endurance. Moreover, the foregoing estimate are based, so far as 
possible, on the results of actual experience.  
 
Stability. 
The conditions of stability for these cruisers have been made the subject of most thorough and 
careful calculations. In connection with the submission of recent designs both for battle-ships 
and cruisers, it has been repeatedly explained to their Lordships that the tendency in modern 
construction to increase height of freeboard, height of guns above water, and the protection 
afforded to the guns, their crews, and the transport of ammunition, all have the inevitable 
effect of raising the centre of gravity of the completed vessels far higher in relation to the total 
depth than was customary in earlier designs.  
 
The French have in this matter practically forced the hands of the designers of other nations. 
It is well known that in some of their latest and most important vessels this has been carried 
so far that the conditions of stability are not satisfactory owing to the large preponderance of 
upper weights accepted during construction. The vessels are so “tender” that they heel to large 
angles when turning in smooth water.  
 
In these cruisers, as in the “Powerful” and “Terrible,” the character of the armaments and its 
protection necessarily involves a considerable difference in the vertical distribution of weight 
from that which held good in the Blake and Edgar classes, where only four maindeck guns 
have casemate protection. The conditions of stability are therefore affected by the increase in 
upper weights.  
 
Taking first the question of Metacentric Height, which measures the stiffness of the vessel or 
her power to withstand inclination when subject to external forces (such as wind pressure, or 
the action of her helm) the following are the results anticipated for the new vessels. In the 
deepest load condition, the metacentric height is estimated as about 2 ¼ feet. In the extreme 
light condition practically the same metacentric height will be maintained. In the intermediate 
condition with 1,000 tons of coal on board, stowed in convenient positions, there will be 
about 2 ½ feet of metacentric height.  
 
In other words the stiffness will remain practically constant with convenient working of the 
coal. Even if the lower bunkers were entirely empty of coal and the upper bunkers were full 
(about 1250 tons) the metacentric height would still be as great as that possessed by many 
cruisers and merchant ships in their most favourable condition of stability. On the basis of all 
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past experience, therefore, the new vessels will possess ample stiffness and such a metacentric 
height as should favour steadiness in a seaway.  
Passing to the consideration of the stability at large angles of inclination curves have been 
constructed under various assumptions. It may be stated generally that the maximum stability 
is attained at an inclination of about 35 degrees to the vertical: and that the range of stability 
under such conditions of stowage as are likely to be existent at sea varies from 60 degrees to 
nearly 70 degrees according as the forecastle doors are open or closed.  
 
This range of stability is rather greater than that possessed by the “Devastation” class and 
closely approaches that of the “Monarch” as a rigged ship with considerable sail power. It is, 
however, less than the range possessed by the earlier cruisers of high freeboard in which the 
upper weights are proportionally much smaller.  
 
Having carefully considered the whole matter were are of opinion so far as all past experience 
and analysis furnishes a guide that in the new vessels (which possess no sail power) the range 
of stability may be regarded as sufficient for sea-going and fighting purposes.  
 
It may be explained further that no possible change in the form of the vessels or in the 
proportions of breadth to depth would sensibly affect this matter of the range of stability.  
 
It is practically governed by the vertical position of the centre of gravity, and that is 
dependent upon considerations above explained particularly in regard to the disposition of 
armament and its protection.  
 
This matter was fully explained by me to the Board when the designs for the “Majestic” and 
“Powerful” classes were under consideration. It is now again dealt with in this submission 
because it is of the highest importance that the facts should be placed before their Lordships 
not merely in reference to this design but in regard to the tendency of recent construction in 
all countries. 
 
While we are of the opinion that the conditions of stability just explained are such as may be 
accepted with due regard to the safety and good behaviour of the vessels, it must also be 
understood that in working out the designs it will be necessary to steadily resist any proposals 
for changes which would tend to further raise the centre of gravity and so diminish the 
stability.  
 
Protective Arrangements of the Hull. 
The principle protection of the vitals of the ship consists of a curved steel deck which closely 
resembles in its form and thickness the arrangements approved for the “Powerful” and 
“Terrible.” 
Over the engines and boilers (that is to say a length of nearly 200 feet in the ship) the plating 
is in three thicknesses making up a total of 4 inches of steel; at the extremities the thickness is 
about 2 ½ inches.  
 
Having regard to its form and its position in relation to the water-line, this deck furnishes a 
very strong defence for the machinery, boilers, magazines, shell rooms, and steering gear 
against all forms of attack and particularly against shell fire.  
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The crown of the deck is nearly 3 ½ feet above the designed load line with 1,000 tons of coal 
on board, and the lower edge of the 4-inch plaiting is about 4 feet below the water-line.  
The two upper layers of plaiting are stopped somewhat short of the ship’s side as shown on 
the midship section. This arrangement enables an excellent structural attachment to be made 
of the framing above to that below the protective deck.  
 
Moreover having regard to the position of this portion of the deck below water, and to the 
constant presence of coal in the lower angles of the bunkers it does not appear necessary to 
carry out the full thickness to the side. If this were done an additional weight of at least 150 
tons would be involved at a portion of the deck least likely to be struck.  
 
The arrangement is, in principle, very like that which when applied to belt armour tapers the 
thickness gradually towards the lower edge.  
 
The lower edge of the deck where it meets the side is 6 ½ feet below the water line, whereas 
in many foreign battleships of larger beam, the depth of armour belt under water is only about 
5 feet.  
 
It will be observed from the midship section, that in accordance with established practice, the 
fullest possible use is made of coal protection by means of bunkers placed above the 
protective deck. About 60 per cent of the total coal stowage is in fact above this deck.  
 
In connection with the design of the second class cruisers (“Arrogant” class), an arrangement 
was introduced where is here repeated in order to give increased protection.  
 
A longitudinal partition has been constructed into the upper coal bunkers with cofferdam 
attached thereto, so that it will be in the discretion of the captain, until a very late period in the 
consumption of the coal; to maintain the coal in the outer bunkers close to the side and above 
the protective deck.  
 
These bunkers will hold about 750 tons. Without drawing upon them the coal endurance (of 
the remaining 1250 tons) at a speed of 10 knots is estimated at about 5,00 knots. The stiffness 
of the ship is such, that the whole weight of that coal could be left in place with the lower 
bunkers absolutely empty. This is a most important feature in the defence, especially when 
the fact is noted that the upper side bunkers are divided into numerous compartments by 
transverse partitions.  
 
Probably the ship will be in her best fighting condition when absolutely full of coal and at her 
deep load draught. The crown of the deck will then be about 18 inches above water, and the 
lower edge of the deck will be nearly 8 feet below water. In the upper bunkers there will be a 
solid mass of coal reaching to the main deck overlying machinery and boilers having a 
transverse thickness on each side of from 20 to 25 feet.  
 
Experiment shows that coal stowed in bulk in this manner is one of the best possible “shell 
stiflers,” and its presence would prevent the access of large quantities of free water, and so 
assist in maintaining buoyancy and stability.  
 
The total weight of the armour in this protective deck is 1,200 tons. 
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Casemate Protection. 
As already explained 12 of the 15 6-inch guns are to have casemate protection. The weight 
assigned to these casemates and to the thick steel tubes for bringing the ammunition up into 
the casemates from below the protective decks will amount in the aggregate to about 560 
tons.  
 
Total Weight of Protective Material. 
Including the conning tower the mantlet to stern torpedo tube, and other items in the defence, 
the total weight of protective material in these vessels will aggregate about 1,850 tons, or 
about one-sixth of the total displacement.  
 
It is, in fact, the heaviest item in the legend of weights apart from the structure proper. Yet it 
is the fashion in some quarters to speak of vessels protected in this manner as “unarmoured.” 
 
Alternative Methods of Protection. 
Considerable attention has been directed of late to the fact that whereas the Admiralty has 
adhered to the protective deck system for cruisers, in foreign navies the use of vertical armour 
on the sides has been preferred.  
 
The mode of application of such vertical armour on the sides of ships varies very greatly in 
different vessels: for example, the French cruiser “Dupuy de Lome” has her sides covered 
with thin armour throughout the length to the height of the upper deck.  
 
The “Rurik,” of the Russian navy, and the belted cruisers of the “Orlando” class in our own 
navy, have a narrow belt of moderately thick armour extending through a portion of the 
length and associated with a horizontal protective steel deck. In this feature they resemble 
many battle-ships.  
 
In the American cruiser “New York” a protective deck similar to that fitted in the “Blake” and 
“Blenheim” is supplemented by a narrow strake of thin armour in the region of the water-line 
extending over the length occupied by the engines and boilers: this is over less than half the 
total length of the ship.  
 
In the Italian Navy an arrangement has been made by which the thin side armour is carried up 
to protect the guns in the central battery. 
 
All of these applications of armour on the sides of cruisers with the exception of the belted 
type exemplified in the “Rurik” and “Orlando” may be considered to be based upon the 
fundamental conception that the explosion of shells with large bursting charges of high 
explosives shall be made to occur on the sides of the ship. 
 
Experiment has shown that with certain types of projectiles this result can be obtained, and 
our own “Resistance” experiments indicated very clearly how this matter stood.  
 
Since the date of the “Resistance” experiments attempts have been made with more or less 
success to modify projectiles and fuzes in such a way as to enable bursting charges of high 
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explosives to be carried through thin armour; and the highest authorities have expressed the 
opinion that this will be perfectly feasible.  
 
So far as experimental information is concerned it may be said that the facts were clearly 
before the Board of Admiralty after the “Resistance” experiments had taken place, and that in 
view of these experiments and with full knowledge of what was being done abroad, it has 
thitherto been considered preferable not to fit thin side armour as hull protection to British 
cruisers.  
 
The question has been repeatedly and exhaustively discussed in connection with successive 
designs. 
 
Some of the most important of these are attached (see S.568/88 and S.4307/89). 
 
When the “Powerful” and “Terrible” were designed in 1893, the matter was again most 
carefully considered and repeatedly discussed at meetings of members of the Board.  
 
On all occasions it has been decided hitherto that the balance of advantage in vessels of the 
cruiser class was to be found in the use of a strong protective steel deck in association with 
effective coal defence, rather than in the adoption of thin vertical armour.  
 
It has necessarily to be admitted that apart from any conclusive experience in actual warfare 
the best distribution of a given weight of protective material is largely a matter of opinion.  
 
So far as experience has gone, however, it is in favour of the view that in all classes of ships, 
the primary necessity in defence is the protection of the vitals by a steel deck. This deck may 
be associated, (as it customarily is in battle-ships) with the thick waterline belt of armour, or it 
may be strongly curved and associated with a protected citadel rising to a considerable height 
above the water as in our “Majestic” class, or it may be supplemented by thin side armour 
rising to the main or upper deck; but in all these varieties of protection the underlying idea is 
that the ultimate defence is in the strength of the deck.  
 
The Admiralty view hitherto has been that with a given weight of protective material the true 
principle is to place the defence afforded by the deck itself beyond question and so far as deck 
protection is concerned battle-ships like the “Renown” or “Majestic” class and cruisers such 
as the “Powerful” or the “Blake,” or the vessels now proposed are very nearly on equal terms.  
 
Whereas in our recent battle-ships intended for close action and to force the fighting this deck 
is associated with a strong and extensive armoured citadel, in the cruisers with their higher 
speeds, large coal supplies and different conditions of stability, the preference has been given 
to an enlarged coal supply and special arrangements for coal defence rather than to devoting 
weight to side armour. 
 
It is of course unquestionable that in a ship of given dimensions, speed, armament, and coal 
supply, a certain weight will be available for defence of hull and armament. If out of this 
available weight a certain proportion is assigned to thin side armour then it follows that there 
must be diminished protection in the form of the deck or casemate or some other feature. 
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To illustrate this general statement a reference may be made to what would be required if in 
the designs now submitted it were decided to fit a total thickness of 4 inches of steel on the 
sides throughout the length between the protective and the main decks. 
 
The weight required for such a thickness of side and the framing needed to support the thin 
armour, would be about 1,000 tons. The total weight devoted to the deck protection is about 
1,200 tons. Consequently if all other features of the defence remained unaltered except the 
protective deck only 200 tons instead of 1,200 tons would be available for deck protection, 
and the deck as a protective deck would practically cease to exist.  
 
Stated in another form out of the 1,850 tons of material devoted to purposes of protection 
more than half would be appropriated to the thin side armour and to extra supports required 
behind it and about 800 tons would remain available for the defence of the armament 
transport of ammunition and the deck.  
 
On the former papers including those which deal in detail with the results of the “Resistance” 
experiments will be found a clear statement of the reasons which have guided the Admiralty 
so far in not following the lead of foreign navies in regard to thin side armour on cruisers.  
 
As a matter of convenience, however, the conclusions which have been reached may be 
briefly summarised. 
 
1. Experiments show that when thin side armour is fitted with a special view to its use 
as a defence against high explosives then enormous damage may be done behind that 
armour by means of chilled cast iron projectiles. In other words that having 
constructed a thin armoured side to minimise damage from a form of attack which 
necessarily involves great risks in the firing of large bursting charges from the guns 
of an assailant, the result is to enable that assailant to vary his form of attack and at 
less risk and cost to inflict very serious damage. 
Those who saw the results of the attack with Palliser projectiles on the decks behind 
the thin armour of the “Resistance” will realise how serious was this matter and to 
what distance from the point of impact the injuries done by mitraille and splinters 
extended. It was the consideration of these facts which led to the introduction of the 
system of the isolation of individual guns in separate casemates, and the danger 
seems to have been greatly overlooked in many foreign ships when the lighter Q.F. 
guns are concentrated in batteries protected by thin armour.  
 
2. As above stated the highest authorities are of opinion that it will be possible to devise 
projectiles that shall carry their bursting charges through the thin armour. 
 
3. It has been demonstrated that when the explosion of large charges of high explosives 
takes effect on thin side armour the local damage to the side is of very serious extent. 
The French experiments on this matter were most instructive and conclusive.  
 
4. The “Resistance” experiments on the unarmoured parts of a ship showed that when a 
shell containing high explosives burst on a thin side the local damage was less than 
when the side was stronger, say when supported by a girder or frame.  
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The explosion in such cases took effect close to the side, but the full violence of that 
explosion did not extend to any great distance, the gaseous pressures lowering rapidly 
as the products of explosion diffused themselves.  
 
In this connection reference may be made again to the French experiments from 
which the authorities drew the inference that even with large melinite charges, if the 
bursting could be determines at a distance of about a metre from a protective deck, 
the damage to the deck would be enormously lessened.  
 
As explained above the ultimate protection of the vitals depends chiefly in all classes 
of ships upon the power for that deck and the protection it affords. 
 
5. The remarkable development of Q.F. guns, such as the 12-pr. and 25-pr., in recent 
years gives the power to an assailant of riddling this side armour with steel projectiles 
very nearly as readily as the thin sides of a ship without vertical armour could be 
riddled by the smaller natures of Q.F. guns. 
 
In other words, the thicknesses of armour 3 to 4 inches used in most of the so-called armoured 
cruisers affords no real defence to the water-line region against the attack of Q.F. guns, which 
can be carried in considerable numbers on board ships. 
 
On the whole, therefore, it has been held to be preferable in British cruisers to develop as 
much as possible within the limits of weight available, the strengths of the protective decks, 
the protection of the principal Q.F. guns, and the transport of the ammunition.  
 
The alternative policy within the limits above mentioned of weight available involved the 
fixing in the form of a passive and incomplete defence of a very large weight of thin armour, 
and consequently weakening all the other features of the defence.  
 
The association with strong protective decks of well sub-divided coal bunkers necessarily 
adds to the defensive power of the ships when the coal is present, and the arrangements made 
in recent vessels and proposed to be repeated here by which a considerable weight of coal can 
be kept close to the side until a late period in the service of the ship necessarily adds to the 
value of the coal protection. 
 
It is unquestionable that the thin sides above the protective decks will be freely penetrable by 
the projectiles of the smallest guns; but it is obvious that in the working out of the fuel the 
coal in the angular spaces above the protective deck will be retained to a very late period, and 
this will constitute a most important feature in the defence. 
 
It may be hoped that after the thin sides are severely damaged the longitudinal coal bunker, 
bulkheads, and cofferdams situated at a considerable distance within the ship will give the 
means of considerably lessening the inflow of water, locking it in fact in the other coal 
bunkers to a great extent.  
 
Much has been made of the experience at the battle of the Yalu, as proof of the value of thin 
armour. Having carefully read most that has been published on this subject as well as the 
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official reports, it does not appear that the experience in that engagement is worth much in 
forming an opinion on this point.  
 
On the Chinese side both a belted cruiser, and a protective deck cruiser were sunk by gunfire; 
but we know that all the Chinese ships had been much neglected and were ill adapted; 
probably their watertight sub-division was practically non-existent. 
 
On the other hand the Japanese had a very considerable number of cruisers of the protective 
deck type in the engagement, and lost none of them. Again the two Chinese battle-ships were 
vessels of the central citadel type with large unarmoured ends and under water decks. It had 
been predicted by those who were opposed to the central citadel that such vessels when 
exposed to the fire of quick firing guns would speedily be sunk of capsized. 
 
But as a matter of fact this result did not follow, and the explanation seems to be that, while 
the unarmoured ends were riddled to a very considerable extent the region of the water line 
was relatively little injured.  
 
What has been done abroad indicates of course the possibility, if it be so desired by their 
Lordships of constructing cruisers of considerable power with thin side armour, but for 
reasons explained above when dealing with stability, if such types of vessels were to be 
designed, it would be necessary to carefully consider the whole question of the vertical 
distribution of weight, the height of freeboard and the height at which guns and their 
protective material could be carried. 
 
In fact it would constitute an entirely new departure and one requiring the most careful 
investigation.  
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S.11584 
1897
1
 
 
The fundamental ideas on which this design is based are as follows:- 
 
1. Special adaptation for service with the Channel & Mediterranean Fleets; & the 
performance of all duties hitherto devolving on First Class Cruisers attached to Fleets. 
2. Capacity for close action, as adjuncts to battleships 
3. Suitability for employment on detached services; if required to be used for the 
protection of shipping, commerce & communications. 
4. Armament, protection, speed & coal endurance to be such that the new cruisers 
should be formidable rivals to the best cruisers built or building for foreign Navies. 
 
For nearly two years past, since the design for the Diadem  class was completed, this matter has 
engaged my attention; & I have made a careful study of all this is being done abroad. My visits to 
France & Italy, made privately when recovering from illness, gave me much information, to which 
some valuable additions were made during my holiday this year. The official visits which I last year 
made to Germany & Russia were also of great service, in giving me closer acquaintance with the 
ideas prevailing amongst those charged with the decision & preparation of new designs. 
 
The present proposals originated largely from what I found in progress in Italy early in 1896. owing to 
financial pressure the construction of battle-ships had been nearly suspended. Only two such ships of 
moderate size were in hand, & advancing slowly. The Italian Naval Authorities  had therefore, been 
driven back upon the policy of constructing cruisers; protected & armed in such a manner that they 
could, when necessary, be associated with battle-ships, & take part in fleet-actions. The Carlo Alberto 
& Garibaldi are representatives of this type: & in my judgement are exceedingly well designed 
vessels.  
 
There were many features in these vessels that appeared susceptible of improvement; & for the Royal 
Navy there could be no question of the substitution of cruisers for battle-ships. On the other hand, the 
inspection of these vessels confirmed the opinion I had previously entertained: viz, that the time had 
arrived when it had become necessary to construct cruisers for fleet-work, which should be capable of 
taking part in fleet-actions as adjuncts to battle-ships.  
 
Hitherto the conception generally accepted has been that modern cruisers correspond to, & take the 
duties of, frigates formerly serving with fleets. As scouts & attendants on the battle-ships their place 
will no doubt, be always fairly described in this manner. But whereas frigates, in old days, took no 
part in fleet-actions, there seems absolutely no reason, under modern conditions, why first-class 
cruisers should hold aloof if designed & constructed suitably. This has become true largely through 
improvements in armour & armaments made in the last few years, & the point seems of sufficient 
importance to justify further illustration. 
 
If cruisers are to be built capable of acting with battle-ships in fleet actions, they must be given such 
protection to buoyancy, stability, guns & crews, as will enable them to come to close quarters with the 
enemy without running undue risks.  
 
                                                     
1 Notes on Cressy class side-armoured cruisers 
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Until the latest improvements in armour were made, the thicknesses & weights necessary to secure 
adequate protection, over a sufficient area & height of broadside, were such as to involve very large 
dimensions & cost, when associated with the high speeds & large coal supplies necessary in cruisers. 
Consequently, it may be said, with confidence, that no existing cruisers have the necessary protection 
to justify their undertaking close action with battle-ships, except it be the Italian cruisers above 
mentioned & a few vessels similarly protected & of a later date. 
 
In my Report on the Diadem class (written in July 1895) I have explained fully the policy of the 
Admiralty up to that date in adhering to strong protective decks & coal protection, rather than 
following the lead of foreign Navies, & using thin vertical side armour.  
All that was said in that Report still holds good, & there is no reason for supposing that our cruisers, 
with their strong protective decks, are not capable of meeting, on more than equal terms, foreign 
cruisers, built at or near the same dates, with thin vertical side armour, & weak protective decks. 
 
As an example, a comparison between the Dupy de Lome & the Edgar class may suffice. The former 
has her broadside covered with soft steel plating a little less than 4 inches thick: & her protective deck 
is about 2 inches thick. Her armament includes 2 – 7.4 inch, 6 – 6.2 inch Q.F. & a number of smaller 
guns. The 7.4 & 6.2 inch guns are in turrets with 4 inch armour. Her speed is 20 knots as a maximum, 
for a very short period. 
 
The Edgar class have protective decks 5 inches thick: they carry 2 – 9. inch guns, 10 – 6 inch Q.F., & 
a number of smaller guns. The armament is better disposed as well as more powerful. Larger suppliers 
of ammunition are carried. Four of the 6 inch guns are in casemates with 6 inch armour: the remaining 
6 inch guns & the 9.2 inch guns have shield protection. The maximum speed is nearly 21 knots, for a 
four hours trial.  
 
The 4 inch side armour of the French cruiser has been provided partly at the sacrifice of the protective 
deck. It can be smashed & perforated by Palliser projectiles from 6 inch guns. Against shell attach 
from guns of large calibre it is not effective, being too thin for armour of that quality. 
 
If an action took place between these two cruisers, the absence of vertical side armour in the Edgar 
would surely be more than compensated for by her superior armament & stronger protective deck. 
And, speaking generally, it may be affirmed that up to the present time British cruisers built at a given 
date are fully equal to engaging foreign cruisers of comparable classes & sizes, built about the same 
period. Nor must it be overlooked that by adopting the protective-deck system very large economies 
of cost have been made, & for a given outlay vessels of superior speed, armament & coal endurance 
have been obtained, as compared with what would have been possible had thin side armour been 
adopted. The Edgar cost £367,000: the Dupy de Lome £416,000. 
 
While there is no reason for supposing that the past policy of the Admiralty has been unwise in regard 
to cruiser construction there is undoubtedly a necessity for a new departure: in view of the 
improvements recently made in armour. 
 
The ships built under the Naval Defence Act of 1889 had the best armour then procurable. Since 1894 
we have had the Harvey system, & successive improvements thereupon. The progress made may be 
represented by the fact that in 1889 – 93 a plate 10 ½ inches thick was needed to resist the attack of 
100 lbs. Holtzer projectiles fired from a 6 inch gun with a striking velocity of about 2000 feet per 
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second. Now a 6 inch plate can afford equal or superior protection. The proportionate thicknesses & 
weights are as 100 to 57. 
 
This remarkable economy of weight in relation to protection necessarily alters all the conditions of 
design for cruisers. It is still true, that if armour is kept so thin as to offer no efficient defence, it is 
preferable to do without vertical plating on the sides altogether, & to strengthen protective decks. But 
it is equally true, that within limits of size & cost which are not prohibitive, it is now possible to build 
first-class cruisers of high speed, well armed & with good coal supplies, which shall have vertical 
armour of sufficient thicknesses to give protection to buoyancy, stability & armament against armour 
piercing projectiles from the largest true quick-firing guns & against the attack of shell with large 
bursting charges from guns of greater calibre. 
 
If such cruisers are to be capable of working with battle ships, it is most important that they should 
not very greatly exceed the latter in length. Otherwise they cannot manoeuvre in company.  
 
These points were discussed at the Meeting of the Naval Members of the Board held on the 3
rd
 May 
(see other papers) & certain leading features were determined upon, to be embodied in an “outline 
Design”. That design has since been worked out in sufficient detail to enable the following statement 
to be prepared of what is practicable. It will be understood that in the completion of the drawings & 
calculations necessary for the building of ships, should the proposals now made be generally 
approved, certain modifications may be required in dimensions & displacement. This will not 
however sensibly affect cost or time of construction. 
For service with the Mediterranean or Channel Fleets, where there are ample facilities for docking at 
command, wood-sheathing & copper on the bottoms is not necessary, for these cruisers any more than 
for battle ships. It is proposed, therefore, to dispense with it. This will save about £40,000 on first 
cost: about 550 tons in weight: & 9 inches in draught by the omission of keel. 
 
This ships will, of course, be less capable of keeping the sea for long periods without fouling of 
bottom & corresponding loss of speed. But experience with the Blenheim & Edgar classes shows that 
even on distant stations, unsheathed ships can be used without serious trouble if docking is properly 
seen to. Docking facilities abroad, moreover, are being greatly increased. 
 
Hereafter it will be shown what would be the effect of adding wood & copper sheathing to the ships 
proposed. 
 
It has been decided that the thicknesses & general disposition of the vertical armour on the sides of 
the new cruisers should be similar to those adopted in the “Canopus” class. 
 
On the accompanying drawing the proposed arrangements are indicated. Over a length of about 230 ft 
amidships the sides are covered with armour plating about 6 inches in thickness., from a depth of 5 ft 
below the normal waterline to a height of 6 ½ to 7 ¼ ft above. The total depth of vertical armour is, 
therefore, about 12 ft.  
Athwartship armoured bulkheads, 5 inches thick are placed at the ends of the 6 inch side armour, thus 
enclosing a “citadel” upon which the protection of buoyancy, stability & trim largely depends.  
 
At the upper edge of the citadel armour a protective (main) deck 1 inch thick is to be fitted: & at the 
lower edge a second protective deck 1 ½ inches thick. Nearly the whole space between these two 
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protective decks will be assigned to coal-bunkers, well-subdivided into separate compartments, & 
giving a great increase to protection.  
 
Before & abaft the citadel the lower protective deck extends to the extremities. From the citadel 
forward to the bow the sides are to be protected by nickel-steel plating worked as in Canopus class; & 
giving a total thickness of 3 inches of steel. Abaft the citadel the plating will be somewhat thickened 
in the region of the water-line. As is usual in all battleships & cruisers the spaces at the extremities, 
above the protective deck, will be very minutely subdivided: & to a large extent occupied with stores. 
Any considerable or objectionable changes of trim resulting from injuries to the sides in action & the 
entry of water above the protective deck will thus be avoided.  
 
The development of this feature of hull protection in the new design will be better understood from 
the statement that whereas in the “Diadem” class 1200 tons and in the “Powerful” about 1500 tons are 
so appropriated, in the new cruisers about 1800 tons will be required – an increase of 50 per cent on 
the Diadem, and over 20 per cent on Powerful. 
 
Contrasting these defensive arrangements with those of recent foreign armoured cruisers so far as they 
are known, the advantage will undoubtedly be with the new ships.  
 
The details of the French ‘Jeanne d’Arc” are not published authoritatively; but I have been informed 
that there is to be a narrow water-line belt of armour about 6 inches thick, with a thinner strake of 
armour above. 
 
The German cruiser “Ersatz Leipzig” is to have a narrow water-line belt of armour having a 
maximum thickness amidships of about 7 ¾ inches, tapered to about 4 inches at the bow and stern. 
This belt rises only about 2 ½ feet above water and extends about 5 feet below. A protective deck 
rather less than two inches thick is worked at the top of the belt. Above this the only assistance to 
protection of buoyancy and stability is given be a small cork-filled cofferdam: the value of which 
must be extremely small.  
 
The Russian cruiser “Rossia” also has a narrow belt of 10 inch armour in the region of the water-line, 
stopping about 60 feet from the bow, with a 2 ½ inch steel deck above the belt. Such belts give little 
or no protection to buoyancy and stability, because of their narrowness.  
We have examples in the Imperieuse and Orlando classes among our own cruisers. It is interesting to 
note that the Russians have abandoned this system and imitated the arrangement of our battle-ships in 
the “Oslyaba” class.  
 
The Chilean, so-called, “armoured” cruisers have curved protective decks of moderate thickness 
associated with a narrow strip of 6 inch armour extending over a portion of the length in the region of 
the water-line.  
 
The American “New York” & “Brooklyn” are similar in their protection, but have very thin armour 
extending over very small areas.  
 
The Italian cruisers of the “Garibaldi” class are well protected vessels so far as thickness & area of 
hull-armour are concerned. That armour, however, has been made at Terni & the quality is probably 
inferior to that now procurable in this country. So that the defence is not so good as that proposed for 
the new cruisers.  
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It is known that the Argentines have purchased cruisers of this class from Italy; & it is believed that 
the large cruisers building or to be built for Japan will be well-defended by vertical armour.  
 
For cruisers designed to act as adjuncts to battle-ships in fleet-actions, it has been considered 
necessary to carry guns of such energy & shell power as would be effective against the defences of 
the secondary armaments of foreign battle-ships.  
 
After repeated discussions it has been held to be undesirable to adopt the 8 inch calibre for the Royal 
Navy in any new vessels.  
 
The 9.2 inch gun, of which new designs are now under consideration, was decided upon by the Naval 
Members of the Board as most suitable for the new cruisers. One to be carried on the forecastle as 
bow-chaser, one to be carried aft on the quarter deck. Both guns to be of the latest type.  
 
The 6 inch Q.F. gun is also being improved in velocity & energy. Provision has been made for 
utilising these heavier & more powerful weapons.  
 
The number of these 6 inch guns was left open by the Naval Lords until the design was worked out to 
some extent.  
 
On the picture drawing (herewith) of the new cruisers I have shewn 12, 6-inch guns in casemates. 
Good positions can be found for that number of guns, which is identical with the casemated guns in 
“Diadem” & “Powerful” classes. 
 
It must be pointed out, however, that the adoption of the 9.2 inch guns & the armour protection for 
them, involves such an increase of weight as compared with the Diadems 4 6-inch Q.F. bow & stern 
chasers with shield protection, that it is not possible to accept the increase without a considerable 
increase of displacement.  
 
I would, therefore, submit for the consideration the following proposals:- 
(1) To carry 12, 6-inch Q.F> guns, each gun having 100 rounds of ammunition as the 
normal supply. The magazines to be made capable of holding 200 rounds per gun, & that 
supply to be put on board when required. Or 
(2) To carry 10 6-inch guns, with 200 rounds per gun as the normal supply. 
 
For the service proposed with the Channel or Mediterranean fleets the first course appears preferable. 
If employed on detached service magazines can be filled up.  
 
 
The armament provided for is – 
2 9.2-inch guns of new type protected as in Powerful 
10 6-inch Q.F. guns with 200 rounds or 12 6-inch Q.F. guns with 100 rounds 
14 12-prs Q.F. 
10 3-prds      
2 Torpedo Tubes submerged 
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The estimated weight of this armament is about 35 tons greater than that of the “Diadem” class: but 
the protection to the armament will involve about 50 tons increase of weight: making an increase of 
over 80 tons –over 6 per cent – on these items. 
 
It is possible that some criticism may arise over the change of armament made from the “Diadem” 
class where an uniform armament of 6-inch Q.F. guns was adopted, there is really no contradiction. 
The “Diadem” class were designed for detached service & to meet foreign cruisers then built or 
building. For these services the balance of advantage was considered to lie in the uniform armament 
of 6-inch Q.F. guns. The new cruisers are designed specially for fleet-service  & for close action as 
adjuncts to battle-ships. Consequently it has been thought desirable to introduce 9.2 inch guns, in 
well-protected & commanding stations, instead of having 6-inch bow & stern chasers with shield 
protection. Both of these guns will be available on each broadside. 
 
It is proposed to give the 9.2-inch guns the same thicknesses of protection as have been accepted for 
the guns of identical calibre in “Powerful”. The armour at the base of the gun-mountings will be about 
6-inch & on the shields 6-inch. The 6-inch Q.F. guns are to have “casemate” protections with armour 
on the fronts about 5 inches thick.  
 
Armoured ammunition tubes will be fitted as usual.  
 
The service of ammunition will be carried out through passages situated below the lower protective 
decks, as in all recent battle-ships & first-class cruisers. 
 
It will be seen for this description that the protection to the secondary armament will be identical with 
that approved for the “Canopus” class. The essential difference between the new vessels & “Canopus” 
class is in the character & protection of the bow & stern chase guns. In this respect the arrangements 
finally approved for the “Powerful” class have been followed.  
 
Two submerged discharges can be arranged in a single room, placed either before or abaft the engine 
& boiler rooms as may be preferred.  
 
There is not available space for two submerged torpedo rooms: nor can it be secured unless the ships 
were lengthened by about 20 feet. 
 
The demands made for protected space in the hold are very great, in consequence of the great engine 
power, heavy armaments & large coal supply. 
 
The arrangements of propelling machinery & boilers provisionally adopted for the outline design after 
consultation with the Engineer-in-Chief, are similar to those of the latest vessels of the “Diadem” 
class. Belleville boilers, with economisers, & four cylinder triple expansion engines are contemplated. 
 
All these points will be carefully considered, in the preparation of the design, by the Engineer-in-
Chief. 
 
For present purposes, it suffices to assign the requisite weights and spaces for the power estimated to 
be required for the maximum speed. 
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It was decided by the Naval Members that the maximum speed to be obtained on the trial should be 
from 21 to 22 knots.  
It is proposed to realise 21 ½ knots with natural draught on the Contractors’ trial of eight hours 
duration.  
 
This appears less than the maximum speeds named for some recent cruisers building abroad. It is 
unnecessary, in view of my recent report on this matter (see other papers) to do more than say, that, 
provided the trials were made under identical conditions, the speed proposed for the new cruisers will 
not be found inferior to that realised by foreign cruisers. 
 
For example, the French “Jeanne d’Arc” has a reputed maximum speed of 23 knots. She has this 
estimated speed associated with the Normand type of boilers. The adoption of these boilers is 
questionable, as trials are in progress at the present time. But even if it is adopted it may be assumed 
that the maximum power & speed are to be obtained with high forced draught, not natural draught, as 
with our cruisers. The maximum speeds of French ships are not maintained more than four hours in 
most cases, & with high forcing cannot be longer continued. If natural draught trials were made for 
eight hours the Jeanne d’Arc would realise a much lower speed, or, if the boilers proposed for our 
new cruisers were made of the same type and highly forced according to French usage, the speed 
would be about 23 knots for a short period.  
 
To realise 21 ½ knots the new cruisers will require about 21000 I.H.P., as against 18000 I.H.P. for 20 
¾ knots in the latest vessels of the “Diadem” class.  
 
The new cruisers will therefore closely approach the sea-speed provided for in the designs of 
“Powerful” & “Terrible” & will certainly equal or surpass other cruisers.  
 
The Naval Members were of opinion that the New Cruisers should correspond closely in coal 
endurance with the latest battle-ships. It would appear that at cruising speeds of 10 knots this 
condition will be realised if the vessels carry about 1600 tons of coal, as against 1800 tons in 
“Majestic” class, &, 1600 tons in “Canopus” class. 
 
Bunker capacity can be found for 1600 to 1700 tons of coal. At the normal draught & Navy List 
displacement 800 tons will be carried. This agrees with “Canopus” class. 
 
With the increased engine power demanded by higher speed, & the extension of engine & boiler 
spaces, as well as the adoption of the armoured citadel for hull-protection, larger bunker space cannot 
be secured in a vessel of the proposed dimension.  
 
Starting with bunkers full the new cruisers should be capable of steaming for 30 days at a speed of 10 
knots. At the highest sustained sea-speed of 19 ¾ knots the vessels should be capable of steaming for 
about 120 hours & covering about 2400 knots before their coal was exhausted.  
 
The bunker capacity in “Diadem” class is for about 2000 tons: more space being available. These 
vessels are specially designed for detached service & a larger coal supply is valuable.  
 
For the purposes of the outline design a provisional complement has been assumed of 725 officers & 
men. This has been done on the basis of the compliment approved for the “Diadem” class, allowing 
for increase in engine power & differences in armament. The same number of officers has been 
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assumed, & it is understood that the new cruisers will not be fitted as flagships, in view of their 
intended service.  
 
This provisional compliment is open to revision under the established regulations. 
 
It may be stated, however, that the accommodation available in the new cruisers would be practically 
the same as in the “Diadem” class, & it is anticipated that after providing for the provisional 
compliment, there will be a margin for supernumeraries.  
 
In arranging the Legend of weights the allowance was made for the New Cruisers for provisions & 
consumable stores has been on the same basis as is followed for the battle-ships with which they are 
intended to work, viz: for 4 weeks’ supplies.  
 
The provision & store rooms will be made as large as possible so as to provide for the conditions of 
detached service on which the vessels may sometimes be employed.  
 
The whole subject of stability in modern high-sided battle-ships & cruisers was discussed in my 
Report of July 1895 on the Diadem class (copy attached). To that Report I would again call attention, 
as the matter is of supreme importance.  
 
What has happened to so many French ships might easily have occurred here had I not steadfastly 
resisted suggestions made to follow the French lead, & to increase loads of armour & armament 
placed at great heights above the water. Subsequent events have fully justified my action.  
 
This is a critical question in connection with the new cruisers & has relieved close attention. It 
becomes absolutely necessary, in passing from the “Diadem” class to the new vessels, to vary 
somewhat the vertical distribution of weight –that is to say heights of decks & guns above water.  
 
My proposal is, therefore, to maintain the long high forecastle which has proved so valuable a feature 
in the “Royal Arthur” & “Talbot” classes, with 31 feet of freeboard forward. The upper & main decks 
will be placed about 1 foot lower than in the “Diadem” class. The main deck guns of the new vessels 
will consequently be about 11 feet above water instead of 12 feet as in Diadems.” This height is very 
considerable & compares well with other classes. The upper deck guns will be from 17 ½ to 18 feet 
above water: & the 9.2 inch gun on forecastle 34 ft. 
 
With these & other changes that need not be mentioned, I am of opinion that satisfactory conditions of 
stiffness & stability will be secured for the ships in all their conditions of loading, included of course 
their deepest draught.  
 
At the same time it must be clearly understood that additions of weight aloft cannot be accepted 
during construction. The balance of the design must not be disturbed.  
 
The higher speed required in the new cruisers & the introduction of considerable weights of vertical 
side armour, necessarily involve additional cost as compared with the “Diadem” class.  
 
On the other hand the omission of wood & copper sheathing carries with it a reduction of cost of 
about £40,000.  
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Until we have worked out the design more thoroughly it is not possible to do more than approximate 
to the cost. But it may be stated that, if built by contract, under conditions as favourable as those 
which were secured for the Diadem class, the new vessels should be obtained at an average cost not 
exceeding £650, 000. The Diadem class (contract built) cost about £550,000: the Powerful & Terrible 
about £700,000. 
 
The “Jean d’Arc” class is estimated to cost £800,000. All these figures are exclusive of armament. 
 
(Signed) W. White 
 10.6.97 
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Appendix III 
Drake Class Cruiser -Notes on design
1
 
 
 
Strictly Confidential. 
S.9873/98 
Report on the  
Designs for New First Class Cruisers  
by 
The Assistant Controller and Direction of Naval Construction 
 
 
S.9873/98 
Strictly Confidential. 
 
Designs for New First-Class Cruisers 
 
The enclosed Report is submitted for consideration and decision on the following points:- 
 
1. The character and disposition of the armament, including its protection. 
2. The thickness and distribution of vertical and horizontal armour protecting buoyancy and 
stability. 
3. The type of boilers and engines. 
4. The character and duration of the trials on which the maximum speed of 23 knots is to be 
realised. 
 
It will be understood that in Designs Nos.1 and 2 provision has been made for Belleville boilers 
(economiser type), worked under natural draught, and capable of maintaining 23 knots for eight hours, 
with a sea-speed of 21 knots.  
 
The engines provided for are similar in type and rate of revolutions to those approved for “Cressy” 
class. 
 
In Design No.3 similar engines and boilers are provided for, but the 23 knots speed is to be 
maintained for four hours under moderate forced draught. The sea speed would be about 19 ¾ knots. 
In Design No. 4 small tube boilers are assumed, and somewhat quicker turning engines.  
 
When their Lordships instructions have been received on these and any other points, the detailed 
design will be proceeded with. With all possible overtime, having regard to heavy current work on 
other ships building, the new designs cannot be completed in less than three months from receipt of 
definite instructions.  
 
W. H. White 
23.5.98 
                                                     
1 The notes presented here are an edited version of the report by Sir William White contained in the Ship Cover 
held by the National Maritime Museum Ship Plans collection.  
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DESIGNS FOR NEW CRUISERS OF 23 KNOTS’ SPEED 
 
Alternative designs for these vessels have been most carefully considered in accordance with the 
decision reached on papers relating to the programme of construction for 1898-99. 
 
The high speed to be attained necessarily carries with it the employment of machinery of very great 
power. A most thorough inquiry into the best forms and dimensions possible in association with 
certain conditions of protection and armament has therefore been undertaken, and has occupied much 
time. It has embraced a very large amount of work and calculation in this office, are careful study of 
all available experimental data, and the constriction and trial of certain new models.  
 
We are thus enabled to proceed with comparative certainty in the preparation of a series of sketch 
designs providing for the trial speed of 23 knots, which has been fixed by the Board.  
 
It may be of assistance in the consideration of these sketch designs, if the principles upon which they 
are based are fully stated; although in certain respects what will be said must constitute a repetition of 
what has already been said in regard to the design of the “Cressy” class. 
 
 
Principle Dimensions 
 
Length. 
For the high speed required, speaking broadly, increased length beyond that of the “Powerful” 
class would favour economy of power. Other considerations, however, put a limit upon the 
length of the new ships. Docking facilities exist for the “Powerful” class at five British home 
ports outside the Royal Dockyards, viz., Birkenhead, Southampton, Tilbury, Belfast and 
Glasgow. 
 
Abroad, these ships can be docked at Hong Kong, Sydney, Auckland, and Halifax, as well as 
Malta. 
From the drawings of these docks now available, it appears that no increase of length beyond 
the “Powerful” is permissible in the new cruisers if docking facilities are to be secured, 
especially abroad.  
 
Again, as is explained hereafter, the use of vertical armour on the side of the new vessels 
introduces new conditions not appearing in the design of the “Powerful” class or other 
“protected” cruisers. It may in fact be preferable to accept less length and increased engine 
power, in order to economise on weight and cost of armour.  
 
The decision as to length, therefore, is one requiring full consideration of various possible 
advantages and disadvantages. This will appear more clearly from the particulars given for 
the sketch designs.  
 
Draught. 
It is agreed that the draught should be such, if possible, that the new ships should be capable 
of passing through the Suez Canal, completely armed and equipped, but with only a small 
quantity of coal on board. The “Powerful” and “Terrible” can be brought into a condition for 
passing through, but other adjustments or removals of weight are necessary. They are 
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sheathed ships, and the presence of the wood keel and false keel adds 9 inches to the draught, 
which is equivalent to the removal of 300 tons of weight. It will be seen, therefore, that the 
use of sheathing must exercise a marked effect upon the design in regard to passage through 
the canal. Moreover the development of engine power in relation to displacement required for 
the maximum speed becomes greater if it has to be obtained on a lighter draught.  
 
Beam. 
Although increase in the extreme breadth per se is not practical to economical propulsion at 
high speeds, yet, for many reasons, it is desirable not to have the breadth of the new cruisers 
sensibly greater than that of the “Powerful.” 
 
There is a prevalent idea that narrowness in relation to length necessarily favours economical 
propulsion. This has been demonstrated to be untrue, although, as above stated, increased 
length favours economy at high speeds.  
 
Freeboard amidships. 
The minimum freeboard amidships (measured to the height of the upper deck) is for practical 
purposes a constant quality, and must at least equal that of the “Cressy” class.  
 
The reasons for this are as follows:- 
 
1. With the maximum draught of water that can be accepted consistently with facilities for 
passing through the Suez Canal, the minimum depth in hold (measured to the lower protective 
deck) is fixed by the height required for the accommodation of the boilers.  
 
2. The height between this lower protective deck and the main deck is determined by the 
considerations 
 
(a.) There must be sufficient height for working the coal in the large bunkers 
situated above the lower protective deck. 
(b.) The 6-inch Q.F. guns on the main deck, which form an important portion of 
the armament, should be placed at such a height above water as to secure 
their efficient working. In the “Cressy” the height of the axis of the 6-inch 
guns above water is 11 feet, and this cannot reasonably be diminished. 
(c.) When the two foregoing requirements are met, a reasonable height is secured 
for the armoured citadel (or side armour), viz., 6 ½ feet above water. A less 
height of citadel would not give adequate protection to buoyancy and 
stability.  
 
3. The minimum height between the main and upper deck must be sufficient to permit of the 
efficient working of the 6-inch Q.F. guns in casemates. 
 
The total height of freeboard amidships to fulfil these various conditions is 14 feet. This was 
fixed in the case of the “Cressy,” which has 15 inches less freeboard amidships than the 
“Diadem,” and 3 feet 6 inches less than the “Powerful.” 
 
Freeboard forward. 
In determining the minimum height of freeboard forward it is necessary to consider chiefly 
two questions:- 
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(a.) The height necessary to permit of the vessel being driven at high speed against the 
sea, 
(b.) The risks incidental to injuries to the bow by an enemy’s fire when chasing her in a 
seaway, and to the consequent entry of water. 
 
In the design of the “Blake,” a vessel less than 400 feet long, I proposed a height of freeboard 
forward of 20 feet. In most of the “Edgar” class, which are 15 feet shorter than the “Blake” 
and designed for 2 knots lower maximum speed, the height forward is also 20 feet.  
 
An alternative design was prepared at the same time and was eventually adopted for the 
“Royal Arthur” and “Crescent,” with a high forecastle and two 6-inch Q.F. guns substituted 
for the 9.2-inch gun. The freeboard forward in these two vessels is 27 feet and 6 inches.  
 
This feature of a high forecastle in a more pronounced shape was also suggested for the 
vessels of the “Sharpshooter” class, and has since been carried out in the “Talbot” and 
“Cressy” classes. 
 
Experience with the “Royal Arthur” and “Crescent” proves them to be far more capable of 
maintaining high speed in a seaway than are the other seven vessels of the “Edgar” class with 
lower freeboard forward. This is confirmed by experience with the “Talbot” class of nearly 
the same length as the “Edgar” class. In the Sharpshooters the advantages of the high 
freeboard forward have also been most marked.  
 
Inquiries have been made as to the heights of freeboard forward adopted in swift ocean 
passenger steamers. 
 
In the Atlantic Service I find that for vessels of 20 to 22 knots’ speed experience has led to a 
height of freeboard of from 30 to 33 feet. 
 
In the “Powerful” class the corresponding height is 34 feet, in the “Diadem” class 32 feet, and 
in the “Cressy” class 31 feet. In the new vessels it is submitted that a minimum height of 30 
feet should be adopted.  
 
If the height were reduced to 24 or 25 feet, and the upper deck were given greater “sheer” so 
as to reach this height without the construction of a forecastle, there would be a saving in 
weight of about 50 tons.  
 
The axis of the bow chase guns would then be lowered to 28 or 29 feet above water, instead 
of 32 feet with the forecastle and the 30 feet height of freeboard.  
 
This saving in weight is so moderate as compared with the reduction in other qualities that it 
would not appear worth making. Nor could the small difference in freeboard have any 
sensible effect in reducing the risks of injury to the bow or the entry of water when steaming 
head to sea in chase. With the protective arrangements and subdivision contemplated at the 
bow, even with the 30 feet height of freeboard, there should be no difficulty in clearing water 
from above the main deck supposing the bow to be injured. This is again referred to hereafter.  
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BOAT-DECKS 
 
In all recent first class cruisers and battleships a distinctive feature of the designs has been the 
building up of the bulwarks amidships and the construction of a steel “boat deck.” A shelter for the 
crew under ordinary circumstances is thus provided, and this can be utilised for sleeping berths in hot 
climates. In bad weather at sea the ships are also much the dryer. These are, however, secondary 
advantages of the boat-deck. It was introduced primarily to give protection to the crews of the upper 
deck guns (usually 12-prs.) from debris arising from the destruction of the boats, &c. by an enemy’s 
fire in action. 
 
While the comfort and dryness of the ships are considerably increased by the existence of these boat-
decks, they necessarily involve a considerable addition to weights aloft, estimated to reach 70 tons in 
one of the new first class cruisers, as compared with what would be necessary if we reverted to 
arrangements similar to those of the “Blake” and “Edgar” classes, where there are shelter decks 
forward and aft, skid beams for the heavier boats and low bulwarks between the shelters. 
 
If the boat-deck is abolished, it would undoubtedly be desirable to transfer the 12-prs. now mounted 
in the upper deck amidships to suitable positions on the main deck. In this way the protection against 
torpedo boat attack might be efficiently carried out, and the crews of these light guns would be 
sheltered from debris in action although not otherwise protected.  
 
On the other hand, the command of the men at the 12-prs. would not be so good as it is under the 
existing arrangements with the guns grouped within a moderate longitudinal distance on the upper 
deck.  
 
Casings and ventilators.  
In addition to the lessening of the top hamper by the omission of the boat deck and reduction 
in the height of the bulwarks, it is contemplated to revert to lower casings around the funnels, 
engine hatches, &c., and to minimise as far as possible the weight of cowls and other 
ventilators.  
 
 
PROTECTION TO BUOYANCY AND STABILITY 
 
Side armour. 
The principles upon which the distribution and thickness of the vertical armour of modern 
cruisers ought to be arranged are fully discussed in the report on the “Cressy” class. Nothing 
has occurred since that discussion which appears to modify the general conclusions then 
reached.  
 
The proposed cruisers will probably remain on active service for 20 years. Inevitable 
improvements in artillery, projectiles, and explosives will occur during that period, all tending 
to degrade their defensive power, which is for practical purposes a fixed quantity. It would, 
therefore, appear unwise to accept any less thickness of vertical armour on the sides in the 
region of the machinery and boilers than that which was adopted for the “Cressy” and 
“Canopus” classes, viz., about 6 inches.  
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It would be possible, of course, to save a few tons in weight by tapering the thickness (in the 
vertical sense) from the waterline to the lower edge of armour. This has been done by the 
French in their cruisers, and is a reversion to a very old practice. But the saving in weight 
would only be about 40 tons; the cost of the manufacture of the armour would be increased, 
and the time necessary for its production would be made greater. This arrangement is not 
recommended.  
Nor does it appear desirable to revert to the system of having the greatest thickness of side 
armour for a few feet above and below the waterline associated with thinner armour above the 
“belt.” This was what was done in the Naval Defence battleships. After full discussion the 
system was abandoned. All our later ships of the “Majestic,” “Canopus,” “Formidable,” and 
“Cressy” classes have armour uniformly thick from the main deck down to the protective 
deck. This appears to be the best possible distribution of the material for defensive purposes, 
considering all the risks; and it is recommended that it be adopted in the new cruisers.  
 
Side armour of French cruisers. 
According to the best information available the “Jeanne d’Arc” and “Montcalm” classes are 
armoured as follows for a considerable portion of the belt amidships: 
 
Waterline belt - - 5.9 inches thick for 3 feet of width; tapering 
   to 3 inches at lower edge. 
“Montcalm”     {above belt to main} 3.75 inches thick; about 6 feet wide. 
    {deck about 8 feet} 
         {above W.L} 
“Jeanne d’Arc”   3 inches thick; about 6 feet wide. 
  
Total depth of side armour - - - -      13 feet. 
Depth below water of side armour - - -        5 feet. 
 
It is said, moreover, that in view of the difficulties of manufacture these armour plates are to 
be of soft nickel-steel, not “Harveyed.” In my judgement this defence is quite inadequate 
under existing conditions of attack, and, as above stated, the distribution of the armour is not 
good.  
 
As our new cruisers are to be built specially with reference to the “Jeanne d’Arc” and her 
consorts, it may be thought that we need not give them the greatly superior defence to 
buoyancy and stability proposed, viz., vertical side armour about 6 inches thick, extending 
over a height of 11 ½ feet from 5 feet below water to 6 ½ feet above. This armour, moreover, 
would be made according to Krupp’s modification of the Harvey process, so that its defensive 
power would be immensely greater than that of soft nickel-steel, such as the French 
contemplate using.  
 
The answer to this suggestion seems to me simple and complete. It would be no justification 
of our reduction in what has been fixed after careful consideration as a proper standard for 
defence of buoyancy and stability, to accept a lower standard, because of the French action. 
Our cruisers may have to meet other vessels than the French cruisers. Already there are in 
existence in the Spanish, Japanese, Argentine, Chilean, and Italian navies vessels of high 
speed, having hull-armour of good quality 6 to 7 inches thick. More such vessels will be built. 
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Moreover, our new cruisers, like the “Cressy” class, should be capable of acting with 
battleships, and consequently should be given good protection. 
 
The thickness of armour adopted in “Cressy” and “Canopus” classes suffices, under 
conditions of service, to give protection from the armour-piercing projectiles of the largest 
true quick-firers, to compel the bursting of shells having large explosive charges from guns of 
large calibre, and to deal with so-called armour-piercing shells of guns up to the 9.2-inch. 
This is as matters now stand; but there will inevitably be further improvements in projectiles 
and guns to be reckoned with at an early period in the service of the ships, and this points to 
the undesirability of using thinner armour. 
 
As matters now stand the special processes of manufacture, which add so much to the power 
of armour, cannot be successfully carried out in plates much below 6 inches in thickness, in 
association with the maintenance of definite forms necessary in ship-work. In other works, 
diminished thickness must be accompanied by a considerable loss of protective power in 
relation to weight and thickness.  
 
On the whole, the greater weight and cost involved in maintaining our accepted practice, as 
compared with reducing defence, as the French have done in the “Jeanne d’Arc” and 
“Montcalm,” are fully justified by the very great gain in defensive power.  
 
 
Protective decks. 
For the new cruisers it is proposed to repeat the arrangements of the double protective decks 
amidships, having an aggregate thickness of 2 ½ inches, which have been approved for the 
“Canopus” and “Cressy” classes. 
 
I am of the opinion, however, that it will be desirable to put the greater thickness of protective 
deck on the main deck instead of on the lower deck in the new cruisers, which must 
necessarily have greater length, and large deck areas. 
 
When chasing or being chased the deck-areas of the vessels will offer targets of from 480 to 
500 feet in length, and from 65 to 70 feet in extreme width.  
Under the supposed circumstances of a chase there would, undoubtedly, be great risk of 
effective shell fire delivered against such deck-targets, since the range would be varied very 
slowly as the ships close.  
 
It is proposed to make the main deck amidships about 1 ½ inches in thickness, and the lower 
deck about 1 inch. 
 
 
Modified protection at the bow. 
For the reasons just stated I would also recommend that the protective plating on the main 
deck be continued right forward to the bow.  
 
Instead of having an armoured bulkhead enclosing a citadel at the fore end (as in the “Cressy” 
and “Canopus” classes), it is proposed to utilise the weight in this extension of the deck 
plating, and in adding to the thickness of the vertical armour on the sides towards the bow. 
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As the ship narrows towards the bow, it is proposed to gradually reduce the thickness of side 
armour from 6 inches down to 2 inches, as indicated on the drawings attached. For most of 
the length this side-plating would terminate at the main deck, and be met by the protective 
plating; but right forward, for a length of about 40 feet, the 2-inch plating would be carried to 
22 feet above water. In this manner we should secure efficient defence against raking fire 
from the stern-chase guns of an enemy, and reduce the risk of the entry of water from shot-
holes in the bow.  
 
There would, of course, be good sub-division of the internal space forward, both above and 
below the main deck. Up to the height of the main deck, 6 ½ feet above the waterline 
amidships, the side armour would give good security against the necessarily oblique impact of 
projectiles. Even if the light unarmoured sides above the main deck and abaft the 2-inch bow 
armour were riddled, there would be little difficulty in clearing the water that might entre –
perhaps by suitable freeing scuttles- as the normal height above the waterline is considerable.  
 
 
Alternative plan for protection against raking. 
Another suggestion for giving protection against raking fire is to construct an armoured 
screen bulkhead reaching to such a height above the upper deck as would also suffice to 
shelter some of the bow chase guns. 
 
From the nature of the case such an arrangement would have to be placed some distance from 
the bow, although far forward in the vessel.  
 
There would, in fact, be a length of 435 feet abaft this bulkhead in one of the new cruisers; 
and the risks of injury to deck-target above described would remain practically unaltered for a 
considerable portion of the length of the vessel. Even when allowance is made for the flat-
trajectories of modern projectiles their “angles of descent” at long ranges are considerable, 
and no practicable height of armoured screen bulkhead would ensure complete protection to 
the main deck.  
 
Moreover, the bow before the screen bulkhead would remain liable to riddling, and to the 
entry of water in a seaway, to the same extent as if no such bulkhead existed.  
 
On the whole, therefore, the available weight of protective material would appear to be better 
disposed if put in to the form indicated on Sketch No.1, with a more strongly protected bow, 
and good main deck plating.  
 
Protection of stern. 
At the after end of the new cruisers it is proposed to adhere to the arrangements of the 
“Cressy” class, terminating the vertical hull-armour by a cross-bulkhead. Abaft this there will 
be a single protective deck situated a little below water. Injury to the stern and consequent 
admission of water above this deck is of secondary importance. In the “Cressy” class, for 
example, if the corresponding spaces were riddled and filled with water, the change of trim 
would only be 30 inches -15 inches more draft aft and 15 inches less forward – and the vessel 
would be little affected as regards speed, stability, or manoeuvring power.  
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ARMAMENT 
 
Disposition and horizontal command of guns 
In considering the most suitable disposition and horizontal range of command of the guns in 
the new cruisers, it would appear to be necessary to provide efficiently for three 
requirements:- 
 
(1.) For a powerful bow fire for use when chasing. 
(2.) For an efficient stern fire for use when being chased. 
(3.) For an efficient broadside fire for use in single ship actions or when engaged as 
adjuncts to the fleet. 
 
The first of these requirements is, no doubt, of very great importance, in view of the fact that 
the immediate purpose for which the new cruisers are required is to deal with the “Jeanne 
d’Arc” and other fast cruisers, which (being presumably less powerfully armed and defended) 
would be anxious to escape from our cruisers.  
 
It would, however, obviously be a mistake not to look forward and to provide for a 
contingency certain to arise during the period that the new cruisers will continue on service. 
At some time or other they must require to escape from a more formidable adversary, and 
therefore should be given a powerful stern armament.  
 
The third condition, viz., that of single ship actions or association with a fleet will, of course, 
be a permanent one if these cruisers are to be regarded as capable of acting with fleets as well 
as performing detached service.  
 
Broadside armament of 6-inch Q.F. in casemates. 
There appears to be a consensus of opinion that we cannot sensibly improve upon the 
disposition of the 6-inch Q.F. guns, which has been carried out in the “Diadems,” “Powerful,” 
“Canopus,” “Majestic,” and “Formidable” classes.  
 
This involved the provision of double-storied casemates, giving fore and aft fire to 8 6-inch 
guns –four towards the bow and a similar number towards the stern, as well as intermediate 
casemates on each side of the ship in which the guns have a horizontal arc of training of 120 
degrees.  
 
12-pr. Q.F. guns. 
It has been previously stated that, if the boat deck should be abolished, the 12-pr. guns would 
be better placed on the main deck between the casemates, or before and abaft them, rather 
than on an open upper deck. This point requires decision.  
 
Bow-chase guns. 
In recent first-class cruisers there are two arrangements of the bow-chase guns. 
 
In the “Powerful” and “Cressy” classes a single 9.2-inch gun is mounted on the middle line, 
and is available across the bow and on both broadsides through 270 degrees of horizontal 
training. These bow-chasers are protected by 6-inch armour.  
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In the “Diadem” class two 6-inch Q.F. guns are mounted on the same athwartship line of the 
forecastle. Only one of them is available on each broadside; but both are available ahead and 
through considerable arcs of training on each side of the line of keel. These 6-inch guns in the 
“Diadem” have only shield protection. 
 
It appears to be generally agreed that for the new cruisers it would not be desirable to repeat 
the “Diadem” arrangements, but that adequate protection should be given to the bow-chase 
guns.  
 
6-inch bow-chase guns mounted behind armoured screen bulkheads. 
One alternative method is indicated on Sketch No.2, which provides for mounting two 6-inch 
Q.F. guns in approximately the same positions as in the “Diadem,” and protecting them by an 
armoured bulkhead with suitable ports formed therein to give large arcs of training.  
 
Only one of the 6-inch guns would be available on each broadside; both of them would be 
available for bow-chase purposes through about the same arcs of training on either side of the 
keel line, as in the “Diadem” class.  
 
Twin 6-inch guns in armoured turret. 
Another alternative, indicated in Sketch No. 3, would be to place two 6-inch gins in a single 
armoured turret forward situated at the middle-line.  
 
It would be necessary in that case to introduce mechanical appliances for training the turret 
and hoisting ammunition. So far as weight is concerned, this arrangement would be more 
favourable than that on Drawing No. 2 with a fixed armoured screen. It would have the great 
advantage that both 6-inch guns would be available on each broadside.  
 
Stern-chase guns.  
Similar considerations to the foregoing apply also to the character and positions of the stern-
chase guns.  
 
 
Comparative advantages of 9.2-inch and 6-inch Q.F. chase guns. 
As between the 9.2-inch gun and the 6-inch for bow and stern-chase purposes, the following 
statement will be of interest, taking one end of the ship only for purposes of comparison. 
 
A 9.2-inch gun of the new type, protected and mounted as in the “Cressy” class, involves a 
total weight of about 200 tons.  
If the two bow-chase guns were placed behind a 6-inch armoured screen bulkhead, and that 
screen were extended down to the main deck protective plating, so as to form some defence 
against raking fire, the total weight of the two 6-inch guns, mountings, ammunition, and 
protection would amount to 240 tons.  
 
With a turret protected by 6-inch armour, and containing two 6-inch guns, the corresponding 
weight would be about 140 tons, allowing for mechanical power for training and ammunition 
hoists.  
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It thus appears that the last-mentioned arrangement would enable two 6-inch guns to be 
carried on the forecastle as bow-chasers instead of the 9.2-inch gun, and would leave a margin 
of weight sufficient to provide an additional 6-inch gun and its casemate on the main deck 
amidships.  
 
As between the 6-inch and the 9.2-inch gun, there is necessarily a great difference in the rate 
of fire. While each of the former could deliver from four to five aimed shots per minute, that 
is to say eight or ten for the pair of guns, the 9.2-inch gun would only deliver a round in about 
45 seconds.  
 
If it were only a question of rapidly destroying by shell-fire the unarmoured or lightly 
armoured structures of an enemy’s cruisers –which was the condition chiefly to be considered 
when the armaments of the “Powerful” and “Diadem” were being settled- then there are 
undoubted advantages to be gained by the adoption of the uniform armament of 6-inch Q.F. 
guns.  
 
My personal views on this question were fully stated at the time when these designs were in 
hand, and I then endeavoured to summarise the gains to be obtained with such a uniform 
armament.  
 
But since these vessels were designed, the construction of cruisers with substantial vertical 
armour on their sides and strong protective decks has been greatly developed, and this change 
of condition has led, in the case of the “Cressy” class, to the decision by their Lordships to 
adopt the 9.2-inch guns for bow and stern-chase.  
 
 
That decision, in my judgement, is a wise one for the following reasons:- 
 
As noted under the head of “Armour Protection,” when a vessel is chasing or being chased, 
the range remains nearly constant over a considerable period of time, and the greatest risk to 
be run of disablement, supposing the bow to be protected by thin armour, is that of injury to 
the protective decks, and disablement to the propelling machinery or boilers, or the explosion 
of magazines.  
 
The mere destruction of the unarmoured superstructures of the modern type of cruiser by the 
shell-fire of the 6-inch gun would not be likely to cause the termination of such a chase; but a 
well-planted projectile for the 9.2-inch gun would undoubtedly involve much more series 
risks. Shell-fire from the 6-inch guns would not, in these respects, compare with that from the 
9.2-inch gun. 
 
One feature, however, in the 9.2-inch gun as it at present stands clearly requires amendment, 
viz., there must be greater rapidity of loading.  
 
Our experience with the 12-inch guns, and with the 10-inch guns mounted in the “Centurion,” 
“Barfleur,” and “Renown,” indicates clearly that there will be no difficulty in greatly 
accelerating the rate of loading 9.2-inch guns if we apply suitable mechanical appliances.  
As long as the 9.2-inch guns remained with only shield protection, there were obvious reasons 
against the extension of mechanical appliances for their working, but this is no longer true. 
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With the modern quality of armour, and the thickness of armour contemplated, these 
mechanisms in the 9.2-inch gun would be as well protected as are considerable portions of 
corresponding mechanisms in the “Centurion” or “Renown.” 
 
Question of the 8-inch gun. 
The question of the 8-inch calibre gun has been repeatedly considered in connection with 
cruiser armaments.  
 
Hitherto, it has been held undesirable to multiply calibres, or to introduce calibres 
intermediate between the 6-inch and the 9.2-inch. 
 
The so-called quick-firing Elswick 8-inch gun is in reality not a true quick-firer, although its 
breach mechanism and loading arrangements are admirable. No doubt very rapid firing has 
been obtained from the 8-inch gun on an open emplacement, and with a large number of men 
able to work freely in an open space. But the weight of the shot would clearly prevent the 
continuance over any moderate period of this rate of fire; and in the restricted space of an 
enclosed turret or gun-house, such rapid operations would in themselves become impossible 
with manual power. 
 
The value of the 9.2-inch gun is increased by the fact that foreign nations are adopting, on a 
large scale, our casemate system of protecting the broadside armament; and, although in the 
“Jeanne d’Arc” or “Montcalm” class the thickness contemplated to be used on these 
casemates appear to be somewhat less than we employ, yet it cannot be overlooked that this is 
not true in other foreign cruisers; and, in the future, increased thicknesses of casemates and 
turrets or stronger qualities of armour are certain to be employed.  
 
Our own recent experiments show that the 6-inch plate of the Krupp quality can deflect, with 
very little injury, the common shell from a 9.2-inch gun striking it at an angle of obliquity of 
about 20 degrees, and can resist special armour-piercing shell from that gun with great 
success.  
 
Under Service conditions the 6-inch Q.F., or even the 8-inch, gun is, therefore, not likely to 
be really effective against these gun emplacements.  
 
Many officers of high standing in the Service have expressed to me their concurrence in the 
arrangement of the armament in the “Royal Arthur” and “Crescent.” They carry a 9.2-inch 
gun aft, and 6-inch Q.F. guns as bow-chasers.  
 
This is a system of armament which I proposed 15 years ago for fast protected cruisers to be 
built for foreign navies not possessing armour-clads; and where, therefore, the vessels might 
have had to make a running fight with armoured ships.  
 
If there were only to be one heavy gun in a cruiser, I still think it would be advantageous that 
it should be placed aft rather than forward; but, on the whole, the balance of advantage would 
appear to lie in the “Cressy” arrangement, which has a 9.2-inch gun both forward and aft, so 
placed as to be available on both broadsides.  
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Magazines and ammunition passages.  
The arrangements for stowing ammunition in Her Majesty’s ships, and for transporting it 
from magazines and shell-rooms to the guns, have been very carefully studied for many years 
past.  
 
For large cruisers and battleships designed since 1889 the established practice has been to 
place the magazines and shell-rooms before and abaft the machinery and boiler spaces in 
positions where high temperatures are not likely to occur, thus preventing deterioration of the 
powder or cordite. For the bow and stern-chase guns the hoist of ammunition is practically 
vertical. For the 6-inch Q.F. guns the longitudinal transport takes place in ammunition 
passages situated below the lower protective decks, in the best defended part of the ship. 
From these passages vertical protected hoists lead up to the several casemates and gun-decks. 
Arrangements are made in the passages near the lower end of the hoists for hooks and ready-
racks, in which ammunition can be stowed to diminish the labour of transport in action.  
After a careful study of these arrangements, I am of opinion that our established practice is 
greatly superior to them, and should not be departed from.  
 
There are two classes of alternatives. One, which we fitted in the “Edgar” class and 
“Blenheim,” is to have armoured “ready-use magazines” built in the bunkers above the 
protective decks, capable of holding a certain number of rounds for each 6-inch Q.F. gun. 
These ships were not of sufficient size to permit of the construction of ammunition passages. 
But obviously the plan of ready-use magazines is not so good as that of ammunition passages. 
And it is necessary to provide means for reaching and refilling the ready-use magazines when 
the supply is exhausted.  
 
The other alternative, much favoured in foreign designs, is to multiply the number of the 
magazines, and to place them, as far as possible, vertically under the guns. This system has 
two great drawbacks. It places the magazines for broadside guns in positions where high 
temperatures occur from the nearness of engines and boilers, and it isolates the supplies of 
ammunition for guns of the same calibres.  
Our system, with its duplicated magazines and shell-rooms forward and aft, enables the 
ammunition at either end of a ship to be used for any gun, provided that it can be transported 
through the passages. Injury forward may flood the magazines and shell-rooms there, but 
those aft remain available and accessible, or visa versa.  
 
Nor is it an unimportant matter that the protected passages enable voice tubes and other 
fittings to be carried fore and aft besides providing for communication under cover by 
messenger in action.  
 
The only objection that can be made against the existence of the passages is that they occupy 
space which might be used for additional coal. In vessels of moderate size –such as second 
and third class cruisers – this is consideration of such importance that passages are not fitted. 
In the “Blake” and “Blenheim,” the largest ships without such passages, the desire to increase 
bunker space as much as possible led to the omission of passages. We have had many 
suggestions from these ships to the effect that their omission caused a serious loss of 
efficiency. So far as I am informed, the general opinion of the Service is in favour of their 
great value.  
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It is interesting to note that the French have copied our system in the “Jeanne d’Arc.” M. 
Bertin, the designer, made a thorough inspection of the “Magnificent” in my company two 
years ago, before the “Jeanne d’Arc’s” design was proposed.  
 
 
SPEED 
 
It has been decided that in the new cruisers the speed of 23 knots shall be maintained on the 
Contractors’ trials, which in recent Admiralty practice extend over eight hours’ continuous steaming 
under natural draught in the stokeholds.  
 
These conditions have not yet been approached, either as regards the duration of the trial or the 
absence of forcing in the stokeholds, by any of the foreign cruisers whose reputed maximum speeds 
range from 22 ¾ to 23 knots.  
 
Confining attention for the moment to those vessels which are said to have realised those speeds on 
actual trial, the total number is small. They are as under:- 
      Tons  H.P.  Knots 
 
United States Navy:- 
 “Columbia”    7,375  18,500  22.8 
 “Minneapolis”    7,375  20,800  23 
 
Japanese:- 
 “Yoshino”    4,180  15,000  23 
 
Argentine:- 
 “Nueve de Julio”   3,500  14,350  22.74 
 “Buenos Aires”    4,500  13,000* 23.2 
 
Chilean:- 
 “Blanco Encalada”   4,400  14,500  22.76 
 “Esmeralda”    7,000  16,000† 23 
 
* Some accounts give 14,000. H.P 
† Some accounts give 18,000. H.P 
 
All except the first two vessels are of Elswick design, and of very similar type, differing in length and 
displacement. We have no authoritative statement of the engine-power developed on trial, the figures 
given above being taken from published accounts. There are obvious inconsistencies between the 
results for different vessels, and the figures for power in the case of the “Buenos Aires” and 
“Esmeralda” are open to grave doubts if the speeds are correctly reported.  
 
Without dwelling on these points, however, it is necessary to remark that the trials of these vessels 
were not made under Admiralty conditions, that the speeds were maintained for short periods, and that 
forced draught was used in the stoke-holds. If Admiralty conditions of trial were observed the speeds 
would be much lower, for it is possible to develop very high powers for short periods under the 
conditions described. In the past, when forced draught was used on trial of Her Majesty’s ships, from 
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50 to 60 per cent. draught above the natural draught power has been developed for short periods. 
Experience led, however, to the abandonment of such trials for Her Majesty’s ships, as the results did 
not represent conditions of practice, and the boilers (of cylindrical type) suffered from forcing.  
 
Having so little information about the conditions of trials for these vessels, it is difficult to estimate 
their speeds under Admiralty conditions of working machinery and boilers. As an example only, it 
may be stated that if the “Esmeralda’s” boilers were forced 50 per cent. above their natural draught 
power, then at natural draught the speed would be about 20 ¾ knots instead of 23 knots.  
 
These vessels have very quick-running engines also, of comparatively short stroke and making a high 
number of revolutions per minute. This tends to large economy of weight in proportion to maximum 
power developed. 
 
Again, we know little respecting the weight of coal and stores carried at the speed trials, or the 
draught and displacement. It has, however, transpired that in many cases the weight of coal has been 
only one-third of the bunker capacity. On service, fully stored and equipped, the decrease in speed due 
to extra immersion must be considerable in ships of their size.  
 
Fuller information is available for the trials of the American cruisers. Their speed was measured by 
two runs (out and home) on a 44-knot course with one turn, and therefore lasted less than four hours. 
About 40 per cent. of their bunker capacity was carried as coal. The circumstances of the trial must 
have made it difficult to eliminate the effect of tide, and may have sensibly influenced results. An 
estimated correction was made. The boilers were forced, but only to a moderate extent. The engines 
ran rather above 130 revolutions per minute. No long distance trial under natural draught was made. 
The “Columbia” averaged about 18 knots across the Atlantic, and must have then developed about 40 
per cent. of the maximum power associated with the reported speed of 23 knots. Probably if tried for 
eight hours under natural draught she would not attain more than 19 ½ knots, instead of the reported 
23 knots. 
These statements will suffice to show the important bearing upon the design of the new vessels which 
the more stringent conditions and longer duration of their trials must exercise.  
 
Swift cruisers building.  
Turning from the completed vessels to vessels either building of projected for maximum 
speeds of 23 to 24 knots, the following list includes all that are known:- 
 
      Tons  H.P.  Knots 
French Navy:- 
 “Guichen”    8,146  24,000  23 
 “Chateaurenault”   7,890  23,000  23 
 “Jurien de la Graviere”   5,550  17,000  23 
 “Jeanne d’Arc”    11,092  28,000  23 
 
Building at Elswick:- 
 Japanese, “Takasago”   4,200  17,000  24 
 Chinese, “Hai-Tien”   4,300  17,000  24 
    “Hai-Chi”   4,300  17,000  24 
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The four Elswick vessels are very nearly repetitions of the “Yoshino,” and it is reported that 
with power and speed are to be obtained at light draughts of water, and with high forced 
draught in the stokeholds. I would add that the reputed speed of 24 knots is not likely to be 
obtained with 17,000 H,P. if the “Yoshino” required 15,000 for 23 knots.  
 
The “Guichen” and “Chateaurenault” are “Corsair-cruisers” based on the American 
“Columbia,” but with water-tube boilers (small diameter tubes in “Chateaurenault”). They 
have triple-screws, and ought to attain 23 knots if the power specified is realised. The “Jurien 
de la Graviere” is based on the Elswick type, and in regard to triple-screws and type of boiler 
follows the corsairs. The “Jeanne d’Arc” stands alone in size. She has ample boiler power and 
should (apart form an inefficiency of the triple screws) secure a safe 23 knots for four hours, 
and a continuous sea-speed of about 21 knots. This is the vessel which must be kept chiefly in 
view in considering the speed appropriate to the new cruisers. The experiment being made in 
her by using modified Du Temple boilers (with small diameter tubes) is a serious one, no 
doubt. As regards numbers of boilers (48) however, she stands on the same footing as our 
“Powerful” and “Terrible.” A considerable saving in weight is effected by using the small 
tube boiler even when compared with the latest type of Belleville boiler. This is dealt with 
hereafter.  
 
 
 
 
Ratio of horse-power to displacement at high speeds. 
From the foregoing tabular statements it will be seen that when the speed of 23 knots is to be 
attained, very great engine-power is required; and that the ratio of horse-power to tonnage 
increases as size is diminished.  
 
In the “Yoshino,” of 4,180 tons, about 3.6 H.P. per ton was required; in the “Minneapolis,” of 
about 7,400 tons, about 2.8 H.P. per ton: and in the “Powerful,” of 14,200 tons, at 23 knots a 
little over 2 H.P. per ton would suffice. Increase in size, therefore, favours relative economy 
in propulsion, and consequently favours increased carrying power.  
 
I have fully explained these matters to the Board on many occasions, and particularly in 
connection with the design of the “Powerful.” At that time I pointed out the fact that the same 
horse-power would be required for 22 knots speed, whether the vessels were made about 450 
feet long and 12,000 tons or 500 feet long and 14,000 tons. Now we have the actual trials of 
the “Diadem” and “Powerful” to go upon; and they absolutely confirm my forecast. From 21 
to 23 knots the “Diadem,” of 11,000 tons would require as great engine power as the 
“Powerful,” of 30 per cent. greater displacement. The French designers have also accepted 
this principle. In the “Jeanne d’Arc” they have provided 28,500 H.P., which is very close to 
the power which would drive the “Powerful” at 23 knots. Probably they have taken a margin 
of horse-power, in order to provide fully for possible losses due to triple-screws as compared 
with twin screws.  
 
From these facts an important deduction may be made, bearing on the design of the new 
cruisers. Whether their displacement be 10,500 or 14,000 tons, for the speed of 23 knots, the 
difference in engine-power, in weight of propelling apparatus, and in engine-room 
compliments,  cannot be very marked. Hence in the smaller vessel (the machinery and boiler 
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spaces being nearly the same as in the larger vessel) there will remain much less protected 
space for magazines, torpedo rooms, and other “vitals.” And, as the weight of propelling 
apparatus will be very nearly the same, the disposable margin of weight –for armament, 
armour, coals, and equipment – must be very seriously diminished in the smaller vessel. This 
will appear more clearly from the alternative sketch designs described hereafter.  
 
 
PROPELLING APPARATUS 
 
When such enormous engine powers have to be provided, unusual importance attaches to the selection 
of the most suitable types of engines and boilers. Which shall yield the required power with the least 
weight consistent with a due provision for strength, efficiency, and durability, as well as for economy 
in coal consumption. 
 
Types of boilers and corresponding weights. 
 
Boiler room weights, 28,000 H.P. 
 
           Tons. 
 I. Cylindrical boilers: natural draught, 8 hours’ trial  - 2,000 
 II. Cylindrical boilers: moderate forcing, 4 hours’ trial  - 1,680 
 III. Cylindrical boilers, high forced draught, 3 hours’ trial   - 1,400 
IV. Belleville boilers with economisers: natural draught, 
8 hours’ trial  - 1,250 
 V. Belleville boilers: moderate forcing, 4 hours’ trial  - 1,030 
 VI. Small-diameter tube boilers such as in “Jeanne d’Arc”: 
     moderate forcing, 3 to 4 hours  - 1,000 
 
The figures for the “Jeanne d’Arc” are necessarily only approximate, as details have not been 
published. They show that if the intentions of the French designers are realised and economy 
in weight of about 250 tons will be secured. This saving in weight will be obtained in 
association with the use of a much greater weight of water in the small tube boilers than is 
provided for the Belleville boilers. According to published statements, in the Normand-
Sigaudy type of boiler first contemplated for the “Jeanne d’Arc,” the weight of water for a 
given horse-power is nearly three times that provided in the Belleville boilers. 
 
According to published reports the “Jeanne d’Arc” is to have an ample provision of boiler 
power. Her maximum indicated horse-power is given at 28,500 (French) H.P. Reduced to 
English measure this would be about 28,100 H.P. A further correction is necessary, as in 
French practice it it [sic] appears to be usual to include an allowance for auxiliary engines in 
the horse-power. Taking this allowance at 5 per cent., the horse-power for propulsion, on our 
basis, would be about 26,700 H.P. The heating surface is stated to be about 78,500 square 
feet, which gives 2.94 square feet of heating surface per horse-power at maximum 
development. In the “Speedy” the corresponding figure for small-tube boilers is 3.1 square 
feet; in the “Pelorus” herself, 2.24 square feet; in later vessels of the “Pelorus” type, 
somewhat greater. With Belleville boilers the provision is represented by 2 ½ square feet per 
horse-power in the “Powerful,” and 2.63 square feet in the “Argonaut.” These figures indicate 
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the fact that only “moderate forcing” will be necessary in the “Jeanne d’Arc” when 
developing the full specified power.  
 
Long distance steaming. 
Contract trials for a few hours at a certain power may not be, and in fact are not, associated 
with equal developments of power by different types of boilers for long-distance steaming at 
sea. Taking the boilers tabulated above, the following figures indicate approximately the 
power that could be continuously developed for long periods at sea, if the trial power were 
26,000 H.P. 
         H.P 
I.  Cylindrical boilers: natural draught  -  17,000 
II. Cylindrical boilers: moderate forcing  -  14,000 
III. Cylindrical boilers: high forcing   -  12,000 
IV. Belleville boilers: natural draught  -  21,000 
V. Belleville boilers: moderate forcing  -  18,000 
VI. Small tube boilers: “Jeanne d’Arc”  -  21,000 
 
The estimate for the “Jeanne d’Arc’s” boilers is based on the actual performance of the 
“Pelorus” on a long distance trial (60 hours), on the assumption that 3.7 square feet of heating 
surface gives one H.P. as it did on that trial. On this basis the “Jeanne d’Arc’s” small-tube 
boilers should give as great a power for long distance steaming at sea as Belleville boilers 
about 25 per cent heavier, and carrying much smaller weights of water.  
 
On the side of coal consumption French reports claim excellent results for Normand and other 
boilers of the small-tube type. We have our own experience with the “Speedy” and “Pelorus” 
as well as in many destroyers. That in the “Speedy” represents several years of service, ands 
shows good relative economy in coal consumption. Her proportion of heating surface to 
maximum development of power is very little in excess of that reported in the “Jeanne 
d’Arc.” The trials of the “Pelorus” have been largely experimental, and in her the provision of 
heating surface is not relatively so large. 
 
So far as can be seen, therefore, the use of small-tube boilers in the “Jeanne d’Arc” does not 
carry with it any necessary increase in the rate of coal consumption.  
 
If it did so then, for a given radius of action at defined speeds, the aggregate weight of coal 
and propelling apparatus might be increased, even though the weight of boilers were largely 
diminished. But there is no reason, so far as I am aware, for anticipating such a result from the 
use of small-tube boilers proportioned as in “Speedy” or “Jeanne d’Arc.” 
 
Space, as well as weight, requires consideration in regard to boiler installations. From the 
comparative designs submitted for the Royal Yacht by Messrs. Humphrys, one with Belleville 
boilers, the other with Yarrow boilers, and from other investigations it appears that the floor 
space is practically identical, while the height required for the small-tube boiler is rather less.  
 
The small-tube boiler, possibly in a modified for, and with large and thicker tubes than are 
used in destroyers, appears to offer substantial advantages from the side of weight, and (on 
the basis of our “Speedy”) no inferiority in the rate of coal consumption. A full consideration 
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of the subject seems desirable, therefore, before a decision is reached, especially in view of 
the action taken in France.  
 
There are, of course, other questions of great importance in regard to the choice of boilers; 
such as ease of examination, cost of maintenance, durability &c. On these questions the 
Engineer-in-Chief will advise the Board. The preceding statement has been made primarily to 
illustrate the important influence which the selection of the boilers must have on the design of 
the new cruisers.  
 
Main engines 
Attention has already been drawn to the fact that in the 23-knot cruisers built or building the 
engines are of the “quick-running” type, making a large number of revolutions at maximum 
power, having comparatively short strokes. These engines are consequently much lighter in 
relation to their power than the engines fitted in Her Majesty’s ships. Whereas our large 
engines run at 110 to 120 revolutions per minute, when working at full power, the engines of 
the Elswick cruisers run at 150 to 160 revolutions, and are proportionally much lighter. 
 
The greatest power hitherto applied to these quick-running engines, on a single shaft, seems 
to have been 9,000 to 10,000 H.P. All the Elswick ships have twin-screws.  
Similar action has been taken in America and France for the engines of their swiftest cruisers. 
Triple-screws are there adopted, and even in the “Jeanne d’Arc” the power of each engine is 
below 10,000 H.P. With the highest speeds contemplated in our new cruisers, the power on 
each shaft will be from 14,000 to 15,000 H.P.  
 
The use of quick-running engines, with short strokes, has a further advantage in vessels of 
moderate draught of water and depth in hold. In vessels like our “Medea” or “Apollo” classes, 
in order to provide sufficient height to accommodate engines with longer stroke than is used 
in the Elswick cruisers of equal draught, armoured “coamings” have been constructed, above 
the protective deck, around the cylinders. A weight of from 100 to 120 tons has been involved 
in this arrangement, and considerable additional expenditure. The performances of these 
vessels on long-distance steaming at high speeds has been satisfactory, and many of them 
have been severely tested.  
 
In the Elswick cruisers of moderate draught with much shorter strokes the cylinders are kept 
entirely below the protective decks, as they are also in Admiralty practice when the depth of 
hold permits. In consequence of this, armoured coamings are unnecessary, and the weight 
required for them can be otherwise appropriated. 
 
Some of the Elswick ships, with engines designed and built by Messers. Humphrys, have now 
been several years on service. The “Yoshino” had much hard work during the war with China, 
and is well spoken of. We have little detailed information as to the practical workings of the 
engines in most of the ships, but I have been informed by officers of various foreign services, 
and by the makers of the engines, that the results have been satisfactory.  
 
Practice of the Mercantile Marine. 
In the mercantile marine the conditions of service are altogether different from those of the 
Royal Navy. Passenger steamers work from port to port over known distances and always at 
maximum speed. Mercantile practice is, therefore, in favour of long strokes and moderate 
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rates of revolution, which means much heavier engines. Economy of weight is not of such 
great importance in these ships as it is in war ships. Merchant steamers having sea-speeds of 
20 to 22 knots, have load-displacements of 16,000 to 20,000 tons, and carry small weights of 
cargo, in addition to their coal supplies. 
 
For war ships ordinary cruising is done at low speeds requiring less than 20 per cent. of the 
maximum power.  
 
Under these cruising conditions the rate of revolution is very moderate, and large cylinder 
capacity necessarily tends to losses of efficiency. 
As an example, the “Powerful” may be taken. At 12 knots about 3,500 H.P. is required, and 
about 60 revolutions suffice. At 20 to 21 knots about 18,000 H.P. and 103 revolutions. This is 
the maximum result anticipated for continuous steaming at sea. At 22 knots about 25,000 H.P. 
and 114 revolutions are required. This last trial, or maximum development of power, 
represents contract conditions only occasionally reproduced in service, even in ships of the 
latest design. 
 
These figures illustrate the fact that for warships a higher rate of revolution for maximum 
powers than that preferred in the mercantile marine is, on the whole, advantageous and, 
within proper limits, unobjectionable. Already great progress has been made in this direction 
in the Royal Navy. Other engineers have gone further in this direction for engines fitted on 
the swiftest foreign cruisers. The question for decision now is whether a further step can be 
taken in the new cruisers, which must have engines of greater power than have thitherto been 
constructed, while fulfilling the essential conditions that the machinery shall possess that 
strength and endurance which are necessary for the special service.  
 
Triple screws. 
The question of triple-screws versus twin-screws has been repeatedly discussed in connection 
with the designs of the “Powerful” and other vessels. While France, Germany, Russia and the 
United States have adopted triple-screws, we have adhered to twin-screws. So have the 
builders of the largest and swiftest Atlantic liners, in some of which from 25,000 to 30,000 
H.P. is efficiently utilised on twin-screws. Our experience in the “Blake,” “Blenheim,” 
“Powerful,” “Terrible,” and “Diadem” confirms the conclusion derived from mercantile 
experience.  
 
There has been no prejudice here against triple-screws. Nearly 20 years ago I thoroughly 
investigated the question, and came to the conclusion that twin-screws would prove superior 
even with large increases of speed and power. Of course the time may come, draught of water 
being limited, when higher speeds and correspondingly increased engine power may lead to 
the more extended use of multiple screws. In the turbo-motor destroyer we are acting on this 
principle.  
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But without reproducing former remarks on the subject, it must be stated that the allegation 
commonly made by outside critics that we forfeit great advantages by not adopting triple-
screws, under existing circumstances, is disproved by experience. I am in possession of facts 
which show conclusively that:- 
 
(1.) At maximum speeds twin-screws are more efficient than triple-screws. 
(2.) At low cruising speeds triple-screw ships require greater power than twin-
screws for equal speeds. This is distinctly contrary to the claim made by 
advocates of triple-screws. Recently I gage comparative results for the 
“Rossia” and “Powerful,” but I have others no less striking. 
(3.) Allowing for reductions in weight consequent on the use of quicker-running 
engines with triple-screws, the total weight of machinery for a given engine 
H.P. is not less than for twin-screw engines 
(4.) Greater engine room space is needed with triple-screws. 
(5.) With triple-screws the space available near the stern for magazines, &c. is 
much less than with twin-screws. The symmetrical distribution of 
ammunition this becomes an impossibility, unless ships are lengthened to 
give greater hold space aft. 
 
Advocates of triple-screws, when met by facts such as these, fall back on the general principle 
that greater safety from total breakdown is thus attained. In the abstract this is true. 
Experience shows, however, that with twin-screws there is a practical immunity from total 
breakdown. There are many examples of twin-screw ships breaking one shaft, and steaming 
over long distances with a single engine at work. Obviously the gain possible in this respect 
cannot outweigh the serious disadvantages above enumerated for triple-screws.  
 
I have been assured by American officers of high rank, that experience with the “Columbia” 
and “Minneapolis” is adverse to the extended employment of triple-screws. The Italians have 
tried the system in small vessels, and reverted to twin-screws. Captain Paget recently reported 
– although I doubt the correctness of the rumour – that the “Gromoboi” (New “Rossia”) was 
to have twin-screws.  
 
One very influential factor in the use of triple-screws in foreign navies has been the difficulty 
of manufacturing the large shafts, forgings, and castings required for high powers if twin 
engines had been adopted. This was the chief reason for using three engines in the American 
cruisers; and it has been operative in other countries. Here it has no force.  
 
As examples of the effect upon length which the use of three screws has, as compared with 
twin-screws, I may state that in a vessel of the “Diadem” class, the increased length would be 
35 feet. 
 
The “Pallida” class of the Russian Navy are based on our “Talbot” class. Largely in 
consequence of having triple-screws, they are about 50 feet longer than the “Talbot.” 
 
When vertical side armour is used, such an increase of length in the machinery space is a 
serious matter, involving, as it does, a corresponding increase in the weight and cost of 
expensive side armour.  
 
On the whole, I am of the opinion that in the new cruisers twin-screws should be adopted.  
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Influence of length of machinery and boiler spaces on weight of armour. 
Allusion has been made above to the fact that, with vertical side armour as the main 
protection to buoyancy and stability, great importance attaches ti the length occupied by 
engines and boilers.  
 
It is generally agreed that the full thickness of side armour should be maintained in wake of 
engines and boilers. Consequently, increase of length of machinery space involves extra 
weight and cost of armour; and, therefore, increase displacement, much exceeding the 
additional load of armour in a ship of 23 knots’ speed having a fixed draught of water.  
 
Before the boiler-rooms the sides are more lightly armoured, and consequently increase in 
length involves a less serious penalty in increased displacement. Abaft the engine-room there 
is only a protective deck; and here also increase in length is not a serious matter. 
 
Taking two vessels each of 23 knots speed, but with displacements widely differing, the 
smaller will, of course, have less internal space, and (as before explained) she will require 
greater power in relation to her displacement,. Although absolutely less power than the larger 
ship. As breadth will be less, it is quite possible that in the smaller ship a greater length will 
be required to accommodate engines and boilers that will be needed in the broader and larger 
ship. Hence it follows that a larger area, and greater weight of maximum thickness of side 
armour may be required in the smaller ship.  As she necessarily has a less relative margin for 
carrying power, this fact may involve a considerably diminished protection and smaller coal 
supply. 
 
This illustration shows that many considerations have to be taken into account in order to 
ascertain where the balance of advantage lies, in fixing total length as well as the arrangement 
of propelling apparatus. The problem is, in fact, of a complicated nature, and to be dealt with 
only be comparing concrete examples, which include estimates for weight of hull, armament, 
protection, propelling apparatus, &c. It is much simpler in vessels of the “protected” type than 
in vessels with vertical side armour. 
 
Hold space and bunker capacity. 
In cruisers of this great speed, a very large portion of the hold space, below the protective 
deck, is necessarily appropriated to machinery and boilers. The spaces before and abaft, 
comparatively limited as they are, have to be appropriated to magazines, shell-rooms, torpedo 
rooms, &c., and consequently the bunker spaces have to be provided, to a large extent, 
between the lower and main decks. Roughly speaking, in the “Powerful” class, two-thirds of 
the bunker capacity is situated above the lower (protective) deck; and this is a typical case.  
 
The arrangement has many advantages, as it strengthens the defence, and enables the stability 
to be kept nearly constant while the load is greatly varied.  
 
As example of the bearing of increased speed and power upon available bunker space has 
occurred in the “Cressy” class, where only 1,600 tons of coal can be carried, against 2,000 
tons in the “Diadem” class, although the “Cressy’s” are 10 feet longer and of 1,000 tons 
greater displacement.  
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As explained above, in cruisers of 23 knots, the engine-power and corresponding space does 
not vary greatly for large variations in displacement, and consequently it will be seen that in 
the smaller vessels, the available protected hold-space (outside the machinery spaces) must be 
relatively smaller. The bunker capacity, also, must be less.  
 
In the foreign cruisers of 23 knots, the ammunition supplies are much less than in the Royal 
Navy, and the vessels are not stored or equipped for independent sea service to the extent 
usual in our Service. Neither are they given such large complements in relation to engine-
power and armament. All this tends to greatly diminish the requirements for internal space in 
foreign ships, more especially in the holds, and favours the enlargements of bunker capacity. 
But even under these favourable conditions, the published description of the “Jeanne d’Arc” 
dwells upon the great difficulties that have occurred in providing for her magazines, &c., in 
consequence of the enormous proportion of the hold space occupied by the propelling 
apparatus.  
 
The “Jeanne d’Arc” is to have 2,100 tons of bunker capacity. Her waterline length is about 
475 feet, as against 456 feet in our “Diadem,” and 460 feet in the “Cressy.” The French 
system of measuring the length differs from ours. To compare the two, about 20 feet must be 
added to our measurements for large cruisers and battleships.  
 
 
DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE SKETCH DESIGNS 
 
The particulars of certain alternative sketch designs, submitted for their Lordships’ consideration. All 
these designs are for unsheathed ships. If the vessels were wood sheathed and coppered, their draught 
of water would be increased by 9 inches, the displacement by 550 to 650 tons, and the trial speeds 
decreased by about half a knot, and the cost increased by 35,000l. to 40,000l. 
 
 
 
Design No.1. (Sketch No.1.) 
 
This is a vessel of the same length as the “Powerful,” 13,800 tons displacement, and about 28,000 
H.P. This power is to be obtained with natural draught from Belleville boilers (economiser type) and 
with engines similar to those in “Cressy” class. 
 
The weight assigned to armament is the same as that in “Cressy” class, the same numbers and calibres 
of guns are provided for as in “Cressy,” and the same supplied of ammunition. The disposition of this 
armament is shown on Sketch No. 1.  
 
Alternative dispositions and natures of armament are shown of Sketches Nos. 2 and 3. 
 
A discussion of the relative advantages of these several armaments appears in this report. 
 
The hull protection includes 6-inch armour on sides abreast engines and boilers, tapering towards the 
bow (see description), and two protective decks (except at the stern) aggregating 2 ½ inches in 
thickness.  
The continuous sea-speed would be about 21 knots. 
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Coal supply; 1,250 tons on designed draught and displacement; 2,500 tons bunker capacity.  
The cost of this vessel should be about 830,000l.  
 
As a matter of information it may be stated that if small-tube boilers were used (as in “Jeanne d’Arc”) 
the displacement would be about 13,500 tons, and the mean draught might be diminished by about 6 
inches. The cost would not be appreciably affected. 
 
 
Design No. 2. 
 
This is for a ship 20 feet shorter than No.1, and of 13,200 tons displacement. It is identical in 
protection and horse-power. With similar engines and boilers, it would have equal speed on trial and 
for continuous steaming. As the machinery space would be of the same length, the same weight of 
vertical armour would be required in wake of it. A little saving in weight of armour on the bow and in 
weight of protective deck would result from the diminished length. The coal supply would be 
diminished to 900 tons normal and 1,800 tons bunker capacity.  
 
The cost would be only about 15,000l. less than Design No.1. 
 
It is obvious that this decrease in displacement and cost is not desirable, since it diminishes the coal 
supply by nearly 30 per cent.  
 
 
Design No. 3. (Sketch No. 4.) 
 
This is for a ship in which the speed of 23 knots is to be obtained with Belleville boilers slightly 
forced, as in the “Diadem’s” trials. Armament and protection are as in Designs Nos. 1 and 2. 
 
The essential differences are – 
(1.) A natural draught power of about 21,000 H.P., as in “Cressy,” with a corresponding 
speed of about 21 ¾ knots.  
(2.) A power for continuous steaming of about 16,000 H.P., with a corresponding speed 
of about 19 ¾ to 20 knots.  
(3.) A coal supply of 850 tons normal, with bunker capacity of about 1,700 tons.  
 
The length would be about 450 feet, and displacement about 12,000 tons. 
Cost about 730,000l., or 100,000l. less than Design No. 1. 
 
In view of what is now known as to boiler power provided in “Jeanne d’Arc” and the corresponding 
speeds likely to be attained, this smaller vessel is not recommended.  
 
 
Design No. 4. 
 
This is for a ship 450 feet in length and about 10,500 tons displacement, capable of steaming 23 knots 
for 4 hours. It is absolutely necessary on these dimensions to have recourse to small-tube boilers, and 
moderate forcing.  
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The coal supply would be 800 tons normal, with a bunker capacity of about 1,600 tons.  
 
The protection in wake of engines and boilers would be reduced to four inches as compared with the 
standard thickness of six inches.  
 
The main armament would be 14 6-inch Q.F., 4 in two turrets (as Fig. 3) and 10 in casemates.  
 
The sea-speed would probably be 19 to 19 ½ knots.  
 
The estimated cost is about 620,000l.  
 
All the foregoing estimates of cost are based on the tenders for the “Cressy” class. 
 
It is not possible to forecast what influence on quotations will result from the abnormal activity now 
prevailing in shipbuilding and engineering. That condition must affect both time of completion and 
cost of production. 
 
(Signed) W. H. White 
23 May 1898 
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Appendix IV 
British first-class cruisers laid down 1884-1909
1
 
 
 
Class   Name   Type   Tonnage  
  
Orlando  Aurora   Belted /   5,600 
(ld. 1885)  Australia  armoured 
   Galatea 
   Immortalite 
   Narcissus 
   Orlando 
   Undaunted 
Blake   Blake   Protected  9,150 
(ld. 1888)  Blenheim 
Edgar   Crescent  Protected  7,350 
(ld. 1889)  Edgar 
   Endymion 
   Gibraltar 
   Grafton   
   Hawke 
   Royal Arthur 
   St. George 
   St. Theseus 
Powerful  Powerful  Protected  14,200 
(ld. 1894)  Terrible 
Diadem   Amphitrite  Protected  11,000 
(ld. 1895)  Andromeda 
   Argonaut 
   Ariadne  
   Diadem 
   Europa 
   Niobe 
   Spartiate 
Cressy   Aboukir  Armoured  12,000 
(ld. 1898)  Bacchante 
   Cressy 
   Euryalus 
   Hogue 
   Sutlej 
Drake   Drake   Armoured  14,150 
(ld. 1899)  Good Hope 
   King Alfred 
   Leviathan      
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Since the construction of many classes spanned several years, the initial year in which a class was laid down is 
given. 
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Monmouth  Bedford  Armoured  9,800   
(ld. 1899)  Berwick 
   Cornwall 
   Cumberland 
   Donegal 
   Essex 
   Kent 
   Lancaster 
   Monmouth 
   Suffolk 
 
 
Class   Name   Type   Tonnage 
Devonshire   Antrim   Armoured  10,850 
(ld. 1902)  Argyll 
   Carnarvon 
   Devonshire 
   Hampshire 
   Roxburgh 
Duke of Edinburgh Black Prince  Armoured  13,550 
(ld. 1903)  Duke of Edinburgh    
Warrior   Achilles  Armoured  13,550 
(ld. 1903)  Cochrane 
   Natal 
   Warrior 
Minotaur  Defence  Armoured  14,600 
(ld. 1905)  Minotaur 
   Shannon 
Invincible  Indomitable  Armoured  17,250 
(ld. 1906)  Inflexible 
   Invincible   
Indefatigable  Indefatigable  Armoured  18,500 
(ld. 1909) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additions 
 
Class   Name   Type   Tonnage 
Dreadnought  Dreadnought  Armoured  18,120 
(ld. 1905)    
Bellerophon   Bellerophon  Armoured  18,800 
(ld. 1906)  Superb 
   Temeraire 
St. Vincent  Collingwood  Armoured  19,560 
(ld. 1907)  St. Vincent 
   Vanguard 
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